According to the Sudanese defense minister, 24 Jewish organizations are behind the Darfur conflict.
We may be wrong, but the honorable minister might have taken this video a bit too seriously.
Contentions
07.31.2007 - 9:36 AM
According to the Sudanese defense minister, 24 Jewish organizations are behind the Darfur conflict.
We may be wrong, but the honorable minister might have taken this video a bit too seriously.
The myth of a “lasting peace” is so useful to those seeking the destruction of Israel and their useful idiot allies at J Street. Whatever Israel does to defend itself can always be condemned on the grounds that its action will not lead to a “lasting peace.”
“It troubles me to think that such a solution may not exist; I wish it did. But at some point we should acknowledge the reality, no matter how unpleasant.”
Yes, at some point we shall have to acknowledge reality but of course a solution exists.
The Iranians are working hard on it. Once they achieve nuclear capability, the perhaps unintended but entirely predictable consequence of nuclear proliferation will begin. In at most 10 years, the M.E. will have more than enough nuclear capable nations for a ‘black market’ in nukes to begin to emerge…and then Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc. will gain access to nukes.
They will use them. Goodbye Tel Aviv.
Reality will then have forced its acceptance upon us…
Islamic terrorists will have imposed their solution.
Then it will be time to say Goodbye to New York and Goodbye to US National Security.
And the ending of our national security will mean the increasing and ongoing curtailment of the freedoms that make America, America.
For security, threatened sufficiently, trumps freedom every time.
The Israeli ‘experiment’, “in the desert, by the sea” will have ended and Martial law will begin to reign within the US. Liberal pacifism’s ‘policies’ of appeasement shall have run her course and essentially, capitulation will be our only real option.
This view is mistaken because . . . ?
Max Boot’s reference to the centuries-long Anglo-Scottish conflict reminded me of a recent comment by David Pryce-Jones, which also manages to encompass both the Jewish-Arab conflict in the Gaza and the fighting spirit of the Scots…
http://pryce-jones.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MzIzZWFjNDM1YjRjMzYxODZmYjlkOGI2ZGJkNjA2OTk=
DPJ is always worth reading, of course, but that was really one of his best.
#3 — Max Boot can speak for himself, but I don’t think he was describing that “view” as necessarily “mistaken.” I think he was ascribing that view to many or most Arabs, and saying that it may come to pass or it may not.
Mr. Boot is unfortunately right about the pessimistic chances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to see resolve any time soon. Such a realistic view is appreciated among a media that tends to sensationalist reporting and commentary. Thank you.
Max, the only problem with your WSJ op-ed was that you left the last word–”unconscionable” un-modified. You should have said “unconscionable to Israel, but in reality, the right thing to do.” You are right that Israel has been demoralized. The key is to “re-moralize” it, and “de-moralize” Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. By saying that it would be plain “unconscionable” for Israel to undertake total war against Hamas, you are leaving a tinge of moral doubt in the air. Probably not your intent, but that was the effect.
Israel dealing Hamas to death is only unconscionable, until it isn’t.
Why does Mr. Boot assume Israel can’t become something other than a Post-Modern Democracy to survive?
That the current Post-Modern Israeli democracy can’t go there does not mean that an Israel people that wants to survive can’t.
All Israel has to do is drop the trappings of multi-ethic democracy and become another tribal state like the Arabs.
Israel has always had that military power to do what it takes to destroy Hamas. It could literally bulldoze every building, road, port, farm airfield and well leaving the Palestinian population in Gaza with nothing but dust.
What Israel lacks is the politcal will to use it in that manner.
If that state of affairs changes, so will the continued existance of Hamas.
The warning sign of it was coming would be a successful IDF military coup and military strong man government over throwing the current Israeli political class.
Given reports I am reading on Israeli blogs that a large plurality of IDF Jewish draftees are no longer voting because they don’t support their politicsl elites and that Israeli-Arabs are being radicalized by Hamas an Hezbollah, that day seems to be a lot closer than many give it credit.
Max Boot wrote: “The real risk for Israel is not fighting these types of wars; it is the risk of complete annihilation which is raised by Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.”
Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld would strongly disagree. In his assessment, the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran acts more as an inhibitor of Iranian actions than a physical threat to Israel. On the other hand, van Creveld believes that chronic low-intensity conflicts like the Intifadas, the war against Hezbollah and the the present action against Hamas are a greater threat to Israel because their open-ended nature and the asymmetry between the combatants will eventually shatter Israeli morale. For an in-depth explanation of this perspective, see his recent book, “The Changing Face of War”.
