There’s a growing chorus of skeptics among the foreign policy establishment who argue that sanctions will not change the Iranian regime’s behavior. After all, the Islamic Republic prioritizes ideology ahead of its own public’s well-being and, having grown up at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, many of Tehran’s ruling elite have faced far worse deprivation.
It is curious that proponents of engagement cite Iran’s pragmatism when it comes to the possibilities of successful diplomacy, but then acknowledge the Iranian leadership’s ideological commitment when it comes to reasons not to utilize tools of coercion.
History, however, can be a guide. Twice, in the Islamic Republic’s history, the Iranian leadership has sworn no surrender. In 1979, they said they would not release their American hostages until Washington met Ayatollah Khomeini’s demands not only of the forcible extradition of the Shah and his family, but also apologies, compensation, and a return of all Iranian assets, real or imagined. While cancer claimed the Shah during the crisis, Khomeini reversed course against the backdrop of the Iraqi invasion: The cost of Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation had simply grown too great to bear; Khomeini preferred to focus on the greater danger posed by Iraq and so cut the deal he had determinedly refused for the prior year.
Saddam Hussein’s invasion fanned the flames of Khomeini’s fervor. While Iranian forces had largely expelled Iraqi forces from Iranian territory by 1982, Khomeini shrugged off suggestions that he accept a ceasefire and instead committed Iran to end Saddam’s regime once and for all. During the course of the following six years, the Iranians lost hundreds of thousands of men and gained nothing. In the end, however, the tremendous human cost, isolation, and sanctions took their toll.
When Khomeini announced a ceasefire with Iraq, he likened it to drinking a chalice of poison but said preserving the Islamic Republic gave him no choice. Herein, the precedent is clear: Years of diplomacy have achieved nothing. The Iranian government has mastered the art of stringing credulous diplomats along. But if the cost becomes too high for Iranians to bear, even the government will swallow its pride and reverse course. The only question for diplomats and congressmen should be how to maximize the pain sanctions can cause the Iranian regime.
Michael Rubin: "It is curious that proponents of engagement cite Iran’s pragmatism when it comes to the possibilities of successful diplomacy, but then acknowledge the Iranian leadership’s ideological commitment when it comes to reasons not to utilize tools of coercion." n n–It is more than "curious." Have you considered the possibility that they are not arguing in good faith? That they are basically OK with Iran getting nukes, and these arguments that are so "curious" to you are really a smokescreen?
It's just like Iraq. There's no amount of sanctions that can force Iran to stop their non-existent nuclear weapons program. Sanctions cannot work for this reason. n nEventually, the USA will have the war it so desires. 100K + dead, would be a guess.
You know this because . . . . why exactly?
Problem is, Mr. Rubin, what if you're wrong?
He's advocating sanctions, not war. You have a problem with that?