The D.C. Circuit’s 46-page opinion in Canning v. NLRB (ably analyzed by John Steele Gordon) is a master class for law students, legislators, and lawyers–an illustration of the first rule of constitutional interpretation: before you refer to legislative or judicial history, or how a “living” Constitution might read if you could re-write it, or the words in invisible ink in the “penumbras”–look at the words as written, and determine what they meant to those who adopted them.
The Recess Appointments Clause provides the “President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.” Canning contended “the Recess” is the period between sessions of the Senate, when it is by definition unavailable to receive and act on nominations from the president. The NLRB argued the president could act during any break in the Senate’s business (and determine for himself when a sufficiently long one occurred). The court held the NLRB failed to note that the Constitution references “the Recess,” not “recesses.” Here is the key portion of the opinion:



