Tonight’s debate provided a remarkably crystalline portrait of the two candidates. Barack Obama is a mellifluous caregiver, beautifully reassuring folks that their suspicions and resentments are registering in the halls of power. In this role, he need not get too specific because he’s not dealing with specific gripes. He’s there to let people know that burdens will be “shared” in a more “fair” manner, nevermind how that will be accomplished.
John McCain believes that America is a force for good, and is willing to stake a lot (too much?) on this principle. Moreover, he has decisiveness behind him. But there’s not much popular strength in data. Sure, he had names for the Secretary of Treasury question, but Obama could echo popular gripes and point at a vague light at the end of the tunnel.
It should be noted that this debate, coming at the height of election mudslinging, was admirable issue- and policy-oriented. Doubtless, that makes for a bunch of “dud” reviews, but it’s also probably a welcome change for a lot of us. And credit where it’s due: Tom Brokaw was excellent.
Admiral Keating: another DOLT in very high places. We have a seeming unending supply.
“Yet Keating keeps on trying. In 2007, he said the United States would be willing to help the People’s Liberation Army Navy — yes, that’s what they call it — build aircraft carriers.”
I can’t think of a bigger waste of China’s scarce modernization resources. Building an aircraft carrier and operating it effectively is an immensely expensive proposition, so much so that only one navy in the world does it on a regular basis. Other “carrier” navies have a handful of small V/STOL ships operating jump jets and helicopters of limited range and capabilities. The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, operates a fleet that includes twelve carrier battle groups. Each U.S. carrier, with a nominal 72-84 aircraft on board, has the capacity to sink every non-U.S. aircraft carrier in the world several times over.
When you buy a carrier, you also have to buy an air group, and an escort group, and a fleet replenishment train. You have to learn not only how to take off and land on a carrier deck in all sorts of weather, you have to learn how to do it in an operationally meaningful way; i.e., how to get a strike group off, while recovering a combat air patrol, sending out an AEW plan, posting an ASW cordon, spotting the next strike, servicing aircraft down below–it’s organized chaos, and it can only be learned by doing it. It has taken the U.S. Navy some 80 years to learn how, with a lot of hard lessons along the way. Starting from scratch, it will take the Chinese decades to learn how to operate an aircraft carrier–and remember, first they have to build one (which generally takes a decade or more).
Having one carrier doesn’t get you much. You have to have three carrier for each one you want to keep on station–one on station, one working up, one returning for replenishment and overhaul. Each carrier you build needs to have about six escort vessels to provide ASW and AAW defense. Complete with air group and escorts, a carrier battle group costs in excess of $10 billion. I haven’t got a clue what it takes to operate one, but it’s a really big number.
When one considers the many other things in which the Chinese can invest their limited defense resources, aircraft carriers strikes me one giving the least bang for the buck. Other than for prestige purposes, a Chinese carrier force would have very limited operational utility, and in the event of war would simply allow U.S. naval aviators and submariners to rack up some very hefty tonnage figures.
But, of course, China isn’t a “satisfied,” status quo power. If she were she would have little use for an aircraft carrier. Since she’s not, we need to take seriously her carrier aspirations. Interesting piece in Asia Times from a little over a year ago:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JA08Ad01.html
Obviously, we have to apply current intelligence about how much China is actually doing, to these reports. But we also have to recognize that China doesn’t approach things in the linear manner of the West. Americans think in terms of building the weapons to fight anticipated battles with. China thinks in terms of occupying positions, leveraging them for decisive influence, and letting the existence of her weapons do 90% of the work of changing the opponent’s will.
America, humorously enough, has been — inadvertently — better at China’s approach than China has, at least over the last century. But the irony is that we don’t see what we do the way China does. Our ring of bases around the Far East, and the implied (but rarely used) force of our Navy and Air Force, are, precisely, the implementation of China’s way of thinking. It’s kind of a joke that we don’t think of it that way.
That said, the point is that China DOES. It would be very characteristic of her to fully intend to build a force of three carrier battle groups, but take her time doing it — all the while consolidating forward basing options around South Asia, and getting them as close as possible to the Malacca Strait, preferably on both sides of it. (Interested readers can investigate further in this piece at my new blog:
http://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/2009/02/11/we-have-ways/ )
The world economic downturn will undoubtedly affect China’s military procurement programs. But only fundamental regime change will eliminate China’s long-term aspirations to project power, starting with her region and working out to her hemisphere. In China’s situation, the actionable prod she feels is not from the military might of the USA, but from what Russia is doing. Russia’s one aircraft carrier has more actionable meaning for China than all twelve of ours — and India’s two are not that far behind. China’s strategic concept doesn’t envision deploying CVBGs to the Americas to bomb land targets from 1000 miles off the coast — at least not in the next half century. For the power of intimidation she seeks, across the chokepoints and bounded seas of Asia and the Middle East, even little piss-ant VTOL airwings have their uses.
