t 73, Bob Woodward—the Pulitzer Prize–winning sleuth of Watergate legend and America’s premier nonfiction author, with 17 bestsellers to his name—is nearing the end of one of the most celebrated careers of the media age. His latest book, The Last of the President’s Men, is his fifth about Watergate and in some ways his best. Yet it also underscores the need for him to get cracking on the last Bob Woodward book our times still demand: a candid autobiography.
In such a work, the famously slow-talking Midwesterner could relate, with clarity unattainable from thousands of cagey TV interviews, the inside story of how this former naval intelligence officer achieved his unique stature in journalism and publishing. And it would give him an opportunity to come clean about the less than savory parts of that story, which have attracted growing attention from Woodward’s peers in journalism and the more dispassionate precincts of academia.
The Last of the President’s Men1 attempts, transparently, to cement Woodward’s special status in American journalism and thereby makes for a curious entry in his canon: one of the shortest, yet the most scholarly, of his works, an important contribution to the literature of the Nixon era that is nonetheless fatally flawed by the classic Woodward sins of omission and avoidance.
The book presents a profile of Alexander P. Butterfield, the White House staffer who oversaw the installation and operation of President Nixon’s secret taping system and who, in July 1973, disclosed the system’s existence to Senate Watergate committee investigators. In so doing, Butterfield was the cameo player who dealt the deathblow to the Nixon presidency.
Woodward and his researcher recorded 46 hours of interviews with Butterfield between 2011 and 2015, the year he turned 89. They also mined an unpublished autobiography Butterfield had long tinkered with and a small archive of documents he took with him at the end of Nixon’s first term (when one of Butterfield’s duties was to compel other White House staffers to turn over their papers).
The Butterfield Papers are rich with detail and enable Woodward to make, at this late date, his most substantive contribution to the history of the Nixon presidency. This is evidenced in the fact that the book’s major revelation—the juicy nugget on which the Washington Post and other media, during publication week, lavished The Woodward Treatment—concerns the Vietnam War and not Watergate. Moreover, the book includes 93 pages of source notes and appendices—rarities in Woodwardia!—reproducing three dozen letters and memoranda. Heavily annotated by President Nixon, sometimes missing from official archives, these are important documents. It is refreshing to see Woodward using the written record to advance the story of the policies of the first Nixon term rather than selective snippets from interviews, conducted in garages, to rehash the oddball obstructions of justice that unraveled the second.
Yet here again, as so often since 1972, Woodward omits much about the context of his scoops, and his own motivations in pursuing and publishing them.T
he crown jewel of Alex Butterfield’s archival treasures is a code-worded “TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE” memorandum that national security adviser Henry Kissinger sent to President Nixon on January 3, 1972. The one-page memo updated the commander in chief about the military situation in Laos and a North Vietnamese rocket attack on the U.S. air base at Da Nang, which wounded an American airman and damaged three Air Force planes. What makes the document remarkable—aside from the fact that no copy exists at the Nixon presidential library—is Nixon’s scrawl, sideways up the left-hand side, boldly across Kissinger’s typed font:
K – We have had 10 years of total control of the air
in Laos + V. Nam. The result = Zilch –
There is something wrong with the strategy or the Air Force
I want a barks off – study – no snow
job – on my desk in 2 weeks as to
what the reason for the failure is.
Otherwise continued air operations
Make no sense in Cambodia, Laos etc. after
we complete withdrawal –
Shake them up!!
This note is extraordinary: It shows a commander in chief who has already dropped 3 million tons of bombs on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and who was destined within the next 12 months to drop an additional 1.1 million tons, acknowledging that these operations were accomplishing “zilch,” and that they represented “a failure” it made “no sense” to continue. As Woodward notes, just the evening before he wrote these words, Nixon had conducted an hour-long primetime interview on CBS during which Dan Rather had asked the president to assess “the benefits” of extensive bombing of North Vietnam. “The results,” Nixon said, “have been very, very effective.”
