Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yaakov Amidror, who held several senior posts in the Israel Defense Forces, including head of the IDF division preparing Israel’s National Intelligence Assessment, held a conference call this morning sponsored by One Jerusalem. In discussing Egypt, he said this:
There is no question that this is one of the fruits of the Internet technology — that these are mechanisms which give people the ability to organize without an organization … [T]his is the strength of the opposition: the fact that it was not organized by someone, but is a matter of people who organized themselves.
But when it comes to the next stage … I mean “We don’t want Mubarak” is okay, but now you want something that can bring you to another stage. For that, you need an organization. And in elections after some months, there are very few organizations who have the ability to organize themselves … [other than] the Muslim Brotherhood. They have a long history, they have very deep roots in the society and when they compete with other elements of the opposition, which do not have these traditions, this organization, these roots, it is a new phenomenon …
In The Case for Democracy, Natan Sharansky warned that elections are never the beginning of the democratic process, but can only occur after the basic institutions of a free society are in place — a free press, the rule of law, independent courts, political parties. It was why he praised George W. Bush’s landmark June 24, 2002, speech conditioning U.S. support for a Palestinian state on prior Palestinian success in building “a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty” — and then opposed the Roadmap, which he viewed as Bush’s abandonment of that condition in exchange for faith in Mahmoud Abbas as a “moderate.”
Sharansky’s insight was that moderation is not a function of a leader’s disposition or promises but of the society he governs: “One can rely on a free society to create the moderate, but one cannot rely on a moderate to create a free society.” In thinking about Egypt and its future, perhaps we can profit from a comparison of the Bush administration’s great achievement — the long, hard slog to create a representative government in Iraq — and the administration’s signal failure: the “shortcut” elections it sponsored in 2006 that produced the victory of Hamas.
The Obama administration’s current approach may be, as former State Department senior adviser Christian Whiton argues, too clever by half — closer to what produced Hamastan than what is necessary for a lasting democratic result.
We could do worse than to stop imagining that there is ANY solution to the Palestinian Arab Problem.
Not to sound like a Hamas apologist or anything – I’m just curious: doesn’t LIkud’s party platform/charter ALSO reject a two state solution?
I believe you are correct, Lars, except that your “ALSO” implies a false equivalence. Hamas supports the destruction of something that currently exists – the state of Israel – and appears to mean what it says. The Likud Charter has opposed the creation of something that does not yet exist. As for the current positions and openness to compromise of the Likud itself and its top leadership, I’ll leave it to others here to explain if they care to.
CK,
Ok I hear what you’re saying, but I don’t see why that distinction should make a difference – isn’t it fair, at least in principle, to say that Hamas and Likud both officially oppose a two-state solution? I only say this because I often hear people accuse Hamas of not really wanting peace because they reject the two-state solution, but Likud rejects it also!
This doesn’t mean that there’s an equivalency between Hamas and Likud. There isn’t. I’m just wondering about this, because I don’t know how to respond to people who make this argument…
Daniel Levy is essentially a New Historian in blogger form: where the original New Historians published thoroughly “revised,” often completely warped, accounts of past events, Levy publishes such narratives about current events.
The problem with this analysis is that the New Historians’ interpretation, and Levy’s, is supported by the overwhelming scholarly consensus, whereas the Jabotinskyite views of Pollak and Commentary are — from an academic if not political standpoint — completely marginal.
Noah, I have to concede to Levy a certain point: Israel’s attacks make America’s task of earning the trust of the Arab world alot more difficult. He says:
“Demonstrations across the Arab world and contributors to the ever-proliferating Arabic language news media and blogosphere hold the U.S., and not just Israel, responsible for what happened today (and that is a position taken, for good reasons, by sensible folk, not hard-liners). America’s allies in the region are again running for cover. America’s standing, its interests and security are all deeply affected.”
Protests range from Jordan to Turkey to Pakistan and many places more. That’s why I am hesitant at first to say that the ambigous statement “Both sides should show resraint” should not be said. Recalling the “constituents of war” President Bush mentioned at AEI, I think the constituents for the United States in this conflict would be 1) American citizens, 2) Israeli citizens, 3) the enemy, Hamas, and 4) the rest of the Arab world.
No words diplomatically uttered could possibly be acceptable in appliance to all of those groups. But Bush’s “Israel has a right to defend themselves, but must avoid hurting innocent civillians” is trying to soothe what Levy points out: the Arab world’s fury.
