I have already compared the trial of 16 Americans, along with a number of Egyptians, in an Egyptian court on trumped-up charges of violating various laws to the Iranian hostage crisis in terms of the challenge it poses to American power. There is another similarity worth noting: In both cases we were in some sense reaping what we sowed.
Much of the reason Iranians were so anti-American in 1979, after all, was the unlimited backing we had given to an unpopular dictator, the Shah. Likewise, much of the reason Egyptians are anti-American is because of the unlimited backing we gave to another unpopular dictator, Hosni Mubarak. It did not matter in either case that at the last minute, when both men were in danger of toppling, the U.S. effectively withdrew its backing. All that the people of Egypt and Iran would remember was the decades of support for a dictator which preceded the regime’s demise.
Needless to say, I do not condone this anti-Americanism, but I can understand it–just as I can understand why so many American governments found it prudent to back the Shah and Mubarak. The regime which succeeded the Shah makes his rule seem paradisiacal by comparison; the same might yet be said of whatever regime emerges in Egypt, which will be dominated by Islamists. Perhaps there was no “third way” possible (to evoke that Cold War phrase), but we should have at least tried harder to find it by pushing our dictatorial allies to reform and providing support to moderate opposition elements.
We didn’t do that in the case of Egypt and Iran and are now paying the price. It is not too late in the case of other regional allies such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. We need to push them to liberalize, or else we can expect more hostage crises and show trials in our future.
The Shah was not a dictator of the Mubarak stripe. The U.S. did not need to push the Shah towards reform, because the Shah was doing it himself. In fact, despite the vastly exaggerated claims about the depredations of the Shah's Savak domestic security apparatus, civil liberties were expanding and in fact should be given dubious credit for facilitating the spread of Ayatollah Khomeini's malign movement. Certainly one could call the Shah a despot, yet a benevolent despot, better compared with a King Hussein than a Mubarak. Unfortunately, the Shah's Iran was not Hussein's Jordan. n nLikewise, a proper look at the overthrow of the Mosaddegh regime reveals a far more complex event than just the "CIA coup" of the bloggers or those who get their history from Wikipedia. In fact, the resentment towards the U.S. in Iran for the 1953 "coup" is largely mythical — the mullahs supported it! — and at best retrospective. The revolution in Iran had nothing to do with the aspirations of a liberty-loving people trying to free themselves from a dictator, and everything to do with the ambitions of opportunists centered in Qum and the bazaars of Tehran. n nEgypt and Iran may be comparable as to "Islamist" results, but as to "dictator" causes, I think Boot's comparisons are far too facile.
I understand that this is common sense view of the world. But since 80% of all Iranians have no living memory of the Shah it's increasingly difficult to make that case. The leftists in the US go even further, all the way back to 1952's Mossadq's coup. But in fact things that happened 60 years ago become increasingly less relevant when the current regime has held untrammeled absolute power for a generation.
Max Boot loves spreading democracy in Dar al-Islam. There is a tiny problem there, what if people democratically vote, as they increasingly do, to blow up Jews and behead Christians? n nWhat Mr Boot response? n nNone as far as I can see. n