Now, reasonable people can stipulate that the exigencies of war might justify a military commander, such as Nixon, lying to a reporter, such as Rather, about the efficacy of a given military campaign, particularly if the commander was convinced the alternative would jeopardize American lives by somehow minimizing the chances for ultimate success in the conflict, undermining the morale of the rank and file, or otherwise vitiating pressing national-security objectives. Nixon may have been motivated by such considerations. As Woodward notes, “The ‘zilch’ conclusion had grown over three years. In what way and when did Nixon realize this? History may never know. Maybe Nixon never knew.” Woodward overstates when he asserts the need for “a fresh examination of the entire Vietnam record” in light of the “zilch” note, but he is correct to ask: “What is to be said about a wartime leader who goes on with war knowing a key part of the strategy is not working?”
What’s missing from Woodward’s account, however—as Woodward surely knows—is the context of Nixon’s relationship with the Pentagon in January 1972. Critical here is Nixon’s underlined suggestion that what was “wrong” with our air operations in Southeast Asia could be found either in the strategy “or the Air Force.” That sentiment of Nixon’s is reinforced by his closing demand, underlined twice, seemingly more important to him than his order for a “no snow job” study, which was in any case never performed: namely, to “shake them up!!”
Even before Nixon was sworn in, Pentagon leaders fearful of continued exclusion from the policymaking process had begun using their small liaison office to the National Security Council to spy on the White House.Why would a hawkish commander in chief harbor such low esteem for the Pentagon’s top brass, such that he expected them to attempt a “snow job,” and why would he order his national security adviser to “shake them up”? Such distrust was not new, either to Nixon or to his predecessors in the Vietnam era. As George Lardner Jr. disclosed in a December 1998 Washington Post article that reported on declassified Nixon tapes, the president had long been wary of the chart-flipping presentations of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas Moorer. “I don’t want any more of this crap about the fact that we couldn’t hit this target or that one!” Nixon thundered in April 1971, two months after the taping system had been installed. “Goddamn it, the military, they’re a bunch of greedy bastards! They want more officers’ clubs and more men to shine their shoes. The sons of bitches are not interested in this country.”
In substantive and rhetorical terms, Nixon here sounded a lot like John F. Kennedy, another Navy veteran whose view of the Pentagon deteriorated markedly over his tenure in the Oval Office. “Those sons of bitches, with all the fruit salad, just sat there nodding, saying [the operation] would work,” JFK sneered on his own tapes after the Bay of Pigs. In late 1962, when the Department of Defense slow-walked Kennedy’s request for troops during the integration of the University of Mississippi, the president snapped: “They always give you their bullshit about their instant reaction and split-second timing, but it never works out. No wonder it’s so hard to win a war.”
Under Lyndon Johnson, this schism between the commander in chief and the uniformed leadership of the armed forces only worsened. In Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (1997), H.L. McMaster chronicled in unsparing detail the machinations by which the wily Texan, “distrustful of his military advisers,” patronized and circumvented the chiefs.
“Uninterested in the chiefs’ advice, but unwilling to risk their disaffection,” McMaster wrote, “Johnson preserved a façade of consultation, concealed the finality of his decisions on Vietnam policy and…got the military advice he wanted.” By August 1967, the chiefs teetered on mutiny. After congressional testimony by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara on the efficacy of U.S. air operations undercut the chiefs’ own, they met, according to historian Deborah Shapley, “in complete secrecy, late into the night,” and agreed to resign en masse. Only the withdrawal of the chairman, Army General Earle Wheeler, who suffered chest pains overnight, caused the plot to collapse.
Even before Nixon was sworn in, Pentagon leaders fearful of continued exclusion from the policymaking process had begun using their small liaison office to the National Security Council, housed in the Executive Office Building across from the West Wing, to spy on the White House. Nixon’s defense secretary, Melvin Laird, a longtime congressman with appropriations oversight of the Pentagon, told me in a 1997 interview that at the dawn of the Nixon administration, he privately urged that the JSC-NSC liaison office be shut down. “The Johnson administration had had such a problem there, and I knew about it,” Laird told me. “I don’t think [LBJ-era defense secretaries] Clark Clifford or McNamara really realized it, but I knew what they were doing…. So early on, I said, ‘You better watch that very carefully.’”