Of course, van Creveld can only be correct if Iran adheres to the “rational actor” model of international behavior; i.e., that Iran will act in its own best interests, and the risk of nuclear annihilation through an Israeli nuclear counter-strike would not be in Iran’s interest. Iran would thus be impelled to do nothing that would give Israel even the slightest hint that it was planning a nuclear attack, which would tend to moderate Iranian rhetoric and behavior.
On the other hand, one can make a good case that Iran does not subscribe to the Western notion of “rationality”, but instead is motivated by eschatological expectations in which the destruction of israel is well worth the destruction of Iran if it immanentizes the return of the Lost Imam and the reign of Shia rule throughout the world. But is that actually a credible scenario? The Mullahs may think that way (or at least make noises of that sort for the consumption of their followers), but do the highly westernized technocrats, military officers and intellectuals also agree? Without their explicit assent, there can be no Iranian bomb, no Iranian missile program, hence no Iranian attack on Israel. Right now, these people can play a double game, much like German nuclear scientists under Hitler. But, confronted with the reality of an irrational political leadership with access to nuclear weapons, how would they respond?
Overall, then, I think Martin may be correct, and that Israel could probably live with a nuclear Iran, if it was reasonable certain that Iran would act responsibly; but it cannot live indefinitely with the kinds of festering sores caused by Hezbollah and Hamas. Hence, at some point, they will make an end of it, accepting in the short term the opprobrium of the “civilized” world, if it means shattering Palestinian intransigence.
Remember, 2000 years ago, the Jews of Judea were not that different from the Palestinians of today. They were driven by irrational hatred of an occupying power (at least Rome really was one), as well messianic expectations, which tended to mitigate the military asymmetry in their minds. It took three bloody wars to finally stamp out that manifestation of Judaism, but in the end it was accomplished: the Jews were reconciled to being ruled by Rome. The Israelis may not reconcile the Palestinians to being ruled by Israel, but I doubt if that is what the Israelis themselves want. Instead, a constant diet of decisive defeat would reconcile the Palestinians to having to live peacefully within their own borders alongside the Zionist Entity.
It may stick in their craw, but eventually all the ones with the stomach for continuing the fight to the very end (always a small percentage of the whole) will be dead or in Israeli captivity. At which point, the others can begin trying to live normal lives.
Stuart,
Might I point out that Israel is not Rome, nor that she possesses nowhere near the degree of ruthlessness and singular leadership that Rome possessed?
You appear to imply that Iran will acquire the bomb?
If so, do you agree that subsequent to Iran’s ‘going nuclear’ that nuclear proliferation within the M.E. is thus highly likely?
If so, do you then agree that in a world of greatly increased nuclear proliferation, that at some point Islamic terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc. will be able to acquire nukes, either through being given them, or stealing or buying them?
Do you agree that should terrorist groups acquire a nuke(s) that they will undoubtedly seek to use them upon Israel?
And that the successful detonation of a nuke upon the most likely target, Tel Aviv, effectively ends the nation of Israel?
If the premise that Iran’s acquisition of the bomb inevitably leads to greatly increased nuclear proliferation… then the subsequent logic and conclusion appears undeniable?
Gee, so now you’re starting to think a few weeks ahead to what comes next. Come on, isn’t this superficiality somewhat unJewish? It would seem that even I, the designated Nazi of these threads, gave more credit to Jewish strategists than was deserved. Yes, folks, it might have been a good idea to think through the implications of attacking Gaza.
Or, maybe someone did. Maybe someone(s) in Israel thought it through quite carefully, and realized that if you go into Gaza it is ultimately an all-or-nothing affair, “all” being something on the order of genocide. That’s where this movie ends, and my gut says someone(s) are well aware of it.
Physically going into Gaza is an ‘all-or-nothing’ affair. An all-or-nothing affair of course is one in which one either achieves all of what one seeks or nothing at all. This has been true in every Israeli ground assault and the Gaza operation will achieve nothing at all beyond the most temporary of goals, just as in Lebanon.
Regardless of what some within Israel may have realized, the political will and leadership is not supportive of the required degree of killing necessary to eliminate the Hamas threat.
