This could not have been more predictable:

The junior partner in the Norwegian government, the Socialist Left Party of Kristin Halvorsen, (Sosialistisk Venstreparti), plans to vote on a measure calling for military action against Israel if it decides to act against the Hamas in Gaza… Here is the less than lucid reasoning behind the motion: The credibility of the world community in its confrontation with the Gadafi regime is undermined when there is no reaction against other states in the region who commit injustices against civil population. The greater world community must therefore also react against Israeli air attacks on the Gaza strip.

Admittedly Norway might be a special case. The country’s level of institutionalized anti-Israel hostility is pathological. Norway is where the Israelis are being evicted from their embassy because there are too many security threats against their building. Those security threats are incited in part by Norwegian authorities who fund anti-Israel hatefests, whether in the form of Israel-hating all-star academic seminars or via blood-soaked exhibits that line up dead Palestinian babies with Nazi-style IDF helmets. The Israelis are trying to relocate elsewhere, but no one is willing to rent land to the country’s favorite Two Minute Hate target. So it’s unclear what’s going to happen.

Norway also has a long tradition of trying to shield genocidal partisans from Israeli retaliation. In 1992 Norwegian UNIFIL troops smuggled Lebanese terrorists away from the IDF, one of many stunts before and after that caused the Israelis to distrust their participation in the international force. The country is also an incubator for creative anti-Israel lawfare, as happened when the Red Cross floated the idea of prosecuting dual Israeli-Norwegian citizens for war crimes. So it’s no surprise that Oslo would be at the forefront of trying to apply the Libya Responsibility-to-Protect precedent to Israel.

But with due deference to Norway’s status as a particularly toxic cesspool of anti-Israel incitement, the idea won’t stay in Oslo. Ambassador Rice and President Obama have succeeded in linking the use of national force with a particularly flexible interpretation of international humanitarianism. Contemporary international humanitarianism, in turn, is a pretext seething activists and government officials use to obsess over Israel. With every juridical tool imaginable already being turned against the Jewish state, it’s inevitable that this newer and more expansive precedent will soon become very popular.

President Obama told lawmakers in a closed session last Friday that the United States won’t kill Qaddafi. Those who embrace the institutions of international justice might applaud, but the reticence of Western officials to consider targeted assassination in their quiver of policy options is misguided. Israel, of course, has utilized targeted assassination: Taking out a terrorist mastermind by predator or bomb obviates the need to send in a massive force and therefore minimizes collateral damage.

A few years ago, in the context of Hezbollah’s war with Israel, I penned a piece re-examining the issue of assassination in American policy. The fact is that in many circumstances assassination is not illegal under international law. The moratorium on assassination is more a matter of choice. Certainly, fear that assassinating foreign leaders might open a Pandora’s Box of retribution is valid, although rogue leaders will try to assassinate Americans anyway. Still, targeted assassinations are not a policy to be embarked upon lightly or for any reason but to prevent (further) war.

When foreign leaders are, like Qaddafi, unelected and unstable dictators and military commanders, they are valid targets. Qaddafi certainly does not deserve immunity which is what, in effect, Obama now promises him. When terrorist leaders spark conflict, they should be held personally accountable. Qaddafi may be willing to fight to the last conscript, but he may be less enthusiastic about risking his own skin.

There is also the question of deterrence. While it’s conventional wisdom in certain circles that Israel lost the 2006 war, I quibble: By trusting in the international community, Israel lost the peace and allowed Hezbollah to rearm. This past fall, however, when I was in Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon and southern Beirut, locals were talking about Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon. Ahmadinejad was his bombastic self, but what Lebanese were gossiping about was that Hassan Nasrallah did not take the stage with his patron. Whereas before 2006, the Hezbollah secretary-general appeared in public often, post-2006 he is simply too scared. It’s time to make Qaddafi fear for his life as well. By doing so, we might avoid far greater bloodshed both in Libya now and down the road. The point is not aggression, but deterring war and ultimately saving lives.