Laird’s prophecy came true. Nearly three years later, on December 21, 1971—13 days before Nixon scribbled the “zilch” note—his top aides convened for a rare nighttime session in the Oval Office. There the commander in chief was informed of a stunning development: Federal investigators had discovered that the JCS-NSC liaison office had been spying on Nixon and Kissinger for 13 months. Navy Yeoman Charles Radford, a 27-year-old stenographer who traveled extensively with Kissinger overseas, including on the secret flight to Pakistan that paved the way for Nixon’s historic trip to China, had all the while been stealthily rifling Kissinger’s briefcases, “burn bags,” and wastebaskets. He then secretly—and illegally—routed an estimated 5,000 classified documents to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, and other top officers. The uncovering of the Joint Chiefs spy ring was the one legitimate accomplishment of Nixon’s much-reviled Plumbers group, which would eventually execute the Watergate break-ins.
Why would Woodward omit mention of the monumental- and critically timed- rupture between the commander in chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The “Moorer-Radford affair,” as scholars now call it, was ultimately exposed by the press—though not by Woodward and Bernstein—in early 1974. Chiefly due to the wishes of Kissinger, who by that time was secretary of state, only pro forma congressional hearings were held and the affair was allowed to recede amid the larger bombshells of Watergate.2
The importance of the affair is hard to overstate. “This was Seven Days in May,” declared Defense Department investigator Donald Stewart, referring to the 1962 thriller about a military coup d’état in the United States. Nixon called the spying “a federal offense of the highest order” and demanded Moorer be tried for espionage. As the White House tapes make clear, Attorney General John Mitchell calmly took control of the situation, advising against public disclosure in any forum and prevailing upon Nixon to banish Yeoman Radford to a remote outpost and keep Admiral Moorer where he was, perhaps weakened and more pliable.
As Nixon told an aide in May 1973: “Admiral Moorer, I could have screwed him on that and been a big hero, you know. I could have screwed the whole Pentagon about that damn thing…. Why didn’t I do it? Because I thought more of the services.” It was, indeed, to Nixon’s everlasting credit that he never made political hay of the Moorer-Radford affair—to this day a neglected chapter in American history, an unprecedented Cold War constitutional crisis that no one has treated at book length—even when his political life depended on it.W
ith that backdrop, do we not attain a much better understanding of Nixon’s jaundiced view of the efficacy of the Pentagon, and the president’s demand, 13 days later, for a “shake up” of the Air Force? Why would Woodward omit mention of the monumental rupture between the commander in chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that erupted on the eve of the “zilch” note? Was the Washington Post ace, when he wrote The Last of the President’s Men, somehow unaware of the Moorer-Radford affair? Assuredly not. For decades now, brave historians have been questioning Woodward’s strange avoidance of the subject matter.
Most notable was the 1991 bestseller Silent Coup: Removal of a President, co-authored by Len Colodny and Robert Gettlin and denounced by Woodward and Bernstein as “trash.” Yet Silent Coup marshaled important new archival evidence of its own to advance a number of claims about Woodward. The first was that one of his Watergate-era sources was General Alexander Haig, Kissinger’s NSC deputy. Silent Coup established that Woodward had met Haig during the first Nixon term, when Woodward served as a Navy intelligence briefer to senior White House officials. A former Vietnam commander and Pentagon loyalist, Haig held his own boss, Kissinger, in low regard and was deeply complicit in the JCS spying: It was Haig who handpicked Yeoman Radford to travel with Kissinger. By the time Haig became Nixon’s chief of staff, succeeding Haldeman as the Watergate scandal mushroomed in the spring of 1973, Haig worked tirelessly behind the scenes to bury the Moorer-Radford affair and his own role in it. Silent Coup detailed how Haig had enjoyed the compliance of Woodward and Bernstein, who knew of Moorer-Radford yet passed on it as a news story. The clear implication was that Woodward had protected Haig, a key source.
All these years later, even with the “zilch” note in hand, Bob Woodward is still steering clear of Moorer-Radford. Such sins of omission do not detract from the historical importance of the “zilch” memo and the other archival discoveries in the appendices to The Last of the President’s Men. But they do show that the author’s agenda remains suspect, or at least worthy of closer scrutiny than is typically accorded by the Post and other media so eager to give each new Woodward book The Woodward Treatment.
