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Re: Re: In Praise of “Disrespect”

Eric, finger-wagging at a nation on the verge of elections and assuming their inability to comprehend American policy can be called a lot of things, but respectful is not one of them. Indeed, the State Department statement you link to not only respectfully praises the Palestinian Legislative Council for holding elections, but makes U.S. opposition to Hamas’s ideology explicit before the fact:

To participate in a peace process of Israelis and Palestinians, the Palestinian partner must at least accept Israel’s right to exist. To implement agreements on movement and access for the Palestinian territories, the Palestinian partner must be committed to preventing violence. In short, the Palestinian partner must be committed to peaceful development.

This doesn’t even require reading between the lines: Electing Hamas will sideline the peace process. What more could the U.S. have said?

Respectfully,
Abe

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One Response to “Re: Re: In Praise of “Disrespect””

  1. J. Lichty says:

    Were Israel to depose Hamas right now, the pressure on it to conclude a sham peace deal with Abu Mazen would increase exponentially.

    Only when it comes time that the Obama administration recognizes Hamas as legimitate (as France appears to be doing now) will Israel be expected to sign onto Oslo II. Having a cartoonish puppet of Iran in power in Gaza serves Israel politically much better than the fiction that Abu Mazen is back in charge there.

    Israel still needs to fight Hamas, but needs to leave its heart beating politically right now.

  2. Maine's Michael says:

    Investing in a Hamas free future at the current time implies investing in a Fatah-full future.
    The latter would mean sucking up anything the Gazans, with the more subtly genocidal Fatah’s backing, dish out – for fear of angering the Americans and euros, who will insist Fatah/Abass should not be ‘weakened’.

    No, on further reflection, leaving Hamas in charge, nominally, with the threat of assasination over the heads of Haniyeh, Zahar, and the other monsters, is the better short term plan at this time. It leaves open the option of a more definitive action later, and also is better from the point of view of a longer range objective of either forcing Egypt to reabsorb Gaza, or better yet, just the Gazans – in time.

    This may have to play out over decades. What’s the rush, as long as the Gazans are rendered impotent?

    Fatah unfortunately has the the USA’s and the euros confidence that it is a true ‘peace partner’, while more rational heads know the truth.

    No point in facilitating Fatah’s con job. Better to have an enemy who is obvious as an enemy to those powers (USA, euro) whose acquiescence to your actions you need.

  3. Maine's Michael says:

    Lichty, we are on the same page, I see (I’ve been saying this since the day after the ‘ceasefire’).

    I think we are on to the true strategy here.

  4. Winston says:

    Can we get an estimate from the armchair generals here just how many civilian deaths – and how many Israel deaths – will be required in order for Israel to completely destroy Hamas? Please take into account the new members of Hamas that will be created as a result of this program of “complete eradication.”

  5. chuck martel says:

    When Fatah became too wealthy and complacent to satisfy the ultra-radicals leaving Friday prayers, Hamas stepped in to fill the open position. It’s probably impossible for Israel to eliminate Hamas entirely except under terms that would be feasible only to someone like Caligula. And why would they want to? The Israelis are far better served by a fractioned Palestinian society with Fatah and Hamas hunting each other down on the streets, than by one united, single-minded, well-led terrorist organization. Now discredited and decimated Hamas stands in the way of any new group hoping to take up the jihaad. And don’t forget that the resident Gazan clans, who watch these guys come and go, have a say in what happens as well.

  6. Magnolia says:

    #4, I heard that before. It’s a bunch of bunk.Destroy them once & we will worry about it later.

  7. John Hartland says:

    Israeli leaders should stop burning through their country’s moral and political capital in short-term retaliatory missions against Hamas, and think of investing in a Hamas-free future. It would represent a brighter prospect for everyone.

    Jawohl, a Final Solution is needed.

  8. J.E. Dyer says:

    Objective and strategy are potentially in serious discord here. I like J. Lichty’s and Maine’s Michael’s point about Fatah above, but I also note that it is not enough to merely change objective (“invest in a Hamas-free future”). The strategy constraints imposed by Oslo, and agreements on modus vivendi with the Palestinian Authority, are a major concern.

    We don’t know that a strategy similar to the US “surge” in Iraq would achieve a turn-around in Gaza — that is, a strategy of secure AND HOLD: remaining in place among the people whom the terrorists are exploiting, building their trust along with a professional — loyal — force for civil security.

    But we do know that Israel is not likely to effectively have any opportunity to try such a strategy, under foreseeable conditions. We also know, from more than two decades of experience, that the default Israeli strategy of secure-and-leave doesn’t work in Gaza any better than it worked in Iraq.

    I’m well aware that the political conditions are different for Israel and Gaza, compared to the US and Iraq. The animus of Palestinian Arabs against Israel has a different and more intractable quality from the incoherent and often transient resistance met by the US surge force from Iraqis. I don’t suggest that if Israel COULD mount a similar “surge” in Gaza, that would be a matter of taking the same action under the same conditions, and lead to the same result.

