When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits the White House next week, Obama and his administration would do well to employ their much-practiced skills at making nice. New Delhi rightly fears outside meddling after this week’s U.S.-China Joint Statement, which contained a sentence widely interpreted as an affront to India:

The two sides [China and the United States] welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.

The Joint Statement’s timing was particularly bad considering the recent India-China border dilemma. Both countries have reportedly increased troop presence near the blurry border, and the Dalai Lama’s visit to Indian territory that is still claimed by China did little to improve the relationship. China has emphasized that its “more pronounced” territorial issue is its border dispute with India. So New Delhi has good reason to be nervous about Chinese prying at Washington’s behest.

A spokesman from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs quickly commented on the Joint Statement, stating that “a third country role cannot be envisaged nor is it necessary” regarding India-Pakistan relations.

Already, both China and the United States are trying to downplay the significance of the Joint Statement reference.

China’s Foreign Ministry denied that a discussion took place between Obama and Chinese heads of state about U.S.-India nuclear cooperation, and its statement emphasized Beijing’s support of regional stability. The spokesperson added that China “values its friendly cooperation with” India and Pakistan and “hopes to see relations between the two continue … improve and grow.”

But India can hardly be blamed for frustration at the Obama administration’s mixed message. Yesterday, Robert Blake, the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, said the United States welcomes China’s participation in stabilizing the India-Pakistan region. But he also added, “We have always said, in terms of Indo-Pakistan relations, that’s really up to India and Pakistan to decide how and when and the scope of that.” Also yesterday, William Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, declared that better relations with China do not necessarily come at the cost of India.

One can only hope that the ill-considered phrasing of the Joint Statement won’t hinder next week’s discussions. No doubt Obama will want Prime Minister Singh’s support on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not to mention climate change. That Singh is the first head of state to visit the Obama White House in itself highlights the importance of Indian cooperation. If the mix-up is merely linguistic, it can be overcome. But if the lack of clarity lies within Obama’s foreign policy itself, expect a rocky summit. Obama’s diplomacy and eloquence will be tested as he attempts to please both India and China.

As Barack Obama takes the long flight back across the Pacific Ocean today, he would do well to reflect on his meeting with the South Korean president, a man who truly understands and exercises smart, realist diplomacy.

On paper, South Korea and the United States approach North Korea in parallel. Both want Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons, and both see the six-party talks as the most likely venue for persuasion. But in reality, Lee’s approach is much tougher; his hand is extended — but he also has a clenched fist, and he’s not afraid to use it.

Last January, Lee suspended aid to North Korea, saying he’d reinstate it only after Pyongyang denuclearized. And while Lee has often said that South Korea’s top priority is peace and reconciliation with the North (a Lincolnian goal if ever there was one), he has also been smart enough to amp up his military, especially at the border. Lee has maintained a staff that could stare down Pyongyang and has fortified his outside alliances to check North Korea. Though Lee prefers international economic sanctions against North Korea, he has also made no secret that Northern military aggression would be formidably matched.

Needless to say, this approach has perturbed the North, long accustomed to extracting Southern concession. In the last year, Pyongyang declared an “all-out confrontational policy” toward South Korea, ratcheted up provocations at sea, hurled insults, held South Koreans captive, and tested missiles. Lee has nevertheless held his ground.

Yet despite his toughness, Lee has also established opportunities for the North to cooperate and re-engage. Most recently, Lee has sought what he dubbed the Grand Bargain: if Pyongyang dismantles its nuclear program in a single, definitive step, the South will guarantee North Korea’s security and offer significant economic assistance.

In contrast, the U.S. is rewarding Northern bad behavior. Abducting American journalists won the North a photo-op visit from Clinton. Further fits of pique have earned the North attention from an envoy, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, who is now concretely scheduled to visit Pyongyang on Dec. 8. Obama hopes bilateral discussions will return North Korea to the six-party talks. But in reality, direct talks leave the North with even more reason to avoid six-party company.

The irony in all this is that Lee’s actions represent exactly the strategy Obama has professed since his Inaugural Address. But as Lee has proved to the North, his strategy involves more than just words.

Although the results — or more accurately, the lack of results — from Obama’s China visit suggest the opposite, the $800 billion the U.S. owes to Beijing “had no impact on [Obama’s agenda in China] whatsoever,” claimed Deputy National Security Adviser Mike Froman.

“The $800 billion never came up in conversation, and the President dealt with every issue on his agenda in a very direct way and pulled no punches,” Froman said at a news conference yesterday in Beijing.