SUCH SCRUTINY would begin with the simple question: Why did Bob Woodward choose now to seek out Alex Butterfield, who was nearing 90, and write a book about him?
The fact is that Woodward’s journalistic reputation has been under assault for some time, starting with the controversies surrounding his books about John Belushi (1985’s Wired) and Reagan-era CIA director William Casey (1987’s Veil), and most thoroughly in Silent Coup. But the worst hits have come in just the last few years.
The sale of the Woodward-Bernstein papers to the University of Texas in 2003, and the 2005 death of Mark Felt, the former FBI official whom Woodward has identified as Deep Throat, have led researchers to ever larger doubts about the accuracy of Woodward’s reporting on Watergate, and particularly his account of his relationship with his much-heralded, and often inaccurate, Watergate source.
The first domino to fall was Woodward’s contention that Deep Throat was Felt and Felt only, and not a composite character based on numerous sources. The journalist Ed Gray demolished this myth when he completed In Nixon’s Web (2008), the posthumous memoir of his father, L. Patrick Gray III, the acting FBI director during Watergate. In this the Grays benefited from access not only to Woodward’s notes and papers at the University of Texas but also from Pat Gray’s own FBI archive (45 boxes’ worth). In Nixon’s Web exposed how Woodward’s reporting attributed information to Deep Throat that Mark Felt simply could not have known in November 1973, at the time of their last (alleged) meeting in a garage in Rosslyn, Virginia. The book also showed that Woodward’s Deep Throat file included notes from an interview he had conducted not with Mark Felt but with another source at the time, whom the Grays confirmed to be Justice Department official Don Santarelli. Pressed on such matters, Woodward dismissed them as “technical, wiring-diagram issues.”
More recently, we have learned that among those harboring deep skepticism about Woodward’s account of Deep Throat—so critical to the Washington Post’s coverage of Watergate, and to the Woodward legacy—was the man to whose memory The Last of the President’s Men is dedicated: Ben Bradlee, the executive editor who oversaw that coverage.
Rummaging through Bradlee’s papers for an authorized biography, Jeff Himmelman—himself a trusted former researcher to Woodward—came across an unpublished 1990 interview in which Bradlee had confided his misgivings about Woodward’s reliability. “Did that potted [plant] incident ever happen?” Bradlee mused about the notion that Woodward moved a flowerpot on his balcony to signal for meetings with Deep Throat. Likewise, about the purported rendezvous in the garage, Bradlee wondered: “One meeting in the garage? Fifty meetings in the garage? I don’t know how many meetings [there were] in the garage.” He added: “There’s a residual fear in my soul that that isn’t quite straight.”
Geoff Shepard laid bare the contortions that were required for Sirica to overlook Woodward and Bernstein’s brazen interference with the grand-jury process.Nor did Himmelman’s archival discoveries stop there. He also found contemporaneous notes showing that contrary to four decades of flat denials on the point by Woodward and Bernstein, the latter had indeed approached and interviewed a Watergate grand juror—a violation of law—and had deliberately misled the readers of All the President’s Men to portray the grand juror as an employee of the Nixon reelection campaign. Indeed, Himmelman exposed half a dozen lies, evasions, deceptions, misrepresentations, and other journalistic sleights of hand on a single page of All of the President’s Men.
The final product was Yours in Truth: A Personal Portrait of Ben Bradlee (2012). Were it up to Woodward, the book’s explosive contents would have been suppressed. Writing in New York magazine, Himmelman recorded how Woodward sought to intimidate his former protégé:
I had worked for [Woodward]; he had given an impromptu toast at my wedding. You know me and the world we live in, he said. People who didn’t like him and didn’t like the Post—the “fuckers out there,” as Ben had called them—were going to seize on these comments. “Don’t give fodder to the fuckers,” Bob said, and once he lit on this phrase he repeated it a couple of times. The quotes from [Bradlee’s 1990] interview…were nothing more than outtakes from Ben’s book, he said. Ben hadn’t used them, and so I shouldn’t use them, either.
That argument didn’t make sense, and I said so. Bob told me it was his “strong recommendation” that I not use the quotes, then that it was his “emphatic recommendation.” Then, when that got no truck: “Don’t use the quotes, Jeff.”
Finally, last year, former Nixon White House staff lawyer Geoff Shepard, in his groundbreaking book The Real Watergate Scandal, chronicled the secret and highly improper ex parte meetings between John J. Sirica, the presiding judge in both major Watergate trials, and various relevant parties, most notably the Watergate prosecutors. Drawing on hundreds of pages of previously unpublished documents, Shepard laid bare the contortions that were required for Sirica to overlook Woodward and Bernstein’s brazen interference with the grand-jury process.
These were largely performed in still more ex parte meetings with Edward Bennett Williams, the fixer who just happened to serve simultaneously as the lawyer for the Democratic National Committee (burgled and wiretapped in the Watergate operation), the lawyer for the Washington Post (chief chronicler of Watergate and prime offender in violating the integrity of the Watergate grand jury), and as godfather to Sirica’s daughter. Really, could a cozier situation, more thoroughly marinated in collusion, be dreamed up?
Had a judge of integrity presided over the Watergate trials, or had the actions of Woodward and Bernstein been exposed in real time, or something like it, the two reporters, at a minimum, would have been hauled before the grand jury themselves, and the indictments of several Nixon aides challenged credibly on due-process grounds. At worst, the famous scribes would have found themselves, along with all the president’s men, criminally charged.
To these revelations of the last decade, so damaging to the Woodward-Bernstein legacy, The Last of the President’s Men represents the closest thing to a substantive response from Woodward that we are likely to get: an exercise in misdirection. The author’s power in American media ensures that whenever he publishes, on any subject, Thinking America will sit up and pay attention, and when he publishes on Watergate, the effect is doubly resonant. So who will focus on the slow and steady erosion of Bob Woodward’s Watergate brand when the legend has just produced a handsome new Watergate book, its title echoing his greatest triumph, the text delivering the nuggets we’ve grown accustomed to expect from Official Woodward Product? Nixon doubted the efficacy of U.S. bombing in Vietnam! Nixon clumsily patted a secretary’s leg! Crank up the machine—Woodward’s back on Watergate!
What the author does not do is engage the growing controversy surrounding his conduct and motivations in his Watergate-era reporting. The bright, shining object here, meant to distract, is Butterfield, treated until now as a bit player in Watergate but depicted this time as a major figure of the Nixon presidency. It is true that as Haldeman’s deputy, controlling the flow of men and memoranda into the Oval Office, Butterfield might have seen more of the president than any other staff aide. But was he ever really one of “the president’s men”?
Again Woodward omits much. As Butterfield himself recently told the Post, Woodward is “sort of the master of being vague…. He can be vague more smoothly than anyone!” Presumably those who point such things out, as here, will be dismissed as members of the malevolent tribe of “fuckers” to whom no credence is ever to be accorded.
BORN IN 1926 to a Navy family in Pensacola, Butterfield attended UCLA and there befriended H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman, later the all-powerful chief of staff in the Nixon White House. While their sorority-sister wives kept in touch, Butterfield and Haldeman lost contact for over 20 years, until November 1968, when Richard Nixon was elected president. Butterfield, an Air Force colonel, was the top U.S. military officer in Australia. Early on in these pages, Woodward covers in detail the unsolicited letter Butterfield sent his old acquaintance after the election, seeking employment in the new administration. But the author relegates to a footnote on the second-to-last page of his main text, and even there leaves unexplored, the strange circumstances surrounding that letter.
When Butterfield appeared before the House Judiciary Committee in July 1974, a year after he had exposed the existence of the taping system to Senate investigators, he testified that it had been Haldeman who had reached out to him with an out-of-the-blue telephone call to Australia. Butterfield also testified that Haldeman had insisted, as a hiring condition, that Butterfield resign from the Air Force. Both claims were false. It was Butterfield’s letter that came out of the blue, and Haldeman told his old acquaintance he could keep his military commission and be “detailed” to the White House, a common practice. It had been Butterfield who insisted on resigning from the Air Force. Butterfield’s lies went unchallenged until 1978, when Haldeman—by then serving a prison sentence for his convictions in the Watergate cover-up case—published his memoir, The Ends of Power. “It didn’t make sense to me,” Haldeman wrote. “Why does he distort the facts now unless he has something to hide?”
