Richard Cohen of the Washington Post has an interesting history with Israel’s recent wars. Today, as Jennifer noted, he has an article blaming the Gaza war on Hamas, while taking to task those who criticize Israel for retaliating against the rocket attacks hitting towns in the southern part of the country:

I get the impression that Israel is expected to put up with this. The implied message from demonstrators and some opinion columnists is that this is the price Israel is supposed to pay for being, I suppose, Israel. I am informed by a Palestinian journalist in a Post op-ed that Israel is trying to stop “amateur rockets from nagging the residents of some of its southern cities.” In Sderot, I saw homes nagged to smithereens.

Cohen’s right, of course, but he has not always been quite so understanding. Some might recall that back in 2006 Cohen caused a stir when he wrote critically about Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, suggesting that Israel itself was “a mistake”:

The greatest mistake Israel could make at the moment is to forget that Israel itself is a mistake. It is an honest mistake, a well-intentioned mistake, a mistake for which no one is culpable, but the idea of creating a nation of European Jews in an area of Arab Muslims (and some Christians) has produced a century of warfare and terrorism of the sort we are seeing now. Israel fights Hezbollah in the north and Hamas in the south, but its most formidable enemy is history itself.

The 2006-Cohen continued:

The smart choice [for Israel] is to pull back to defensible — but hardly impervious — borders. That includes getting out of most of the West Bank — and waiting (and hoping) that history will get distracted and move on to something else. This will take some time, and in the meantime terrorism and rocket attacks will continue.

Now, imagine if Israel had followed the advice Cohen offered back then–that is, imagine  if Israel had withdrawn from the West Bank. Cohen does so in today’s column:

Three years ago, Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip. Good, the world said. Next, pull out of the West Bank, the world said. But then Hamas, which has vowed to destroy Israel, won the election in Gaza. Sderot soon became hell. The West Bank is controlled by Fatah, the moderate Palestinian organization, which once had control of Gaza, too. If Israel withdraws from the West Bank, will rockets come from there? If you lived in Tel Aviv, a spit from the West Bank, would you take the chance?

Of course, Cohen is hardly the only person to have had his mind changed by the current circumstances–and this is not the only reason readers should treat the advice of columnists with caution. Soon after he published the 2006 piece, I asked him to clarify his position. “It was a mistake,” he told me in reference to the piece (not the formation of the State of Israel). He explained that he was trying to say something about the complexity surrounding  Israel’s formation, and that his column had turned out badly. (Unfortunately, he never did publish a corrective article clarifying his position.)

A week or so after this 2006 “mistake” piece, Cohen wrote another article on the Lebanon war in a more straight forward manner. It was coherent and blunt. Indeed, in that regard, it was similar to what he wrote today, and it is still very relevant to those struggling with the philosophical questions related to proportionality. Here’s what Cohen wrote about the proportionality of Israel’s response in Lebanon:

The dire consequences of proportionality are so clear that it makes you wonder if it is a fig leaf for anti-Israel sentiment in general. Anyone who knows anything about the Middle East knows that proportionality is madness. For Israel, a small country within reach, as we are finding out, of a missile launched from any enemy’s back yard, proportionality is not only inapplicable, it is suicide. The last thing it needs is a war of attrition. It is not good enough to take out this or that missile battery. It is necessary to reestablish deterrence: You slap me, I will punch out your lights.

Makes good sense, don’t you think?

A couple of days ago, James Kirchick wrote here (and I wrote here) about the dissenting position taken by the dovish Jewish lobby on the Gaza operation:

[A]t a time when the vast majority of Israelis and American Jews support what Israel is doing, J Street steps out of the shadows as the voice of communal dissent, joined by the likes of the United Nations and the Guardian editorial board (even the Arab League tacitly supports what Israel is doing, seeing that Hamas is an Iranian front). J Street has the right to its extreme leftist, capitulationist opinions, but it does not have the right to claim, as Ben-Ami once did, that it represents the “broad, sensible mainstream of pro-Israel American Jews.”

