If it’s the first week of August, it’s time for the annual session of American breast-beating about President Harry Truman’s decision to launch the first nuclear weapons attack on Japan. For decades, leftist revisionists have sought to brand Truman as a war criminal for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whose anniversaries are commemorated this week. Those critics have generally ignored the facts concerning Japan’s intransigence about surrender while wrongly seeking to portray as immoral a reasonable American decision-making process in the summer of 1945 about how best to achieve a quick end to the war while shedding the least blood.
But there is a new theory about why Japan surrendered that avoids the naïveté of Truman’s traditional critics while still insisting he was wrong to drop the bomb. A fascinating feature in yesterday’s Boston Globe outlines the theories of historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who argues in a new book it was not the A-bomb but the last minute entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the Pacific that convinced the Japanese to give up. This thesis provides plenty of food for thought but is ultimately unpersuasive as a critique of Truman.



