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The Russian Reset: A Eulogy
- Abstract
Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama met his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev, to sign the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Known colloquially as New START, the treaty is the latest in a series of agreements between the United States and Russia aimed at reducing the countries’ nuclear stockpiles, a process that has been pursued by Democratic and Republican presidents for decades. Over the course of seven years, New START commits the two sides to lowering the limit on deployed strategic warheads by 30 percent and nuclear launchers by half. Most important, the treaty renews the mutual-inspection regime of nuclear facilities, pithily articulated by Ronald Reagan’s maxim, “Trust but verify.”
New START has been hailed by the White House and its supporters as the most significant of Obama’s foreign-policy achievements, which says something about the administration’s record thus far. Contrary to the grand claims of advocates, who argued that reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia were vital in preventing nuclear proliferation, New START is no panacea. Over the past 30 years—especially during the administration of George W. Bush—both countries have dramatically lowered stockpiles, while nations like North Korea and Pakistan attained nuclear arsenals and Iran jump-started its own program.
About the Author
James Kirchick is writer-at-large with Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty based in Prague and a contributing editor to the New Republic.
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