Remember how liberals used to get apoplectic when members of the Bush administration said things like “all options are on the table with Iran”? This was beating the war drums, it was saber-rattling, it was exemplary of all that was wrong with the Bush administration’s approach to the world.
Of course it isn’t surprising that such accusations are not leveled at the Obama administration, which has also regularly employed the all-options-on-the-table formulation — mostly because everyone understands that it isn’t a true statement. But here is a better one: According to the Washington Post, President Obama sent two officials on an advance trip to China before his recent visit. Their message? Sign a toughly worded IAEA statement or the Israelis might attack:
If Beijing did not help the United States on this issue, the consequences could be severe, the visitors, Dennis Ross and Jeffrey Bader, both senior officials in the National Security Council, informed the Chinese.
The Chinese were told that Israel regards Iran’s nuclear program as an “existential issue and that countries that have an existential issue don’t listen to other countries,” according to a senior administration official. The implication was clear: Israel could bomb Iran.
One might go so far as to say that international affairs continues to be dominated by power and force, despite hopenchangey predictions of a new era of dialogue and cooperation. Even accomplishing something as modest as cajoling a Chinese signature on a largely meaningless IAEA statement necessitated the threat of force. “Soft power” and “smart diplomacy” didn’t quite cut it, did they?
China’s inclusion on yesterday’s IAEA statement will be hailed as a great accomplishment for the Obama administration, but it should be apparent that this victory actually represents the hastened disintegration of the administration’s preferred policy — an elegant and high-minded diplomatic campaign. The “Israel will attack” card has now been played, and quite early. What will the White House say to China and Russia when it wishes to pursue sanctions, or even a gasoline embargo? A repetition of the same threat? Wasn’t Obama’s presidency supposed to liberate us from the ugly business of making threats?
Kinsley does one make one argument that will be difficult to rebut when he argues in his concluding paragraphs that if, when the war was “sold,” we had been told that by the end of Bush’s second term we’d still have 100,000 troops in Iraq in a less than fully secure country, we’d have been hard-pressed to call the war a “success.” The whole WMD debacle, the perception that occupation was a “fiasco,” and the implicit belief that the war was one of choice rather than necessity have tended to overwhelm the relatively weakly advanced strategic rationale. The trump card, so far, has been the understanding that, regardless of one’s beliefs about the justification and costs of the war, no one, least of all the Democratic Congress and probably not a Democratic President, wants to take responsibility for the catastrophe that a precipitous withdrawal would entail. The Democrats have rightly understood that successfully de-funding the war or otherwise crippling the effort would convert their political advantage into political disaster. All of their efforts have instead been designed to wring maximum political advantage from opposition to the war without actually having to implement the policies they pretend to favor. The closer that the Democrats come to executive power, the less relevance such carping over abstract definitions of success will have. Articles like Kinsley’s reflect acknowledgment that they’ve lost the political fight over the surge, and desperation to salvage whatever the Democrats can for a larger, more difficult than expected battle over security policy.
Is Mr. Boot still pretending that the law on De-Ba’athification was a sign of reconciliation, rather than what it was: a fraudulent, anti-reconciliation measure opposed by the people it was meant to help? It’s easy to argue that there’s political progress in Iraq if you pretend that signs of political regression are actually signs of progress.
Anyway, Kinsley is making a reasonable point. Staying in Iraq is essentially failure. The comparison to Japan and Germany is meaningless because the wars were over and these were post-war occupations. The U.S. troops continue to be killed and will continue to be killed indefinitely; therefore, when John McCain supports a 100 year occupation he supports U.S. troops being killed for 100 years, since there is no prospect of the shooting ever stopping (particularly since there has been no actual political reconciliation and civil war violence is still at 2005 levels).
The surge was sold as something that would allow American troops to draw down without “losing.” In fact, we are now told that the surge requires a huge troop presence to stay and no draw-down below surge levels. Therefore, there has been no success, because success would mean that the U.S. can start a genuine draw-down (not merely a withdrawal of extra surge troops, which is currently being avoided anyway). If you define “success” as wasting American money and lives indefinitely while handing a victory to Al-Qaeda (since there is no substantial AQ presence in Iraq, and by staying in Iraq and fueling a civil war we are essentially saying that we have given up the pursuit of the jihadists) then the surge is a success. It is not a definition of “success” that anyone accepts except the elitist “serious foreign policy elite,” with its contempt for American public opinion and its belief that staying in Iraq has no costs (whereas leaving Iraq, which is the only thing that can bring about real peace or political progress, is the worst thing ever).
Add this to the fact that the surge caused violence to rise, that Petraeus was wrong in September of 2007 when he said that violence was down, and that the drop in violence was due to Sadr’s recently-revived cease-fire (meaning that Sadr, hated by conservatives, was responsible for the Iraq drop in violence whereas Petraeus succeeded only in killing more Iraqis), and the reasons for Boot’s triumphalism are not clear. The surge succeeded only in one way: making sure that Bush won’t have to withdraw. It has made things worse for America, but better for Bush, which was always the point.
