There are strong arguments for and against American military intervention in Syria. And everyone is weighing in. An editorial in the Jewish Daily Forward asks: ‘‘What is to be done about Syria,’’ and asserts that, ‘‘passivity [is] impossible.’’ And so the piece sets out to consider some of those arguments. However, its intention comes to naught, and instead the editorial finds itself reduced to precisely the equivocation that it claims is so unacceptable.
That alone wouldn’t be worth comment. But it gets worse: the editorial not only fails to confront the arguments seriously, but has the further audacity to criticize from its transcendent perch those who have actually staked positions on the matter. And not only that either: it ends with the self-righteous assertion that only the Forward’s editors really appreciate the true complexity of the issue. Their sentiments are best communicated in their own words, so here are the particularly offending concluding paragraphs:
But how should the international community channel this new indignation? Is the answer as simple as military intervention? It appears not. Even the human rights organizations are cautioning against such a move. Though the Holocaust and the genocides of the 1990s make passivity impossible, there are even more recent precedents that do and should give us pause: Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are those who, like Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, offer cavalier solutions, such as providing arms to the fractious band of rebels. Others demand a NATO-led air war. But these hawks can’t answer basic questions about who exactly could take power in Syria after Assad, which of the various factions of warring opposition groups to even support, or how to avoid turning an intervention into a regional conflagration. Legions of experts keep making the same point that what worked for Libya won’t work in Syria. After the interventions of the past decade and their Sisyphean aftermaths, it would be irresponsible to imagine we could dip our toe into this conflict without considering the consequences.
But this complexity should not be an invitation to sit on our hands, nor is it acceptable to simply give Assad more time to kill by settling for half-measures like former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s ineffectual peace plan or sending a few powerless UN observers.
What we can do is use this moment for the moral clarity it provides. If, before Houla, it was still conceivable for Assad’s remaining defenders to imagine they were witnessing in Syria an internal power struggle between pro- and anti-government forces, it should now be clear that Assad is a murderer, capable of ever worse brutalities and willing to cravenly exploit ethnic divisions to hold on to his power. This is now plain and simple to see. Perhaps if Russia and China — and, one can always hope, Iran as well — start to feel his bloody hands staining theirs, the path might be open to the sort of isolation that will make a difference.
Our responsibility, in the meantime, is now more apparent than ever. Don’t forget the massacred children of Houla, and don’t let the world forget them, either.
What is interesting about this is that it is not the first time we have been forced to endure the unjustified pietistic vainglory of the Left. Norman Podhoretz, in his Ex-Friends, recalled his earlier analysis of the Vietnam War, where he had famously observed this same phenomenon:
Certain people took the position that they were against both Saigon and Hanoi. What then were they for? The answer given in a piece written jointly by Irving Howe and the political theorist Michael Walzer, the editors of Dissent, after the war was over was that they had ‘‘hoped for the emergence of a Vietnamese ‘third force’ capable of rallying the people in a progressive direction by enacting land reforms and defending civil liberties.’’ But since, as they themselves admitted, there was very little chance that this would happen, to have thrown their energies into opposing the American effort was tantamount to working for the Communist victory they said (in all sincerity) they did not want. Nothing daunted by this contradiction, they still awarded themselves moral congratulations on having been against the evils on both sides of the war:
‘‘Those of us who opposed American intervention yet did not want a Communist victory were in the difficult position of having no happy ending to offer…And we were in the difficult position of urging a relatively complex argument at a moment when most Americans, pro- and anti-war, wanted blinding simplicities.’’
Yet considering the actual alternatives that existed, what did the urging of ‘‘a relatively complex argument’’ avail other than to make those who urged it feel pleased with themselves?
There we see that oppressive ‘‘complexity’’ again, and the self-congratulatory self-pity of those isolated few who, unlike everyone else, perceive it. And, once again, we see that convenient combination of equivocation and fantasy – ‘‘the emergence of a ‘third force’’’ or the hope that Russia, China, and Iran will pressure Syria so that we don’t have to – that all but disqualifies these commentators from being taken seriously.
