I wanted to address some of the points made by Andrew Sullivan in his response to my piece yesterday.
1. Andrew writes that I “huff and puff” over his comparing Russia invading Georgia with the U.S. invading Iraq and that I “haul out” Andrew’s “own passionate defenses for war as if it’s proof I’m off my rocker.”
Actually, I cited Andrew’s past pieces to demonstrate how dramatically and radically his views have shifted and to remind people that whatever Sullivan believes at the time, he speaks with absolute certitude, with arguments ranging from passionate and intelligent to extreme and careless. Quoting Andrew back to himself was not, by my lights, evidence that he’s “off his rocker.” That Andrew would characterize things that way says more about him, I think, than it does about me.
2. The degree to which President Bush seems to dominate and distort Andrew’s thinking is noteworthy. For example, Russia invaded a lawful, self-governing, pro-American government–and Andrew writes, “I was a little too mad at Bush to express adequate sympathy for the plight of the Georgians at first.” Exactly why Russia’s invasion of Georgia is grounds for fury at George W. Bush isn’t really clear.
3. Despite the fact that Andrew’s views today are fundamentally at odds with his views several years ago, Sullivan can only say, “I was deceived and feel terrible responsibility for my naivete.”
This is a recurring theme. Andrew does not say he was wrong; rather, he says that President Bush deceived him. Andrew, in other words, was guilty of being too trusting. Remember the comedian Flip Wilson? “The devil made me do it”? Andrew’s version (call it a sua culpa) is “The President made me do it.”
4. According to Andrew, “The US invaded [Iraq] without the critical second UN resolution, putting the US outside of the kind of international legitimacy in a way not totally unlike Russia.”
For the record, here’s what Andrew said (on March 18, 2003) about the second UN resolution at the time:
Tony Blair’s speech to the House of Commons this afternoon . . . outlines in excruciating detail exactly what happened in the last couple of weeks. There is no question that it was France that scuppered any deal, any ultimatum, any attempt to get U.N. support for final pressure on Saddam. Not Cheney. Not Wolfowitz. Not Bush. France. [Sullivan then quotes extensively from Prime Minister Blair's speech.] The failure of diplomacy is not the Bush administration’s fault. And the attempt to make that argument must deal with Blair’s chronology. The people of this country see it. It’s the partisan elites who are still blind to reality. [emphasis added]
And the day before, Sullivan quoted Ann Clwyd writing this in the Times of London:
I do not have a monopoly on wisdom or morality. But I know one thing. This evil, fascist regime must come to an end. With or without the help of the Security Council, and with or without the backing of the Labour Party in the House of Commons tonight.
Andrew went on to add:
This would be true even if Iraq were not already in violation of umpteen U.N. resolutions. It would be true even if Saddam didn’t pose a genuine threat to the region and, via terrorists, to the West itself. How much more morally indefensible is appeasement when we also have complete international authority to do what must be done? I think we will look back in the future and not ask, as so many now are, how it was that diplomacy didn’t get unanimity on this matter. We will look back and see the moral obtuseness of Chirac and Putin and Schroder [sic] and Carter and feel nothing but contempt for them, and their preference for state terror over the responsibilities of the free world. That’s why I felt enormous pride tonight in the stand being taken by Blair and Bush. The president’s speech was measured, firm, just. Blair’s political risks – in order to do what he believes is plainly right – will confirm him in history as a great prime minister, the conscience of his party, and the leader of his country. I say that before this war begins, because the cause is just whatever vicissitudes of conflict await us, and there will be plenty of people who will make this point if and when the war succeeds. But the truth is, regardless of what happens next, we know something important about the two major leaders of the free world right now. Neither man has blinked at evil. The only question in the next forty-eight hours is whether evil will blink before it is destroyed. [emphasis added]
5. As for the argument that failing to secure a second UN resolution prior to war undermined America’s legitimacy: President Clinton’s director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, has pointed out that, in more than a half-century, the U.N. has sanctioned only two wars out of the 100-plus wars that have been fought. These were the first Gulf War, and the Korean War–with the latter an anomaly, since the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council vote. Presumably Andrew does not believe that all the wars that have occurred without the blessing of the U.N. were illegitimate and akin to Russia’s invasion of Georgia.
The proposition that because the second U.N. resolution failed due to (in Andrew’s words) “the moral obtuseness of Chirac and Putin and Schroder,” the liberation of Iraq is “not totally unlike” what Russia did to Georgia is an example of Andrew reaching for strained arguments in an effort to try to justify his current, completely different position.
6. Sullivan writes, “I have come to see, by force of the evidence, that some, if not all, in the Bush administration knew that the WMD case was paper-thin.”
