Even though President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have promised that any Iranian nuclear deal arrived at next month will have unprecedented verification mechanisms, the crux of any verification has yet to be negotiated. Any inspections to verify Iranian compliance, however, will be the purview of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which has been seeking to negotiate access and preserve what it believes necessary to confirm Iranian compliance against the backdrop of Kerry’s obsessive willingness to undercut the IAEA’s redlines. One of the major stumbling blocks remains the “possible military dimensions” (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear program. While Obama and proponents of the tentative deal reached repeatedly say that Iran has abided by the terms of the Joint Plan of Action, even if this were true, it is the equivalent of saying that a drunk passed a sobriety test by counting to one. Much of the work on PMDs has occurred in military facilities, especially those maintained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that, for what it is worth, has never endorsed or agreed to abide by any nuclear deal reached.

Yukiya Amano, the secretary-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been seeking to guarantee access to nuclear work conducted in Iran’s military restricted zones and bases. Iran’s Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) yesterday reported on his efforts. Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, responded:

Mr. Amano has not set demands for Iran, but instead has offered an interpretation of the Additional Protocol that we have some reservations about… According to the Article 5 of the protocol, access to the sites that the IAEA is seeking to enter requires substantial evidence and arguments. Also, the agency should pay attention to different concerns from member countries, including security concerns.

So, let’s get this straight: Obama and Kerry have celebrated Iran’s concessions and flexibility. They have celebrated Iran’s agreement to be guided by the Additional Protocol, an enhancement to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was created in 1997 in order to fill loopholes that had allowed Saddam Hussein to develop a covert nuclear program all the while receiving clean bills of health by the IAEA. The vast majority of the world—and pretty much every state of concern (minus North Korea and Pakistan which are not NPT members)—has signed onto the Additional Protocol and accept its contents. Not so, Iran. First, they said they would only abide “voluntarily” to the Additional Protocol, which means they could walk away at any time. Now, the Iranian government is putting forward an interpretation that would effectively gut any remaining bite the inspections have by arguing that raising security concerns should be enough to avoid inspections. That reading is the nuclear equivalent of quibbling over what the meaning of “is” is in order to absolve oneself from a lie. Perhaps it’s time for Obama and Kerry simply to replace the Stars and Stripes with a white flag of surrender, because it is increasingly clear that their deal is nothing but capitulation and the verification mechanisms about which they bragged are little more than an illusion. Unprecedented verification, indeed.