Top Secret
03.04.2008 - 9:20 AMWhy do some government officials, entrusted with classified materials, choose to funnel them to reporters in violation of their oaths of secrecy and in violation of the law?
In 2002, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez formed an interagency task force to look into the question and see what could be done about it. One of its subgroups concluded, unsurprisingly, that “[p]eople leak information for any number of reasons: negligence, by accident, as an act of espionage, or as willful disclosure to satisfy some personal need.”
The same group suggested a variety of remedies:
Education can reduce negligence. Well-designed control mechanisms and work processes can minimize the accidental leak. Countering a well-planned, focused technical or human espionage operation is more difficult, as system vulnerabilities are systematically exploited. The willful disclosure by one with authorized access may be the most difficult leak to manage via technical controls. Individual motivation can be mitigated somewhat by “deterrents,” i.e., the use of technical interventions, psychological and behavioral threats that generate fear of detection and reprisal. But even the most sophisticated technology cannot prevent the authorized individual, intent on leaking, from memorizing or hand-copying information and passing it to an unauthorized person.
All of this true. But it is also incomplete. Some leaks pass on highly sensitive information and do enormous damage to national security. But some leaks are benign.
The CIA has just posted on its website a document that it declassified in 2004. It is a page from the 1976 Congressional Record, a statement by Congressman Robert Roe offering a salute to the people of North Caucasia on the anniversary of their independence. This particular document was never leaked. In fact, it couldn’t have been in that it was always available in the public domain. But if it had been, what harm would have been done?
Rampant mis-classification creates a climate in which officials feel free to treat cavalierly information stamped secret. Any solution to the problem of leaking has to address this side of the equation.
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March 4th, 2008 at 12:15 PM
Overclassification is maybe 5% of the problem here. Maybe. The only way to reliably stop bastards with clearances from leaking properly classified information to the press is to turn the screws on the press to discover the identities of the leakers — and then prosecute them.
That’s why I’m not a fan of prosecuting the media for leaks. That just gives them the 5th amendment to hide behind, in the effort to avoid disclosing their sources. Leaks of classified information, like the particulars of NSA phone monitoring, should never be afforded the protection of press immunity.
If that posture should then CREATE a problem of government officials improperly classifying information related to their peccadillos, as a means of discouraging leaks about them, the laws are already on the books to deal with that.
Leakers do not leak because they haven’t been “educated,” or because technical controls are inadequate. They certainly don’t leak because they’re not sure what really qualifies as classified. They leak because they want to expose national secrets, usually for reasons of politics or personal animus.
March 4th, 2008 at 8:17 PM
As has been discussed here many times before the problem is too much bureaucracy. Having a secret to share makes one a powerful bureaucrat, especially if one’s bureaucratic butt is not on the line. Where the sense of mission is higher and the concern for the safety of one’s comrades, organization or country is higher the lips don’t leak.