An article in the Jewish Forward, written by Rabbi Eric Yoffie, President of the Union for Reform Judaism - a liberal Jewish organization, no doubt - proves that Kirchick was right: J Street can’t claim that it represents the view of the American Jewish majority. More so: It can’t even claim to represent the view of a liberal Jewish majority. Yoffie, a liberal, writes this:

It is not easy for me to write these words. I welcomed the founding of J Street and know many of those involved in its leadership. Furthermore, I am a dove myself. I support a two-state solution, believe that military action by Israel should be a last resort and welcome an active American role in promoting peace between Israel and her neighbors. But I know a mistake when I see one, and this time J Street got it very wrong.

J Street’s first statement expressed “understanding” for Israel’s motivations, and called - as I do - for a political rather than a military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nonetheless, its conclusion was that Israel made a mistake in attacking Hamas and that the United States and others must press for an immediate cease-fire.

A second J Street statement was worse by far. It could find no moral difference between the actions of Hamas and other Palestinian militants, who have launched more than 5,000 rockets and mortar shells at Israeli civilians in the past three years, and the long-delayed response of Israel, which finally lost patience and responded to the pleas of its battered citizens in the south. “Neither Israelis nor Palestinians have a monopoly on right or wrong,” it said, and it suggested that there was no reason and no way to judge between them: “While there is nothing ‘right’ in raining rockets on Israeli families or dispatching suicide bombers, there is nothing ‘right’ in punishing a million and a half already-suffering Gazans for the actions of the extremists among them.”

The folks at J Street didn’t like Yoffie’s article, to put it mildly:

It is hard for us to understand how the leading reform rabbi in North America could call our effort to articulate a nuanced view on these difficult issues “morally deficient.” If our views are “naïve” and “morally deficient”, then so are the views of scores of Israeli journalists, security analysts, distinguished authors, and retired IDF officers who have posed the same questions about the Gaza attack as we have.

They provide very little evidence that such “analysts” and “authors” exist. In fact, when the operation started, most dovish Israelis, among them left-wing authors Amos Oz and A.B Yehushua supported the operation. A growing camp within the Israeli left now supports a cease-fire - but very few opposed the operation in its initial stages. As I’ve shown here, even the left-wing Meretz Party supported the operation when it started:

“The time has to act without compromise and without narrow political considerations, to protect the citizens of the Gaza periphery and Sderot,” the statement said. “There is no choice but to hit Hamas in a precise way and to act for a renewed ceasefire,” the party said.

And even assuming that Meretz’s position is now more in sync with the one espoused by J Street, it is still not the position of Israel’s “left” - not even by a stretch. Meretz - according to most polls - represents barely 5% of Israel’s population. If J Street argue that a similar percentage - or even double that percentage - or even five times that percentage of American Jews agree with them - it is still far from the “broad mainstream” they claim to represent.

If Jews really “worry for a living,” as Aaron David Miller, a former Clinton peace team official contends - Miller now gives them another reason for worrying. Writing for Time, he predicts:

[T]he days of America’s exclusive ties to Israel may be coming to an end. Despite efforts to sound reassuring during the campaign, the new administration will have to be tough, much tougher than either Bill Clinton or George W. Bush were, if it’s serious about Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

Miller repeats a familiar complaint: “for the past 16 years, the United States has allowed that special bond to become exclusive in ways that undermine America’s, and Israel’s, national interests,” he writes. One can read similar assertions in Dan Kurtzer’s book, in which he blames his former boss, President Clinton, for “often allowing Israeli domestic politics effectively to veto critical issues” and blames President Bush for being “overly deferential to the stated political problems of the Israeli government.”

Miller argues that American support for the Gaza operation does not “make sense.” His explanation isn’t very detailed, but it has something to do with making life “unbearable for 1.5 million Gazans by denying aid and economic development.” Surely life in Gaza is hell, but what alternative Miller has for the country that merely wants to prevent a hostile organization from shelling its cities with rockets is not clear.

Miller also wants Obama to be tougher on the settlement issue. If this happens, it will come as no surprise to Israeli officials: most of them expect some “pressure” on the settlement issue, and would admit that on “illegal outposts” Israel has very few good answers. Israel has made a commitment to President Bush on this issue, and if President Obama asks Israel to show some progress Israel will have to comply.

