Yesterday I wrote about the WikiLeaks document dump in terms of what we learned about Arab leaders and their views toward Iran. Today I want to focus on its damage to American national security, and to do so by quoting from Henry Kissinger’s memoir White House Years.
In discussing the so-called Pentagon Papers — the release of more than 7,000 pages of secret documents related to the Vietnam war — Kissinger wrote that the documents “were in no way damaging to the Nixon Presidency.” He points out that “there was some sentiment among White House political operatives to exploit them as an illustration of the machinations of our predecessor and the difficulties we inherited.” Kissinger rightly believed that this was against the public interest. He then zeroed in on a point that is apposite today, in the context of the WikiLeaks matter:
Our nightmare at that moment was that Peking might conclude our government was too unsteady, too harassed, and too insecure to be a useful partner. The massive hemorrhage of state secrets was bound to raise doubts about our reliability in the minds of other government, friend and foe, and indeed about the stability of our political system. We had secret talks going on at the same time with the North Vietnamese, which we believed — incorrectly, as it turned out — were close to a breakthrough. We were in an important point in the sensitive SALT talks. And we were in the final stages of delicate Berlin negotiations which also depended on secrecy.
… I continue to believe that the theft and publication of official documents did a grave disservice to the nation. In the event, the release of the Pentagon Papers did not impede our overture to Peking. But this does not change the principle. We could not know so at the time; nor did those who stole the documents consider the consequences of their action, or even care — their purpose was, after all, to undermine confidence in their government.
(For a very helpful overview of the Pentagon Papers and its relevance, see Gabriel Schoenfeld’s essay “Rethinking the Pentagon Papers” in National Affairs magazine.)
In this particular instance, there does not appear to be any evidence that the American government misled the public on any matter. Rather, it appears to be an effort to release secret communications simply for the sake of malice and to undermine confidence in order to create chaos, embarrassment, and offense.
The collateral damage from these leaks could be massive, as Emanuele Ottolenghi has noted. If foreign governments and diplomats do not have confidence that their candid opinions will remain confidential — if they must now edit their appraisals and judgments with the assumption that they will appear on the front pages of the New York Times or Der Spiegel — then it will make diplomacy and the conduct of foreign policy substantially more difficult.
One can imagine extremely rare circumstances in which exposing state secrets is justifiable or at least debatable. This case is nothing close to that. What we have in Julian Assange is a nihilist and a malcontent, disturbed and dangerous. He really ought to be stopped.
Schoenfeld’s October Surprise
“Are we due for an ‘October surprise?’” asks Gabriel Schoenfeld in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal. “Several factors have converged to make this more probable than in any recent election.”
According to the famous COMMENTARY editor and blogger, we should look for Iraqi insurgents to step up violence as a means of discrediting John McCain. J. E. Dyer, who often posts comments in this forum, replied to Schoenfeld by saying that the “October surprise” may be Iran temporarily appearing reasonable in order to give a boost to Barack I-will-talk-to-any-tyrant Obama. In any event, as Schoenfeld notes, the world’s worst leaders are hoping to defeat the Republican candidate in November. Unfortunately, they essentially get to “vote” in our election by perpetrating-or refraining from perpetrating-horrible acts.
There are two ways for American presidents to undermine autocrats. One is to adopt a conciliatory posture, deprive them of a foreign enemy, buy off crucial segments of their regimes, and expose them as the despicable creatures that they are. The second is to confront them at every turn and destroy them when the opportunity arises.
Of course, our enemies do not actually want to negotiate with us or be our friends. Fidel Castro, for instance, did all he could to derail attempts to end the American embargo because he needed an excuse for his own economic failures. Kim Jong Il, similarly, has worked hard to make sure the United States remains an enemy so he can keep his people in line.
Yet, as Schoenfeld notes, the world’s rogues are now publicly endorsing the Democrat. Why do they ostensibly favor him? Of course, as a matter of appearances they have to say they like Obama’s friendly approach. But there is a much more important reason. At this moment, they fear American military might. Yet they think trends are with them and that we will only weaken over time. In other words, our adversaries believe they can wait us out and think Obama’s engagement will buy them time.
I don’t buy their prediction of American decline, but they are acting on their beliefs and, as Schoenfeld notes, are already trying to elect the next American leader. They obviously think the contest in November is that important. So should we.