Any Syrian rebels looking for a sign of support from the Obama administration got their hopes dashed pretty thoroughly by Hillary Clinton on the morning shows today. Not only has she essentially taken military intervention off the table, but she also referred to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad as a “reformer.”  ”There is a different leader in Syria now, many of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe he’s a reformer,” she said.

Basically the State Department’s position is that Assad really isn’t that bad of a guy, and even if he was, the U.S. and the rest of the world don’t really care enough to intervene.

“If there were a coalition of the international community, if there was the passage of a Security Council resolution, if there were a call by the Arab League, if there was a condemnation that was universal, but that is not going to happen because I don’t think it is yet clear what will occur, what will unfold,” said Clinton, when asked if the U.S. would take military action in Syria.

Assad can rest easy knowing that he can continue to gun down peaceful protesters in the streets with impunity.

This past week, Hussein Ibish of the American Task Force on Palestine wrote an article published by Foreign Policy in which he asserted a false moral equivalence between the terrorists of Hamas and Israel’s government, and more than hinted that he believed both were interested in fomenting a new war. He also lamented the prospect that this joint sanguinary exercise might derail the Arab Spring and somehow convince those hoping that Arab tyrannies might be replaced by democracies to forget about reforming their own countries. Here at Contentions, I pointed out that his thesis was preposterous. The belief that the Arabs were so simple as to be beguiled out of hoping for freedom by yet more violence perpetrated by Islamists infantilized them. His assertion of a moral equivalence by Hamas and Israel was not only false; his attempt to blame Israel for Hamas terrorism was part of a long tradition of anti-Zionist propaganda.

Ibish has now responded with a longwinded rant on his Ibishblog that, if anything, makes me think even less of him. Rather than merely attempt to point out the weaknesses of my critique of his piece, Ibish explodes in a 1,800-word temper tantrum (in response to my 600-word post) of name-calling and ad hominem vitriol aimed at both COMMENTARY and me. He concludes by asserting that I’ve called him an anti-Semite even though he admits I never actually wrote that. Read More

President Obama’s dithering response to both Egypt and Libya should be a model for exactly how not to respond to the escalating violence in Syria. There’s no guarantee that immediate U.S. action will forestall a major crackdown by Assad, but there are certain steps the Obama administration should be taking to help prevent that outcome.

In the Washington Post, Elliott Abrams recommends five of them:

1. Robust vocal condemnation: And not just from the White House, says Abrams. “All those who were taken in by Assad” – such as Sen. John Kerry – “should be loudest in denouncing his bloody repression,” he advises.
2. Ramp up the pressure on Assad at multilateral forums: Abrams names the UNSC, the UNHRC and the ICC as three possibilities. I’d also add that it might be helpful for the UNSC to expedite the Hariri tribunal, and add Assad to the prosecution list.
3. Bring in the Arab League: “Libya was expelled; let’s demand that Syria be, too,” writes Abrams.
4. Push for sanctions from the Europeans: Abrams notes, “U.S. sanctions against Syria are strong and probably cannot be increased effectively now, but the European Union has far more trade and investment.”
5. Bring home Robert Ford: Abrams writes that the Obama administration “erred badly” by sending an ambassador to Syria. He argues that we should recall Ford and “unveil a hard-hitting political and human rights campaign against a bloody regime whose people want it gone.”

Great recommendations that should be put into action immediately, with the possible exception of recalling Ford. As long as he’s still over there, it might be worth it to try to gain some leverage.

At the Progressive Fix, Josh Block suggests that the Obama administration “should start by dispatching Ambassador Robert Ford to Daraa, where dozens were slaughtered in the streets this week…From Daraa, Ambassador Ford should call for a full UN Security Council investigation into what happened during the recent protests.” The U.S. can always pull him out later, and it might be better at the moment to have him there as an outspoken critic of the regime.

Encouraged by the revolts taking place throughout the Arab world many Syrians have taken to the streets hoping to get rid of their own tyrants. Given the history of the Assad regime, it was hardly surprising that the government would crack down hard, killing dozens of protesters. But the reaction among our chattering classes to the latest evidence that the leadership of Bashar Assad was every bit as brutal as that of his father, Hafez, has been a little different from their response to events in Libya. To Washington’s foreign policy “realists” and the professional peace processers in the State Department and think tanks, the spread of the so-called Arab Spring to Damascus has provoked something akin to panic. As a “news analysis” published on the front page of Sunday’s New York Times that was peppered with anonymous quotes from administration officials put it: “the deepening chaos in Syria, in particular, could dash any remaining hopes for a Middle East peace agreement.”