Readers imagining Woodward would get to the bottom of this mystery, somewhere in his 46 hours of taped interviews with Butterfield, will be disappointed. In the footnote, Woodward says Butterfield “omitted” from his testimony the fact that he had contacted Haldeman first. But that is false. Butterfield didn’t “omit” his initiation of contact with Haldeman; he lied and claimed Haldeman had been the initiator: “I was surprised to receive the phone call,” Butterfield had testified, with a flourish.
“Butterfield told me that he had asked Haldeman to omit that part of the story,” Woodward writes here. So why, exactly, did Butterfield seek Haldeman’s collusion in a lie? Woodward offers no elaboration. If Butterfield is important enough to focus on at book length, wouldn’t the lies he has told about how he inserted himself at the last minute into the inner orbit of the president warrant the author’s attention?
Haldeman had his own ideas. “Was the White House filled with plants from other agencies, most particularly the CIA?” he asked in Ends of Power. “The overwhelming evidence is that it was. But was Butterfield one of them? It’s hard for me to believe it—but the ‘facts’ in the story he constantly gives the press disconcert me.” Rose Mary Woods, Nixon’s longtime secretary, also harbored suspicions about Butterfield, originating with the way he vaulted himself into one of the most sensitive positions around the man she had served for two decades and ending with the betrayal of Nixon’s most explosive secret: that he taped himself.
In installing the taping system in February 1971, Butterfield observed a restriction placed by Nixon himself: Don’t use the military (no surprise there). So Butterfield turned to the Secret Service, whose technical division agents placed all the microphones in the Oval Office and Nixon’s other taping locations; hooked the microphones up to state-of-the-art voice-activated recorders; wired the system to a blinking-light tracker for the president, which notified agents whenever Nixon moved from room to room; changed each reel-to-reel tape as it filled up with recorded material; hastily labeled the tapes; and kept them in a West Wing office. The system operated in this way until Butterfield spilled the beans to the Senate Watergate committee.
In Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat and the CIA (1984), Jim Hougan reported the previously unpublished account of William McMahon, a CIA technician who was detailed to the Secret Service unit that managed the taping system. According to McMahon, the agency was aggressively “lending” technicians to the unit, which was already fully staffed. “I don’t know what they were up to,” McMahon said, “but the fact of the matter is you had these guys from [the CIA’s] Office of Security working in the White House under Secret Service cover.” As Hougan noted, this situation “amounted to the calculated infiltration of a uniquely sensitive Secret Service unit: the staff responsible for maintaining and servicing the presidential taping system.” Indeed, the CIA’s inspector general reported in 1975, after Nixon had resigned, that CIA agents had been placed in “intimate components of the Office of the President.”
Could Butterfield have been one of them? The years preceding his successful approach to Haldeman hadn’t seen Butterfield toiling exclusively in the obscurity of Australia. In the Air Force, Butterfield spent two years as an intelligence officer in Vietnam, commanding all low- and medium-level reconnaissance flights. “We were really intelligence collectors in every sense of the word,” Butterfield would say of this period, in an hour-long interview with me in October 1994. He added: “I ran another program I can’t talk about. I ran one element, or one facet, of a program…in the Far East, which was a CIA program.” By late 1964, Butterfield was detailed to the policy directorate of war plans in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There his duties included counterinsurgency planning and management of the program that resettled Cuban veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion. This latter project Butterfield inherited from his new colleague at the Pentagon: Lt. Col. Alexander Haig.
Butterfield told the authors of Silent Coup, in four hours of taped interviews, that he performed “a lot of undercover stuff” at the Pentagon—during a period when he was spending, by his own account, 20 hours a week “minimum” at the Johnson White House and “was like a fly on the wall in all these meetings up in the president’s bedroom at one a.m.” When he left the Pentagon in 1967, assigned to Canberra as the senior U.S. military officer in Australia, Butterfield again enjoyed frequent dealings with the CIA as the Defense Department liaison to the agency in-country. “I was the point of contact, the principal point of contact, for the CIA,” Butterfield told me.
