I have already blogged on Matthew Kroening’s compelling article in the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs: “Time to Attack Iran.” Now the Foreign Affairs website has posted two thought-provoking responses.
One, by Colin Kahl, who recently left the Defense Department as a senior official, argues the case against striking Iran. Or, to be exact, he argues that “given the high costs and inherent uncertainties of a strike, the United States should not rush to use force until all other options have been exhausted and the Iranian threat is not just growing but imminent”—a point that even most advocates of military action would not, I suspect, disagree with.
The other response, by Jamie Fly of the Foreign Policy Initiative and Gary Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute, argues the case for more ambitious attacks designed not only to stop the Iranian nuclear program but to overthrow the regime.
In the end, I am not fully persuaded by either response, but both have good points to make—especially about the difficulty of controlling the aftermath of airstrikes on nuclear installations. We should never enter another conflict based, as we did in Iraq, on best-case scenarios; we must prepare for the worst that could happen as well as the best. Kroening suggests it should be possible to keep the conflict from escalating, while both Kahl and Fly/Schmitt suggest escalation will be hard to avert. The difference is that while Kahl uses this as a reason to avoid airstrikes altogether, Fly/Schmitt suggest this is all the more reason to strike Iranian regime targets hard so as to make retaliation less likely and less effective.
I’m with Kroening here: I think it would make sense to keep any airstrike strictly limited at first, reserving the right to escalate should the Iranians respond with attacks on us or our allies. I also agree with Kahl there is no need to rush into airstrikes—yet. But time is growing short, and we must be careful not to let Iran pass certain redlines that will allow it to field functional nukes in short order.
Max, Max, Max. Grumps Gramps will now proceed to have a coronary. n nA few points: a) preemptive wars of choice are easy to get into but much harder to back out of, at least, back out of with your original goals achieved rather than discretely hedged, folded, and put in the back pocket as the GIs sail home,–think the last two Israeli operations in Lebanon and you could go back the last two before that and, yes, less glaringly Operation Cast Lead; b) yes assume worst case, particularly when targetting semi-assembled connect-the-dots components, plans, installations, labs in progress (and the enrichment sites are being hardened beneath, word has it, mountains); c) assume that air campaigns absent a vigorous ground component will fail to meet their strategic goals absent (if then) a punishing and exhaustive unloading of smart and stupid ordinance that no conceiveable national leader actually in a position to do anything will do for the forseeable future,well, unless Newt wins and the mullahs run TV commercials against him….
I suggest that we wait until until the first nukes from Iran strike New York, or Los Angeles, or Washington. Then we will be thoroughly justified in anything that we do to remove the nukes from Iran. After all, we were cautious with Hitler. And we did 'win' eventually – 60 million or so innocent lives later. And Iran has been so innocent so far. They didn't attack our embassy in Teheran in 1979. They don't send arms to terrorists all over the world which then uses them to murder thousands of innocents. They're nice people who don't mean any harm. If ever 'the sooner the better' meant anything at all, it is in this case.
Think of it this way. They have to test the da_n thing before they use it. Because an attempted strike with a dud would be a very very very lethal oooops. An Iranian nuclear strike out of the blue without warning and foreknowledge is just not that likely. If you track Israeli military activity in Lebanon from 1976 to today you'll see that the net effect has been to reshuffle dangers not eliminate them. A strike against Iran needs to meet some balance of absolute need and likely success. If sanctions fail and Iran gets a nuke Israel will make its decision along the absolute need axis and likely success will be not so important. But imo we aren't there yet.
While we wait for Iran to "test" a bomb,they are sending the latest ground to ground and ground to air missiles to every despotic regime in the world. Where do they get these and other weapons? China, Russia, North Korea, etc. It's not just the 'bomb'. It is a nation led by Hitlers anxious to murder every American and every Jew in their sights. And they are doing it and have been doing it every day in Iraq, Afghanistan and throughout the world. It must be stopped NOW. And military force is the only was to do it.
Too early. And your comprehensive rationale calls not for elminating facilities but uprooting an entire regime. Right now this is beyond American will, resources, and capability.
Funny. Before I saw the comments, I was going to say that even though we have different readings of the situation, Mr. Boot's post showed a modicum of reasonableness. If a strategist thinks of this soberly, and the many ways it could go out of control, he may become more cautious. This is a country of 70+ million, heir to an ancient civilization, with many skilled and educated people, some reasonably powerful friends, and a history of bravery in defending its territory.
He does say a strike should be only in response to an "imminent" threat–he was more cautious than this old pooch gave him credit for–personally I worry about acting on "red lines" before they are set and, which he does say, acting on best-case scenarios. The problem is that unless you sweat the details of possible end games and your worst case you end up with strategic drift. Also Max just assumes that airstrikes are going to solve the problem–let's say we accept that there are nuclear weapons under acttive development and that is considered a redline. But if you follow the history of Israeli warfare, campaigns that did not have a carefully thought out (and decisive) grand force did not work. It could work but it will not necessarily be clean.
(part of my comment got eaten) n nI don't have the same assessment of where our strategic interests lie, and I'm not so fearful of Iran as many are, but when one thinks about what could, and therefore probably would go wrong, one becomes more cautious. For such small favors, I am grateful. n nAs for non-military means, remember that it was the oil embargo on Japan, among other things, that provoked Pearl Harbor. Provoking any kind of act of war against us, or Israel, which would allow us to claim the war was defensive, may well be in the cards, intentionally or unintentionally.
