Jonathan Tobin outlined a number of objections and criticisms of Senator Rand Paul’s foreign policy address at Heritage, in which Paul, among other things, embraced a containment option toward a nuclear Iran. While containment is often bantered about, there are two main problems with containment which undercut anyone’s ability to contain Iran.
First, containment is a military strategy, not simply a rhetorical strategy. Paul sought to cloak himself in the mantle of Reagan, but containment requires a Reaganesque military build-up. It requires basing around Iran more extensive than that now available to the United States, a more robust naval presence, prepositioning of arms and men, and the ability to defend facilities. For example, defense against mines requires not only minesweepers, but also shipyards capable of repairing damaged vessels, and surface-to-air missiles and troops to defend those shipyards. NATO was a cohesive element during the Cold War, but the Gulf Cooperation Council could hardly organize itself out of a paper bag if it involved tactical cooperation. Paul, like Obama, is willing to talk the talk, but unwilling to invest in the backbone of containment. That heightens the danger, since the Iranians—when they see U.S. commitment to containment doesn’t go far beyond rhetorical hot air—conclude that the United States is a paper tiger and can push the envelope too far.
A greater flaw is the broad over-generalization with which Paul, Chuck Hagel, and other self-described realists too often approach Iran. Iran is not a monolith, and ordinary Iranians would not be the ones to control any nuclear arsenal. Rather, command, control, and custody of an Iranian nuclear bomb would be in the hands not only of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but the most ideologically pure unit within that organization. That no one has precise insight into the ideological allegiance of the commanders who would possess the bomb will worry regional rulers a great deal. After all, it’s one thing to talk about hardliners and reformers when it comes to politicians, but it’s another thing to fly blind when it comes to the predilection of those who we actually would face.
The Iranian regime might not be suicidal, but the nightmare scenario where Cold War-style containment and deterrence breaks down is this: What happens if there’s an uprising in Iran, like the ones in 1999, 2001, or 2009 but, instead of crushing the protestors, some units at least of the security forces join the people in the street? After all, some American analysts suggest the Revolutionary Guards is no longer so revolutionary, so it follows that they might react to the same outrage to some spark as their friends and neighbors. If momentum builds to the point where regime collapse is inevitable—think Romania in 1989—then can anyone guarantee that the guardians of an Iranian nuke wouldn’t launch it to fulfill their genocidal ideology? After all, their regime is finished anyway, so why not? Under such circumstances, containment and deterrence breaks down. Until these problems are addressed, Paul’s discussions about containing Iran fall flat.
Iran is, unfortunately, the classic example of our modern way of political discourse.. If, say, Hungary was threatening a nuclear strike on Germany, and was accordingly accelerating its nuclear enrichment program to achieve this, we would encourage dialogue between Budapest and Berlin to resolve the issue. So, what do we do with Iran? Can there be dialog between Iran and Israel to determine whether Israel deserves nuclear annihilation? Probably not. So, if you're on the Left, how do you treat Iran? One way is to turn the issue into one where Israel, the Jewish Lobby and the neocons are the real issue. This could be termed the Hagelian Dialectic, as opposed to the Hegelian version. In the extreme form of the Hagelian Dialectic, it is Israel that is threatening Iran and not the other way around. For this reason, Iran should be allowed to become a nuclear power so that it can match Israel's capability. The most obvious historical precedent was the rationalization of Hitler's rebuilding of the German military in the 1930s as a not unreasonable response to the onerous terms of the Versailles Treaty. And that Jewish thing was, you know, whatever. Jews can be so self-interested.
Containment is fraught with horrible problems and the fact that we are still debating it shows just how weak the U.S. is in the face Iranian ambitions. Containment is expensive, as Mr. Rubin notes. It is a policy that requires consistent, constant, and never ending enforcement. To contain a country, others must continually monitor that country and, if necessary, use force to keep nuclear weapons within that country. It is like containing a vicious lion: you have to keep the cage locked and have a guard watching for any weaknesses in the fence. If the lion comes out you have to be willing to shoot it before it strikes. n nWitness Israel's strike against arms (possibly chemical weapons) from Syria to Hezbollah. While no rational person thinks Syria should have chemical weapons, it is all the more necessary to ensure that Syria's chemical weapons (or conventional weapons) are not shared to terrorists. Hence, Israel struck the shipment. Would the U.S. be willing to allow Iran to have nuclear arms within their borders yet forcibly prevent Iran from sending its nukes to other countries or terrorists? To ask that question is to answer it: No. n nFurther, the U.S. will not strike Iran should it launch nuclear weapons against Israel or other countries. Such retaliation would be met with much hand-wringing, committees of civilians and military leaders who could well argue that nuclear war is not worth it. We've seen the world's response to that before (see melkreitzer's comment above.). n nContainment is a grand label for doing nothing. Anyone who thinks about it can see that and can further see that politicians who say it are really cowards who hope that nothing happens on their watch. The Iranian threat is real, Iran wants to be a nuclear power, and is working with all its might to make it so. The problem is that to stop them requires action prior to them having the actual bomb and we seem unable to respond to what is a clear and growing danger. n nIf the world wants to keep nuclear weapons out of Iran, they have to destroy Iran's ability to make them. It's that simple to state. Implementation and execution of such a plan is another problem but to get to the how to do it, you first have to know what you need to do. Containment merely short circuits the what down to nothing rather face the evil that is growing by the day.
This leads to the next question; if the Obama administration continues with its current Iranian policy, where we talk a lot and act very little, it is conceivable that Iran would obtain a nuclear weapon well before the 2016 presidential election. If that should happen, what would be the best policy for the next president to pursue? Wouldn’t it be true containment, in the sense as described in this article, knowing that anti-ballistic missile defense would have to be the center piece? It’s a thought too terrible to contemplate, yet, as I see it, the most likely outcome. It will be interesting to see Rand Paul’s evolution on this issue as current realities change.
iran will just float one into ny harbor on an old freighter and light one off. nthat way they get the freedom tower and the financial district and maybe a little bit of williamsburg(just some extra Jews for good measure)