When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits the White House next week, Obama and his administration would do well to employ their much-practiced skills at making nice. New Delhi rightly fears outside meddling after this week’s U.S.-China Joint Statement, which contained a sentence widely interpreted as an affront to India:
The two sides [China and the United States] welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.
The Joint Statement’s timing was particularly bad considering the recent India-China border dilemma. Both countries have reportedly increased troop presence near the blurry border, and the Dalai Lama’s visit to Indian territory that is still claimed by China did little to improve the relationship. China has emphasized that its “more pronounced” territorial issue is its border dispute with India. So New Delhi has good reason to be nervous about Chinese prying at Washington’s behest.
A spokesman from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs quickly commented on the Joint Statement, stating that “a third country role cannot be envisaged nor is it necessary” regarding India-Pakistan relations.
Already, both China and the United States are trying to downplay the significance of the Joint Statement reference.
China’s Foreign Ministry denied that a discussion took place between Obama and Chinese heads of state about U.S.-India nuclear cooperation, and its statement emphasized Beijing’s support of regional stability. The spokesperson added that China “values its friendly cooperation with” India and Pakistan and “hopes to see relations between the two continue … improve and grow.”
But India can hardly be blamed for frustration at the Obama administration’s mixed message. Yesterday, Robert Blake, the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, said the United States welcomes China’s participation in stabilizing the India-Pakistan region. But he also added, “We have always said, in terms of Indo-Pakistan relations, that’s really up to India and Pakistan to decide how and when and the scope of that.” Also yesterday, William Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, declared that better relations with China do not necessarily come at the cost of India.
One can only hope that the ill-considered phrasing of the Joint Statement won’t hinder next week’s discussions. No doubt Obama will want Prime Minister Singh’s support on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not to mention climate change. That Singh is the first head of state to visit the Obama White House in itself highlights the importance of Indian cooperation. If the mix-up is merely linguistic, it can be overcome. But if the lack of clarity lies within Obama’s foreign policy itself, expect a rocky summit. Obama’s diplomacy and eloquence will be tested as he attempts to please both India and China.
Well, it’s an interesting theory that this represents progress, since the UNSC has had sanctions on Iran since 2006, and so far they have not induced Iran to stop enriching uranium.
In fact, as a November 2007 article by perennial Iran-nuke writers David Albright and Jacqueline Shire observes, since the first round of sanctions was imposed in December 2006 (UNSCR 1737), Iran has installed more than 2,500 additional centrifuges (beyond the 300-odd centrifuges that were in operation in December 2006), has continued to enrich uranium, and by the IAEA’s assessment, in August 2007, had converted 330 tons of uranium hexafluoride feedstock, compared to the 55 tons identified by the IAEA prior to UNSCR 1737.
(Albright/Shire article here: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Albright.asp )
Albright and Shire, who describe members of the Bush administration as “finger-wagging, told-you-so naysayers” when it comes to North Korean nukes, and who deplore the idea of a military solution to the threat of Iranian nukes, nevertheless go on to point out that Iran had probably produced as much as 70 kilos of low-enriched uranium since the sanctions started (Iran’s interior minister gave the figure 100 kilos in June 2007, later disavowed by other officials http://archive.gulfnews.com/indepth/irancrisis/Uranium_enrichment/10134214.html ). They also admit — rather blithely, considering the implications — that Iran’s posture with the IAEA has been increasingly secretive, since before the imposition of sanctions; that outside knowledge of Iran’s nuclear procurement network is poor; and that “it would not be surprising” if Iran considered it a good idea to build a secret enrichment facility, given the widespread international knowledge of Natanz, and its consequent vulnerability. They assure us, however, that such a secret facility would not violate any IAEA safeguards agreement.
Notably, Iran’s Bank Sepah, a key target of existing sanctions, was acknowledged to be hard hit as of July 2007 (see: http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/7/30/113957.shtml ). (Bank Sepah was important to Iran’s missile program procurement; a line of sanctions effort that may lose some steam after the 2007 NIE.) Since Bank Sepah’s suffering had no discouraging effect on Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, the point remains that merely getting agreement on sanctions is not the same thing as progress against uranium enrichment in Iran.
It seems we have already decided that nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran are not enough of a threat to do anything effective about. We’re now in “make ourselves feel better and look like we’re doing something” mode.
The only progress this represents is Iran’s progress on its nuclear weapons program. Hence, Amadjihads defiant response and his mullah masters’ laughing behind their beards.