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Fragile Gains in Forgotten Afghan Corners

Why do reporters bother to write formal news stories? The best, most illuminating accounts I read are those in which the reporter dispenses with the conventions of “objective” journalism and writes in the first person, telling readers what he or she saw. Exhibit A is this blog post by New York Times Kabul bureau chief Alyssa Rubin. Rubin had earlier published a news story attempting to get to the bottom of what happened recently when American and Afghan soldiers exchanged fire with one another, killing six men. She could not figure out the real story–were the Americans simply jumpy or were the Afghans actually trying to kill them?–and so the story was inherently unsatisfying. But her blog post on how she reported the story is the best single snapshot I have seen of real security conditions in Kabul and its environs.

She begins by noting that living in Kabul, as she does, can give a misleading impression because, “despite the blast walls and checkpoints and rubble, there’s still some normalcy there,” with “restaurants that cater to us [Westerners], clothing shops, grocers — even a couple of neighborhoods where you might run into each other on the street.” But if you drive just 35 miles out of the capital into Wardak Province, an area that has never been truly pacified, the scene changes alarmingly: “The road empties out, and the few trucks and minibuses bounce over the scars of I.E.D. blasts every mile or two. ” Further, she writes:

There were Taliban watchers everywhere, of course: little boys, old men, they squatted by the roadside just looking into each car. I was wearing local clothes, but began to fear that they could see through it and tell I was American, and then we would all be at risk. A couple of times we passed small groups of men with Kalashnikov rifles, lounging by the side of the road. Some wore traditional clothing, others the khaki uniforms of private security firms, and there was no clear hint of their intent or loyalty.

When she finally reaches her destination, a small base occupied by the battalion involved in the “green on blue” incident, she must conduct her interviews not far from a burning fuel tanker–set on fire by the Taliban just as she arrived with an Afghan colleague. She finds an Afghan battalion commander who is trying to cope with the deep resentment felt by his men at the petty slights they have suffered at the hands of oblivious American troops yet fearful of what will happen if those Americans leave. “It will be more difficult in the future when you leave us alone,” he told her. “We don’t have heavy weapons, we don’t have heavy artillery, we don’t have enough ammunition. We don’t have night vision, we don’t have an air force. This post doesn’t even have electricity — we use oil lamps at night.”

Like most great reporting, this dispatch is subject to multiple interpretations. To me, it shows the problems inherent in the chosen American strategy of drawing down our combat forces and mentoring the Afghans–there are undoubtedly deep cultural divisions between Americans and Afghans that are hard to pierce, especially in the current atmosphere of distrust because of the green on blue shootings. But it also shows the necessity of continuing to support the Afghan security forces, for without our support areas like Wardak Province, located just a few miles outside of Kabul, will fall quickly into Taliban hands. U.S. commanders had hoped to pacify this area after the completion of operations in southern Afghanistan, but President Obama’s overly hasty withdrawal of surge troops makes that impossible, leaving Afghan forces in a precarious position as we continue our drawdown. If we continue to withdraw too quickly, Kabul itself, which is relatively peaceful at the moment, will be endangered by the Taliban.

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5 Responses to “Fragile Gains in Forgotten Afghan Corners”

  1. mshapi2 says:

    " Kabul itself, which is relatively peaceful at the moment, will be endangered by the Taliban." n nSo, do we need to invade or keep troops in any country where religious fanatics may gain power? nHow about US invading Gaza? or Lebanon? or Yemen? or Sudan? or Mali (just learned about that one), or Syria, or quite a few other God forgotten places where terrorists may find safe harbor? n nWe should not have switched the mission in Afghanistan from getting Al Qaeda to building a new society. I would vote for getting out asap, supply those we want to support with arms and let the Afghanis fight it out.

  2. nacllcan says:

    1. Alyssa Rubin showed her mettle with terrific reporting from Iraq, and she clearly continues to be as keen eyed, gutsy, and articulate in observing Afghanistan. n n2, Boot's "fragile gains" now at risk in Afghanistan, is malarkey. There were never real gains. Sure our troops fought, and fought hard, and our drones killed enemy commanders, but the brunt of our gains were the Taliban pulling back and sensibly waiting for the scheduled withdrawal announced by the president from the first. n nWhen Obama went after the hawk's votes in 2008 by promising to make Afghanistan "the central front in the war on terror", that at least made sense from his perspective. He needed to wipe the egg off his face after having called Iraq unwinnable and the surge unworkable, just as the surge was working and Iraq was being won. It was shameful to stampede the country into a war for the sake of winning an election, but at least it had the merit of being smart. Obama's national security polling improved. n nBut why in heaven's name did Republicans and conservatives feel a need to support that gimmick? There was nothing smart or patriotic or honorable about reflexively supporting the transformation of Bush's relatively cheap sideshow into a blazing war, where we had and have no vital national interests. The justification given, that al Qaeda needed to be denied its spiritual home was rubbish. Its protean nature was foreseeable. Its cells now operate in a dozen other countries. Al Qaeda never needed Afghanistan, nor did the United States. After the initial punitive expedition, for having sheltered Osama, we had no further business there. We could fight global terror as effectively without a single combat battalion in that country. n nThe drumming for war in Afghanistan by such as Max Boot, Michael Rubin and other Commentary writers is disgraceful. Do they think and feel their support for the vital war in Iraq, where the US had vast national interests and which coincidentally also served Israel's security, obliges them to show equal bellicosity for a war where there is absolutely no Israeli connection? Such a motivation would be ridiculous and cowardly. But what then explains this folly?

    • Davidthomson1 says:

      We made an awful mistake indulging in Afghan nation building. It behooved us to monitor the country—and kill Islamic extremists as needed.

    • amspirnational says:

      We won nothing in Iraq. Iran and Syria won at least a temporary ally. In the past month,Iraq has refused to turn over to the US an insurgent and Hezbollah member who our government says killed US troops during the war. It is also co-operating with Assad and Iran. Morever, the surge did not work either as one of its "planks" was to reconcile Sunni Shia and Kurd so as to form a stable cohesive government. Such an atmosphere does not exist within the current Iraq government.

  3. K2K says:

    "the deep resentment felt by his men at the petty slights they have suffered at the hands of oblivious American troops" sounds like "petty slights" = a lot lost in translation. n n

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