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To the Editor:
Norman Podhoretz writes that “deterrence [can]not be relied upon with a regime ruled by Islamofascist revolutionaries who not only [are] ready to die for their beliefs but care less about protecting their people than about the spread of their ideology” [“Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military Action Still Stands,” February]. The regime’s behavior, however, tells a different story.
The mullahs talk a big game, but they act only through terrorist proxies. They stoke the fires of nationalism in order to turn the attention of the populace away from their economic policies, social agenda, and sham rule, but they keep Iran’s large army within the country’s borders, where it has enough work on its hands maintaining the regime’s grip on power. Iran may be a nuisance, but it is hardly an undeterrable threat.
Mark Baker
New York City
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To the Editor:
According to Norman Podhoretz, the failure of diplomacy to halt Iran’s nuclear program means that a preemptive strike on its nuclear facilities remains the least worst option on the table for America. Not surprisingly, he draws on the analogy of 1938 to excite his readers into support for his position, and for good measure adds that President George W. Bush is “a man who knows evil when he sees it and who has the courage and determination to battle against it.” But while President Bush’s sincerity is not to be doubted, there is ample scope to criticize his judgment—and his apparent use of theological paradigms in international affairs. This is an Iranian export I wish he had shunned.
There are several flaws in Mr. Podhoretz’s brief for opening up a new conflict in the Middle East. Given how concealed and dispersed Iran’s facilities are, it is by no means clear that a surgical strike would significantly impair its nuclear program. Moreover, to prevent serious retaliation against American troops in the region, the U.S. would have to engage a broad range of targets. Iran’s infrastructure would be crippled, and the humanitarian and political consequences would far exceed the imagined threat.
The main problem with Mr. Podhoretz’s position is its fatal lack of political context. It is as if he had forgotten the dictum that “war is a continuation of politics by an admixture of other means.” The military option is at best a short-term solution to a long-term problem. It is the broader political dynamic between Iran and the U.S. that really needs to be addressed. Without that, any diplomatic effort is hamstrung.
Simply denigrating America’s intelligence agencies, as Mr. Podhoretz does, is no path to a solution. They must be reformed for the 21st century and an age of asymmetric politics defined by mass media: a politics in which the weak may outwit the strong through a better manipulation of the many and varied tools of communication.
In sum, the U.S. must refine and articulate an Iran policy that is consistent, clear, and unambiguous. This means using “soft power” and framing a practical strategy for dealing with Iran instead of dictating a wish list; focusing on the durable foundations of authority rather than the immediacy of power; and organizing for peace rather than preparing for war.
To achieve these things, the U.S. must invest in the requisite tools of human intelligence—to begin with, analysts who can properly assess different cultures. America stands alone among global players in having a largely introverted political establishment. Those in it who bother to engage and understand the “other” are all too often accused of having gone “native.” This mentality will have to change.
Over a century ago, England’s Lord Curzon berated his countrymen for their failure to develop a sober and consistent policy toward Iran. The problems may be different today, but the reaction of the world’s superpower is all too familiar. The politics of fear is a poor substitute for serious analysis. It is not only Iranians who deserve better.
Ali M. Ansari
University of St. Andrews
St. Andrews, Scotland
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To the Editor:
Nowhere in Norman Podhoretz’s article is there any discussion of what would follow if the bombing he urges were to fail to damage or destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. What would happen to our troops in Iraq? Could our economy sustain the inevitable rise in the price of oil? Would Islamic militancy escalate to unseen heights?
These questions would also apply if the bombing were to succeed, but at least then we would feel safer. To bomb without dealing a knockout blow would be disastrous. Is Mr. Podhoretz aware of these contingencies, and is he in fact prepared to advocate the unthinkable, namely, dropping a nuclear bomb?
Allen Rutchik
Miami, Florida
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To the Editor:
Norman Podhoretz does an excellent job explicating the flaws in the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran as well as explaining why it remains imperative to prevent the Islamic Republic from getting nuclear weapons, even if that requires the use of force.
Historically, it has proven impossible to talk many nations out of nuclear ambitions by way of diplomacy or the threat of sanctions. (See India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and North Korea.) It was only the use of force by Israel that delayed Iraq’s nuclear program in the 1980’s, and the use of force by the U.S. and its allies following Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait that ultimately prevented Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons.
History also demonstrates that nations with nuclear-weapons programs tend to conceal and lie about them. South Africa denied that it was pursuing nuclear weapons when it was, and refrained from placing communications equipment on the roof of a key facility in order to avoid attracting the attention of American imagery analysts. Israel originally claimed that its Dimona facility was a textile plant. North Korea expended much effort burying pipes that were to carry nuclear waste from a reactor to a reprocessing facility. India took great care at its test site not to leave any traces of nuclear activity. And Iran, for its part, has lied again and again about its nuclear efforts at Natanz and elsewhere.
Another historical instance of deception—this time by the U.S. itself—might shed light on the Iranian situation. In the late 1950’s, an effort by the U.S. Air Force to produce a special reconnaissance satellite was publicly “terminated,” to the great chagrin of key people involved. At the same time, however, and unbeknownst to them, a parallel effort was established at the CIA that would eventually produce the first photographic reconnaissance satellite. Part of the motivation at work was that the grumbling of the Air Force team would suggest to the outside world that the project had been abandoned. Iran could be engaging in a similar ploy.
The extent to which these past episodes are a guide to the present situation remains to be seen. But the notion that Iran can be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons without American or Israeli action seems only marginally more probable than the prospect of the centrifuges at Natanz getting up and walking out of the facility.
Jeffrey T. Richelson
National Security Archive
Washington, D.C.
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To the Editor:
The recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran was an even greater fiasco than Norman Podhoretz writes. Not only did the NIE fudge its own finding that Iran’s nuclear activity continues apace, it also confessed that the U.S. did not have “human intelligence” about the Iranian nuclear facilities.
Unless this admission is an elaborate piece of disinformation (something belied by the rest of the NIE), it is a stunning advertisement of the incompetence of our intelligence community and an inducement for the mullahs to stay the course. How hard should it be for the most powerful country in the world to get intelligence about a nuclear industry that requires the work of hundreds if not thousands of people to function?
James Wyeth
Can Iran Be Stopped?
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© 2008 Commentary Inc.
