In the current issue of COMMENTARY, Jamie M. Fly has an excellent article reminding readers of the moral case for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. With the Koran burning in February and a lone, deranged soldier’s massacre of Afghan civilians last month, U.S. support for our continued intervention in Afghanistan has declined precipitously. Both American progressives—for whom Afghanistan was once the good war—and many conservatives increasingly say the United States is at the point of decline returns, and that our occupation has become the problem. News reports showing 500 people in Kabul protesting and chanting anti-American slogans can be disheartening given the blood and treasure which the United States has invested into Afghanistan. The situation looks dire especially if one forgets that Kabul is a city of five million people, and so spontaneous demonstrations of 500 are pitiful by even rent-a-mob standards. Seldom, however, do journalists and officials consider what the Afghans are thinking before they project their own doubts onto the Afghan population.
It is in this context that a March 28 article in Hasht-e Sobh (8 a.m.), Afghanistan’s newspaper of record, is so interesting. In an editorial entitled, “Will support for war wane?” (with a translation provided by the Open Source Center), the newspaper places blame for declining U.S. public support not on the United States but rather on Afghan President Hamid Karzai:
The question is why war in Afghanistan is losing support after a decade? This has happened due to some internal and external factors. It appears that prolongation of war, increasing casualties of the US forces and the high financial costs are the main factors behind the fall in support for the Afghan war in the United States… Over the past 10 years, the Afghan government has not been able to prove its capability. The inability of the government in ensuring security and rule of law is one of the factors which questions continuation of US support and US forces’ presence in Afghanistan. In addition, US-Afghan relations have seen many ups and downs over the past 10 years. Many times, Mr. Karzai strongly criticized the United States and sometimes supported the neighboring countries’ anti-US policies. Now, it is expected that there will be less tension with the signing of the strategic agreement, however the presence of some anti-US circles in the government and the government’s stances have caused the Americans to lose hope about the continuation of their presence in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, we will witness a fall in support for Afghanistan from other countries if Mr. Karzai does not change his policies and bring about changes in the presidential office.
Americans have a bad habit to self-flagellate. But leadership requires not allowing strategic goals to be undercut by the vicissitudes of war or short-term public opinion. Indeed, if the Afghan press is believed, the situation might improve considerably if, rather than throw up their hands and surrender, Obama administration officials would do a better job of holding Hamid Karzai to account for his own double-dealing.
This article (and apparently the one by Jamie Fly) is a good example of how even astute pundits can fail to understand the national mood. n nAmericans (and conservatives in particular) are not tired of the war in A-stan because of Koran burnings and the protests etc… And they are not tired because Obama has somehow failed to argue the moral imperatives of the war. We are tired because both Bush and Obama completely screwed up the campaign by, first, transforming it from a completely justified and supported operation to eliminate terror havens in A-stan to one of hopelessly naive nation building, and, second, by failing to implement the kind of all-out strategies needed to actually *win* as opposed to simply stalemate or manage the decline. n nAs General Patton famously observed, Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser. Americans do not want 15 years of drawn out counter-insurgent warfare that allows a corrupt, nepotistic fraud like Karzai to gobble up billions in aid money while chewing off the hand that feeds him; that allows safe havens to thrive just across a mythical border in Pakistan; that starves our commanders of badly needed combat forces while demanding impossible goals of pacification and insurgent control; that employs such restrictive rules of engagement to our warriors that they cannot attack any insurgent once they have dropped their weapon; that uses such restraint (again, due to Karzai's pathetic tantrums) in close air support and artillery that our forces suffer needless casualties. n nThe American people are smart enough to know when we are fighting to win and when we are simply throwing away lives to maintain the pretense of a fight. If we learned anything from Vietnam, it was supposed to be that we do not commit forces somewhere if we are not prepared to fight to win. This one-hand-behind-our-back kind of warfare is un-American and, ironically, immoral. We want out of A-stan because our leaders have utterly failed to either commit to winning or, at the very least, present to us the costs of winning and allow us to make the decision on whether it is worth the cost. n nAmericans are well aware of the consequences of pulling out. But the consequences of staying with the current non-strategy is far worse.
Was it hopelessly naive to build democracies in Germany and Japan after WWII? Some thought so. But it worked out in the long run, didn't it? n nI think there's nothing wrong with trying to spread democracy. Otherwise we retreat into a kind of elitist island of democracies amidst a sea of tyrannies, and we just say, tough for you that you have this brutal dictatorship or theocracy stomping you into the ground and sending terrorist teams around the world. n nIf the people we are liberating don't want or understand freedom, then we have hit a brick wall for sure, but at least we gave them the opportunity–now it's theirs to use it or lose it.