To reiterate, there are strong arguments for and against intervention, and no serious thinker on either side of this debate believes that their policy is straightforward or without cost, but at least their arguments aren’t smug and are based on real, and not imaginary, circumstances.










This is none of our business. n nIf we intervene or send aid more people will be killed and displaced than Assad has killed, and the successor régime will no doubt kill or exile still more. What is more, we have no idea who the opposition are. n nAll in all, a nasty business we can only bake worse. For once, let's NOT "make the world safe for democracy," and just make it safe(r) for us."
The Syrian "rebels" are probably dominated by Islamic Jihadis. I rather stick with Assad. A secular thug is usually preferable to a religious extremist.
The opposition is Muslim Brotherhood funded by SOROS. n nWhy take sides between a dictator and a bloodier and far more micromanagerial Shari'a regime with stronger Global designs?
It isn't that complicated. It's really quite easy. There. I said it. n nThe Assad Regime is perhaps Tehran's closest ally. Tehran is our mortal enemy. Anything bad that happens to the Regime is, ipso facto, good for us. The toppling of the Regime and an inconclusive civil war that hamstrings Syria for a decade or more? Good for us. An Islamist autocracy that is hostile to Tehran but also incompetent, poorly organized and subject to constant insurrection and rebellions that sap all its energy? Good for us. A Western-friendly government that can partner with the Lebanese to drive out or marginalize Hezbollah (as well as be something of a counterweight to Islamist Turkey? Best of all for us (however unlikely). n n*Whatever* happens, all of these outcomes are…. (drumroll please)… *good for us*. n nAnd, better yet, none of them require that we set a single regular army soldier, marine or even pilot on Syrian soil. There are millions of Syrians who would gladly do the fighting if we will only have the discernment to figure out which ones would best serve our interests. Whether the rebels win outright, engage in a long civil war or partition the country into ethnic enclaves, we don't care. Just keep Syria looking inward and prevent them from supporting Hezbollah, messing with Israel and serving as Tehran's cat's paw. n nThe civilian massacres are lamentable. But entirely predictable and, to some extent, our own fault for dithering on whether to arm the rebels or not.
What happens to all the weapons in Syria’s arsenal, conventional and unconventional?
Obama gives it to the Muslim Brotherhood along with additional American stores. They'll need it to enforce Obama-approved Shari-a Law.
What happens to all the weapons in Syria's arsenal, conventional and unconventional?
As with Iraq the unconventional Syrian biochem arsenal may prove to be degraded. The first victims of biochem stores being evacuated by mujahideen, even with AQ tech staff, could just as well be work accidents on the spot as anything else.
Good question. It sure would be alot easier to figure out what weapons are there, where they are and how to secure/destroy them if we were actively backing a pro-Western rebel force. As it is, we have very little clue and seem to just be leaving it to chance or the kindness of Islamists to figure out what happens with these noxious items.
There is NO pro-western rebel force there. There is only an Obama/McCain-approved Muslim Brotherhood rebel force funded by SOROS that is more anti-Western than Assad. n nTherefore, there is only a Treasonous support of Muslim Brotherhood conspiring against America here at home.