What, besides wishful thinking, leads anyone to think that the present, or any other Israeli administration has the ‘stones’ to ‘go all the way’ with Hamas? Upon what prior behavior would anyone presuppose that Israel will NOT pull back at the earliest opportunity that face-saving allows?
Personally, I think that the historical record and the geo-political factors at play make an undeniable case for Israel’s continued vacillation regarding Hamas, Iran, etc.
In fact, it’s Israel and the west’s vacillation that makes the coming consequences of Iran acquiring the bomb so predictable.
In “The Changing Face of War” (which everyone should read), van Creveld notes that in war against civilized countries (read “Western liberal democracies”), terrorists and insurgents hold an advantage that derives, paradoxically, from their weakness vis a vis the states they are attacking. At the point of contact, the forces of the state will win every engagement, and by ridiculous margins (see our forces in Afghanistan, Israeli forces in Gaza). Because the opponent is perceived as (and indeed, is) a weak and unworthy opponent, and because no number of victories seems to bring conflict closer to an end, gradually the morale of the state forces erodes–either within the military, or the government, or the people, or all three. Time is thus the friend of the insurgent.
There are only two ways to win an insurgency, van Creveld postulates, both of which work by circumventing the enemy’s time advantage. The first way, which he identifies with the British effort in Northern Ireland, relies on the extreme forebearance of the military forces facing the insurgents. They literally place themselves between the insurgents and the civilians on which they prey, using force only as a last resort, taking casualties because they forego their huge advantage in firepower. Gradually, this technique wears down the insurgents, undermines their support by making them look impotent and denying them propaganda victories, while at the same time insulating the state from the corrosive effects that undermine morale. But for this to work, one must have an incredibly disciplines, professional army, as well as control over the area and the civilian population you are trying to protect. We seem to be doing this in Iraq, and may also be able to do it in Afghanistan, but insofar as Israel has ceded control of Gaza to Hamas–and because Israel does not have a long-term professional army–this is not likely to work for them.
The other alternative is, interestingly, that chosen by Hafez al Assad in dealing with the insurrection in the Syrian city of Hama back in the early 1980s. For those who don’t remember, this was a serious threat to the regime, and Syria was on the verge of becoming another Lebanon. Assad responded by surrounding the city, allowing no one to enter or leave. He then initiated a sustained bombardment of the city until hardly anything was left standing. Troops then entered the city, and whenever resistance was encountered, they pulled back, brought up tanks and artillery, and blasted the remaining strongpoints into oblivion.
It is estimated that more than 20,000 Syrian civilians died in the city, along with all of the rebels. Large swaths of Hama were never rebuilt. The threat to the regime was over, and Assad was never seriously challenged until his death.
He succeeded in Hama because he was absolutely ruthless, and utterly unapologetic. The latter, in van Creveld’s opinion, is the key: one must do what one must, explain clearly what one is doing and why, and never express a moment of remorse over it, for as soon as you do, you transform the enemy from derided losers into heroic martyrs, and one does not want that. He also notes that it helps if the national leadership has someone available to take the fall (“He did it, not us!”)
Because the Hama Rules are so horrific, van Creveld doubts any Western democracy, even Israel in extremis, could resort to them. At the same time, he doubts that many–including the United States–could follow the example of the British in Northern Ireland (on which point I strenuously disagree). Instead, democracies blow hot and cold, and end up using a variety of half measures, none of which can succeed, and in the end, bring about the demoralization that allows the insurgents to win. Hence, his pessimism for Israel fighting a low-grade conflict against Palestinian thugs.
But I disagree with him–I think Israelis can be just as ruthless as Syrians, given enough provocation. Hamas is always one misplaced rocket away from committing suicide–and they may go over the line this time. Push comes to shove, the Jews of Josephus’ or bar Kochba’s day were just as ruthless as the Romans they faced, and Israel, I believe can be just as ruthless as both.
On Iranian nuclear weapons: Any idiot can build a nuclear device, given enough U235 and some elementary knowledge. They are so simple, we never even bothered to test the Little Boy design before we dropped it on Hiroshima. Plutonium devices are a bit more sketchy, but they can be done.
But a device is not a weapon. A weapon has to be reliable, and it has to be deliverable. Our first generation nuclear weapons weighed in at five tons, and only a B-29 could carry them. For a long time, they got bigger before they got smaller, and it took a huge industrial complex to make that happen. I don’t see Iran making anything more complicated than Fat Man or Little Boy within the next decade.
