After the Storm:
Can de Gaulle End the Algerian War?
FOR weeks now the entire West has waited on the news from France. As in a suspense film the uncertainty lasted right up to the end, although the next day observers were surprised at their failure to see what, in retrospect, appeared inevitable. The confusion of deeds and actors has added to the fascination. Had General de Gaulle (the hope of Bourguiba, Francois Mauriac, and certain advocates of a liberal policy in Algeria) suddenly become the man of the extremists, of MM. Soustelle, Bidault, and Srigny? Had the French army, which since Napoleon Bonaparte’s seizure of power in 1799 never initiated a coup d’etat, embarked upon a career in which the Spanish army was its predecessor? Was France forced to choose between the Popular Front and fascism? Was General de Gaulle the savior or the gravedigger of the Republic?
Perhaps it is not yet possible to give a definite answer to all these questions. The reality itself is confused and contradictory. Let us try to understand what has happened. We do not wish to recount again the history of events which readers have certainly not forgotten, but it is necessary to recall the essential facts, in contrast to the systematically falsified interpretations which a section of the French press is trying to spread.
About the Author