In this month’s issue of COMMENTARY, Benjamin Domenech has an excellent article on the Republicans’ broken technological machine. In it he explains why the Romney digital team was unable to catch up to Obama’s record-setting digital team that many have likened to “Big Brother” in its scope.
Domenech contends, and I agree, that even taking the strength of Obama’s digital team into account, the Romney campaign didn’t scratch the surface of what they should have accomplished on the digital front. The issues of the Romney campaign were varied and are not only due to the failure of Project Orca. Domenech explains:
While digital efforts were the primary focus of the Obama campaign from the beginning, with data miners and tech gurus culled from Silicon Valley, they were a relatively late addition to the Romney effort. Its digital operation was staffed after the rest of the campaign, with an operation that seemed remarkably inefficient for a campaign that was supposed to do things with the rigor of Romney’s research-intensive firm, Bain Capital. There were plenty of people working on the digital side, but tasks were poorly assigned and hampered by restrictive approval processes. Romney’s staff was politically diverse and more used to the world of business than politics—some had never worked on a political campaign before. Frustration set in, then boredom, then Facebook-browsing. The quiet was deafening.
For digital staffers who recognized they were playing catch-up with the Obama machine that had never stopped building after 2008, the contrasts were infuriating. Where the Obama campaign’s content and emails were tailored to the interests of individually targeted demographic communities based on topics of interest and other data-mined priorities, Romney’s campaign didn’t even make distinctions between whether someone had given $5 or $500, or whether the name came to the database through a petition about health care or energy policy.
The campaign was also fiercely hierarchical, to the surprise of some longtime Romney staffers who found their ideas for innovation shunted aside by senior staff and consultants who were unapproachable and unresponsive.
Late last month RedState’s Erick Erickson had a stinging post on the incestuous and unproductive relationship between consultants and the Romney campaign, contending that a group of consultants were “the seeds of Mitt Romney’s ruin and the RNC’s get out the vote (GOTV) effort collapsed — bled to death by charlatan consultants making millions off the party, its donors, and the grassroots.” Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, it appears that his advice on the usefulness of these consultants has more or less fallen on deaf ears.
Yesterday a “private” meeting (which was immediately reported on by sources present) took place between some members of Romney’s digital team and other major conservative digital strategists. It appears that many found it to be a positive and uplifting experience, and that discussing the enormous gap between the two sides didn’t overwhelm or discourage those present. Roll Call reported that “One source said the meeting was so positive that it was almost as if Romney had won.”
That attitude calls to mind the overconfidence that marked most of the Romney campaign, especially after the first debate. In Domenech’s piece he quotes Romney pollster Neil Newhouse, who announced boldly in a staff meeting, “We’re f—ing gonna win this thing.” The digital divide between the two sides is not insurmountable, but it should not be filling anyone in the conservative movement with anything resembling confidence either. The fact that this meeting left many leaving feeling positive is a worrisome indication that the consultants and strategists who underestimated their ability to compete with the Obama campaign are still living in an alternate reality.










The problem is not consultants or technology or staff or organization or any of that stuff. It is that the Obama people are passionate followers, like the early Christains who died in Rome, willing to do whatever it takes to have their God win. No amount of tech savy or managerial focus can overcome that.
Well, believe what you want if it makes you feel better. But the truth is that Romney lost because the public didn't buy his voodoo proposals, like basing debt reduction on closing unspecified loopholes. Sounds familiar. n nAnd then, of course, there's the fact that there was nary a position on which Romney hadn't turned a 180.
"And then, of course, there's the fact that there was nary a position on which Romney hadn't turned a 180." n nObama's also changed many of his positions on issues. but when he changes HIS mind, it's called "evolving" and he is praised for it. n n
BDZ is almost entirely right, but HillelA is completely wrong. n nI would bet you that if you gave most people Romney's and Obama's policies and asked them to pick which was which, they couldn't do it. (if you asked people free-form to explain the differences, most of them would say "Romney doesn't care about poor people and Obama is for fairness" without having the slightest idea how that translates to policy or action.) n nand for many Obama voters, it doesn't matter what his policies are: he is their god, as BDZ points out. (I had a co-worker rhapsodize to me once about Obama "filling out his brackets" during NCAA time. the same co-worker had nothing but contempt for George W. Bush's interest in baseball.) n nwhere BDZ goes astray is doesn't blame the consultants enough. n nthe particular consultants the Romney campaign hired turned out to be very, very bad, possibly criminal (there's talk of missing money). but leaving that alone, the whole ORCA effort was a MAJOR fail, and not only technically: it was a waste of time–many local GOTV volunteers could have been doing something that actually might have gotten out the vote. instead, we were futzing around with non-working smartphone "apps" and non-working 800 numbers and 60-page lists of voters sent to us THE NIGHT BEFORE THE ELECTION, leaving us with less than 12 hours to get them printed. n nI remember thinking "If this is an example of their overall campaign organization, Romney's going to lose big." n n
Rulieg, I agree with you. Thanks for making those points.
If it makes Domenech feel better, there is some mythology attached to the Obama GOTV magic. n nI maintained one email address from the 2008 Obama campaign, using the zip code I grew up in (long the heart of Ros-Lehtinen's CD) as a Jewish-American. I was offended by every outreach email. n nBut, I vote in The Bronx since 2001, and same absence of mailers or robo-calls this year, as 2004 and 2008, except for one call to volunteer to GOTV in Pennsylvania. nYet, at the polling place, was amazed at the turnout of young minorities this time. A neighbor was in charge and said it had been busy all day – he was also surprised. n nI think the Obama campaign focussed on GOTV for <50, in a skewed urban strategy. nand the GOP does not compete where I vote. n n