That said, how will they get it from Iran to Israel? Federal Express? They have no aircraft that can carry the payload, no missiles capable of lofting that much weight to Tel Aviv. One can posit things like a kamikaze airliner, or a bomb in a shipping container, or a ship rigged to explode in Haifa bay, but all of these are highly improbable, given the consequences of failure (because a failed nuclear attack would be considered by Israel, and the United States, for that matter, as equivalent to a successful attack; you only get one punch).
I have no doubt that groups like Hamas, Hezbollah or al Qaeda would like to get nukes and would use them if they did, but the same problems pertain: even a “suitcase nuke” (the yield of which would only be a fraction of the Hiroshima bomb) is actually the size of a couple of large steamer trunks and weighs several hundred pounds. Not the sort of thing you can check aboard El Al and fly into Tel Aviv. These things also have signatures, and could probably be tracked as they moved from one place to another.
But the question remains: how do you get the bomb to the place you want to destroy? And once it happens, assuming it does, what then? The Israelis would certainly be pissed, and would rightly assume that Iran or some other proxy state was responsible. Game over in Teheran. Unlike Iran, or Syria, or other putative Muslim nuclear powers, Israel has real nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, repeatedly, at will. Everybody in the Middle East knows this. So what happens when Iran gets the bomb? Iran is now on notice that it is responsible for its new toys, and if one should go astray, Iran would bear the consequences.
I don’t think that, in the short term, an Iranian nuke would mean widespread proliferation throughout the Middle East. Making nuclear weapons takes money and know-how, both of which are in short supply in the front-line states. Iran would not give away its weapons to those who would want them, because only Iran’s monopoly would allow it to exercise any sort of hegemony in the Persian Gulf (which, I suspect, is Iran’s real target, anyway).
We also have to ask ourselves, given the current state of the oil market, whether the Iranian economy is going to hold up long enough for them to build the big firecracker. With gas rationed, with high unemployment and a large, frustrated youth cohort not too pleased with their black-robed masters, there is a good chance that Iran will implode well before they get the opportunity to finish the program. But even if they do, it’s at least another decade before they have some way to deliver their nuclear weapon to Tel Aviv.
By the way, it would take a whopping big nuke to destroy Tel Aviv, let alone the entire nation of Israel. And Israel is not entirely defenseless against attack, either.
Israel should buy Gaza.
“I don’t think that, in the short term, an Iranian nuke would mean widespread proliferation throughout the Middle East. Making nuclear weapons takes money and know-how, both of which are in short supply in the front-line states.”
We’ve just experienced the largest transfer of wealth in human history. The west has and will continue to provide ALL the money needed.
Iran is Shia, every other Islamic nation in the region is Sunni. Given the historical and ongoing animosity toward each other, is it realistic to postulate that Sunni governments would not feel threatened by Iran’s Shia government? That they would not feel that the acquiring of Nuclear weapons had now become a geopolitical necessity? Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey will have to arm. Iran will, at some point, certainly arm Syria. There will be no stopping it.
Poverty was not a disqualifying factor in either Pakistan’s successful acquisition of the bomb, nor in Syria’s (even poorer than the Pak’s) recent pursuit of the bomb. North Korea, China and Russia are helping Iran acquire the bomb. Why would they not do so for other M.E. nations? It’s in their interest to do so. And know-how can be ‘hired’ from ‘sympathetic’ nations.
Delivery of a nuke to Tel Aviv is easily obtained. Just buy a yacht, gut it, place a nuke aboard and sail it into Jaffa Harbor (a Tel Aviv harbor) as you dock it, set it off. Goodbye Tel Aviv.
Tracing the bomb will be an exercise in futility if Al Qaeda or Hamas either ‘steals’ it or buys it from a black market arms dealer. The country of origin will then become moot.
Stuart, you’ve illustrated all of the challenges in nuking Israel, but challenges are regularly overcome by committed men and women. If nothing else, Islamic fanatics are committed.
The nuclear destruction of Tel Aviv means the end of Israel for psychological as well as logistical reasons. The emigration of Jews out of Israel becomes a tidal wave once the permanent threat of nuclear immolation becomes an experienced event.
