Bashar Goes to Paris
Eric Trager Web Exclusive
This coming Saturday, French President Nicholas Sarkozy will greet Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in Paris. This major diplomatic event, which the state-run Syrian press has been touting for weeks, comes only months after Paris cut ties with Damascus over its role in perpetuating yet another Lebanese political crisis. But renewed French-Syrian ties hardly means that Syria has ended its intervention in Beirut. To the contrary, the Doha Agreement heavily favors Hezbollah, and thus guarantees Syria’s ongoing involvement in Lebanese affairs for years to come.
By inviting Assad to Paris despite this inconvenient truth, Sarkozy’s message to Damascus is crystal clear: we are willing to concede virtually anything to you, so long as you keep Lebanon quiet. Whatever you desire—substantial economic aid, increased political power for Hezbollah, or tacit approval for future non-military interventions in Lebanon—we’ll probably let you have it. Just make sure that Lebanon doesn’t either descend into another civil war, or become embroiled in another Hezbollah-Israeli standoff.
Though hardly principled, Sarkozy’s cynical approach towards Lebanon has some strategic appeal. After all, in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war and most recent political crisis, France has apparently concluded that periods of Lebanese instability ultimately benefit Hezbollah, and thus bolster Iranian regional hegemony. Indeed, if the priority remains ending Iran’s nuclear program, then promoting calm in Lebanon is critical to containing the Islamic Republic’s ever-expanding reach.
But rather than merely containing Iran, France should seek to roll back Iranian regional influence altogether. One way to accomplish this is by constructing policy such that a wedge is driven between Iran and its allies. In this vein, by leaving responsibility for Lebanese stability in Assad’s hands, Sarkozy might have located a strategy for undermining the Syrian-Iranian alliance. After all, the next time that Iran wants Hezbollah to foment tension internally or launch attacks against Israel, Syria will be compelled to stand in Tehran’s way, or risk losing French support.
Of course, if Assad is to be forced to choose between Iran and France, Paris must make clear to Damascus the consequences of future disturbances from Hezbollah for French-Syrian relations. It could further bolster this approach towards Damascus by bringing western allies on board to reinforce the carrots and sticks relevant to Syria’s maintenance of stability in Lebanon. The key is for Sarkozy to cast Assad’s visit to Paris as the first step in broader Syrian-western rapprochement—a rapprochement that carries important responsibilities for Assad, including priorities that clearly conflict with Tehran’s agenda in Lebanon.
Yesterday, an Israeli official engaged in talks with Syria announced that Damascus might be ready to abandon its alliance with Iran. Sarkozy’s dealings with Assad should be the first test of Damascus’s sincerity.