The Left is sympathetic of terrorists like Hamas. But sympathy is not all bad. We DO need it- but for the Arab world.
Lars, you err. Hamas denies/rejects/refuses to acknowledge/et.al. the right of Israel to exist. Try this site among others: http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm
And Andrew, take a look at this and think about Israel’s role in supposedly making it hard for the US in the Mideast: http://myrightword.blogspot.com/2008/12/todays-quiz.html
#7: I think Laris is quite aware of that. I’m not sure there is a way to get around the abstract symmetries between the positions of Israelis and Palestinians who both oppose 2-state solutions.
Lars:
There is currently one Jewish state and there are 22 Arab states which cover nearly the entire Middle East. There is not the slightest resemblance between Likud objecting to the formation of yet another hostile Arab state out of the minuscule portion of land that Israel controls and Hamas demanding that the only Jewish state be eradicated in favor of a 23rd Arab state.
” . . . the Arab world’s fury.”
If the West is to eliminate this fury without eliminating the ignorance and illogical thinking of that world, it will require never-ending acquiescence to their paranoid fantasies. Before adopting dhimmitude, can’t an effort be made to educate these people?
#11 Enforcing strict rules against incest would be a start.
Hanoch,
That’s the answer that I always give.
…But for some reason I’ve never been satisfied with that answer, because the underlying argument is as follows: Likud just doesn’t want a Palestinian state on their territory (they would not be opposed if it were elsewhere), but Hamas doesn’t want a Jewish state ANYWHERE!
But that isn’t really true, is it? For instance, Hamas doesn’t object to a Jewish state elsewhere – say in Madagascar, for argument’s sake. They just don’t want a Jewish state in what they perceive to be their land. Similarly, Likud doesn’t want a Palestinian state in what they consider to be their land. But they wouldn’t object to it existing elsewhere.
So what’s the difference? I really want to get a good answer because I’m on Israel’s side!
Lars — there are a few answers that come to mind.
1) Hamas wants to create on its territory a totalitarian Islamic theocracy that exports terrorism, while Israel is a modern liberal democracy. This isn’t a hard call as to whose statehood and security should be protected.
2) The characterization of Likud isn’t quite right. In my experience — I am not a scholar of the Likud party, so this is anecdotal — the objection of the average Likud voter to a Palestinian state is not Palestinian statehood per se, it is the creation of a terrorist state on Israel’s borders. This is a very important distinction, and a legitimate one. If Hamas started acting like Swedes next week, or even like ordinary peace-minded people, I don’t know any Likudniks who would have any problem with them.
Mr Pollak, your #2 is a concrete refutation of the equivalency argument, and you might further adduce the willingness of leading Likud figures to approve meaningful concessions, including most recently and controversially a disengagement policy that included dismantlement of settlements. I believe that the fact remains that the Likud Charter is a “Greater Israel” document favoring the right to settlement in Judea and Samaria and excluding from consideration the creation of an independent Palestinian state west of the Jordan – without any “unless they act like Swedes” exceptions. There may be – I think indeed there are – good, practical reasons to support this policy, but in an abstract sense Likud still represents a kind of absolute rejectionism. I don’t know how Netanyahu explained either his original support for disengagement or his eventual resignation prior to implementation, but on some level doesn’t this difference explain why he resigned from Sharon’s government and why Sharon had to form Kadima?
Lars’ problem lies in trying to figure out “whose land” it is. The equivalence he sees is between two peoples who both claim the same land for themselves.
The almost unique feature of the Palestinian war against Israel is the world’s willingness to continue to entertain the idea that the land “is” the Palestinians’. Does anyone still push for the unification of Cyprus? Is anyone really trying to free Tibet? Do we think that the various peoples of Yugoslavia should be guaranteed the ability to return to the districts they occupied 30 years ago? Or should the Jews who fled Arab lands (about half the population of Israel) have a right of return to the lands of their ancestors?
In all these cases, world opinion recognizes that abstract “rights” have to yield to practicalities, that causing horrible dislocations of populations is not a reasonable response to a group’s claim to possession that has since been superseded. Only in the case of Israel is it still an open question whose the land is, even though one party has made clear its unwillingness to live in peace. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots were peacefully absorbed by their compatriots years ago. Yet the Palestinians are surrounded by populations very similar to themselves, some of which boast the highest per capita national wealth in the world. Somehow, there is no room in these states for the Palestinians.