On Nov. 15, the New York Times described Obama as a “profligate spender coming to pay his respects to his banker” and predicted before the trip’s beginning that “Mr. Obama will be spending less time exhorting Beijing and more time reassuring it.” It was a prediction that Froman’s statement contradicts.

And a savvy prediction, indeed, as it turned out. Obama offered vague statements on human rights—admittedly, an improvement on previous silence. Both sides reaffirmed their cooperation on environmental issues, nuclear nonproliferation and security – agreements likely less solid in reality than in rhetoric. Both promised increasing student exchanges. But all these stated commonalities are mild. If anything, the U.S. lost ground, minimizing India as a first-rate Asian power and making concessions on Taiwan, as Foreign Policy’s Daniel Blumenthal noted.

So the question is one of correlation or causation: whether Obama’s conciliatory approach can be blamed on the debt alone, or whether it is instead indicative of a larger China-policy outlook.

True, as Froman said, there was no documented mention of the $800-billion debt on the White House website. (But, given its status as a quite rotund elephant, perhaps it was a topic that should have been broached at least once.)

But if Obama intends to shift U.S.-China policy altogether, expect bigger foreign policy problems soon, a dilemma articulately described by Robert Kagan and Dan Blumenthal, who wrote for the Washington Post before Obama’s visit.

Previously, the American strategy has been to simultaneously engage and balance China, Kagan and Blumenthal write. But this time, throughout the visit, Obama repeated that “we do not seek to contain China’s rise,” words that must be musical to a country historically accustomed to regional dominance and hegemony.

Blumenthal and Kagan suggest a tension between reality and a policy of strategic reassurance: The U.S. doesn’t want to diminish its Asia presence or power, but China demands parity at bare minimum. “So it will quickly become obvious,” they write, “that no one on either side feels reassured. Unfortunately, the only result will be to make American allies nervous.” As if Obama’s recent treaty forfeitures in the Czech Republic and Poland were not enough.

Either way, the tone of the visit belied a less confident America—but whether that’s by dollar or decision, we have yet to see.

President Barack Obama is losing ground on all three points of controversy in the Japan-U.S. security alliance, and his meeting today with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama did nothing to improve the U.S. position.

Japan is one of America’s most important allies, geopolitically essential for U.S.-East Asian policy and security efforts. The American presence in Japan has, among other things, been a deterrent to North Korea, a guarantor for Taiwan, and a balance for China, all of which stabilize East Asia. But this summer, Japan’s politics changed as the Democratic Party of Japan overturned the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in 16 years. And while the new prime minister has called the U.S.-Japan alliance “the axis of Japan’s foreign policies,” his goals suggest the contrary. Up for debate is Japan’s refueling mission to Afghanistan, the status of a U.S. marine base in Okinawa, and — most important — a nearly 50-year-old security treaty between the two countries.

Let’s start with the latter, and most troubling, of these possible changes: the review of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The treaty establishes U.S. protection of Japan in exchange for an American military presence on Japanese soil. Revising that treaty to decrease U.S. military presence would diminish American influence, capability, and agility in the region.

And if the ruling party’s attitude toward the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Base in Okinawa is any indication, the American military presence in Japan could eventually encounter an even larger threat. The U.S. agreed in 2005 to relocate the Futenma base to a remote coastal area. But Prime Minister Hatoyama might want the base outside Japan altogether — hardly a surprise, considering that he campaigned partially on promises to reduce the U.S. military presence in Japan.

As Tokyo considers what it will do about Futenma, Obama has announced “ministerial-level meetings to discuss” the situation. But the U.S. ambassador to Japan, John Roos, said America’s “hope and expectation [is] that, at the end of that process [of review], the government will be comfortable with that [original] agreement.” He added, “The United States believes that the agreement is vital, that after considering all the alternatives this is the best agreement for the stability, the security and the strength of the alliance.”

That brings us to the Japanese Indian Ocean refueling mission, which is important more symbolically than logistically. The mission is primarily acknowledged as an act of Japanese support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, and it has continued nearly uninterrupted since its inception in 2001, pausing only for three months when the DPJ won control of the upper house of parliament is 2008. But by all accounts, parliament will allow the mission to expire by January, despite urges to renew from Pakistan, Britain, and especially the United States. Instead, Japan will send money and vocational training to Afghanistan.

These security questions between the United States and Japan remain unresolved. So what of the Toyko meeting? Obama warned Asia against reliance on U.S. consumers and talked about nuclear disarmament and climate change. (Well, he did also get on a first-name basis with Yukio Hatoyama — duly lauded in the joint remarks.) But he accomplished nothing on the security front. East Asia remains a dangerous neighborhood, and the increasingly precarious security holdings there deserve more of Obama’s attention. This is yet another instance where American delay could really hurt.