The real question is: can the U.S. achieve more by being “balanced” and putting pressure on Israel - or can it be more effective by standing with Israel in virtually every attempt Israelis make to fight their hostile neighbors? While Arabs will be happier with an administration that’s tougher on Israel, one can argue that Israel, at least in the past, was much more cooperative when it felt safe, and much more willing to make concessions when there was no doubt of American support

Clinton got more from Rabin and Barak than George H. W. Bush got from Shamir, and George H. W. Bush got more from Israel than people might realize. Remember: the ultra-hawkish Sharon was the first Israeli Prime Minister to evacuate settlements - and this happened when Bush was in office. That’s because Sharon trusted Bush not to ask for more than is possible for Israel to give. Olmert, as Prime Minister, was willing to go much further than most of his predecessors on final-status issues for a similar reason.

If Obama is more “balanced,” if he applies more pressure, he might get some results by forcing Israelis into tough choices. But he might also discover that making Israelis feel unsafe makes them act nervously. And nervousness makes them less likely to trust both the peace process and the mediator.

Previous polls have shown that Israelis are apprehensive about the kind of ground operation in Gaza that has just begun. This is a direct reflection of Israelis’ dwindling confidence in the IDF’s ability to emerge  victorious from a ground war in this dense and treacherous territory. And this very skepticism is a key factor in Israeli leaders’ decision to go in on the ground tonight (Israel time).

If Israelis, traumatized by the 2006 Lebanon war, have a hard time believing they can win a ground war against Hamas, so do Israel’s neighbors. Hamas spokespersons were bragging last week that Israel would not dare invade Gaza, and promised that the Jewish state would pay a high price if it did. If the Gaza war ended without a ground operation, Hamas leaders would have crowed that Israel was deterred by Palestinian forces,  and this would have led to a further erosion of Israel’s reputation as a nation that cannot be intimidated. If Arab terrorists perceive Israel as a country wary of conflict, terrorist groups will only attack more in hopes of defeating the paper tiger.

So - the IDF and Israel’s leaders have three goals in launching this ground war: First, they want to make Hamas pay a price that will force it into a renewed ceasefire. Second, they must prove to the Arab world that Lebanon 2006 did not turn Israel into a country afraid of war. And third, they must engender renewed Israeli confidence in the country’s armed forces.

Rasmussen polled Americans on the Gaza War and found this:

Forty-four percent (44%) say Israel should have taken military action against the Palestinians, but 41% say it should have tried to find a diplomatic solution to the problems there, according to a new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey. Fifteen percent (15%) are undecided.

This striking split might be explained in terms of two factors. First: for America, this is the era of diplomacy. Obama has successfully convinced Americans that the time for talking has arrived and the age of aggression is over. The poll shows the results of this new American ethos as applied to the realities of the Middle East. This makes even more sense when you look at the division between Democrats and Republicans regarding the war:

Sixty-two percent (62%) of Republicans back Israel’s decision to take military action against the Palestinians, but only half as many Democrats (31%) agree. A majority of Democrats (55%) say Israel should have tried to find a diplomatic solution first, a view shared by just 27% of Republicans.

That Republicans are generally more supportive of Israel is not new. But these numbers reflect exactly what Israel was worried about before the American election: that the new Democratic majority will generally find it hard to sympathize with the use of force. (Barack Obama may be much less naïve about these things than are his supporters.)

The second factor is the failure of Israel’s leaders. Those who follow regional events on a daily basis know quite well that Israel was trying hard to avoid this operation, and was negotiating a “diplomatic” solution for the crisis for a very long time (many believe it was too long). The problem is that Americans are evidently unaware of these efforts. Israeli leadership has not been sufficiently tenacious about making their attempts known to the rest of the world (to be fair: it’s much harder convincing the media to report about diplomatic efforts to avoid war, than it is to get them to report about actual war).

Rasmussen also found this:

Fifty-five percent (55%) of adults, however, believe the Palestinians are to blame for the current situation in Gaza, while 13% point the finger at the Israelis. Nearly one-third (32%) aren’t sure… Seventy-three percent (73%) of Republicans blame the Palestinians, as opposed to 47% of Democrats.

This is no surprise when “75% of Republicans say Israel is an ally of the United States” and “just 55% of Democrats agree”. This is a huge challenge for Israel in the Obama years - but also a challenge for the pro-Israel Democratic camp. If they would like to have the ability to argue persuasively that Democrats are no less supportive of Israel than Republicans - the way they did last year - they need to work on these numbers.