    But it is worth noting that Israel doesn’t have this option, or at least does not think she does. Some Israelis would say that their own leaders have dealt the option away through irresponsible negotiation. Others might say the biggest constraint is the possibility of third-party intervention if Israel tried it.

    What we do know is that no one, anywhere, has yet found a way to break the back of a guerrilla insurgency with remote attacks, raids, and indecisive withdrawals — OR to make obliteration of the force, and inevitably of its population shield, politically palatable. I myself would support a “surge”-type initiative by the IDF, to pacify Gaza: a genuine, long-term, don’t leave until the situation has changed approach. But the will and sense of opportunity for this approach have not materialized, and seem, at the moment, unlikely to.

    Nevertheless, the obviousness of the approach also seems likely to align, sometime soon, with the emerging, low-level clamor for an international peacekeeping force to undertake it. This is a terrible idea. A “peacekeeping” force, even one deployed by NATO, would only serve as a shield and convenience for Hamas. The Israelis might want to really start thinking about pulling a rabbit out of the hat here. I’m not sure how much longer Israel’s leaders will have to “burn through their country’s moral and political capital” on their timeline, and at their own discretion.

  9. J. Lichty says:

    Maines – I think we are on to the true strategy here

    That gives the troika too much credit. I don’t think that Hamas was left in power for any other reason than it would have been too costly in terms of blood and treasure for Israel to remove them at this time, and that the government wanted to be done before Obama took office.

    Further, do not mistake my conclusion with a round of applause for the result of this operation. While I do think that leaving Hamas in power is in Israel’s best interest, I also believe that Israel could have gained more had it continued to put pressure on Hamas not only in Gaza, but in raids on Hamas interests in Damascus as well. The latter step should have been taken to up the pressure on Zahar. I also think that surrounding Shifa a la the Muquata in Ramallah would have been a prudent show of force. Tunnels going into Shifa should have been destroyed, leaving the leadership as impotent as Arafat, eating canned hummus provided by Israel.

    This pressure should have been applied with one goal in mind – the rescue of Gilad Shalit. For Israel to leave Gaza without him gives voice to Hamas’ claims of victory. I would not have been opposed to having him released as part of a prisoner exchange for those taken by Israel in Cast Lead (no others) to allow Hamas to save some face (they would not do it otherwise), but Shalit needed to come home.

    Finally, Israel should not have agreed to any ceasefire without international (or US consent) that it be able to retake the Philadelphi corridor. Israeli control over this land is the only thing that can possibly slow smuggling from Sinai.

    With those objectives, I think that the operation could have been legitimately claimed as an Israeli victory, or at least more of one than can be done with this not-as-bad as Lebanon result. As Caroline Glick wrote yesterday, Israel didnt really win, but it wasnt defeated either – an improvement from 2006.

  10. chuck martel says:

    What would have had to happen for Israel to “really win”? Rendering Hamas prostrate would require an occupation and census of the population that would have the Scandinavians throwing herring at synagogues. And would radicalize the Gazans even more, if that’s possible. No, the IDF did what they could, administer punishment without a total world frenzy. If the Saudis actually come up with the money, at least some Gazans will have jobs rebuilding the place. Maybe that was part of the plan all along.

  11. elen says:

    Chuck, rebuilding the place for Gazan Arabs means only rebuilding underground tunnels and replenishing weapon caches.

  12. Maine's Michael says:

    test

  13. Maine's Michael says:

    J.E. Dyer For good reason, Israelis have no desire to sacrifice blood and treasure in a Hurculean but ultimately futile/impossible effort of pacifying the weaponized culture of the ‘palestinians’ – I do not believe it is possible, and they likely do not either. At best, some sort of modus vivendi – based on rendering them impotent or deterred – can be worked out – 6 months here, six years there, and so time will pass and either make the arab world more accepting of a Jewish state, or, not. If not, the increased passing of time may cause the arabs to lose clout as oil is de-emphasized as a critical commodity, or they will have overplayed their hand elsewhere, likely in europe, and Israel will have increased freedom to maneuver towards the end game of either a gaza reabsorbed by egypt, or its population encouraged to emigrate by years upon years of failure, or simply transfered out at the point of a bayonet – sudeten style – should they remain the rabid and implacable Amalekites they were specifically designed to emulate. In either case, years pass, lives are lived, and new generations come to the fore. This sort of pattern can continue for a long time, as it has to this point, if the outside world’s meddling/peace processing can be held at bay, and a con like Fatah is not shoved down the Israeli throat. The great unknown is Iran, of course, but it is hard to believe anything Israel does or does not do vis a vis the ‘palestinians’ has any bearing on that. Lichty, No doubt you are correct aht the clown show ruling Israel may not have seen what you and I see as the merit of a unilateral ceasefire. And it is certainly a flop not to have Shalit come home after this large expenditure of lives and ordnance. Nonetheless, Olmert and Co can be correct, or nearly correct, in action, for the wrong reasons. Hopefully, the next gov’t will fully exploit the virtues of the current situation. Yeah, it would have been nice to have more of the Hamas leadership Yassinated or otherwise shown up as the total cowards they are, but I think those lessons will sink in, over time. Hamas has lost a lot of prestige, setting the stage for more salutory bloodletting, eye-gouging, kneecapping, and flying lessons between the two parties.