Throwing in the French Vietnam was a 29 year multi-faceted overlapping diplomatic-military-smart force-brute force exercise replete with strategic hamlets, CIA skullduggery up the wazoo, South Vietnam paladins, stalking horses, and sacrifices that eddied around in circles inconclusively decade in and decade out. Norman's stance against the piety of complication is just another pietistic pose, the piety of moral clarity that, in this particular recension, turns into another redaction of … complexity in the final graf before fade out. n nWhich leaves us no better off than we were before in deciding how a uni- or multi-lateral intervention is supposed to work, what it is supposed to accomplish, and how it will overcome opposition by Iran, China, and Russia. n nIsraeli defense officials themselves see the threat in small-bore parochial terms: Al Qaeda affiliates may exploit the collapse of state authority–but for them the state authority has been, if rationally so, hostile. n nGenerally speaking, yes, what is bad for Iran is a good thing for the rest of us but this is a conczeptia not a strategic doctrine. n nConcretely, the only rational scenario for an intervention is an American-led coalition partially under or not the military umbrella of NATO (if it exists beyond letterhead and a color guard brigade) prepared to muscle aside China and Russian military opposition if things escalate to that level. Or, perhaps the Russians and the ChiComs stand aside and see how deep of a Big Muddy the crusade turns into. Or, who knows, things turn less chaotically and a near thing than they did in Iraq/Afghanistan. n nAfter the self-congratulatory excursus on the sin of self-congratulation is over the questions remains. Do we need to intervene and what are our objectives and how do we intend to accomplish them? n
"Concretely, the only rational scenario for an intervention is an American-led coalition partially under or not the military umbrella of NATO (if it exists beyond letterhead and a color guard brigade) prepared to muscle aside China and Russian military opposition if things escalate to that level." n nNo, this is simply not true. Assad is sitting on top of a minority ruling class– a kind of Spartan among a sea of Helots. His position is extremely shaky and vulnerable. There is absolutely no reason or need for the U.S. (or worse, another coalition) to take one step into Syria. Direct involvement must be avoided in any event. The Russians and Iranians have smartly opted to back their guy Assad with weapons (and in Iran's case, some IRG thugs) but neither one is going to send in ground troops. We should be so smart. We find our own rebel groups that have a pro-Western bent (or are at least willing to adopt a pro-Western bent in exchange for firepower and supplies) and do what we can with them. If we're lucky the rebellion gathers some momentum and Assad's military bails on him and now we have a few, pro-West, armed groups in Syria with the muscle to bargain for at least a seat at the governing table. If we're not so lucky (or, perhaps skilled is more apt), we have a long-term civil war in Syria that effectively neutralizes Tehran's plans in the area– a stalemate in the Levant.
Here we go again. I wonder how many who are beating the drum that we are obligated to go in and stop the killing, are the ones that bleat that we had no business in Iraq or Afghanistan. n n I expect their Mamas and Papas, if not the older ones themselves, were also screaming at me back during Vietnam. n nWell, they convinced me. We have no business sending our troops anywhere unless the CinC can articulate a clear national, that is U.S., interest. I am sorry for the Syrian folks, but what is going on there is Syrian on Syrian. Not our fight. n nDoes anyone really think that a military incursion would be clean and straightforward? We should have learned. We buy it, we own it. Meanwhile Assad will have Russia supplying him. The Iranians will be infiltrating and supplying a whole new generation of Muji's to keep it stirred up, while making sure that Hezbollah remains the strong to pick up the pieces. If we go in, it is anyone's guess how many of the various factions would unite against us. n nNope. It is a shame, but it isn't ours shame and it isn't our business. n nFor TSalfabet, I wonder how you plan to muster millions of fighters on one side of a civil war in a country with a total population of 22mill, and definitely multiple factions. Your argument would be fine, if we could identify the good guys–which we have a very poor record of doing–and if we could help them to prevail without one American fighting man setting foot in Syria. More than likely, the "Reformists" (definitely TIC there) are likely to fight with the Assadists while Hezbollah sits on the side, maybe sabotaging whoever looks to be getting the upper hand, until they are both bled dry. Then they walk in.
Good thoughts, Bob. As to your comments to me, I would reply that, whether the pro-Western forces we identify — and there are definitely those in Syria– prevail or not, we are seizing a huge strategic opportunity to, at the very least, hobble and paralyze one of the linchpins of Iran's Jihad in the Levant. These opportunities don't come around very often and, sadly, chaos and civil war are effective in crippling an opponent. All this can be done without any insertion of U.S. ground forces.
The civil war will continue without American munitions contributing to the carnage or not. By the way, this is how the world operates in those parts. These "opportunities" come around continuously but intermittently. The Baath party itself was one "solution" to the pandemic instability and bloodletting of Arab and Islamic countries. Coups and heads paraded on pikes through the streets are not freak who-wudda-thunk-it features of the Middle East. The Shah was the uncontested leader of Iran until he wasn't. Ditto for Mubarak. Or Nasser. Or King Farouk before him. The Levant is what America would be if our political arguments that the other side are un-American traitors, religious nuts, or Marxists weren't followed by elections but by likeminded buddies getting out their guns to do something about it.