I’m really not sure where Rosa Brooks of the Los Angeles Times gets her information, but her assertion that “the Israeli military offensive has more to do with politics than anything else” is not only wrong, but also probably an attempt to discredit the operation.

However, the politics of the day and the military aspects of war have gotten tangled up in an unhealthy way in the last 72 hours. Note the debate within the government concerning the proposal for a 48-hour cease-fire and the strange way in which Defense Minister Ehud Barak handled this matter. We’ve also seen the first signs of weakening public support for the war, and the first organized campaign against it.

Barak’s rivals, mainly Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and her Kadima buddies, are trying to use his sloppiness for political gains. As the operation in Gaza has helped to boost Barak’s (and Labor’s) fortunes in the polls, Livni and company need all the help they can get. The party that was recently considered a political corpse is now alive and starting to kick. Kadima can’t let this happen without kicking back.

In the 2006 Lebanon War, Livni called for diplomacy and an early cease-fire. Now, Livni is a hawks’ hawk. When Barak, in the weeks before the war, was trying to renew the Hudna (cease-fire agreement), Livni called for action. She also opposed the French cease-fire initiative, and keeps hinting that toppling Hamas is what’s really needed. Barak is careful not to aim for the sky. Suspecting that both of these leaders’ positions have something to do with politics is far from scandalous: Livni needs to be the hawk in order to convince voters that she’s no less tough than her male rivals, Barak needs to don the traditional tribal costume of the Labor leader and remind voters that he is from the peace camp.

But many Israelis are understandably upset about the mere mention of political considerations in a time of war. Unity and resolve can give way to shock and dismay, and the punditry is always there to fan the flames by redefining the word “politician” as one who sends our sons and daughters into the line of fire for the sake of election results.

The public outrage is both expected and overblown. In a democracy like Israel, politicians make war - and peace. And expecting politicians not to think about politics, a month or so before Election Day, is preposterous moralistic purism. Hopefully, Barak and Livni will make the most important decisions for the benefit of country — not party.
Barak and Livni are not uniquely opportunistic. Many of Israel’s past leaders fought wars on the eve of elections, and all have thought of political consequences as they went to war.

Think about Menachem Begin and his decision to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor on the eve of the very tight 1981 election. Did he do it just to win the election? No, he didn’t. Did he use it smartly for political benefit? Indeed he did.

Or take Shimon Peres’s decision to launch the Grapes of Wrath operation in Lebanon on the eve of the 1996 election. Was this a justified military operation? Probably. Was Peres thinking about Election Day and the need to boost his image as a capable military leader? Probably. (The operation eventually backfired: many Arab Israelis, angry at Peres, refrained from voting and thus helped Binyamin Netanyahu win.)

Such opportunism has also been employed in matters of peace. When Ehud Barak went to negotiate with Yassir Arafat in Camp David, he was already planning ahead, asking some political advisors to prepare for election “in case the summit is successful.” He was not necessarily going to Camp David in order to win elections, but he was definitely hoping to use success politically. When you ask a politician not to behave like a politician, be prepared for disappointed.

J.G., what Ehud Barak really wanted to achieve–not only by supporting the French-proposed cease fire but also by letting the public know about his recommendation–is not clear.

The story is simple:

The idea for a 48-hour suspension was first raised by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in a phone call with Barak on Monday. Barak initially rejected the offer, but in a second conversation on Tuesday told Kouchner that he would reconsider and raise it in talks with Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni.

News of Barak’s decision took the IDF - which continued to mass forces outside Gaza on Tuesday ahead of a planned ground operation - completely by surprise, and Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi released a statement saying the IDF was not behind the move.

The complicating factor is Barak:

Barak, at a meeting with his aides and half a dozen guests, said things that were meant for publication, but not for attribution. The result was miserable, in terms of both content and form. He confused the public just when the aims of the operation seemed crystal clear and enjoyed broad support.

He did not explain the connection between the stable, long-term cease-fire whose achievement - and nothing else - would justify ending the operation, and a limited cease-fire called solely to enable negotiations on the larger cease-fire. The opposition he aroused from his colleagues in the government and senior defense officials managed to put the weaknesses of the group that will decide the operation’s future at the top of the agenda.