  14. J. Lichty says:

    Chuck – thew IDF did what it could do, it is the political echelon who has historically lost any military gains. A military victor suing for peace is still a loser.

    Maines is correct, the best Israel can hope for vis a vis the Palestinians is a stalemate like it has with Hizbollah – except hopefully with less of a threat.

    The only thing that could change the game is god forbid a large scale attack with resulting unthinkable Israeli Death Credits* such as a WMD attack by Iran or its terrorist proxies. Until then Israel must win the battle of attrition and make any Palestinian trnsgrsion painful. It must resume targetted killings of Hamas leadership until all terror stops. It must retake Philadelphi.

    On the faux peace process front, it must not make any more concessions until terror entirely ceases. It must as an initial measure insist on an end to all incitement in PA media and that its populace begin to be educated for peace. It must insist on respect for rule of law and freedom of press and speech and it must make the Palestinains pay a heavy price for any transgressions.

    Wile I am apprehensive about Bibi, there is no doubting the fact that the Palestinians committed far less terror when he was PM the first time aorund.

    No peace deal is possible, but the war of attrition can be tilted more in favor of Israel if it is willing to take some diplomatric risks with respect to Obama pressure.

  15. Joe says:

    Andrew Sullivan is already gloating over the coming prosecutions, noting that Bush did not pardon anyone associated with torture.

    I hope President Obama does not go there, it would be a terrible mistake. I did not support the adhanced interrogation techniques of the Bush Administration and was absolutely against Rummy’s “taking off the gloves” policy at the DoD, but war crime prosecutions would be a disaster for this country.

  16. Seth Halpern says:

    Agree with the anti-Fatah concerns obviously, plus the denazification/deBaathification fantasies need to be debunked : Not only is there precious little liberal heritage to build on in “Palestine”, but there is no practical incentive for its Arabs to nurture it as there was for non-Communist Germans or Shia Iraqis. The former accepted the western allies as vastly preferable to the Red Army and the latter needed America to save them from Saddam’s fascism and Sunni caste domination. Who will rescue the supremacist Sunni Arabs of Gaza from Jewish “oppression”? Plainly not more Jews.

  17. John Hartland says:

    Come on, Nazis, let’s be real here. You know what to do.

  18. Seth Halpern says:

    And of course the Sunni Iraqis needed US protection from Shia vengeance, and the Kurds needed it from the Arabs. To expect Israel to constructively position itself between warring Hamas and Fatah clans is to wildly overestimate both Jewish imperial competence and Arab amenability to tutelage.

  19. chuck martel says:

    O.K., the failure to get Shalit back is a real failure. But they didn’t sue for peace, they just quit shooting. And even though the highest level of the Israeli government is indeed a “clown show”, don’t dismiss Israeli intelligence capabilities, something that drives Arabs all over the Middle East crazy. Heroes like Nassralluh probably never sleep twice in the same bed. Expecting terror to cease entirely might be overly optimistic. Does any terrorist organization have complete control over would-be jihaadis? There’s so much munitions scattered around there that even a lone psycho could ignite something serious, as has happened at other times and places in history. The “trimming the fingernails”concept is probably as valid as anything.

  20. You people are talking about killing/expelling the entire population of Gaza as if they were so many termites, and you’re worrying about Shalit?

    Un-bleeping-believable.

  21. Dan says:

    The world doesn’t seem to believe that there’s anything like a “sham peace” regarding Israel.

    If the Palestinians and their Arab kinsmen make promises, ———– despite the historical record indicating otherwise, the world will BELIEVE them. And ridicule and mock anyone who suggests it might be unwise to enter into a new peace deal.

    That’s what happened in Annapolis.

    The Israeli position was that the Pals, as usual, failed to cross any of the thresholds that were previously agreed upon. State simply disregarded previous benchmarks not simply as an irrelvancy, BUT MORE, AS A POSITIVE IMPEDIMENT to the peace process.

    So now any expectation regarding the Palestinians is simply a non-factor. It might be included in subsequent deals, but everybody now knows that’s just for show, just to help sell it to the Israeli public. But the parties now know that such things have been written off as relics of the past in the peace process.

    Israel is screwed.

    There’s just no other way to say it.

    And if you think the pressure we saw imposed upon Israel for the whole Annapolis debacle is anything, ——————– you just wait to what old Hussein Obama and his boys have in mind.