Obama’s butchering of history continues apace. He sure does this a lot. Ever since the campaign.
How soon before Obama’s approval and disapproval numbers converge? (In Rasmussen, they did already.)
Fred Barnes thinks Americans have figured out what’s up and that the ObamaCare battle is lost. Looking at the poll numbers, he concludes: “1) The public is smarter than we think. They know their health care. 2) A bill that’s rejected this soundly has little chance of being enacted, and the congressional recess won’t make things better. 3) Obama is not persuasive. He’s been touting his plan for months as support for it dropped. He’s lost the argument.” Well, now we’ll see what can be passed. It might not be anything. The status quo never looked so good.
If this doesn’t scare you, it should: “If President Obama has his way, another such unelected authority will be created — a manager and monitor for the vast and expensive American health-care system. As part of his health-reform effort, he is seeking to launch the Independent Medicare Advisory Council, or IMAC, a bland title for a body that could become as much an arbiter of medicine as the Fed is of the economy or the Supreme Court of the law.”
The New York Times warns Obama that he’s overexposed: “The all-Obama, all-the-time carpet bombing of the news media represents a strategy by a White House seeking to deploy its most effective asset in service of its goals, none more critical now than health care legislation. But longtime Washington hands warn that saturation coverage can diminish the power of his voice and lose public attention.” Part of the problem is that when he’s out there, he’s not saying much.
ABC News calls it health-care chaos: “Just a day after Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said there is ‘no question’ she has the votes to pass health care, it looks now like Democrats in the House have also given up on having a health care vote by the August recess.”
On again, off again: “Hours after calling their chairman a liar, Blue Dogs on the Energy and Commerce Committee stood by that chairman’s side and announced together that the once-collapsed health-care negotiations are back on track.”
J Street can’t really say whether its members are pro-Israel.
Meanwhile, from the “meddling in democracies” file: “Let’s hope the Administration was paying attention to India’s environment minister when he told Mrs. Clinton a thing or two about climate policy Sunday. ‘There is simply no case for the pressure that we, who have among the lowest emissions per capita, face to actually reduce emissions,’ Jairam Ramesh told Mrs. Clinton in a closed-door meeting, according to a copy of his remarks distributed after the session. ‘And as if this pressure was not enough, we also face the threat of carbon tariffs on our exports to countries such as yours.’ ”
Did Obama actually apologize for his “stupidly” uninformed comments about the Gates-Crowley incident? Maybe in private. How nontransparent if so.
In Virginia: “The Obama administration dispatched a senior aide to Richmond Wednesday to urge former Virginia Gov. L. Douglas Wilder to get behind state Sen. Creigh Deeds, the Democratic gubernatorial nominee. . . . But Wilder, in disclosing the meeting in an interview with POLITICO, made it clear that he remained far from endorsing Deeds and was in no hurry to weigh in on the closely watched race — all the while outlining with his typical brutal candor what he thought some of the party’s challenges were and what was at stake. On what the former governor called ‘bread-and-butter issues,’ he said of Deeds: ‘Tell me what the man has done? I haven’t heard it.’” Ouch.
In New Jersey, you knew this was coming: “One day after federal authorities arrested five New Jersey politicians involved in a massive money-laundering operation, GOP gubernatorial candidate Chris Christie hit the airwaves with his first general election ad reminding voters of his record fighting corruption. . . . Christie’s law-and-order background has always been his strongest asset, and the mass arrests (which led from an investigation that he initiated as U.S. attorney) couldn’t come at a better time. It also comes on the same week he tapped a female county sheriff as his running mate.”
The Obama administration says it is defending democracy and the rule of law in Honduras. “But in fact, a close look at Mr. Zelaya’s time in office reveals a strongly antidemocratic streak. He placed himself in a growing cadre of elected Latin presidents who have tried to stay in power past their designated time to carry out a populist-leftist agenda. These leaders, led by Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, have used the region’s historic poverty and inequality to gain support from the poor, but created deep divisions in their societies by concentrating power in their own hands and increasing government control over the economy, media and other sectors.”
So shoot it down. No need to even threaten.
I was expecting unicorn and peace, someone should have told the PDRK, IRAN, HAMAS, ET AL
One does not, of course, prefer the prospect of war. But the correct response to Pyongyang’s threat to Japan seems to be: “Go ahead, make my day.”