Eventually, Israel has rejected the proposed cease fire (giving the Washington Post an opportunity to get it right). The credit Barak might get for success in the Gaza operation is already in some danger. But this should worry him and his party, not Israel’s citizens. Thus, the real problem arising from this miserable incident is that it served to pick holes in the relative unity behind the operation and its goals. As usual, the leftist Meretz party and its satellites were ready and willing to put an end to operation they endorsed just a couple of days ago.

Here’s Meretz last Thursday:

“The time has to act without compromise and without narrow political considerations, to protect the citizens of the Gaza periphery and Sderot,” the statement said. “There is no choice but to hit Hamas in a precise way and to act for a renewed ceasefire,” the party said.

Here’s Meretz four days later:

In a speech to the Knesset on Monday, Oron warned against the IDF “getting stuck in the Gaza Strip” and said he still did not understand what the goals of the war were. Meretz MKs later voted against a motion endorsing the war.

You can’t blame Barak for this (expected) shift in Meretz’s position. But sowing confusion in time of war–something Barak knows as well as anyone is not a good idea–gives the Meretz/Peace Now camp a tool with which they can work to change public opinion. Strengthening Meretz is not what Barak needs to do right now.

The Washington Post’s editorialists point today to one of the most interesting phenomenons of the Gaza war — the divide within the Arab world:

Israel’s battle with Hamas in Gaza is producing a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its ally Hizballah in Lebanon have joined Hamas’s Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel — and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel’s air attacks. Those governments, along with the West Bank Palestinian administration of President Mahmoud Abbas, have issued rote condemnations of Israel. But they have also accused Hamas of triggering the conflict by ending a ceasefire — and they have responded harshly to the Iranian camp, which has “practically declared war on Egypt,” as Cairo’s foreign minister angrily put it yesterday.

Don’t be fooled by this narrative of “moderates” against “extremists.” The real divide is less between organizations and countries than between the “leadership” and the “street.” The governments of some countries (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) may see the dangers of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas taking over. But their citizens do not.

Public opinion in Egypt is more likely to side with Hizballah than with President Mubarak. Jordanian citizens are more likely to support Hamas than blame it for causing the war. The 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, conducted by Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland, shows clearly that most Egyptians and Jordanians blame the more moderate Palestinian Authority for the “situation in Gaza,” and more of them identify with Hamas than with the more moderate Fatah.

In the 2006 survey, Telhami found that Hizballah’s Hassan Nasrallah was deemed the most popular foreign leader in both Egypt and Jordan. People in both countries identified Israel and the U.S. as those posing “the biggest threat” to them. Seventy-one percent of Egyptians and 74 percent of Jordanians described their attitudes toward Hizballah after the war as “more positive.” Thirty-two percent of Egyptians supported Hamas; only 8 percent supported Fatah (a majority wanted a unity government).

None of this is new. And the dilemmas it presents to all parties involved are well known. For the next American President it means, plainly put, that supporting “moderate” Arab governments likely means less of a chance to boost America’s image in the Arab street. It also means that Arab governments will eventually not be able to go very far in battling the extremist forces in the region. They cannot constantly defy public opinion without risk ing internal unrest.

Those arguing that Israel’s actions against Hamas in Gaza only serve Hamas’s cause, elevating its profile and earning it more support in the Arab street, should have the same feeling with respect to Egypt’s war of words against Nasrallah. This is a fight Hizballah is only too happy to have, considering that it is more popular with ordinary Egyptians than their own government. Those hoping for a better Middle East should remember that, in the meantime, the choice is between the devil we know and the one we don’t. In short: either “moderation” (and hypocrisy) or “democracy” (and extremism). If you think that’s an easy choice, think again.

While I generally agree with most points raised by Jennifer, I do not think it is that bad that Barack Obama has taken a no-comment position on the Israel-Gaza war. He will gain nothing, and might lose plenty by taking a stand on such an uncertain situation. The warring parties will also gain very little - with one exception: Israel can claim that Obama’s silence might tempt Hamas to remain defiant and hold out for a better deal after January 20 (as I argued earlier, I don’t think this is a war about toppling Hamas, but rather about getting a better deal). However, I don’t think Hamas seriously expects Obama to support their cause.Of course, once inaugurated, Obama will not be able to remain silent and run away from tough choices. But since there will be plenty of time for that — why start now?