In fact, the evidence makes the opposite case. I base that judgment in part on the findings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s bipartisan Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, and the Silberman-Robb Report (The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction), both of which shatter the claim made by Sullivan. In fact, the latter said this:
As problematic as the October 2002 NIE was, it was not the Community’s biggest analytic failure on Iraq. Even more misleading was the river of intelligence that flowed from the CIA to top policymakers over long periods of time — in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and in its more widely distributed companion, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB). These daily reports were, if anything, more alarmist and less nuanced than the NIE.” (emphasis added)
And this:
The Intelligence Community’s Iraq assessments were … riddled with errors. Contrary to what some defenders of the Intelligence Community have since asserted, these errors were not the result of a few harried months in 2002. Most of the fundamental errors were made and communicated to policymakers well before the now-infamous NIE of October 2002, and were not corrected in the months between the NIE and the start of the war. They were not isolated or random failings. Iraq had been an intelligence challenge at the forefront of U.S. attention for over a decade. It was a known adversary that had already fought one war with the United States and seemed increasingly likely to fight another. But, after ten years of effort, the Intelligence Community still had no good intelligence on the status of Iraq’s weapons programs.
Andrew might also want to consult this column by Fred Hiatt, editorial page editor of the Washington Post, which eviscerates what he calls the “phony ‘Bush lied’ story line.” That Iraq possessed WMD was a view shared by Democrats as well as Republicans; by the U.N. as well as the U.S.; by American intelligence agencies and by intelligence agencies of almost every nation that looked into this matter.
7. About the Iraq war, Sullivan writes:
When you add to this [Sullivan's contention that the Bush Administration wanted to do to the Arabs what Putin is now doing to his neighbors: teach them a lesson about raw power] the deployment of torture and abuse of countless innocent Iraqis as a weapon, the deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqis, the displacement of millions more, the ethnic cleansing the US presided over for years, it does become harder and harder to see the unquestionable moral superiority of the US. Certainly, it seems much more questionable than ever before in my lifetime.
It seems to me the Iraq war makes precisely the opposite point. It was animated in part–not wholly, but in part–by a humanitarian impulse, which Sullivan understood at the time. And the truth is that we were, as the New York Times’s John Burns has said, greeted as liberators. The problem is that for a variety of reasons–having largely but not exclusively to do with a massive mistake in the Phase IV planning by the Bush Administration–Iraq turned violent and chaotic. But the President, to his great credit, embraced the surge, which is in the process of transforming Iraq. It is now a free, self-governing nation, an ally of America, and the place which gave rise to an anti-jihadist movement within the Muslim world. It is also the place where al Qaeda, having declared it the central battleground in the war on terror, has been routed. The same thing appears to be happening to the Mahdi Army and the Shiite militias. And Iran’s influence is clearly waning.
Former Ambassador Peter Galbraith said that Saddam’s regime was, along with Pol Pot’s in Cambodia, one of the two cruelest in the last half of the 20th century. The fact that the people of Iraq have been freed from almost unimaginable oppression and are now–after extremely difficult and painful years–on a path to a decent society ought to make Sullivan proud of his country, not call into question its “moral superiority.”
The fact is that America, instead of having bled and fled Iraq, fought and stayed. We continued to fight the good fight. The men and women of the United States military and their families have borne the burden; more than 4,000 have died in this effort and many more have been badly injured and maimed. And to suggest that the enormousness of their sacrifice was for a less than noble cause–and even an ignoble one–is, I think, deeply mistaken and even offensive.
8. For Andrew, almost everything comes back to the Bush Administration’s policies on interrogation and water-boarding, Guantanamo Bay, rendition, and whether the Geneva Conventions ought to apply to non-state actors and terrorists.
Jack Goldsmith, the former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, is an example of a person who has made a highly critical but reasonable assessment of the Bush Administration’s policies. His book The Terror Presidency offers a nuanced, learned analysis of these issues and places them within a historical context. Goldsmith is fair-minded in presenting the arguments for and against various policies. This kind of subtlety and sophistication is completely missing in Andrew’s critiques. That doesn’t mean the Bush Administration was right on all these issues; as I have said before, I think in some important respects we made the wrong decision. But Andrew allows this to so cloud his judgment that he now states that because of the Bush Administration he now doubts “the core moral decency of the US” and believes that “the question of moral equivalence [between the United States and Russia] becomes a live one.”
That Sullivan has reached the point that his attitudes toward America now sound like those that routinely emerge from the fever swamps of the Left is a shame; and for him to say that “this administration has done it to me” is a transparent dodge. Sullivan’s fundamental worldview has changed, as any fair reading of his past writings demonstrate, and for reasons that go far beyond George W. Bush.
One can only image what the Andrew Sullivan of 2002 would say about the statements of the Andrew Sullivan of 2008. You can bet, though, that it would have been emphatic, and it would have been furious.