I’m not convinced that if North Korea tried to march to Seoul, any of the troops would even still be armed and in uniform by the time they got there.
Thanks JED – but I thought it was highly fortified NORK artillery batteries just across the DMZ that threatened Seoul …they don’t need to “march”, just “fire” and tens of thousand of Seoul residents die in 30 min … I thought it was that scenario that has stayed our hand and frightened the bejeepers out of the S Koreans.
After all the rhetoric, to not do anything will be almost as bad as shooting it down. It would just point out more lack of resolve. By not saying anything, maybe we could have tried the
Boeing laser system which is invisible and then blamed the resulting explosion on their bad engineering regarding rockets. Now we cant even do that. To be fair, they could accuse us of trying to shoot it down with the new system system anyways and say we failed, just to score 2 PR victories in one shot..pardon the pun. Its invisible anyways so how could others tell they were lying? LOL Schrillean radar?
J.E., not to burden you, but I’d think we’d all appreciate here a little elaboration on your serious doubts that those masses of North Korean troops would not get very far.
Also, what about RegretLeft’s comment about the lethality of North Korea’s artillery batteries?
Thanks, J.E.
RegretLeft: Why do you assume that those NORK batteries would be allowed to fire unmolested for 30 minutes? I imagine the US and South Korean air forces would be busy taking them out almost immediately. This reminds me of those people who shudder at the thought that Iran, in the event of a conflict, would “block” the Strait of Hormuz and so strangle oil shipments out of the Gulf. For how long do you suppose they could keep that up? The US Navy would have it swept for mines or whatever and reopened in no time and the Iranian blocking forces would be quickly annihilated. I’m not saying the North Koreans couldn’t cause a lot of death and destruction, just that they wouldn’t get away with it for very long before they themselves were hammered to pieces.
Consider, rationally, the utility of the Taepo Dong series as a weapon. We have here a liquid-fueled, bi-propellant missile that requires an extensive pre-launch fueling and preparation cycle, and which, due to its unstable fuel, must be launched not in a silo, but from an external gantry. Friends, we are looking at first generation ballistic missile technology here, the same sort that brought you the U.S. Atlas and the Soviet SS-6 Sapwood missile back in the 1950s. The reliability of Taepo Dong, however, is considerably lower than either of those two antiques.
The only reason either the Atlas or the Sapwood were viable weapons was the lack of effective early warning and counter-force capabilities by the opposition. That is, both the U.S. and the USSR were afforded the time to go through the entire launch cycle unhindered–the Soviets because (presumably) they would get the first shot; the U.S. because the Soviets would have a terrible time locating and striking our ballistic missile force.
North Korea has neither of these advantages going for it. It’s a small country, and we have it under continuous satellite surveillance. in the event of elevated tensions, surveillance would be intensified, probably with the addition of persistent aerial surveillance using UAVs. It will be very hard for the North Korean to roll out a Taepo Dong and begin fueling without our knowledge–as the present situation demonstrates.
Once the North Korean begin preparing a missile for launch, it is absolutely vulnerable to what some call “pre-launch intercept”; i.e., destruction on the launch pad. A missile in the open is an incredibly soft target, one that can be blown up by a sniper with a rifle from a range of more than two kilometers (a missile is a big target), or by a cruise missile from a couple of hundred kilometers. That the North Koreans possess nuclear weapons has made such preemption not only legitimate, but essential.
Finally, we today have effective ballistic missile defenses, which we did not back in the 1950s. Given the geography of the Korean peninsula, U.S. and Japanese forces positioned off the coast of Korea have the ability to destroy any North Korean missile during boost phase, assuming somehow we are stupid enough to give the North Koreans a launch opportunity. If, somehow, we miss during boost phase, we still have several midcourse and terminal intercept possibilities. Assume that we get three shots in all–one during boost, one in midcourse, and one in terminal. Assume that each of these systems has only a .50 kill probability (Pk). Overall, there is an 87.5% chance of destroying the incoming missile–which we can increase to 94% by taking two shots in midcourse. This is a very conservative estimate, since the effectiveness of our midcourse system appears to be significantly higher than 50%, and boost phase intercept has the potential to be much, much higher.