As U.S. News accurately reports:

Media reports are portraying the Israeli offensive in Gaza as a setback to President-elect Obama’s hopes to broker a lasting Middle East peace deal. At the same time, some reports suggest the flare-up increases the pressure on Obama to deal quickly with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a time when his foreign policy agenda is already crowded.

One of the only assets Obama will have at his disposal is clean-slate-clean-brake status. But as Jennifer argues, “the dramatic departures which some envisioned (e.g. immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, a Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough, closing of Guantanamo) aren’t remotely possible any time soon.” This status is more image than utility. And if that’s all Obama is working with for now, there’s not much for him to say.

One of the most troublesome issues related to the war in Gaza, is the reemergence of tension between Arab-Israelis and the country they live in. Arab-Israelis - or Israeli-Palestinians - find themselves in an unenviable position, and their leadership, as usual, does everything in its power to fail them. Instead of looking to calm things down, instead of trying to delicately maneuver, Arab Israeli leaders are looking for ways to capitalize on the crisis - and maybe get some extra votes in the coming election. Yes, elections are still scheduled for Feb. 10^th.

Thus, Israeli-Arabs took to the streets, not in great numbers but with some violent incidents severe enough to make Israeli-Jews concerned about a possible reenactment of the 2000 so-called “October Riots,” in which Arab citizens disrupted the country’s life by blocking roads, throwing stones, clashing with police forces and ripping apart the delicate fabric that is Israel’s society (Israeli-Arabs have a different version of these events - involving discrimination and police brutality - and that’s one of the problems).

The fact that Israeli-Arabs find it hard to fully identify with Israel’s war in Gaza is unfortunate, but not surprising. However, when an Arab Minister in the Israeli government has decided to boycott a meeting of that same government, by way of protesting the war - he gets himself in trouble. When Arab Knesset members constantly take to the airwaves complaining about Israel’s forceful actions and hardly take time to condemn Hamas’s aggressive tactics, charges of Arab-Israelis constituting a “fifth column” find purchase.

Who’s going to benefit from this resumed tension? Definitely not most Arab citizens who’d like to live their lives peacefully. Not Arab merchants and restaurant owners who have taken pains (and years) to make Jewish-Israelis comfortable buying from them after the 2000 clashes. Not Jewish-Israelis who support coexistence. And I don’t see any benefit for the Palestinians in Gaza - nor for those in the West Bank, who’d like to see Hamas’s rule collapse. In fact, the position taken by Arab-Israeli leaders today against the war is much more extreme than the one taken by the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. So afraid to be seen as “collaborators” - so keen on getting a political boost by raising tensions - the Arab-Israeli leaders play the “holier than thou” card. A loosing card for all involved - except, maybe, politicians.

But will Arab politicians benefiting the most from these tensions? They might, or might not. The right-wing Israeli Beiteinu Party, headed by Avigdor Lieberman, can hardly believe its good fortune. In the polls preceding the war this party was already getting more votes than Labor and Shas, and on its way to becoming the third largest party in Israel’s political landscape. Assuming that a successful war can benefit Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his party, Labor - also the party most identified with the cause of taming Arab-Israeli nationalism - Lieberman is the only one thus far who has a chance of getting some extra votes when the war is over.

One should listen carefully to the words uttered just minutes ago by Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in the wake of the military operation in Gaza. He was not talking about toppling Hamas’s rule - as both his Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu have advocated  just days ago. Olmert, burned by his painful 2006 Lebanon experience, rejected the ambitious goals that these two contenders for Prime Ministership have made parts of their campaign.

Olmert sides with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, leader of the Labor Party and less likely contender for prime minister, who last Sunday cautioned against confusing rhetoric with policies the government is likely to pursue:

I am aware of the fact that we are living in a period that is naturally sensitive and that there are many people who think that if one makes aggressive and daring statements, then these statements solve all problems.  I have no intention to compete with any of those who issue such statements.

Today, appearing in a short press conference, the Prime Minister conveyed a similarly cautious message: The operation has a very specific goal - to give the Israeli civilians living in the southern part of the country their life back. When Hamas will agree to commit itself to “understandings” - according to which rockets can’t be launched into Israel - the goal of this operation will be achieved. Until the next round.

