Marc Lynch, a blogger and professor of Middle Eastern studies, has penned a lengthy policy brief about Syria for the Center for a New American Security. It is comprised of two parts that appear to be at war with one another. The first part lays out all the reasons why the West must do something about the escalating violence in Syria.
He warns that Syria is descending into a full-blown “internal war” that “could shatter the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Syria and reverberate across the region.” He even says “Syria could replicate Lebanon of the 1980s, on steroids.” “Beyond these strategic concerns,” he continues, “there is a humanitarian imperative to help the Syrian people. The horrifying evidence of massacres and regime brutality make it difficult – and wrong – for the world to avert its gaze.”
I couldn’t agree more. Where I disagree is in his recommendations for what to do about this calamity which is now unfolding. He argues against military intervention—even against arming the Syrian opposition—in favor of, you guessed it, more robust diplomacy. He proposes to do the following:
First, the international community should present Assad with an ultimatum: Since Assad can no longer participate in a legitimate Syrian government, he, his vice president and a limited group of top regime officials must resign or be referred to the International Criminal Court for War Crimes (ICC). Second, the international community should continue to tighten the economic and financial sanctions against the Assad regime, its senior leaders and the most senior members of the Syrian military. Third, the international community should conduct a sustained and vigorous effort to isolate the Assad regime diplomatically. Fourth, the international community should strengthen the opposition and encourage it to develop a unified political voice. Finally, the United States and its partners should support a strategic communications campaign to publicize the regime’s atrocities, shame those who continue to support the regime and encourage regime members to defect.
All of these steps are worth taking, but they are not very different from what is currently being done—with scant impact. The Assad regime is able to stay in power because it can count on the loyalty of a substantial portion of its security forces and the backing of unsavory regimes such as Russia and Iran. Lynch himself dismisses airy talk from the administration “that the collapse of the Assad regime is only a matter of time.” He notes, rightly, that “Assad’s fall could take a long time. In the interim, many Syrians will die, and the conflict could evolve into an extended regional proxy war that victimizes the Syrian people.” But if that’s the consequence of our current policy, which is focused exclusively on diplomatic efforts to oust Assad, what reason is there to think more diplomacy will make a difference?
Lynch is right to warn that we need to think through the consequences of various military options such as air strikes, no fly zones, safe havens, and arming of the opposition. All of those policies carry potential downsides that need to be carefully considered. But in the end, I don’t find his objections to any military action terribly compelling, because if we don’t act then we are de facto accepting the unacceptable—i.e., a prolongation of the current civil war, which, aside from being a humanitarian disaster, is likely to further atomize Syrian society and provide an opening for extremists.
No one wants more war. But at this point the international community’s best bet (as it was in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999), is to act to end the killing. Yes, there are significant risks in a post-Assad regime, but by playing an active role in helping the opposition, including providing military help, the U.S. and our allies can win influence to shape the future of Syria.
Lynch himself admits that even if we don’t arm the opposition “arms are likely to flood the country if the civil war continues, regardless of U.S. preferences.” What he neglects to mention is where those arms will come from. A likely source: Gulf regimes such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia and radical groups loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda and its ilk, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq. The longer we stay on the sidelines, the more influence they will exert.
There is no ideal option in Syria, and I commend Lynch for warning about the potential pitfalls of military action, but at this point, I don’t see a good alternative.
Considering the great track record of humanitarian intervention Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan who could argue! n nWhats a little Mass murder, ethnic cleansing and looming Civil War! Nothing to worry about at all!
Let's intervene, by all means. Perhaps in ten years we will have made Syria into a model of stability and political comity like Afghanistan.
I tend to adopt the radical leftist totalitarian cheerleader approach to this, e.g. who are we to indict their quaint and ancient indigenous customs. At some time in the past some American did something bad ergo we have no right. n nWhy do I say this? Because if we intervene we're the bad guys while if we don't intervene we're the bad guys. And truly, if the Arab League is ok with doing nothing other than watching them slaughter one another to the last one standing, than so am I. The Arab world gives you two choices: anarchy and totalitarianism. Pick one.
Only problem with that is when that bloodbath spills into Israel, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan which you dont get to sit and choose your anarchy and totalitarianism unless you support Israel and dont want future wars, which see them attack to break down the Middle East only democracy and would attack it again as worth the risk to shift the blame even if no Syrian is that stupid. Also, Hezbolllah, the IRGC, and Syria could threaten the Golan. n nTurkey is far from my favorite country or least under the AKP and to see Assad attack Free Syrian Army taking refuge in a NATO country would change everything as its North of the Tropic of Cancer unlike the Falklands. Also, the Free Syrians can use Turkey as a free base to attack Assad, as Erodgan will allow him to. Sooner or later Iran and Syria will run out of patience w/Iraq
Isaiah 17:1 nTHE MOURNFUL, inspired prediction (a burden to be lifted up) concerning Damascus [capital of Syria, and Israel's bulwark against Assyria]. Behold, Damascus will cease to be a city and will become a heap of ruins. n nNever fulfilled BEFORE. n Now we see, Muslim Brotherhood + Odrama Queen + Al Qaeda = WIPEOUT!
One problem, of course, are the Sykes-Picot lines that divided up the Middle East according to imperial convenience and ignored ethnic, religious, and tribal loyalties – but that's water under the bridge. Another problem is that the Arabs adopted the Western state system, which does not reflect their indigenous cultural and social needs – but that's also water under the bridge. Redividing the Middle East would be fun, as would devising ways the Arabs could rule themselves effectively and peacefully – one could probably get a government grant to study such things. In any case, the only sentence in the above article which really makes one chuckle is the idea that providing weapons to the rebels would give the US influence in a post-Assad Syria. If we provide support to the rebels, it should be because of US interests (morality may be one of them) but not for any putative future gain – we'll have the same influence in a post-Assad Syria as we do in an Assad Syria, or as we do in Egypt (less actually, as we don't give the Syrians oodles of money). There may be places where guns buy influence, but the Middle East ain't one of them.