Yes, "the civil war will continue without American munitions…" That's not the point. The point is whether, considering the strategic importance of Syria in the Middle East, the U.S. wants to have at least a chance to influence the direction and outcome of the civil war by finding a side that might serve U.S. interests and then backing that side (or even sides) to that end. Or we could just continue to watch as the Islamists fill the vacuum and things go from bad to worse. n nAnd, yes, the opportunities come around "continuously" but, by your own examples, not frequently– which was, ahem, my point. n nYour final point about U.S. politics is a good, if chilling, one. Not to go off on too much of a tangent, but the kind of language being employed by the SEIU and other public unions on the Left is getting uncomfortably close to the kind of Levant you mention. Look at the mess in Wisconsin. No one is arguing that the 2010 elections were not free and fair and yet that didn't stop the public union thugs from marching on the state capital and trying to impose their will on the duly elected government.
All these bright ideas are supposed to get you for a quarter what a dollar won't get bring. Will we directly attack Iran. NOOOOO. No no no. OK, how about Syria like we did in the latter days of Nam. No no no. We'll start circa Nam in 1960 with guns and a few advisors. Then we can fine tune escalate our way into complete FOOBAR.
No it is not Vietnam. It is on the other hand more or less central Africa. Permanent anarchy, permanent instability, periodic atrocities and no one really notices or cares.
War between 2 like sides and the uprising is worse than the existing status. WHY would we want American soldiers chewed to hamburger for that! n nMark those American politicians such as Obama and McCain who openly support it and let their careers be dried up like they have earned.
It's Blackhawk Down territory. It's like trying to play off the Crips against the Bloods or choosing the "pro-Western" faction of the MS-13 to ship guns to. So we keep trying out these neat international "Fast and Furious" ops. War on the cheap. And the locals are left holding the bag.
AMEN! Black Hawk Down is precisely what it brings to mind. This is thought out as carefully as Clinton thought out Somalia.
Nothing of the sort. Are you really trying to say that there are absolutely no pro-Western in Syria? We know that isn't true. The Kurds, for one, are very pro-U.S., and are the largest minority group in Syria, making up about 9% of the overall population, more than the Alawites that dominate Syria now. n nThis is not "war on the cheap," as you call it. It is simply exercising U.S. interests without committing prematurely to a ground invasion.
Who cares if there is "DIRECT INVOLVEMENT"? God forbid we have to take direct action to have a material negative impact on our enemies. As TS_Alfabet said, nearly everything we do to hurt Assad harms Iran and Russia, which is great for us.
Everything you do to hurt Assad helps Muslim Brotherhood, Soros, Shari'a Law, Obama and McCain. n nWhy would you want to help them? n nBOTH sides hurt Israel and America worst of all – why help our enemies and kill our soldiers to do it? n How is it America never fights on the side of Christians and Israelites against their murderous invading enemies?
Rose, please. Assad is no better option than the Muslime Brotherhood. And you pose a false choice anyway. It's not a choice between Assad or the MB/Sharia et al… Presumably, the U.S. has the ability (or can borrow the Israeli's ability) to ferret out pro-Western groups in Syria that would be better than having Iran's puppet Assad or the Islamists in power.
The Israelis are staying out of this completely so far because for now they don't see ANY pro-Western groups succeeding Assad, just Al Qaeda. That's their take. The vacuum left by Assad's departure will be filled by terrorists, not nice guys with Blackberries.
AMEN! You said it rightly.
EGYPT! n nYou tell yourself Garbage. n nNO USA TAX PAYER $$$ or FORCES should be wasted on Dim Attempt to BLEED AMERICA in their attempt to help establish SHARI'A regimes.