The Saudi plan for Middle East peace - now known as the “Arab peace initiative” - is an interesting, if somewhat suspicious idea. The Saudis have always invested more in the public relations component of the plan than in taking practical steps toward it its implementation. Thus, it is no wonder that the plan started not with a proposal to the Israeli government but with an article by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman. Since the appearance of that article, any progress on the plan has been more symbolic than substantive. The article by Turki al-Faisal in today’s Washington Post is just another link in a long PR chain.

Al-Faisal is a well informed figure in the DC, having served as the Saudi Ambassador to Washington for two years (he is now chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research & Islamic Studies in Riyadh). But his article misses an important mood-shift: while al-Faisal aims to convince Obama that he should “not miss this critical opportunity,” he neglects to notice that the new Washington has very little patience for those refusing to “engage” their opponents and enemies in direct talks. Obama is willing to sit for a chat with the Iranians, but Al-Faisal does not show a similar openness to engaging Israel :

At this point, the Saudi government is constrained from direct talks with Israel. Egypt and Jordan have been commissioned to meet with Israel on behalf of the Arab world. Once agreements between Palestine, Lebanon and Syria are reached with Israel, Saudi Arabia will join fully in ending hostilities and establishing diplomatic and normal relations with Israel.

This is a position that the Obama administration has good reason to reject. The Saudis can’t reasonably applaud change in the American approach while playing the same old Middle East game on their end. However, their plan is interesting, and presents some opportunities worthy of pursuit. A new booklet of articles published by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Prevent Breakdown, Prepare for Breakthrough: How President Obama can Promote Israeli-Palestinian Peace) contains some illuminating recommendations, including some references to the Saudi plan. In the introduction, the Institute’s Rob Satloff recommends Obama “look for regional keys to unlock the bilateral impasse, in part by working to adapt (not simply adopt) the Arab Peace Initiative.” Wendy Chamberlin, President of the (more Arabist) Middle East Institute writes an article advocating the plan as a way to avoid a “dangerous impasse”:

Even in the current environment, the Arab Peace Initiative - adopted at the Arab League’s Beirut summit in March 2002 and since reaffirmed - provides an opportunity to advance final-status negotiations in a manner that could guarantee Israel’s security and help build a viable Palestinian state.

And while acknowledging that “The initiative is a statement of principles, not a detailed proposal, and much work would lie before the parties in terms of bridging gaps and defining the details of implementation” - Chamberlin believes that, “There is encouraging evidence of Arab commitment to engage in a meaningful peace effort with Israel-an effort that would be strengthened if it were collective.”

In the concluding chapter - the one containing the detailed recommendations for the next administration - the book’s editor, David Pollock points to some of the flaws inherent to the current state of the Arab Initiative:

[T]he Arab Peace Initiative offers Israel recognition under certain conditions. On the other hand, many of the same Arab governments that made this offer also give various forms of material, moral, and political support to Hamas, which is sworn to Israel’s destruction and dedicated to supplanting the rival Palestinian government that has formally offered to make peace.

Still, Pollock calls the plan “a valuable point of departure” and believes that both Israel and the U.S. should “echo this appraisal, without endorsing any details.” He calls for the following steps: Israel can say it’s ready to negotiate on the basis of the plan, should promise to maintain full freedom of access to the holy places in Jerusalem (this should be easy), and declare a moratorium on settlement activities (to see if such a thing can happen we need to wait first for a new Israeli coalition). But Pollock has some demands for the Arab side - demands that al-Faisal (in the Washington Post) does not see as essential: practical support for the solving of the refugee problem, ending the state of war as a “first step”, ending incitement, and an agreement to accept a reality of border modifications and recognize Israel as a Jewish State. Last, Pollock writes this:

[I]n November 2008, Saudi Arabia hosted a UN symposium in New York with senior Israeli officials in attendance. Why not hold another such event in a major Arab city, or accept a return invitation to Israel? Why not encourage Iran to participate as well?

Compare this suggestion to the half-hearted approach presented in the Al-Faisal article:

The Arab world is willing to pay a high price for peace, not only recognizing Israel as a legitimate state but also normalizing relations and putting a permanent end to the state of hostilities that has existed since 1948.

