Jeffrey Goldberg, Ronen Bergman, and various other commentators believe that an Israeli strike on Iran is more likely than not this year. I agree that the odds are in favor of such a preemptive strike, and that there are compelling reasons for Israel to act before November—not only because of the progress Iran is likely to make in its nuclear program by the fall but also because of a widespread perception that President Obama will have to be more supportive of America’s closest ally in the region before the election than after it. What I don’t know—know one does—is what the impact of such strikes would be: how much would they set back the Iranian nuclear program and how would Iran respond?
Goldberg reports that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are fairly optimistic about the damage that Israel could do to Iran’s nuclear complex and sanguine about the prospects of Iranian retaliation: “Some Israeli officials believe that Iran’s leaders might choose to play down the insult of a raid and launch a handful of rockets at Tel Aviv as an angry gesture, rather than declare all-out war,” Goldberg writes. Moreover, he adds: “Some Israeli security officials also believe that Iran won’t target American ships or installations in the Middle East in retaliation for a strike, as many American officials fear, because the leadership in Tehran understands that American retaliation for an Iranian attack could be so severe as to threaten the regime itself.
The New York Times reports that a Central Command war game raised greater concerns about Iranian retaliation including possibly missile strikes on U.S. facilities and warships in the Persian Gulf. Those are legitimate concerns but Iran would be making a serious miscalculation if it gave the U.S. an excuse to unleash our own, much more formidable air forces against its nuclear installations. That doesn’t mean that Iran won’t do it—its leadership has miscalculated before and will do so again—but it should caution against assuming that the U.S. will automatically become embroiled in a war with Iran after an Israeli attack. I think Iran is more likely to unleash a massive missile barrage against Israel using its Hezbollah proxies and to step up terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in the region.
Whatever the risks of Israeli action, we must never lost sight of the disastrous consequences of inaction—namely the almost certain acquisition of nuclear weapons by the world’s No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism. That is a frightening thought that should put the fallout from any military action into perspective. Ehud Barak, Israel’s most decorated living soldier and a man who knows a thing or two about warfare, says, “A war is no picnic,” but he believes the consequences of action—which are certain to be far greater for Israel than for the U.S.—will be manageable: “There will not be 100,000 dead or 10,000 dead or 1,000 dead. The state of Israel will not be destroyed.” The other possibility is that if Iran does acquire nukes, then the destruction of Israel becomes a much more imaginable possibility.
There seems to be a real Left Wing Media fest going on lately on this issue. n nAs Jonathan Tobin noted the other day, the NYT's James Risen wrote a piece on Sunday that claimed (using anonymous sources, of course) that the U.S. Intelligence community *and* the Israeli intelligence community both agree with the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that Iran's leadership still has a hold placed on programs to develop nuclear weapons. Yes, you read that right. Risen claims that the intel community consensus is that Khamenei told the IRGC et al to put a hold on the nuke program back in 2003 and he still has that hold in place today. As evidence, the U.S. agencies are, again according to Risen, relying almost exclusively upon signals intelligence, and cited some intercepted phone calls between Iranian weapon developers that were frustrated by the continued hold on the nuke program (!). The clear implication being that neither the U.S. nor Israel should take any action any time soon because Iran's nuke program is still "on hold" and has been for the last 10 years. n nNext we have the NYT article today that complements Risen's piece, claiming that sophisticated war gaming by the Pentagon shows that the U.S. could easily be dragged into war with Iran if Israel should strike at Iran. n nSometimes the Left are so darn obvious it is funny. What isn't funny is the prospect that these stories may actually reflect thinking at high levels in the Obama Administration. If so, Israel would be well advised to strike sooner than later as it is only going to get worse. Expect a steady stream of stories from the Left (sourced from "knowledgeable insiders") that increasingly paint a picture of a harmless Iran and a warmongering, reckless Israeli leadership. n nIf I could make a personal request to Mr. Netanyahu and company, it would be to strike sometime in July or August so there is ample time before November for Obama to make a fool of himself and demonstrate to the last of the not-already-convinced that he cannot be entrusted with another 4 years at the helm.
The unintended consequences of an Israeli attack or an Israeli decision not to attack are almost likely to be bad for Israel and the USA, either way. Who would have thought that a conseuqence of the election of George W. Bush would be that the left would become unhinged and swing, in many cases, from benign liberalism to radicalism and "progressivism" that is much more dangerous. n nIf Obama is defeated and Jews are seen as a big reason why, it could result in the Democratic party becoming like a European party completely unsupportive of Israel.
Quote from the article above: "Ehud Barak, Israel’s most decorated living soldier and a man who knows a thing or two about warfare…" He may be so decorated, and kol ha'kavod lo, but it does not mean that he is qualified to develop strategy for a national basis. Look at the disaster wrought by the middle of the night pullout from Lebanon. n nThat's like saying Audie Murphy or Alvin York should have been on the joint chiefs at some point in their post-war lives.