The belief that a Syria run by one of the Assads would ever make peace with Israel was always a myth. Though the Syrian leadership was as corrupt and bloody as any on the planet, members of the Washington foreign policy establishment have always kept the late Hafez Assad and his son and successor Bashar close to their hearts. They dreamed that somehow the Syrians could be tempted to accept a trade of land for peace with Israel. Since, as today’s Times again states, Syria is key to a comprehensive regional peace, it was vital for the United States to keep trying to appease the Assads and to pressure Israel to do the same. Punctuated by only brief interludes of sanity, such as George W. Bush’s efforts to help Lebanon free itself of Syrian occupation, the impulse to think well of the Assads was part of Washington’s peace process obsession for decades. From President Jimmy Carter’s proclamation that Hafez Assad was a “moderate” to the Obama administration’s wooing of Bashar with envoys like George Mitchell and Senator John Kerry (who succeeded the recently defeated Arlen Specter in the role of Syria’s best friend in the Senate), the illusion of a Syrian desire for peace dominated our attitude towards the country. Read More

There have been a slew of recent reports that some of the Libyan rebels have al Qaeda ties. This seems not only credible, but obvious. Eastern Libya is a known jihadist hot spot. Where Arab governments are repressive and abusive, Islamism and jihad will fill the space occupied by legitimate political opposition in pluralistic systems.

So, yes, some rebels undoubtedly have ties to al Qaeda. And, yes, it is frightening to think that in a slightly tortured mechanical reading of things, this puts us indirectly on the side of al Qaeda. But there is a more important, more legitimate, and more realistic way to view this. Does America want the rebels indebted to the United States for helping them topple Muammar Qaddafi or want them aligning with al Qaeda’s local representatives after we confirm the jihadist narrative that the U.S. does not care about Muslim freedom and only wants to maintain ties with oil-funded dictators?

The answer is obvious. The surest way to turn al Qaeda from a sideline detail to a major player is to abandon the rebels and deliver the country back into Qaddafi’s hands.  It’s become something of a punchline, but the “battle for hearts and minds” is still the most maddeningly important dynamic of the war on terror. That battle is not won by sitting back and letting al Qaeda make its best case to desperate Muslims. Lest we forget: for the two years that Barack Obama implemented his “who are we to judge dictators” policy, support for jihad went up among Muslims in the Middle East. We stay out of things at our own risk.

We can prevent a pro-jihad outcome in Libya, but we must be unapologetic about–and committed to–toppling the Qaddafi regime. As we scramble for an early exit al Qaeda will get stronger and Libyan rebels, like those who aided the downed American pilot last week, will be sure to put their trust elsewhere.

Qaddafi’s had his own mercenaries for a while, so is it time for the rebels to even things out and bring in some reinforcements from Blackwater? Over at Wired, Spencer Ackerman weighs in on what a mercenary mission in Libya might look like:

One would be military: they’d teach the rebels basic infantry tactics, like how to shoot and maneuver, and offer guidance on logistics and command. …

The other mission would be communication, requiring a two-person team. “Rebels always need better public relations,” the vet says. This wouldn’t just be training in how to shoot video or tweet effectively. They’d bring in satellite phones, mobile connectivity tools, “means to get it done [since] the power of witness is huge.”

There’s no doubt that there could be some benefits to the mercenary plan. For one, the rebels are sorely lacking in arms and military training. Our marines are already stretched, and the American people probably aren’t gunning for yet another ground-war. A group like Blackwater would not only provide the necessary training, but it could also serve as a watchdog on any weaponry provided to the anti-Qaddafi forces. There have been reports that al Qaeda has already seized some of the military supplies from the rebels and smuggled it to safehouses, and an infusion of vigilant security contractors could reduce the chances of this reoccurring. Combined, these assets would go a long way in helping to topple Qaddafi.