So behind Lars’ seemingly innocent questions lies a very sinister assumption: The security of all the Jews in the Mideast should remain an open question forever, as long as the claims of the Palestinians for those particular territories remain unmet.
I think Lars would do well to ask some different questions: Why are Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia (which harbors a large Palestinian population which cannot be offered citizenship) not in any way responsible for providing the Palestinians with homes and citizenship?
Margo, that’s very well put. I would add that the dynamics of the conflict, which do permit the Palestinian Arab elites to immigrate or send their children to the West and to some wealthy Arab states, arguably leave in their wake the least functional elements of the population. At any rate, a population evidently devoid of constructive leadership. The best and brightest are disproportionately skimmed off while the rest simply sour.
The old Likud quip was “WE do support a Palestinian state. It is called Jordan.”
Margo, I certainly hear what you’re saying – although I don’t think any of my questions are “sinister” – but I suppose an important point to make in this regard is that there are unquestionably a number of Palestinians who should not need to be absorbed by Syria simply because they’ve been living in what is now the State of Israel for years and years – long before the State was established. Whatever you want to call these people – Palestinians, Southern Syrians, Hashemites, etc. – the fact is that they lived somewhere in that area between Tzfat and Eilat, and I don’t see any reason why they shouldn’t (at least in principle) be allowed to continue living there.
But as far as Noah’s points are concerned, I definitely agree. Thank you! I suppose Likud’s actions speak louder than words. But that being the case, I think it would just be smarter for Likud to emend their platform rather than have to explain it away. There would be no harm done to the actual, practical positions adopted by Likud…and it would make my life a lot easier!
Lars, obviously “at least in principle” they should. If that means perpetual war for the other people, the Jews, who were living in the area between Safad and Eilat and throughout the Middle East for years before the establishment of the State of Israel, that’s too bad for them. Have I got that right?
Margo, I don’t see any reason for your sarcasm or hostility. I’m not even arguing with you. I’m trying to understand a position that I consider valuable and your belligerent tone is not helpful.
You haven’t really responded to my point.
Lars,
It is quite interesting that you are offering the same solution for the Jews as Hitler briefly suggested – a state in Madagascar. And since Jews are unwelcome anywhere in the world, Madagascar is allready populated and Arabs show a definite propensity to murder Jews on sight, what might your suggestion be as to what to do with the Jews?
Lars, I responded to your point. Your point is that the only “principles” to be considered are where populations used to reside. If they lived there, they have a right to it. But then you don’t apply that principle to the Jews of Israel. If they used to live in Iraq, or in Yemen, do they have a right to that? Or if they used to live in Israel pre-state, do they have a right? It seems that only the Palestinians have those kinds of rights according to you.
My principles include the principle that people should not be sacrificed. The Palestinians should not be sacrificed to the Arab states’ rejectionist policies, but should be allowed to find homes among them, as the Jews from Arab lands have in Israel. The Israelis should not be sacrificed to the Palestinians, but should be allowed to have their own secure state.
Would it be better for the Palestinians to be able to take over Israel as Hamas has stated its program to be? Maybe. But it would be a disaster for the Israelis. So why would you consider that a net gain for humanity? And why not suggest that the Palestinians might be able to find a homeland in Madagascar?
I think those who argue for a Palestinian Arab state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean need to download a Google map of the region. I mean seriously, the Arabs control over 5 million square miles of largely empty territory populated by peoples who share a common ethnicity, religion, language, and culture with the Palestinian Arabs. Israel is roughly the size of New Jersey and surrounded by well-armed countries some of whom still reject her existence (the Saudis insisted the Israeli delegation at Annapolis use the service entrance). And please don’t talk to me about the Saudi promise of Arab “normalization” if Israel returns to the 1949 armistice lines and agrees to partition Jerusalem. A nebulous promise in exchange for the permanent surrender of land is simply a bad deal.
There are limited water resources west of the Jordan River and whomever controls the Judean Hills controls the strategic high ground and attack routes above Israeli population centers. There has never been a viable non-contiguous state in recorded history and one or both of Israel and Palestine would be bisected in keeping with the “two-state solution” currently on the table. It is simply untenable for two secure states to occupy the same resource-poor sliver of land. And that is before one considers the long history of violent conflict and mistrust between the two populations.