Holding to the prevailingly brash tenor of the international climate-change debate, the Australian prime minister equated a delay on the enactment of green policy to outright denial of climate change. In doing so, he set himself — and others — up for trouble in Copenhagen in less than a week.
Speaking in Washington yesterday and specifically referencing his country’s own climate-change policy woes, Kevin Rudd said:
Let’s just be very blunt about it. After ten years of delay on climate change, further delay equals denial on climate change. Delay on climate change equals denial on climate change. And it’s time, instead, we voted in support of this bipartisan Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, because to do so votes to act. A failure to vote, or shall I say a vote to delay on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, is a vote to deny the climate change science. A vote to delay this bipartisan Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme is also to deny Australia’s ability to act on climate change.
Rudd is hardly alone in setting dangerously high expectations for concrete and speedy climate-change policy. Across the world, leaders have expressed similar sentiment, and not just on domestic climate-change policy. “We must seal a deal in Copenhagen,” said UN Secretary-General Ban Kyi-Moon. Copenhagen is “capable of delivering the turning point we all want,” said British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. And in a news release issued by the White House itself, John Kerry said that “the fact that the President will attend the Copenhagen talks underscores that the Administration is putting its money where its mouth is, putting the President’s prestige on the line.”
But that’s risky rhetoric, and it puts proponents of stricter global-climate-change policy at a disadvantage.
First, an urgent and for-us-or-against-us approach like Rudd’s automatically alienates those who approach the climate-change debate with healthy skepticism or hesitancy. But it’s also hard to believe any international climate-change agreements can be reached without the help of moderates. And given the recent accounts that the scientific and academic community has suppressed climate-change debate and fogged up evidence, the demonization of skeptics should be hardly the message believers like Rudd want to convey. Further, as India and China have made abundantly clear, climate-change policy is also economic policy. This is not the time for a rushed decision, especially given the global recession.
Second, Rudd has opened the door for a public-relations problem for himself and others at Copenhagen. If anything short of action is evidence of denial, then anything less than total victory in Copenhagen must betray enormous international doubt that a climate-change problem actually exists.
Staked reputations should be the last consideration on the agenda in Copenhagen. But climate-change advocates have needlessly put themselves in a prickly position. There’s no longer much room for such outspoken leaders to hedge against the considerable conflicts they will doubtless face. And with such lofty expectations already established, they’d be foolish not to realize that the political, if not the environmental, clock is ticking. Now they have ensured that time is of the essence.










His capture or death is only important if it casts anti-terrorism efforts in a bad light.
You know that.
Hayden’s and Chertoff’s comments could be based on facts. For a variety of reasons, bin Laden’s stature within al Qaeda might be diminishing. (Being dead qualifies.) We are accustomed to think of al Qaeda as a highly disciplined hierarchical organization. Maybe it’s not. Maybe it is internally very competitive, such that the first task of every “leader” is to gain internal control and suppress opposition. Maybe every leader has to look over his shoulder, all the time, because his own comrades in arms pose a greater danger than the US government.
Let’s assume not, and assume instead that Hayden and Chertoff are making it all up.
It might be an excellent tactic. Bin Laden’s importance can be “talked down” just as surely as the dollar in foreign exchange markets. This could motivate (or force) him to choose to be more visible, which would aid in his location and destruction.
Similarly, even if our intel about al Qaeda is not so good, our intel technologies are spectacular. Why not sow distrust by reporting actions by underlings that did not occur or statements they did not make? Look, if this can happen every day within the Democrat primary, where it is petty, why can’t it be done as an act of state, where it really matters?
It also may be that psy-ops provide the best tool for sowing discontent and distrust within al Qaeda.