A man can face his possible death fighting an enemy but risking his entire family as well? When will it happen next and what other city will be next will become an unavoidable consideration for every Israeli. The answer will be that if they can do it once…and the exodus from Israel will be inexorable. For to stay will be tantamount to suicide.
There are a lot of suppositions in Mr. Britain’s post. The first is there will be adequate money for the various Middle Eastern states to engage in a nuclear arms race with Iran and each other. But as we have just seen, and will continue to see, the oil market is extremely volatile, and those who were flush yesterday are going to be bust tomorrow. Iran is a good case in point.
The second supposition is Middle Eastern governments will be able to muster the political will to take what limited resources are at their disposal and direct them into a long-term program to develop nuclear weapons. After all, Pakistan did it, why not Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on. Several objections come to mind. First, strategic: India posed an existential threat to Pakistan; the two countries had already fought two wars, and if they fought a third, Pakistan would most likely cease to exist.
Israel, on the other hand, does not pose an existential threat to any Muslim state–and in fact, several Muslim states NEED Israel in order to secure their regimes (after all, if the Zionist Entity were destroyed, on whom would the Arab Street turn next?). So, there is a lot less inclination to embark on a costly, politically risky and strategically dubious proposition like a nuclear weapons program, especially when (in contrast to Pakistan and Iran) all the talent would have to be imported.
Third, it is axiomatic that nuclear powers do not share their expertise with competitor states, but always endeavor to maintain a monopoly over them (as the U.S. tried to do over the British and French). Nuclear competition always has a horizontal and vertical dimension–the horizontal against other nuclear powers, the vertical against the non-nuclear powers in one’s sphere of influence. So, I don’t think that the Iranians will be arming the Syrians, nor will Russia go so far as to actually provide Iran with working designs or the expertise to produce them. Indeed, I think Russia counts on Israel and the U.S. to keep Iran from getting practical nuclear weapons. Now, China and North Korea, to say nothing of Pakistan, might try to do that, but the political risks to them can be quite high, and it is more likely that they will try to use the threat of transferring technology to leverage concessions from us, than to actually follow through.
Fourth, putting a nuke on a yacht sounds easy. I suggest, without going into the particulars for reasons that must be obvious, that this is a more difficult proposition than it seems.
Tracing a nuke can be done, since the radiological materials have a characteristic signature. On the other hand, it isn’t necessary–all israel needs to do is tell iran through back channels that it will consider Iran the source for any nuclear attack on israel, and will react accordingly. It’s called deterrence.
Fifth, yes Islamic fanatics are committed. The key question is whether Islamic fanatics are actually running countries capable of developing and producing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. I propose that the very characteristics that make them fanatics also make them incapable of doing so–and also, if by some quirk of fate, they managed to acquire nuclear weapons, the rational men who control the military forces will not allow them to be used. I also postulate that while the Iranian mullahs bluster quite well, and while their tool Ahmedinajad may actually drink his own apocalyptic bathwater, the hard-minded and hard-hearted old men who run the country know enough not to want to join him in invoking the return of the Lost Imam. The difference between them and the Islamist fanatics is the difference between the chicken and the pig: the chicken lays eggs–she’s dedicated; the pig makes bacon–he’s committed.
Sixth, if the Jews abandon Israel in the face of Arab nuclear blackmail, they don’t deserve their state in the first place.
Now, let there be no misunderstanding: I do not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, and I would certainly go to extremely lengths to stop them. But I just don’t see the Iranians as being thirty feet tall and breathing fire out their nostrils. It will take a long time for Iran to develop into a credible nuclear threat, and a lot can happen in that time. For instance, Iranian nuclear scientists and their foreign advisors don’t grow on trees. It would be really sad if a lot of them started having unfortunate accidents (like that 50-something Russian physicist who fell off a mountain in the Zagros). Be a shame if anything happened to Iran’s one and only oil refinery, too. Be a shame if suddenly there was a creible Iranian resistance movement waging guerrilla war against the mullaocracy. In other words, the strategic pallet has a lot more colors than appeasement and total war. We should try to paint with all of them to make a pleasing picture. Above all, we should learn to play the long game.
As to why we should do this, I don’t want Iran even to consider hegemony in the Persian Gulf, nor do I want to give them any reason to doubt our resolve. We said that an Iranian nuke is unacceptable, and having said so, we have to follow through. Besides, the Russians are counting on us.
I dont usually comment, but after reading through so much info I had to say thanks
Is there a way to put this on a trial basis?