“World War II a success? Give me a break! We still have troops in Germany and Japan? . . .The Korean War a success? Don’t make me laugh! We still have troops in South Korea….”
that’s obviously not what he’s saying. He’s saying that when you win a war you come home. we are still there in the thick of it nearly 5 years later. these are tours. being in the DMZ in korea is not akin to being in iraq.
I sincerely doubt Charles krauthammer has any sort of trenchant anything. If it weren’t for Rupert Murdoch he’d be a street person.
“[T]hat’s obviously not what he’s saying. He’s saying that when you win a war you come home. we are still there in the thick of it nearly 5 years later.”
Ergo, we’ve lost? Is that your argument?
Can you guys make an argument without imputing evil motive or name calling? Or is that asking too much?
You’ve already been answered several times on your recycled arguments and misstatements, BD. As ever, you simply repeat yourself, demonstrating that there’s no point in trying to engage you on facts and logic. I have no idea whether your seeming incomprehension is willful, but, whatever the explanation, the results are tiresome. Try dealing directly with what others have to say instead of repeating yourself with virtual cut-and-pastes from your previous posts, and you may find yourself engaging in dialogue. (As for the confusion between yourself and lester, you’ll have to sort that one out for yourselves. I can’t tell what point either of you is trying to make.)
Oops – sorry BD. The above post should have been addressed to TB – escept for the part about you and lester.
That’s OK, CK. Just respond to what you read, not “reputation” (however confused).
Kinsley’s engaged in the time-honored political tradition of moving the goalposts. Back when the surge was announced, the type of politicians Kinsley usually favors (sorry, can’t give you chapter & verse on Kinsley himself, but feel free to offer some links if you can find them) opposed it because they thought we had been defeated (and they were willing to accept that). Simply put, they opposed the surge because (they claimed) it had no prospect of leading to victory.
Of course, you can respond “but it hasn’t led to victory,” and you’d be right – victors aren’t determined until a war is over, and this one isn’t over yet. The Kinsleys of the day would’ve pronounced the Germans victorious in WW II in the weeks after Dunkirk … and then the war was fought to a conclusion.
I guess there’s just a “tone” issue here – if I thought Kinsley was saying “there’s still work to do before we win,” that’d be different … I agree with that.
Only thing is, I’ve known of & read Kinsley for far too long to believe that to be the case. He’s trying to argue the situation is no better today than it was a year ago, that it’s still irredeemable & we should accept the defeat that would result & get out.
Sorry. No sale.
T.B.,
I know I’m wasting my time by refuting a preprogrammed troll, but there may be someone else who benefits from reading this.
Tell me, was removing the genocidal tyrant Saddam Hussein from power “a fraudulent, anti-reconciliation measure opposed by the people it was meant to help?” Maybe deBaathification is only baad when it’s applied to the rest of the Baath party?
America is not “staying in Iraq,” so your point is…..meaningless. Even the particulars of your contention are meaningless.
The war in Iraq ended a few weeks after it began, so your dismissal of the analogy about troops in Germany and Japan is invalid.
John McCain does not support a 100 year occupation.
Iraq is not in a state of civil war. The reinforcements have already drawn down below “surge” levels.
Your definition of “Success” is even more irrelevant than Kinsley’s is–and that’s saying something. The “surge” was not implemented so that troop levels could be drawn down, which you absurdly defined as “success.”
America isn’t wasting lives and money in Iraq (very original,) because the fanciful quagmire scenario you regurgitated is utterly false. Not that I believe you care a whit about the lives or money being spent on America and Iraq’s futures.
The “‘elitist’ serious foreign policy elite,” are among the vast majority who recognize the success of the “surge,” but they aren’t elitist. Sneering naysayers like you and Kinsley are the wannabe elitists who hold the American majority in contempt, as your words make perfectly clear.
It’s irrational to the point of derangement to believe that leaving Iraq “is the only thing that can bring about real peace or political progress.”
Al Qaeda in Iraq would disagree with your astute assessment that there is no “A. Q.” presence in Iraq. So would Zawahiri and Bin Loser (assuming the latter is still alive,) because they both claim Iraq is the their main battleground in every public pronouncement they make. In case you didn’t know, they’re the leaders of “A.Q.”
Your comments about post “surge” violence have no basis in reality, which is why you cant back them up with factual figures.
The only part of your screed that came close to honesty was your conclusion. BDS is the source of all the trite canards you’re trying to promulgate. That’s how I know you cant be reasoned with.
BD- Mcain is saying that iraq deserves the same sort of “respect” if you want to call it that that we give korea and germany and the rest. i understand that.
But the day to day of iraq and the DMZ are entirely different. families aren’t breaking up because guys are doing numerous tours in korea. our presence there doesn’t cost 10 billion a month or whatever.
We don’t patrol the streets of south korea while the south koreans go on vacation in paris with the money they stole from us during the year.
lester:
Are you comparing present day DMZ to present day Iraq?
What was Korea like during the first 5 years after the ceasefire?
There are a couple of potential answers for the strain being put on our troops:
#1 – shrink the military’s mission to fit the manpower; take the risk inherent in that approach.
#2 – increase the size of the military to fit the mission.
IMO, the “Peace Dividend” was a mistake – a bipartisan mistake, by the way – & we’re paying for it now.
Between those options, though, the choice ought to be getting our troops the help they need, not retreating from the field.