Both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama could use a little refresher course in liberal thought.

Speaking at the Berlin Wall, Hillary Clinton used a liberal nickel word: History. But did she actually realize what she was saying? In her first sentence, she spoke of “that night 20 years ago when history broke through concrete and barbed wire and signaled a new dawn…”  She repeats herself later, referring to how “history did not end the night the wall came down; it began anew” (emphasis, in both cases, mine).

A political scholar would see this as a reference to Hegel, who coined the idea of History, as a driving force uniting past and present and pressing toward some utopian ideal. Marx and Lenin took a shining to the concept, using it as a foundation of their political theory. The notion has been latent in liberal thought ever since. You can’t be progressive unless you’re going somewhere, right?

Ms. Clinton must not have realized how loaded her word choice was. After all, History, in that very same context, was used as a justification for many of the communists’ shady or brutal dealings. (Oops.)

Better yet, President Obama accidentally articulated a conservative thought: “Human destiny is what human beings make of it,” he said in his Berlin Wall televised address.

A conservative might wish the extreme thesis and antithesis of the president and secretary of state collided here. The synthesis might be closer to the moderate policy that candidate Obama originally proclaimed. But alas, all we have is nostalgia for Woodrow Wilson, poli-sci prof-turned-president. Apparently, the Zeitgeist is political illiteracy.

Yesterday, the key elements of the congressional health-care bills were outlined by Tevi Troy, COMMENTARY contributor and former deputy secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Speaking at the Hudson Institute luncheon, he noted that all versions of the bill have this in common: new regulations for insurance companies and the health-care industry; mandated health insurance for all citizens; subsidies to help pay for that health insurance; taxes to pay for those subsidies; and cuts in Medicare and Medicaid.

The Congressional Budget Office — which has been refreshingly honest about the skyrocketing expenses — already projects that the cost of health care will soar. And much of the cost is backloaded. (Whoever is president in 2013 and 2014 could have a golden opportunity to blame his predecessor.)

True to the spirit of the age, business-friendly and consumer-friendly measures are being ignored. That’s a pity — some of them are a real bargain. Jeffrey Anderson of the Pacific Research Institute put together his “Small Bill” last month, which would accomplish many of the same goals at a fraction of the cost. Anderson puts special focus on making the health-insurance market more flexible through lifting existing regulations. Such ideas are worth examining, but it’s doubtful Congress will have the courage to give them second thought.

President Obama seeks to increase access to health care, insuring everyone. But at the same time, he wants to decrease costs. As Troy pointed out, these goals are nonaligned at best, contradictory at worst. And they’re laughable if Congress continues aspiring to micromanagement.

From its newest poll, released this week, WorldPublicOpinion.org concluded that “publics around the world show a fairly strong internationalist orientation. Most favor subordinating national interest to international law and are ready to trust the World Court to be impartial.” Respondents from 21 countries were offered two statements to choose from:

The first statement said, “Our nation should consistently follow international laws. It is wrong to violate international laws, just as it is wrong to violate laws within a country”: the second said, “If our government thinks it is not in our nation’s interest, it should not feel obliged to abide by international laws.”

On average, across all nations polled, 57% said that their country should put a higher priority on international law than national interest.

Notably, the study showed that “support for abiding by international law is strongest in China.” Seventy-four percent of mainland-Chinese respondents prioritized international law over national interest.

But in China, domestic rule of law is often disregarded (as are international-law and international agreements). In fact, the domestic law is derived from a single-party dictatorship, hardly a recipe for legitimacy. And China often turns the law against its citizens, the very people it is supposed to protect. So it’s not shocking that the Chinese want a higher power to appeal to.

The poll respondents’ may have answered differently had they only known that, for example, international law has only minimally, if at all, affected China’s behavior — or that of any state loose on internal justice. International law is tough to establish in the first place because, while justice is universal, different countries have different criteria for legality. And even if a standard were agreed upon, pleas have little effect without enforceable consequences.

And the world is a dangerous neighborhood. A state’s primary responsibility — its “national interest,” if you prefer — is the well-being of its citizens. Above everything, the state must be able to protect its citizens when they can’t protect themselves. To be sure, sometimes international law can help a country serve its citizens. For example, treaties held in good faith, as required by international law, can better trade and security. But disregarding national interest in exchange for a feebly definable, often unenforceable international law is a dangerous idea.

Predictably, Beijing has retaliated against Barack Obama’s protectionist trade policy. Earlier this week, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued a preliminary ruling that puts a 36 percent tariff on U.S.-made nylon. That tariff, like the initial one, will hurt American industry and American consumers, and it could have been avoided.