Finally, factor in the reliability of North Korean missiles. Give them every benefit of the doubt, and assign them a .9 success probability for each of the steps in a ballistic missile attack–launch, staging, reentry, and detonation. That would be .9 x.9 x.9 x.9, or 0.66 (the actual figure is probably much lower). The combination of poor reliability and effective ballistic missile defenses makes possession of a small ballistic missile force more of a liability than a “force multiplier”–it makes North Korea’s neighbors antsy without actually adding significantly to North Korea’s military capabilities. It is likely, therefore, to bring on the very thing North Korea claims to fear most–a preemptive attack by the United States and its allies.
Ballistic missiles are of value to North Korea only in two areas; first, for domestic consumption (it bolsters the sagging prestige of the regime); second, as a psychological weapon against South Korea and the United States. With regard to the former, one wonders, given the absolute control North Korea has over information within its borders, it just doesn’t declare that it has launched a missile and be done with it. Regarding the latter, it is only ignorance of the public and the inability of Western governments to explain the threat in a comprehensible manner, that results in the kind of panic that gives North Korea the leverage it wants.
Shooting down the missile, in boost phase, if possible, would demonstrate the impotence of the Taepo Dong system, not just to the U.S. and its allies, but also to the North Koreans themselves. After all, they do not have the resources to build the requisite number of missiles to penetrate an active defense. More than that, they do not have the resources to turn the Taepo Dong into Kim Jong Il’s backyard toy into a useable weapon system. That would require the development of highly reliable missiles with long-term storable propellants (liquid or solid), emplaced in hardened silos and capable of launch within minutes, not hours or days. It cost billions for the U.S. and USSR to develop that capability in the early 1960s. North Korea does not–and will not ever–have the resources to do it today or any time before the regime collapses.
Regret Left has a good point. The North Koreans have emplaced thousands of artillery pieces in super-hard “Y-sites” on ridge lines overlooking Seoul, from which they can indeed wreak havoc on the center of South Korea’s population, government and industry. I do not think, however, that they will cause “thousands of casualties”, in part because a North Korean attack “out of the blue” is unlikely, an in part because South Korea has an extensive civil defense system in place.
If you had asked me a decade ago, I would have said the Y-sites represented a very difficult target to destroy with aerial weapons, because they are extremely hard and very small. Advances in precision munitions, however, now make such sites vulnerable. The combination, e.g., of GPS and laser guidance with thermobaric warheads (developed for and tested against cave complexes in Afghanistan) means we can destroy each Y-site with one or two weapons. Locating the Y-sites would also have been a problem (many of the emplacements are sealed and would only be opened when war is imminent, but now, with persistent surveillance by UAVs equipped with thermal imaging systems and synthetic aperture radar, each site could be located within minutes of going active. It then becomes a matter of servicing each site as quickly as possible, and not running out of ammunition.
The main military threat posed by North Korea, today as two decades ago, lies not in its ballistic missiles, or its artillery, or its tanks, but rather in its very large, well trained, and fanatical special operations forces. It is estimated that there are more than 200 company-sized units, which would be used to infiltrate deep into South Korea, sabotaging critical installations, blowing up bridges and tunnels, and attacking rear echelon headquarters, logistic nodes and air bases. Because North Koreans are indistinguishable from South Koreans, and because U.S. policy allows South Korean military personnel quite free access to U.S. bases, the potential for disruptive decapitation attacks on U.S. leadership are significant (this was demonstrated in a war game some years back, to the consternation of the commanding general of U.S. Eighth Army).
My apologies for not getting back to this earlier, and not seeing Stuart Rose’s question. The “march on Seoul” comment was, in fact, more of a rhetorical device, to get the idea in there of the likely collapse of the NORK army if it came to a force-on-force confrontation. RegretLeft is correct about the existence of the artillery positions, and I largely agree with Stuart Koehl in what he says about them; particularly that they are more suppressible today than they were 10 years ago, if we have the right weapons in-theater. Although the granularity of our routine intel on North Korean forces has declined in recent years, due to higher priority national collection further west, we and South Korea still maintain the ability to recognize in advance a change in North Korea’s posture on the DMZ, and be ready to respond rapidly.
