The State Department’s chief North Korean negotiator, Christopher Hill, is currently in Pyongyang. He should not be there; his presence can only worsen the state of affairs between the U.S. and North Korea. In fact, it already has.
To understand why requires some background. In February of this year, Hill negotiated a two-stage interim arrangement with North Korea. During the first stage, the militant state agreed to shut down and seal by April 14 its reactor in Yongbyon, under the supervision of international inspectors. In the second, the North Koreans promised to disable all their nuclear facilities and to disclose all their nuclear programs. In return, the United States and Japan agreed to lift some sanctions and to start the process of normalizing relations—and to provide a million tons of heavy fuel oil or an equivalent amount of aid. The State Department called this deal a “breakthrough.”
Not formally part of the deal was America’s promise to allow the return of about $25 million in North Korean funds held in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA). In September 2005, the Treasury Department effectively froze these assets by designating BDA a “primary money-laundering concern.” (BDA had previously helped North Korean leader Kim Jong Il hide his cash, distribute counterfeit American currency, and launder the proceeds of other state-sponsored criminal activities.) Pyongyang refused to continue participating in Beijing-sponsored disarmament talks until all frozen funds were returned, and the Chinese sided with Kim’s government. In a humiliating about-face, Washington ultimately bowed and freed all the monies as of April 11 of this year.