A potential downside: There are reports that some of the fighters joining the rebels have al Qaeda ties. If this is accurate, then giving these combatants military training and access to weapons could obviously cause problems down the road.

Whether in Afghanistan (from where I write this post), Iraq, or Libya, there is a single, corrosive assumption underlying President Obama’s foreign policy: By threatening to abdicate leadership, the United States can force allies and regional partners to act responsibly.

Hence, the White House believes it can pressure Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai to crackdown on corruption and focus on good governance if only it signals to Karzai that American support is finite, hence the 2014 deadline. Likewise, the White House believes that withdrawing from Iraq not only militarily but also in terms of post-withdrawal partnerships will force Iraqi politicians to cease squabbling and unite to build a brighter future. With regard to Libya, deferring American leadership will force the Arab League to step up to the plate.

Obama may see himself as an international president, but this core assumption rests upon myopic and ironic arrogance which assumes that American relations are essentially bilateral so that when America threatens to withdraw support, our partners will have no other countries to turn to.  Obama’s strategy team represents Washington navel-gazing at its worst. There are other players in the sandbox. After Obama announced America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, Karzai simply shifted his embrace to Pakistan, and redoubled his efforts to court Iran and China.

When I was in Najaf, Iraq this past December, I met with three Grand Ayatollahs. They all had very different styles and personalities, but each made reference to the elder President Bush’s “abandonment” of the Shi‘ites during the 1991 uprising. That event drove Iraqi Shi‘ites into the embrace of Iran despite Iraqi resentment of Iran’s paternalism and their distrust of Khomeini’s clerical theories. Traditionally, the grand ayatollahs’ eldest sons act as their de facto political agents. Each of the ones I saw re-emphasized this point: Rather than empower Iraq, Obama’s policy was empowering Iran.

With regard to Libya, Obama’s refusal to lead has raised the price of victory: His refusal to recognize that war is as much psychological as military has convinced Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi that he can simply wait out international action. Creating space for NATO to squabble (a certainty with European countries that refuse to tie influence to military investment) simply empowers Russia, China, and the Arab League.

Our commander in chief will fail repeatedly until he recognizes that leadership and multilateral equality are mutually exclusive. When America vacates its leadership, responsible pro-Western forces do not fill the vacuum; without exception, our adversaries will.

The most noteworthy detail of the UK riots Omri mentions is the organized contingent of anarchists and their commitment to large-scale theatrical destruction. This follows last year’s dramatic uptick in anarchist attacks across Europe and in cyberspace.  It is a good time to mention that I wrote an article entitled  “The Return of Anarchism” in the March issue of COMMENTARY, as yesterday’s chaos seems to fit with my take on things. Yesterday’s Daily Mail reports, “Anarchists today broke away from one of the largest protests Britain has ever seen to bring chaos to the streets of London.” In “The Return of Anarchism,” I write:

The best way to think of today’s Euro-anarchists is as a small contingent of rioters who have broken away from the crowd and recognized that asking a failed statist system for more statism is nonsensical. Action aimed at bringing down a failed system at least has a certain logic to it, however dark and unrealistic. Anarchism is the only place for the left to go when statism fails.

In America, a lack of faith in government is a foundational political principle. In Europe, it amounts to a continent-wide identity crisis.  Expect even more nihilism from anarchists in the months ahead, as European governments enact the austerity measures they decided on last year.

This is becoming kind of a thing. The British government slashes benefits in a desperate attempt to move toward fiscal solvency. Then British citizens angrily take to the streets because they think that “stuff costs money” is a capitalist fiction invented to disturb their ataraxic post-national torpor. Riots break out and the UK’s cradle-to-grave welfare recipients try to wreck London, defacing and destroying landmarks and symbols of British life and democracy.

The last riot was over an increase in student tuition. Protesters wrecked Parliament Square, attacked the Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall, and dropped a fire extinguisher from a seventh-floor rooftop onto officers standing below. Rather than hold the children responsible for their temper tantrums, bien pensant papers like the Guardian castigated London police for “criminalizing” the poor dears. Read More