I would add the following: it would be an act of insanity, or at least self-immolation, for North Korea to attack South Korea or — even more absurdly — Japan. Pyongyang knows that shelling Seoul would provoke an immediate and overwhelming counterattack. Fifteen or twenty years ago it was a serious worry that the NORKs could quickly follow up an artillery and air assault with a massive ground movement on Seoul. But the “correlation of forces” (good old Soviet term) has not favored North Korea in this regard for some time now. Our airpower is so efficient and effective — along with our artillery facing the approaches to Seoul — that the most likely outcome is the shattering of the North Korean front line at the outset, and a collapse in the rear, much like what we saw in Iraq in both 1991 and 2003.
We know that China would almost certainly confront us directly if we exploited such an opening to liberate North Korea from the Kim regime, and promote reunification with the South. But Kim & Co also know that they would lose all semblance of control of their own destiny in that event. China is their main patron — because it suits China to keep the Korean peninsula divided while we retain an interest in it — but Kim has no desire to invite China in to organize his affairs for him. That is the result he would get, if he attacked ether South Korea or Japan, provoked a counterattack featuring US forces, and thereby opened a door of unstable vulnerability on China’s northeast border.
The Kim regime really doesn’t have a lot of options, which is why it has pursued nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles so determinedly. No one’s armed forces should ever be cavalierly dismissed, but North Korea’s troops have been subsisting on an average of less than 800 calories a day for almost two decades — and they’re the best-fed people in the country, outside the Party leadership network. (The US military member, for comparison, has access to up to 3500 calories a day, even in the field or the fleet.) Even Pyongyang’s newest, best-maintained weaponry is 1960s-era technology or older — but that weaponry is in the minority. We could say that in conventional force, the NORKs are a mile wide and an inch thick, except that they’re not a mile wide; it’s something less than that. The NORKs aren’t the real military problem in North Korea; China is.
Kim wants nuclear missiles so badly because his conventional forces are not a deterrent or a power projection factor any longer. He wants to be able to constrain the options of the US, South Korea, and Japan, by his ability to hold population centers south of the DMZ, and across the Sea of Japan, at risk.
The reason we haven’t just taken this guy out is China, and the reason China hasn’t just brushed him aside and had her way with the Korea peninsula is us. Welcome to the UN-sponsored Korean Armistice. In its 56th year, and counting.
Thanks, Stuart, for the primer on the likely performance of North Korea’s ability to deliver the apocalypse that Kim also promises if he’s looked at the wrong way twice in one week. One wonders why Bush was so tepid in the negotiations with him.
Well, J.E., reading your takes on the military and geopolitical aspects of the world’s non-tourist bound spots is always informative- and both bracing and encouraging.
It’s dismaying to think, though, that if the North Korean people ever managed to rebel against the regime, China would step in. Or could they so easily? If the U.S. tried to bring down the regime, China would have something of a legitimate reason to move its forces in- to prevent the U.S. from occupying one of its flanks. They could claim we’ve upset the status quo.
But if Kim’s regime began to shatter badly- in a fashion, let’ say, similar to how Ceaucescu’s(sorry the spelling) regime fell- could China pour its forces into the country? Perhaps they could on grounds of preventing chaos.
Taepodong 2? What type is that? Are they using inches or centimeters?
“One wonders why Bush was so tepid in the negotiations with him.”
Partly our hands are tied by our South Korean allies, on whose territory any conflict with Kim is likely to take place. It is unfortunate that the explosive growth of Seoul and its suburbs have put the better part of the ROK population and economy within range of North Korean artillery–and of simple and effective delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. This scares the bejeesus out of the South Koreans. Beyond that, they still harbor the hope of peaceful reintegration of the Korean peninsula, and many South Koreans have family in the North. All of this makes them very cautious in their dealings with the Communist regime.
In addition, it is my belief that North Korea has possessed nuclear weapons far longer than we have been led to believe. I base this on an official, classified CIA briefing delivered at the 1992 Commander’s Threat Conference at the Army Air Defense School at Ft. Bliss. TX. A CIA analyst stood up in front of an entire auditorium and told us “It is our assessment that North Korea has one, possibly two, nuclear weapons and the materials to build up to six more”. I remember because I scribbled this down on a candy bar wrapper, and later put it in a notebook, I was so shocked. Remember, this was 1992.
If this was the official CIA position, and was incorporated into national intelligence estimates concerning North Korea, it explains entirely the hesitancy and tentative nature of U.S. policy towards Kim Jong Il for the last decade and a half.