"…it was the oil embargo on Japan, among other things, that provoked Pearl Harbor." This might be the most prolific canard on what provoked the War in the Pacific. Japan's attack on Pearl marked 10 years of substantially unopposed aggression commencing with her invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The United States, Britain and France invited Japanese attacks with a continuing stream of puny, tepid responses to overt challenges. The U.S. oil embargo followed this limited measures response conveying once again weakness in the face of Japanese aggression. By Grumpy's definition locking the door when a thief is attempting to break in your house would be a provocation. With the Japanese banging on the door in 1941, America didn't need an oil embargo, it needed a preemptive shot gun blast.
imo folks are correct to point out that the embargo was in response to a very aggressive and sustained campaign of imperial expansion that was extraordinarily brutal (rape of Nanking). n nBut the EU is seriously considering the embargo, Certainly (this is the EU which is also considering an escalating campaign to isolate Israeli communities and control throughout the West Bank) does not want to provoke a war (they probably can't wage anyways) endangering the international oil market in an armed conflict (as opposed to pressuring Iran by switching from Iranian product to alternatives). n nThey are straight up. They are mulling over whether they can insulate themselves from the spreading waves of regional disturbances catalzyed by a resurgent theocracy with a nuclear deterrent/threat. If they thought they could negotiate some transparency into the nuclear program of Tehran and deter Tehran from breaking out they would not be considering this step which they do hope will avoid future conflict not spark it.. n nAnd, as we know from Wikileask, the Gulf Sunni emirates are terrified of a nuclear Iran much more than they are of Israel's nukes.
Not yet, the election is in November.
"But time is growing short, and we must be careful not to let Iran pass certain redlines that will allow it to field functional nukes in short order." What red lines are being referred to?
From Def Sec Panetta's remarks Israel is hinting that at a certain stage of breakout uranium enrichment (say perfecting 20% or up to weapons grade) they will consider that as good as a nuke under construction. Panetta says a) actual start up of a nukes weapons system and b) that the various development efforts to date–including testing out high explosive nuclear–triggers, is not weaponization. 1) Israel may not be that impatient for major action and may settle for current sabotage efforts; 2) US "red line" isn't exactly set in concrete either. n nBut if Iran were to master the enrichment cycle up to self-sustaining enrichment up to weapons grade and master the technology to trigger a nuclear device and deliver it by plane or (especially) miniaturized device for missle payload and have the delivery system vehicles (planes, missiles) at the ready–that's the kind of redl line intended. AFIK with this in gear, the actual assembly of nuclear components is "at will".
"Regime Change" is the point that cannot be emphasized enough. n nThe U.S. (and Israel for that matter) has a vital national security interest in getting the Teheran Regime out of power as soon as possible. That fact that we have p*ssed away 30 years talking about it but doing practically nothing makes it that much more imperative. n nMax's post and the one by Fly and Schmitt miss this most important point, leaping right to the idea of bombing the mullahs out of power. Ideally the U.S. should have started working covertly by any and all means with the Green Movement in Iran, to foment the overthrow of the Regime. But even now it is not too late to encourage and instigate as much economic damage to the Regime as possible, including arming any opposition group inside Iran that is willing and able to act. n nNot only is this kind of support a necessary precursor to any, actual military action, it is doubly important in terms of any post-Regime future in Iran. Iranians, in many private polls, are pro-Western, Regime propaganda notwithstanding. It is not unlikely that the U.S. could help a pro-Western government into power in Iran. At that point, the entire momentum and direction of the Middle East changes. That's what the U.S. needs to be focused on. n nOf course there needs to be planning for outright military action but there are plenty of other options that are stronger than diplomacy and sanctions that need to be tried first.
DEar Dr. Boot: Speaking as a devoted friend of Israel and as a firm opponent of anti-semitism, I can only say that a US attack on Iran would be a disaster for America, for Israel and for the world. "Surgical" airstrikes are a myth–particularly if one is attacking nuclear facilities–let us remember Chernobyl. The huge collateral damage from such airstrikes would be blamed on Israel–dumping fuel on the fire of anti-semitism all over the Islamic world in particular and and the wider world in general– and undoubtedly would touch off a wave of violence against Jews in many foreign countries. Yes, Iran getting a bomb would be a terrible disaster for the world–but there are lots of terrible things in the world that cannot be prevented at an acceptable cost and that hence have to be lived with. Sincerely and REspectfully, Dr.Ernest Evans
Don't assume that Israel can live with a nuke enabled regime that thinks Anne Frank's death was funny, calls for extirpation of the Jewish state, sponsors Holocaust denial, and revives every anti-Jewish canard it can get its hands on. Israel may judge that it literally cannot live with an Iran with nukes–if will be sussing out a ratio of upsides and downsides, but if they feel that the situation is as critical as it was for Israel in 1967 then the downsides become less and less relevant. And don't underestimate the radicalizing effect having nukes would have on an Iranian regime that is already attempting to ring Israel with armed proxies. That said, I agree that advocates of airpower typically underplay its uncertainties, inaccuracies, and civilian casualties. And effectiveness. We all remember the extensive bombardments of islands surrounding the Japanese homeland that failed to substantially dislodge or degrade the dug-in Japanese defenders. I have no answers here. Ultimately we encounter the age old questions of human fallibility, just wars, etc.
Who is main enemy of Iran? Saudi Arabia! nWhy Iran's propaganda speaks against Israel and USA?.- To win Arab's mind in the sect religion war. nDo Iran need bomb Israel or USA? – No, they need Mecca! n"Status quo, nor war" is the best strategy for us! nMike
You have to do it! The bomb success is for the interior use,so completely destroyed facilities will be ignored and hidden without serious retaliation.