None of those with flag rank are as UNIFORMLY irresponsible as those in the Navy.
It’s that Thomas P. Barnett nonsense all over again!
Fallon wasn’t unique. He was a twit, and there are many more like him.
Stuart Koehl, everything you say is true. And that mean, although it will take time, China intends to become a peer competitor.
J.E. Dyer, as you suggest, China will not need as large a carrier force as we have because it will be operating closer to home. Thanks for the analysis.
Dan, one wonders why the Navy is so adept at turning out strategically blind flag officers. I get the sense that Army and Air Force generals are more realistic about Chinese intentions.
“J.E. Dyer, as you suggest, China will not need as large a carrier force as we have because it will be operating closer to home. Thanks for the analysis.”
it only needs a carrier force capable of matching what we can put into the region. And that would still be more than China can afford, especially in light of the limited viability of a novice carrier force going up against the first team backed by significant land-based airpower of its own.
Moreover, China’s neighbors will not simply acquiesce to China procuring even the semblance of a sea control force, and will themselves invest in sea denial–and specifically anti-carrier-systems. These are a lot cheaper than aircraft carriers, and, within narrow seas, they can be very effective.
Stuart Koehl, okay, but what about China’s subs? A few sub-launched weapons can take out a carrier, no?
Submarines represent a much better investment for China. Though expensive per ton of displacement, they are not nearly as manpower intensive, can be extensively automated, and, in general, are much easier for a new navy to master than the intricacies of carrier warfare.
On the other hand, diesel-electric, or even non-nuclear AIP submarines have limited mobility, and function more as “mobile mines”, once they reach their deployment area. A high speed surface force has to run over one in order for it to get a shot. Nuclear submarines are much more expensive, and, unless you have the newest technology, relatively noisy. They also do not function as well in shallow waters such as the South China Sea. Finally, submarines can do a lot of things, but they do not match the utility and flexibility of surface vessels for most peacetime maritime missions, including showing the flag (revealing one’s position largely negates the value of the sub).
If China’s main objectives are (a) to isolate and eventually occupy Taiwan; and (b) to gain control of resource rich areas around the Philippines and Vietnam, then its best bet is to invest in a “green water” navy of destroyers, frigates, patrol vessels and amphibious assault ships, backed by a substantial fleet of AIP and nuclear attack submarines. It should invest in sea denial systems, including advanced mines, anti-ship missiles and anti-radiation missiles, plus shore-based naval aviation (missile-armed bombers, strike aircraft and long-range fighter/interceptors), backed by an integrated air defense system featuring long-range surface-to-air missiles such as the S-300PMU or S-400.
Lo and behold! This is precisely what China has been doing, showing a consistency between their strategy and their acquisition policy. I believe talk about wanting aircraft carriers is just that–talk. If they do acquire one, they will use it in the same way Russia uses its one operation carrier–as a massive publicity device capable of showy stunts (like the recent Russian deployment to the Caribbean) of limited strategic import, but useful for impressing erstwhile clients.
Even then, I expect it would only last until some poor Chinese pilot plants his Flanker in the “spud locker” (the area of the stern immediately below the flight deck), causing massive damage, or possibly even sinking the ship. Such accidents can be quite common with inexperienced carrier operators (and even we suffered from it a lot when we transitioned from piston engines to jets). Carriers are catastrophic explosions waiting to happen, and if China does procure a carrier, I foresee lots of fiery death before they learn how to play with their new toy/
I should also have put Gordon’s question the other way: what about American subs? A few sub-launched weapons (and ours have Mk.48 torpedoes, Harpoon anti-ship missiles and long-range Tomahawk anti-ship missiles (TASMs)) can put down a Chinese carrier in short order. After all, the Chinese carrier will be much smaller than ours (about 65,000 tons, tops), and will not have the benefit of 80 years of damage control experience. Most Chinese ships reflect Russian design priorities, and Russian ships, while known to bristle with ordnance, have typically had glass jaws that put them out of action with just one hit. There are a lot of things that go into ship survivability that are not readily apparent to the naked eye, the design of which is difficult to master and expensive to fabricate.
Stuart Koehl, many thanks for your most imformative posts.
” And that mean, although it will take time, China intends to become a peer competitor.”