A “high price”? That’s an odd way to put it. Ending hostilities is not a price the Arabs will be paying - it’s the reward they will be getting, that we will all be getting, if an Israeli-Arab agreement is achieved.

David Ignatius interviewed Syria’s President Bashar Assad, and heard some interesting things from the man now immersed in negotiations with the Israeli government. However, when it came to Lebanon, the lion of Damascus chose to remain vague and insincere:

Asked whether Syria was prepared to restrain Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Lebanon, Assad said this was a matter the Israelis should sort out in separate negotiations with the Lebanese. Indeed, he promoted the idea of the other negotiating tracks — which would draw in, at least indirectly, Hezbollah and Hamas.

“The longer the border, the bigger the peace,” Assad said. “Hezbollah is on the Lebanese border, not Syrian. Hamas is on the Palestinian border. . . . They should look at those other tracks. They should be comprehensive. If you want peace, you need three peace treaties, on three tracks.”

Assad wants to hold the Lebanese stick on both ends: he doesn’t want the responsibility (to tame Hezbollah), but does want the influence in Lebanon (of course, this is something he would not tell an American interviewe), as Danielle Pletka has pointedly remarked earlier this week:

It is not inconceivable that the regime in Damascus might throw its supporters in Tehran under the bus in exchange for prestige, cash and a free hand in Lebanon. But it is unrealistic to expect President Assad to dispose of Hezbollah and Hamas in the same way. Mr. Assad - broadly disliked at home, a member of a mistrusted Alawite minority, comically inept at managing his country’s resources - can maintain his grip on power only as long as he is seen as a vital instrument of Israel’s defeat.

But for Israel, peace with Syria is appealing for two reasons: first, it allows Syria to move away from Iranian influence, and, second, it may lead Syria to make the Hezbollah problem go away. If Assad can’t promise to do these things - the incentive for Israelis might disappear. And while some experts believe that the Syrian-Iranian relations are no more than a bargaining chip for Assad - the Syrian interest in Lebanon is one that Damascus sees as a strategic goal.

That’s why it is more than plausible that Assad is just playing a game with Ignatius. Rather than expressing his willingness to tame Hezbollah - thus giving ammunition to those claiming that what he really wants from “engagement” with Israel and the U.S. is the big prize of Lebanon - Assad plays hard to get. He wants Israel, and later the U.S., to ask for Syria’s intervention in Lebanon. The Bush administration clearly understands this game - and that’s why it has recently warned Israel to remain cautious as far as Lebanon is concerned:

The diplomatic messages asked Israel to remain committed to Lebanese sovereignty at all costs, stating “Israel must not sacrifice Lebanon for the sake of peace with Syria.” A senior Foreign Ministry official said the U.S. even asked Israel for “guarantees” on the matter. However, a source in the Prime Minister’s Office said Tuesday “the matter is not even on the table.”

However (as I’ve written in the past), the Syrian track is an issue on which both Israelis and Syrians weirdly share an interest: they both wait for Obama in the hope that he will be the one willing to change American priorities and abandon Lebanon in search of stability and success in the peace process. No wonder the Lebanese themselves seem less than enthusiastic about the prospect of peace with Israel.

At U.S. News and World Report’s God & Country blog, Dan Gilgoff asks Eric Cantor, the newly elected Minority Whip - and the only Jewish Republican in the House,”How does your faith influence your politics and positions?” Cantor’s response isn’t very specific:

I grew up in a kosher home, attended Hebrew schools on a regular basis growing up. I sent my kids to Hebrew day school when they were younger. Obviously, my faith is part of who I am. It would tend to color my being. I don’t feel like I necessarily apply that faith in any direct way. I’m sure it does manifest itself so far as my perceptions and my views and how I work on legislation. But I can’t come up with a way that says it dictates my position one way or the other. There isn’t a monolithic Jewish position on anything.

So Gilgoff tries again: “For many conservative Christians, their pro-life stance is a direct result of their faith. Is your pro-life stance a result of your Jewish faith?” And, again, Cantor is cautious:

You can find many rabbis that differ on the question of when life begins. I don’t think there’s a monolithic position. That’s one of the things about the Jewish faith . . . there is a multitude of opinions. Our faith has been about discourse, it’s been abou