Thanks for the reply, Blister. n nI agree with you that "there is nothing wrong with trying to spread democracy." I will even go further and say that it is a positive, moral good to spread representative democracy. I am not arguing in favor of the isolationist, Ron Paul, Pat Buchanan school of foreign policy. Just the opposite, in fact. n nThe case of Germany and Japan are distinguishable from A-stan, however. For one, Japan and Germany were thoroughly defeated foes. There was no real resistance to speak of in either country. The U.S and its allies pretty much dictated the post-war order for each (and in Japan's case dictated their constitution and much of their societal structure). The Taliban (as with Iraq until 2007-08) was never truly defeated. Second, we did not approach A-stan in the same way that we approached Germany and Japan, so if you were to say to me that you are willing to subject A-stan to the same type of dictates imposed on Germany and Japan, I would agree that A-stan would be worth it. But you and I know that 21st Century America is not going to dictate to any country like we did in after WWII, so it's a moot point. n nThird (and to you final comment), it is pretty clear that the people of A-stan were never ready for even an 18th Century version of democracy, let alone 21st Century. They are perfectly happy living in a somewhat feudal, 9th century, tribal/ethnic/sectarian culture that does not put much value on individual freedom. They do not have the educational structure or civil service capacity for what we attempted. That is what was naive about our approach. Karzai was not capable of being President of A-stan nor was anyone else. A-stan might work as a loose confederation of semi-autonomous provinces, but that's about it. We certainly gave them an opportunity in 2001-02 when we chased out the Taliban, but it was evident even then that this was a country that was not ready for civilization. Not yet. But we tried to shove it down their throats anyway. That's not to our credit. n n
Actually I would argue that a key difference from the post-WWII situation was the presence of an implacable foe on the border of each country–Iraq had Iran, who sent teams into the shia areas to arm them with IED's etc. Bush was interested in taking out Iran, but after 2006 his wings were clipped and he no longer had Congressional support. He managed to make peace with the Sunni tribesmen in the north, and probably he would have sent some forces to the Iran border to try to seal it off and maybe send punitive expeditions into Iran. n nPakistan's ISI gave safe haven to the Taliban and, apparently, armed them. Bush's response was to use drones to harry the Taliban out of their safe houses, a tactic that has been quite effective, but then Bush left office and a new guy came in promising to pull us out as quickly as possible, which of course convinced anyone who was on the fence that they had better make nice to the Taliban. n nI don't relish the idea of endless war, but these people just don't quit until they're dead. On the other hand, there are reports from the field (which seem to have been under-emphasized if not ignored by the Obama Administration) that the Taliban are tired; the senior fighters are in their 40s and up, and they would like to go home and raise their children and grandchildren. Obama obviously saw this as an opportunity to make a nice treaty and get out, but a more realistic policy would have been to make more nasty until they cried uncle. And then kill them some more. n nIraq is likely to splinter into three states, unless a new strongman emerges who can reunite the region, probably shedding a lot of blood in the process. Afghanistan is likely to revert to a Taliban regime controlled by Pakistan. They will probably not send another team to the U.S. to commit a massive act of terrorism, because the Americans will no longer have the stomach for nation building and will be thinking in terms of bombing them back to the stone age.
Good discussion, blister. n nA quibble, if you will: your point about an implacable foe on the border may actually cut the other way. It could be argued that one reason the Germans were willing to suffer the indignations of U.S. occupation and diktat is that they greatly feared the Soviet Union– that implacable foe– on their border and saw the West as their protector. Contrast that with Iraq and A-stan where at least a great many Shia in Iraq were all too cozy with the Iranians and the Pashtun majority in A-stan consider their fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan to be greater friends than any American (and certainly not someone they need protection against). n nI think you quite effectively make my point about the Islamists –"they just don't quit until they're dead." This sentiment is, essentially, what a great body (majority?) of Americans feel deeply and they know that the U.S. govt is not pursuing anything like this strategy in A-stan. Rather, the American public sees this Administration (and to be fair, the last one, too) as trying to win over these killers with lolly pops and elections. This useless and dangerous policy is throwing away the lives of our best sons and daughters and it is time to either adopt the approach you mention or get the heck out. (Personally, my approach would be to issue some ultimatums to Karzai and if he refuses, we pull our forces out forthwith and start cutting basing deals with the former Northern Alliance leaders against the certainty that Karzai and Kabul will be overrun as soon as we take out our forces. That's another debate of course). n nAgree that Iraq will splinter up and the same with A-stan. And the same with Syria. And my feeling is, why not? The present Middle East is a fiction of borders drawn up (rather poorly) by the British and needs to be re-ordered more closely along ethnic and/or sectarian lines, or at least to more sensible geopolitical boundaries. n nI hope you are right about the reluctance of the Taliban to send another team to attack the U.S. but they have morphed over the years into an Al Qaeda-like mindset that may not care anything about self-preservation.
Resistence to occupation in Germany was high. American soliders were de-capitated in traps just as IEDs are planted in A-stan. A difference being the Marshall plan re-built Germany and we used German scientist for the moon shot. Such are partnership with A-stan would not seem possible.
Sorry, Joe. I'm going to need some back up on your claims. Resistance in Germany was limited, rare and, in any event, short lived. Nothing like A-stan or Iraq.