Gordon, China’s ability to emerge as a peer competitor is contingent on its ability to mitigate the social disruptions inherent in its transformation to a modern market economy. Whether this can be done while the Party retains quasi-totalitarian control over society and much of the economy is questionable. China’s ability to navigate the current economic downturn is contingent on opening up the political process and including more of the rising middle class. Once an authoritarian regime embarks on such a course, its ability to maintain control decreases rapidly. This points to one of two possible outcomes: first, that China does indeed liberalize its political and economic systems in order to avoid massive social disruption; second, China decides to maintain tight control of both and cracks down on political and economic dissent. If it pursues the first path, it will be hard to convince the newly empowered middle classes to divert much of their energy into the pursuit of geostrategic adventurism. If it pursues the second course, it risks aborting the economic transformation that enables its military buildup. In short, they seem stuck in a cleft stick, and neither of their options seem to point to their emergence as a strategic peer competitor unless everything falls their way.
So many of the projections of Chinese economic and military growth were premised on very unrealistic assumptions, such as double-digit economic growth continuing for another decade or more, with little or no U.S. growth–or strategic response–during that same period, it seems to me like elevating the worst case scenario (from our perspective) to the most likely scenario.
Stuart Koehl, another option is government failure. China could be heading there as well, don’t you think?
Look how easy it is to sink a ship:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zesiBbCBrj0
How many billions would an aircraft carrier and its planes cost to rebuild if they were sunk with a 100k torpedo?
“Stuart Koehl, another option is government failure. China could be heading there as well, don’t you think?”
Government failure would be the likely result of the Party attempting to resolve the economic crisis without loosening its hold on power. If that happens, then Katy bar the door! A 1.3-billion person Somalia is just what the world needs.
>>>How many billions would an aircraft carrier and its planes cost to rebuild if they were sunk with a 100k torpedo?<<<
What you are seeing there is the destruction of a 1960s-vintage Leander class destroyer by a Tigerfish torpedo (which, by the way, costs several million dollars, no “100k”, but it is still chump change as compared to the cost of a carrier). Modern torpedoes do not, in general, attack the sides of a ship, but go for an “under keel” explosion through use of a proximity fuze. Exploding underneath the ship, the torpedo creates a rapidly expanding gas bubble that lifts the ship out of the water, then violently slams it back down again, breaking the keel, and often causing the ship to break in two, as shown in the video.
However, it is one thing for a single torpedo to do this to a 4000-ton destroyer, and quite another for it to do the same to a 65,000-99,000 ton carrier. U.S. nuclear carriers in particular have been designed with the threat of under-keel explosions in mind, with heavily reinforced double- and triple-bottoms, as well as shock mounting of all critical equipment and fixtures. They also have extensive side protection systems (a series of void and water-filled compartments) to absorb the effects of a conventional contact-fuzed torpedo.
A Nimitz-class carrier could probably absorb two or three Tigerfish or Mk.48-sized torpedoes before suffering disabling damage. The Soviet Union understood the problem, which is why it developed monstrous 26-inch torpedoes like the Type 65, which has a 1000-lb conventional warhead (the Soviets also used nuclear warheads, which makes damage discussions academic). The Type 65 is a “wake homing” torpedo, which uses an upward pointing sonar to detect the disturbance in the water caused by a ship’s wake. Since wake effects can persist for as much as 50 nautical miles, wake homers can detect targets a long way off. Riding up the ship’s wake, the Type 65 was considered immune to most torpedo countermeasures, leading to desperate expedients such as putting a less valuable ship immediately behind the carrier to act as bait.
Although I agree with Stuart Koehl’s technical judgments, in the main, I have to disagree with his proposition on China’s main objectives as outlined in #10. Those are only interim objectives, and China has already invested heavily in the requisite weapon systems. Her longer term goal, however, is hemispheric hegemony, and for that, sea denial capabilities are not sufficient. Power projection capabilities are necessary.
China is not a small local power, hoping only to control her own EEZ. Nor is she the United States, an unchallenged hemispheric hegemon seeking to bust open local hegemonies on the other side of the world (what we spent our first 120 years as a nation doing). China is a major regional power, in a hemisphere with at least three others who are potential competitors for primacy or even hegemony. The others are Russia, the EU, and India.
China is not in direct competition with the EU — yet. She is, however, in direct competition with Russia and India. Japan retains the potential to become a competitive regional power as well, one that could substantially add to the hegemonic potential of whichever Asian power she affiliated with.
Americans have a hard time seeing all this because we are a continental maritime power with literally no peer competitors in our hemisphere. We have no clue what it is like to be Russia, China, or India. One of the three of them is going to be the premier power in Asia, and all three are always aware of the relative power, the activities, and the perceived intentions of the others.
China is not actively planning to deny areas of South Asia to the US. She is watching for the US to lose the will to demand free access to those areas, and impose stability in them. China will do what she can to encourage that devolution — consistent with her own interests there. China has a long-term interest in power projection across South Asia, and the measuring sticks for her are Russia’s and India’s capacities to do the same.