If only Obama had been more … diplomatic. By upholding his campaign promises to labor unions, he backtracked on his promise to avoid protectionism. And tariffs are a surefire way to irk overseas friends.

The fray began in September. The United Steelworkers, who make the metal wiring that goes into tires, complained to the International Trade Commission that the high number of Chinese tire imports was disrupting and directly threatening the market.

The president has the final say about enforcing ITC recommendations. Unlike George W. Bush, who four times dismissed similar complaints, Obama sided with the labor union.  If only Obama had used his Nobel-winning charm to sate the labor-union leader with dinners and discussions, and if only he had worried about how provoking Beijing might impede goals like international security, global warming, and especially the economy. Instead, he ultimately conceded an internationally important decision to a powerful domestic lobby.

How? Obama enforced a 35 percent tariff on Chinese tires in addition to the existing 4 percent one, ensuring that trade hostility would escalate. And, as the Wall Street Journal reports, Americans got shot in the foot:

Since the tariff announcement on September 11, U.S. tire wholesalers have been warning that their sales prices to retailers will increase by about 15 percent on average. In some cases, the hikes are as high as 28 percent. The only reason prices haven’t risen by the full 35% tariff rate yet is that wholesalers still have some pre-tariff inventory stocks in their warehouse.

Beijing countered. It filed a complaint against the U.S. with the World Trade Organization and threatened tariffs on American poultry and car-part exports. And on Monday came the decision to impose the tariff on Nylon 6, “a synthetic filament that ends up in a wide array of products including toothbrushes, auto parts, socks and the handles of Glock handguns,” the New York Times reports. Who knows where this will end?

None of this should come as any surprise; Chinese trade retaliation has been brewing for more than a month. The irony is that this is one instance where Obama’s conciliatory international approach could have served him well.

When Barack Obama travels to China next month, it’s unlikely he’ll mention the plight of Guo Quan, a pro-democracy dissident sentenced to 10 years in a Chinese prison last Friday.

Thus far, the administration has diplomatically neglected the issue of human rights, as Joshua Muravchik noted in our July/August issue and as Jennifer Rubin addressed earlier today. By toning down the human rights/democracy talk, the White House has felt free to discuss, albeit often ineffectively, collective security, economics, and global warming — higher-priority topics from the administration’s perspective. Obama’s handling of the Dalai Lama is just one example of this shuffling of priorities. Every other president since 1991 has met with the Dalai Lama when he has visited Washington, but Obama did not, apparently to please Beijing.

If there’s one thing the president grasps, it’s how much issues like human rights and democracy rattle China. A 2007 open letter to President Hu Jintao advocating democracy cost Guo his teaching job at the Nanjing Normal University. But losing his job and income didn’t deter him. Guo continued to write and speak out against the single-party government. So he was arrested last November — as the Associated Press reported — just after he had dropped his son off at school.

Guo was charged with “subversion of state power,” punishable by up to life in prison. Guo stood firm, using even his August trial to repeat his calls for Chinese democracy. According to the Epoch Times, he said:

I have written many articles to express my views openly. My intention is to call for a system where multiple parties compete for election. I did not call for the subversion of the nation. I have never found any legal documents that state that calling for a multi-party system is subversion. … There does not exist any legal document that prohibits Chinese citizens from organizing democratic parties.

And so the sentence rolled in — 10 years.

Guo’s case is certainly not unique. China is full of imprisoned dissidents. The world is full of them.

Obama has yet to fully appreciate that Americans have always expected their foreign policy to include a moral component. In fact, the moral aspect usually complements other foreign-policy goals. Issues like human rights or democracy can’t remain unmentioned without a very pressing reason. If a president must delay addressing them, he had better provide good justification fast. Otherwise, Americans will begin to reject the policy and question the administration implementing it. (Take, for instance, how the enhanced interrogation of Guantanamo detainees itched the collective conscience. Or how even when fighting a murderous enemy, Americans want to avoid bloodshed if possible.)

Americans might forgive Obama’s reticence on human rights and democracy if his biggest policy goals are met relatively promptly — for example, if he could persuade North Korea or Iran to yield all nuclear weapons voluntarily, to moderate themselves, and to bound toward the U.S. with unclenched fists.

But so far Obama has yet to accomplish anything of significance with the policy he’s labeled “realist.” And if he doesn’t succeed in meeting his foreign-policy objectives soon, Americans will begin to grow impatient with unaddressed human-rights issues. The president would do well to consider this, especially if he has any doubt about delivering on his other foreign-policy goals during his time in China.