Retired General Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, has just published an excellent op-ed in The Independent newspaper in the UK. He writes: “A gradual military intervention along the lines of the Libyan model of a Western aerial campaign seems the most effective response to the Syrian crisis.” He then goes on to demolish, one by one, all the arguments against such an intervention, showing that Syria need not become Iraq Redux and that the challenge of Syrian military power can be met handily by the air forces of the West.
His article is all the more interesting given that, until the start of the anti-Assad uprising last year, the consensus in Israeli security circles seemed to be that the West should deal with Assad on the “better the devil you know” principle. When the war against him broke out many Israelis privately took the view that it was in their interest for the fighting to continue indefinitely because a weakened and embattled Assad would not cause much trouble for Israel. Similar arguments were and are popular among Realpolitikers in the West. Even today, many in the West argue for inaction on the grounds that we don’t really know who the Syrian rebels are and that Assad’s ouster could give an opening to radical Islamists to take over.
Israel has a lot more reason to be concerned about those dangers than the U.S. simply because it’s located right on Syria’s border, but Yadlin believes, as do a growing number of current and former Israeli officials, that the greatest risk of all is to leave Assad in power indefinitely.
Let us hope that President Obama and his advisers read Yadlin’s article carefully and ponder whether the case for inaction is really as compelling as they seem to think.










Obama will do nothing regarding Syria before the election—unless the risks are perceived to be nearly nonexistent. He will jump on this train only if an easy victory is assured.
I got the part about the risk to Israel(location),but I missed the specifics of the Risk to the US. nWhat's our risk if this war continues until it's over,without our intervening?
Well to some "Responsibility to Protect" means something–arguably, it should mean more to leftists than us of the right, considering Samantha Power's writing/etc. and the UN's acceptance of the doctrine. Yadlin also says that there is opportunity in Syria. ("Fifth, the Syrian opposition presents an opportunity for cooperation.") The risk of not acting in Syria is a) letting someone else take your potential gains, and b) sending a weak message in general to all the wide world (whereas action he has said would send a broad and strong message to actors like Iran). n nAnd, well, if you care at all for fellow humans, then you'd see that lives needlessly lost are, well, lost.
The strategic risk is Assad's non coventional weapons. n nTake those out the equation, and the various Syrian militias can go on chopping each other up in a proxy Turkish-Iranian war, forever or until no man of fighting age is left, whichever comes later. n nThinking that our intervening will stabilize the non conventional weapons situation makes little sense. It may prompt their use by Assad, for example. n nWhat ever happened to the use of Special Forces to remove them? n nWhat have these men been training for? Why do we have trillions of dollars of equipment and training, and then formulate policies where we do not use them, against the interests of the USA? n nHearts and minds of the enemy are won after their overwhelming defeat – if history is any guide. And if they are not won, at least peace and tranquility are achieved, which is in may ways even better. n n(Israel would have had peace after her wars if the natural pattern of history was allowed to unfold, but of course there were one-off rules for victory laid down for Israel by the USA, in deference to the reality of oil) n nYadlin's piece seems just so much post modern wishful thinking. n nHe is advocating a lead from behind effort to convince Assad to throw in the towel. n nAssad is now fighting not only for his regime, but for his life. What does he think he will do with his non conventional weapons? He does not say. n nTargetted removal of those weapons would seem to be the key.
Assad is not going to throw in the towel. Such an action would be prove suicidal. He must fight to the bitter end.
Exactly.
What is strategic vision if you're only concerned with potential risks and guarding current things, and not the gain of strategic position? n nI will give you your third paragraph though, somewhat: any intervening action in Syria should necessarily first secure such things. I must quibble with you though, for you are wondering why we don't use our special forces more, given that they are so costly, when you are otherwise advocating (at best) what is to be characterized as very limited action despite our great capabilities. The two thoughts are somewhat contradictory. n nYour characterization of Yadlin's piece is quite unfair. He can hardly be said to be "advocating a lead from behind effort to convince Assad to throw in the towel"–for the record, "lead[ing] from behind" is a rope best tied to Obama and his crew, for such is where the term originates; Yadlin is also pretty much proposing the whole West step forward anyhow. He does simply give the rather unimaginable best-case scenario, where Assad, squeezed to death, relinquishes what will then be untenable hope. In truth, the good end is simply regime change–there need not be any "rosy" resignation of Assad.
A better option is to let them grind each other down for a long time. Just let the mayhem continue at low boil.
"What have these men been training for? Why do we have trillions of dollars of equipment and training, and then formulate policies where we do not use them, against the interests of the USA? " n nbecause out of respect to them and their families and communities we don't "use them" for anything but defending America. n nThey aren't cannon fodder.
There is no such thing as a STRONG CASE *FOR* Syrian intervention. n nDictators to the one hand – Muslim Brotherhood/Soros to the other hand. n nThat is all we need to know. Obama "Commander in Chief". n nEND of Discussion. Send yourself if someone "must" go. And take the Dim Party with you. n nIsaiah 17 Bible Prophecy is coming to Damascus EVEN AS WE SPEAK. n nWhy jump in front of the heavy equipment on the operator's blind side, at the last moment? Nothing bright about being a Rachel Corrie.