America is one problem for China, but straightforward sea denial, in an operational sense, is not her priority plan to deal with us. China will basically wait us out. The capacity for sea denial has uses for specific campaigns, like occupying Taiwan, but American loss of will, if it becomes real, is more reliable.
However, the problem for China of being in Asia with Russia and India — and Japan — is a more enduring one. Whatever America is doing, the Asian powers will be there, all of them jockeying for control of resources and LOCs, and access to them. We must never shortchange the importance of regional maneuvering to the Asian powers. Its character is largely similar to the maneuvering of the European colonial powers in the decades prior to WWI: Britain, France, Germany. All the same features were in play: resources, waterways, the Middle East as the geostrategic nexus for everyone. Germany didn’t build battleships because they were good for sea denial, or because she “wisely” confined herself to that aspiration, as global maritime thinkers said her geography dictated. Germany built battleships because Britain used them for power projection. As long as aircraft carriers are used for power projection, and Russia and India have them, China will want them.
J. E.,
China wants to bite off more than it can chew, as usual.
J.E. Dyer, you wrote: “As long as aircraft carriers are used for power projection, and Russia and India have them, China will want them.” Thanks for outlining China’s goals so clearly.
>>> “As long as aircraft carriers are used for power projection, and Russia and India have them, China will want them.”<<<
That puts me in mind of the Latin American naval race of the early 20th century: “As long as Chile and Brazil have battleships, Argentina will want them”. True. But the outcome of that naval race was not hemispheric hegemony or even a catastrophic war, but mutual bankruptcy. And of the three countries, only India can really be considered a maritime power, which means India, more than Russia or China, is likely to put a high priority on sea control, even at the expense of ground forces. The Indian navy also has a heritage derived from the Royal Navy, and a sixty year history of extensive and generally professional operations. Given India’s latent economic power, and the likelihood that India, not China, will emerge as the world’s second largest economy in the long term, with the proper support India rather than China will become the dominant regional navy of Asia over the next twenty years.
Stuart Koehl, you wrote: “Given India’s latent economic power, and the likelihood that India, not China, will emerge as the world’s second largest economy in the long term, with the proper support India rather than China will become the dominant regional navy of Asia over the next twenty years.” I agree India will overtake China, but don’t the Chinese have more determination to build a navy at this moment? I would very much like to get your take on this. Thanks.
Gordon,
China’s naval endeavors to date have been mainly “Green Water”–that is, focused on the waters immediately surrounding China and extending only as far as the resource areas it seeks to dominate. It has focused mainly on frigates, diesel-electric submarines, amphibious warfare ships and shore-based airpower (even nuclear submarines remain relatively rare). It is designed to hold a limited piece of the ocean for a limited period of time in order to accomplish a specific strategic objective.
Chinese defense budgets are definitely opaque, but just a comparison of raw size indicates that the PLA receives far more resources than the PLA(N). In fact, the navy appears to be very much the junior service, with the PLA(AF) receiving the bulk of modernization funds of late. For China to build a true “Blue Water” navy would require a huge shift of priorities, which would be marked by a radical downsizing of army and a concomitant redirection of resources to shipbuilding. Starting today, if China wanted to build such a navy, it would have to lay down the keels for not one, but several aircraft carriers, more than a dozen guided missile destroyers, at least one and possible two underway replenishment ships for each carrier it builds. It would have to begin work designing fighters suitable for the carriers it is designing, or procure aircraft around which to build the carriers. Each carrier would require about a decade to complete. During that time, the Chinese would have to acquire one or two surplus carriers on which to gain experience and train cadre air groups. In short, this is a very long term commitment which requires earmarking funds and buying up a lot of long lead items years before the program really gets into gear.
I just don’t see that happening. China, despite its strategic situation, views itself as a land power, and places most of its resources in ground forces. It is analogous to Wilhelmine Germany, which also began engaging in a naval race with Britain at the beginning of the 20th century. But strategically, Germany was the antithesis of Britain, a continental power and not a maritime power. The German navy was the brainchild of Tirpitz and the pet rock of Kaiser Wilhelm, but when hard choices had to be made on resource allocation, the army came first. In the end, all the German naval buildup did was alienate Britain, cause it to devote more of its resources to building more dreadnoughts, and force it into a closer alliance with France. If the Chinese actually began a naval buildup in the Pacific, analogous to the Japanese naval buildup of the 1920s and 30s, it would have the same effect on us: we would pour more money into the Navy, matching the Chinese ship for ship and more. We are a maritime power, they are not. We would see attempts to dominate the western Pacific as a direct threat to our interests, and would not take it lightly.