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To the Editor:
In “The Case for Bombing Iran” [June], Norman Podhoretz continues to liken the challenge posed today by “Islamofascism” to last century’s ideological conflicts with the Nazis and Soviets. But he fails to take his own analysis to its logical conclusion. After all, bombing Iran would at best only delay, not neutralize, Tehran’s nuclear program. Moreover, many military experts argue that Iran’s nuclear facilities are so well hidden and dispersed that it would be impossible to strike at them successfully from the air. Why, then, does Mr. Podhoretz not advocate a full-scale invasion to “drain” another “swamp” of terror and rid the world of a monstrous threat?
Perhaps the reason is that five years ago he misidentified Iraq as the strategic threat. Indeed, our soldiers are still drowning as they try to drain that particular swamp. And not only have America’s military forces been weakened and stretched thin as a result of the Iraq campaign, but our diplomatic tools and political might have also been depleted. In arguing for opening a new theater in the war on terror, Mr. Podhoretz quickly passes over these circumstances by saying they do not matter next to the horror of a nuclear Iran. But clearly they are affecting his thinking or he would not limit our options with Iran—in the middle of “World War IV”—to a mere bombing campaign.
Mr. Podhoretz credits Ronald Reagan (among others) for forcing the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Reagan did not carry out any new strategy; he merely reinvigorated a brilliant policy that was put in place by Harry Truman, a policy that created an alliance of democracies to contain and, where necessary, combat tyranny. This strategy used the threat of military might together with political and economic sanctions, diplomacy, sophisticated ideological warfare, and direct support for democratic forces in order to contain the Soviet bloc and force it to collapse of its own weakness.
Mr. Podhoretz gainsays implementing such a strategy today—sanctions “rarely work,” Iranian leaders act irrationally, diplomacy is hopeless, Western Europe is “Findlandized” by its Muslim minority, and so on—and instead advocates preemptive and unilateral war without any clear reason other than fear. But fear is no basis for clear analysis, much less for sound strategy. We did not have such enormous foreign-policy success during the cold war by acting on our fears; we won because of our strengths. It is time to return to them.
Eric Chenoweth
Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe
Washington, D.C.
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To the Editor:
I share Norman Podhoretz’s dislike of the regime in Tehran and largely concur with his assessment of the dangers it poses. I also agree that the current course of diplomacy with Iran is frustrating and uncertain. Still, I cannot agree with him that a military strike is the solution.
Iran’s leadership is cunning, resourceful, and hostile, but it is not suicidal. It uses aggressive rhetoric as a means to advance its pretensions to regional power, but it is not likely to follow through with action. Nor is Iran’s leadership monolithic. There are differences among top officials about the wisdom of continuing to defy the UN Security Council. Many elites, moreover, have no fondness whatsoever for the Islamic revolution. If America increased nonviolent pressures, internal divisions could widen.
Contrary to what Mr. Podhoretz suggests, Iran has little potential to lead the Middle East and expel the American presence from it. As a Persian and Shiite state in a region of Sunni Arabs, Iran is actually quite limited in its influence. Many of its appeals to the “Arab street” have driven Arab countries closer to Israel. The confidence that Tehran projects is driven by what it sees as American weakness in Iraq, but it is not backed by military strength.
Nor am I so certain that Iran is dead set on acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran seeks not only power but also international respectability. Leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or stating its nuclear plans clearly would undermine that goal and set the country on a collision course with its neighbors.
In any case, for Iran to exploit a nuclear capacity would not be as easy as it sounds. There are grave existential risks for the weaker party in a nuclear competition, and that is what Iran would be next to, say, the U.S. or Israel. Deterrence could still hold.
A perfectly executed strike by the U.S. on all known nuclear sites might delay Iran’s program. But the result could also be a strengthened and more determined regime that would have the sympathy of many in Europe and Asia for its battle against American unilateralism. The repercussions in the Middle East—even without a strong Iranian response there or on the U.S. homeland—would be destabilizing for American allies and interests.
Because the Islamic republic is not about to be brought down spontaneously by Iranians, the U.S. should focus on changing the regime’s behavior rather than on replacing the regime itself. The aim of U.S. policy should be to demonstrate to Iran the benefits of renouncing its revolutionary pretensions and becoming a normal state. If all this does not work, the U.S. should reinforce its deterrence capacity and take measures—arms sales, security assurances, and missile-defense technologies—to dilute and offset Iran’s nascent nuclear capability.
Shahram Chubin
Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Geneva, Switzerland
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To the Editor:
Norman Podhoretz lumps together many widely disparate elements under the rubric of the “Islamofascist” enemy. The highest religious authorities of Saudi Arabia and Egypt have issued many fatwas against Shiite Muslims. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban despise Iranians. Sunnis and Shiites are at each other’s throats in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Yet Mr. Podhoretz believes that these factions are magically “willing to set sectarian differences aside when it comes to forging jihadist alliances against the infidels,” all under (Shiite) Iran’s leadership.
If Mr. Podhoretz’s theory is correct, why is it that Iran played a major role in defeating the Taliban and helping to erect Afghani-stan’s national-unity government? Why is it that Iran, though capable of creating hell for U.S. forces in Iraq, has been relatively restrained?
Mr. Podhoretz’s likening of Iran to Nazi Germany in 1938 is ludicrous. Germany, a powerful nation that had been humiliated a few decades earlier in World War I, had major grievances against the victors. Adolf Hitler was a charismatic leader, and Germany’s culture was such that its people would follow him blindly. And Germany had a powerful military, backed by advanced technological and industrial capacity.
Iran, by contrast, has no territorial claims against any other nation, nor has it attacked any of its neighbors for 250 years. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not a charismatic leader and is, in fact, in deep trouble at home, even among his own supporters. Anti-authoritarian thinking runs deep in Persian culture, and Iranians do not blindly follow their leaders. Iran, finally, does not have an advanced economy, and its air force and navy are museum quality.
All foreign-policy decisions in Iran are made by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini. He does extensive consulting with Iran’s National Security Council, the Expediency Council, former leaders, and the military. Say what one will about Iran’s mode of government, the result has been a calculated, pragmatic foreign policy. Above all, Khameini has issued a fatwa against the production of nuclear weapons.
Ahmadinejad’s remarks about Israel are deplorable, and have been roundly condemned, even within Iran. But others have noted that he has not actually called for Israel to be “wiped off the map.” Iran’s position since the 1979 revolution has always been that Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Holy Land must vote freely in a referendum to select their destiny for themselves. Khatami went even further, declaring that any solution that would be acceptable to the Palestinians would be acceptable to Iran.
Mr. Podhoretz’s worry that Iran could detonate a nuclear weapon in Israel is misplaced. Iran’s leaders consider themselves the protectors of the Palestinians and of Islam’s holy sites in Jerusalem. Any attack on Israel would wipe these out, too, besides provoking a counterattack that would wipe Iran off the map.
Muhammad Sahimi
Confronting Iran
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© 2008 Commentary Inc.