That's my 2 cents–it would be nice if the United States just laid down some unambiguous markers that Israel is an ally, and caring a little bit about the Christian communities persecuted by the PA, the Salafists, and, now, the anti-Assad Islamists, would be nice too. And the United States doesn't need to become involved in Arab civil wars to do that.
War by proxy has uncertain results often the opposite of what you expected. Our war by proxy against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan resulted in warlordism, chaos, civil war, and the Taliban. The Israeli use of Lebanese proxies never worked. The South Vietnamese army remained dependent upon American air power until it folded. Just "hurting Assad" doesn't tell you much as to what will happen to civilian populations. We "hurt the Soviets" but in a few years the people of Afghanistan were in dire stratis.
PLUS, "somehow" (???)sic … we ALWAYS seem to end up on the side of muslim extremists to the harm of decent people in the region. With a lot of disinformation in the MSM and the WASHINGTON DC crowd. n nLook what happened in Egypt and Bosnia and so many other places, places we now know that SOROS always already was – somehow we never were on the side of Western Civilization, and hurt the people worse we SAID we were "FOR". n nThere are influences in our own govt that need to be cleaned out before we go meddling any more, We don't need any more Egyptian experiences, here.
Soros has been found to be behind all the revolutions manned by muslims so far, and those muslims ae all after establishing Shari'a Law where thee was none, before. They never try to overthrow a Shari'a dictatorship. They just try to ESTABLISH them were none were before, i.e. EGYPT and Yemen, etc… n nThe opposition is Muslim Brotherhood funded by SOROS. Promoted by Obama and McCain. nWhy take sides between a dictator and a bloodier and far more micromanagerial Shari'a regime with stronger Global designs?
Yes, we certainly disagree besht, but you should at least fairly state the position. No one is talking about "tossing guns and RPGs off the back of a truck to people we don't know…" That's straw man stuff. Please keep it classy. Neither is Libya applicable as Qaddafi was no, real strategic threat or prize to the U.S. compared to Syria. And let's forget the "humanitarian rationale" that you mention. U.S. foreign policy can *never* be guided primarily by "humanitarian rationale." That is for fools and Democrats (but I repeat myself). And your last paragraph rightly points out how difficult it can be once we start playing these body counting games. n nAs for the Iranians being "on the ground," so what? They are detested by the Syrian people and only serve to harden and radicalize the rebellion against Assad. Assad is in a no-win position: he can now only continue down the path of greater brutality and bloodshed because to do otherwise will quickly result in the crumbling of his regime. Unlike the Green Movement in Iran, the Syrian rebellion is literally up in arms and that genie is not going back into the bottle. Assad can only hope that the international community will continue to do nothing and the rebels will lose hope. But it's too late for that now. The Saudis, Qataris and Islamists are now pouring in military aid to the rebels, so it is a fight to the death from this point on. n nThe choice for the U.S. right now is whether to get into the game and find some groups that can be armed and supported who will, in turn, support U.S. interests (even if indirectly). If the U.S. does nothing, the Islamists will ascend and we will be on the outside looking in with no leverage whatsoever.
Setting up the Muslim Brotherhood and Shari'a Law is NO BENEFIT in Syria to America. n nBesides, when we see that Odrama Queen and Manchurian John McVain both want to go there, THAT tells us more than YOU want folks to know.
