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In 1969 the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection of the Democratic party set out to make basic revisions in party rules. Its purpose was to open the party to wider rank-and-file participation so that the nominee of future conventions might more accurately reflect the ideas and sentiments of the Democratic electorate. The chairman of the commission, George McGovern, was, he said, persuaded to run for his party's Presidential nomination because major reforms were ultimately enacted. Later, after winning the nomination, he explained that it had been the reforms which made his victory possible.

But immediately after the reformed convention, opinion polls showed an unprecedented defection of rank-and-file Democrats to a Republican candidate who previously had been distinguished as one of the most unpopular Presidents in modern history. While most national Democratic leaders endorsed their nominee and worked to bring him additional support, Democratic leaders and party workers in scores of communities turned their backs on the national ticket. The candidate and his supporters—who had previously described the traditional party apparatus as an unrepresentative, outmoded shell—now pleaded for help from those upon whom they had lavished scorn. But it was too late. The revolution which had thrilled the reformers in July was already well on its way to bringing a counterrevolution in November.

With their effects on the electoral fortunes of the Democratic party no longer in doubt, the reforms have perhaps lost that sanctity which so long sheltered them from serious appraisal. Until now, the respectability and apparent idealism of their proponents have made criticism all but impossible. But it is now evident that serious criticism is deserved. The reforms have left one of the major institutions of American democracy in a shambles. They have, moreover, suggested the dangers in the broader current of political ideas from which the reforms were drawn—a current which still has powerful influence not only in our political life, but also in our educational, religious, and economic affairs.

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From the time it was set up in early 1969 by Fred Harris, then chairman of the Democratic National Committee, the McGovern commission was an instrument of the New-Politics wing of the party. Harris, himself a Humphrey nominee, but nursing his own political ambitions, did not guard the interests of the Humphrey wing of the party with an unwavering vigilance. He appointed McGovern as the commission's chairman. Senator Harold Hughes, a key supporter of the McCarthy campaign, was chosen as its vice-chairman, and Robert Nelson, who previously had been McCarthy's administrative assistant, became the staff director. Nelson's somewhat moderate inclinations were more than compensated for by two energetic and militant New-Politics ideologues—Ken Bode, director of research, and Eli Segal, chief counsel—whose view of the party was “reform or die.”

The twenty-eight members of the commission whom Harris selected did include representatives from the moderate wing of the party. But they were outweighed and outvoted by New-Politics liberals such as Fred Dutton, David Mixner of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, and Congressman Don Fraser. (Reformers claimed they had even received a pledge from Harris not to appoint any people to the commission who would be “opposed to” reform—although nearly half of the delegates to the 1968 convention had voted against one of the key reform resolutions.) Will Davis, former chairman of the State Democratic Committee of Texas, was one of the few McGovern commission members who resisted the direction set by the leadership. But the skeptics had little influence at the occasional meetings of the commission—the real work was carried out under McGovern's direction by the militant young staff.

In its early proceedings the commission took up the kinds of limited suggestions that might have been expected: ending the remaining hindrances to black participation in the South, establishing clear rules and open channels for party governance, and abolishing the unit rule. The objectives of the commission were consistently referred to as “recommendations.” Perhaps this moderate beginning disarmed some of the commission's members. But a sudden and sweeping change occurred in the fall of 1969. A few months earlier the Presidential hopes of the leading contender for the 1972 nomination had skidded to disaster at Chappaquiddick. Almost at once the wide-open battle for the '72 nomination began taking shape, and one of the first candidates to begin planning a campaign, according to press reports in September of 1969, was Senator McGovern.

During this same period the reform commission under McGovern was seized with unexpected vigor. At its November 1969 meeting the staff, with virtually no advance notice, introduced the proposal for a quota system for representation at national conventions. Quotas were established not only for blacks—a group which had historically been denied participation in Democratic party affairs in the South—but also for two newly classified victims of political discrimination, women and youth. An even more spectacular leap was taken in the commission's definition of its own purposes and authority: it claimed for itself supreme decision-making power for reshaping the entire process of delegate selection to the national Democratic convention !

The reform commission had its origins in two resolutions of the 1968 convention. The first of these, the majority report of the credentials committee, called on the chairman of the Democratic National Committee to establish a special committee which would “. . . recommend to the Democratic National Committee such improvements as can assure even broader citizen participation in the delegate selection process.” The second resolution, a minority report of the rules committee, passed by a vote of 1,351 to 1,206—the narrowest margin of any convention decision. This required the call for the 1972 convention to include provisions that would assure all Democratic voters a “full and timely opportunity to participate” in the selection of convention delegates. But the resolution went on to explain such a process as one in which the unit rule “would not be used in any stage of the delegate selection process,” and also in which party primary, convention, or committee procedures could be employed, so long as they were open to public participation within the calendar year of the national convention.

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A careful consideration of these resolutions reveals how far the McGovern commission exceeded its mandate in the guidelines it eventually imposed on the party. First, it is clearly stated that the commission must be responsible to the Democratic National Committee. There is no suggestion in either resolution that the convention was considering a quota system of representation for blacks—whose role in the party had been a subject of historic concern by reformers—and certainly not such a system for women or youth. (In fact, an earlier reform effort which was sometimes claimed as a precedent by the McGovern commission—the Special Equal Rights Committee chaired by Governor Richard Hughes—had specifically rejected quotas in drawing up its report to the 1968 convention.) Neither of these resolutions hinted at the restrictions against participation in delegate selection by state party officials which appear in the McGovern guidelines. There is a specific reference to the validity of procedures whereby party committees select delegates, although such procedures were virtually outlawed by the McGovern commission. Finally, there is an unambiguous mandate for striking down the unit rule in delegate selection. The commission sidestepped the logical application of this section to the winner-take-all primary—a curious decision which proved to be decisive in McGovern's nomination in Miami.

The quota proposal first appeared at the same time that the commission was redefining its mandate; it was adopted at the November 1969 meeting by the margin of a single vote. The reformers have since denied that they intended to create a quota system, or that such a system was eventually put into effect. Their formula required state parties to “encourage participation [of blacks, women, and youth]—including representation on the national convention delegation in reasonable relationship to the group's presence in the population of the state.” The full import of this proposition became clear in its application. When the commission issued its official interpretation of the meaning of this guideline to state Democratic chairmen, the phrase “to encourage” was dropped. Instead it spelled out that the representation of the chosen groups in reasonable relationship to their population was a “requirement” which state parties had to meet. Moreover, a later administrative memo issued by the commission and endorsed by the now National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien asserted that “. . . whenever the proportion of women, minorities, and young people is less than the proportion of these groups in the total population and the delegation is challenged . . . such a challenge will constitute a prima facie showing of violation of the guidelines, and the state party along with the challenged delegation, has the burden of showing that the state party took full and affirmative action to achieve such representation. . . .”

One can hardly tell whether most of the commission members knew at the beginning that in effect they were establishing a quota system and sought to disguise it, or whether they were themselves confused about the implications of what they did. It does seem likely, however, that McGovern knew. He later boasted to an interviewer from the National Journal: “The way we got the quota thing through was by not using the word ‘quotas.’” At McGovern's suggestion, a footnote was appended to the guidelines on representation which demonstrates a unique use of language that distinguishes New-Politics spokesmen from the old-line party bosses:

It is the understanding of the Commission that this [proportional representation] is not to be accomplished by the mandatory imposition of quotas.

The true purpose of this amendment is suggested by the fact that those voting for it included the militant minority on the commission which openly advocated strict quotas.

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