Groups fighting have been identified with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists/Al Qaeda on the ground. Your genie is waving the black flags of the world wide caliphate and expelling Christian residents. Which is why, well one reason why, Israel is out of this game completely for now. Libya is an example, not vis a vis its strategic weight, but because it turned out after the dust settled that weapons were not,. as we had been assured, going to "pro-Western" forces but to a rag-tag assortment of Islamist mujahideen, including the Libyan affiliate of Al Qaeda who supplied part of the command structure. That is relevant. n nSo the US got involved in Libya, with air strikes yet, and the Islamists ascended, but, hoooray! with our help. This is not a straw man except in the sense of the movie Wicker Man where the hapless hero is playing a rescue game everybody is onto except himself before he and the straw man go up in flames. With the helpless child he was set to rescue cheering with everybody else. n nIf folks want to argue that the time has come to eliminate Assad for posing, in tandem with Iran, whatever national security threat, at least make the argument for intervention. Real intervention. You intervene by going in. With American boots on the ground you have at least a chance, a chance only, but a chance, of knowing who you are antagonists are and sussing out a strategy to defeat them. n nEven boots in the ground are no guarantee of success. Forget Vietnam. Or the draw in Afghanistan or the pro-Sharia pro-Iranian government we currently sponsor in Iraq. Israel intervened sub rosa in Lebanon 1976-77 playing exactly the kind of politics you recommend, sharping the odds of Lebanese inter factional hatred and violence, then they got in full bore in 1977-78 when Lebanon blew up in a state disintegrating cvil war, really pushed for major force intrusion in 1982-1982 and screwed around in circles until about 2000 when they disengaged. Mission accomplished!!!! n nThat's 23 years of playing cowboy in a civl war *next door*. The result? The near complete defeat of their Christian allies and the rise of Hezbollah. And moving the goal post from threat elimination to threat containment. n nBut, no, imo, all this we'll-send-weapons is a substitute, a place holder, for the hard decision of going to war against a foe. And an Obama administration intervening at whatever level of force is an administration hopelessly addicted to split-the-difference Solomonic strategies of dividing the baby as evidenced in their inability to decide between Bibi and Abbas. So you end up with a President predisposed to favor Muslim Brotherhood proxies and call their ascension to control a pony.
Israel is "out of this game" because it is not a nation that leads the world or even the region–and neither does it necessarily seek to do those things. (True, it is a largely developed economic stay and a democratic beacon in the region, and a nuclear power with a modest military to boot–such things don't necessarily translate to influence though.) n nShould Israel try to overtly influence events in Syria, the perceived aid it gave to any group would largely discredit that group–anti-semitism is, after all, largely a tool of regimes to shift blame and distract from real vulnerabilities and misdoings. (By the way, it is generally a trope that American aid would largely be perceived the same way, but I don't believe this. As well, it does not matter that some Islamist groups have been numbered among those on the ground within the opposition in Syria–perhaps they, as should we, perceive an actual opportunity to gain influence within a future Syria.) n nReally, I believe that Israel should only be brought up in ONE context in this decision: were there true coordination in American and Israeli policy, then Israel would love for America to get involved in Syria. Assuming that there was such coordination, and yet that the US wouldn't strike Iran's nuclear program, and that Israel would be left to do it, Israel would welcome the action of the US in Syria as it would make more favorable the aftermath scenarios of an Israeli strike on Iran: Iran's potential retaliatory actions would be much more limited.
BreadAlone–I just don't get the vibe that Israel has any expectations for Syria, with or without America. Personally, I think people get way over-optimistic in their assessments as to the ability of current Islamic nations to be influenced by leveraged American intervention. But I appreciate your disagreement and the argument that more favorable circumstances in Syria would limit the fallout of Israeli action in Iran. Israel may be relying on sheer deterrence–they have said publicly that the next Hezbollah attack on Israel (as in response to an Iranian attack) will be followed by a far more punitive response than Hezbollah and Lebanon have experienced in recent decades.
No doubt about it, the Islamists are making a bid for Syria. They probably don't expect to be in control in the short term but they probably figure they can at least be a significant player in shaping the outcome in their favor, similar to Hezbollah has done over the years in Lebanon. n nAnd your options are either nothing or all out invasion? That's more than just a failure of nerve, it is an abdication of U.S. interests. I might agree with you if U.S. capabilities in supporting insurgent groups has so atrophied over the last decades that we simply lack the skills to effectively provide aid. But I don't yet see that lack. It seems to be simply a policy choice. The contras in Nicaragua and the muj in Soviet Afghanistan were used to great effect. (The fact that the U.S. later punted on Afghanistan does not detract from the success of the tactic itself). But we have put these sorts of ops on the shelf for quite awhile, so maybe the skill set has disappeared. If that's what you are arguing, I could sympathize. But you seem to be saying, "Don't bother. Only a ground invasion can do any good." That's historical nonsense.