What did that mean, exactly? “Well, I can’t tell you any more than that…. If someone wanted to get in touch with the CIA, they could come to my office.”
In short, if Butterfield wasn’t a plant in the Nixon White House, his experiences in the Johnson administration make clear the buttoned-down Air Force colonel was well suited—if not trained—for such a mission. Of this history of his subject, his peculiar background and agency connections, Woodward mentions nothing.I
n truth, Bob Woodward was a player, not a chronicler, in Watergate. Never was this clearer than in the crucial role he played in the making of Butterfield’s bombshell testimony about the White House tapes.
In The Last of the President’s Men, Woodward acknowledges that it was his recommendation of his childhood friend Scott Armstrong that landed the latter a plum job as an investigator for the Senate Watergate committee. As Woodward explains it, he himself rebuffed a job offer from the committee’s Democratic majority counsel, Sam Dash. A former federal prosecutor and ardent liberal opponent of the Nixon administration, Dash told the authors of Silent Coup that Woodward had also told “us to talk to certain secretaries” in the Nixon White House and reelection campaign.
Woodward does not address longstanding allegations about his relationship with Armstrong. The late Fred Thompson, who served as the Watergate committee’s minority counsel two decades before he was elected senator from Tennessee, wrote in his Watergate memoir, At That Point in Time (1975), that he “more than once…accused Armstrong of being Woodward’s source” for committee leaks to the Post. In later years, Armstrong acknowledged that he “was designated as Woodward’s point of contact on the committee.” One of Armstrong’s fellow Senate investigators, James Hamilton, later recalled, “Woodward was of the opinion” that the panel needed to call Alexander Butterfield as a witness. Nowhere does the author pause to ponder the ethical considerations that arise when the Washington Post’s leading Watergate reporter is recommending personnel and witnesses to the investigative staff of the Senate Watergate committee.
That Scott Armstrong should subsequently have emerged as one of the two committee investigators who elicited the momentous testimony from Butterfield (in executive session, three days before the televised testimony of July 16, 1973 that stunned the nation) is, presumably, another “wiring-diagram issue” that Woodward sees no need to reckon with. Ditto for the decision by Woodward and Bernstein to take a pass on reporting Armstrong’s astonishing discovery. In All the President’s Men, they admit having learned from “a senior member of the committee’s investigative staff” about the taping system a full two days before Butterfield gave his televised testimony. Their decision not to reveal what they had learned allowed Butterfield’s bombshell to drop on live TV unimpeded—and thereby deprived President Nixon of an opportunity to seek to curtail his aide’s testimony by invoking executive privilege.
Here is still another subject Woodward skirts in The Last of the President’s Men: the decision by Nixon’s counsel and top aides, including the ubiquitous Alexander Haig, to withhold from the president their knowledge that Butterfield was fully cooperating with the Senate committee. One of the most impressive chapters in Silent Coup, entitled “Five Days in July,” examined in minute-by-minute detail the chronology of the deathblow. It was on July 12 that Butterfield was called to testify (summoned on Woodward’s recommendation); it was the next day, a Friday, that Butterfield dropped his bomb, in executive session, to GOP investigator Donald Sanders and Armstrong (hired on Woodward’s recommendation); it was over that weekend that Butterfield notified his superiors in the Nixon White House of what had transpired (and Armstrong tipped off Woodward, who sat on the tip); it was over that same weekend that Nixon’s aides and lawyers met with him repeatedly but never saw fit to mention to him anything about Butterfield and the committee; and it was on that Monday, July 16—shortly before Butterfield was to testify in open session, on live television—that those aides finally, belatedly informed the president of what was to happen, by which time Nixon no longer held any options for averting it.
It requires a near-encyclopedic knowledge of the Nixon presidency just to know what’s not in it, and why such omissions are telling.Since the bulk of Woodward’s book focuses on this turning point in the Nixon presidency, shouldn’t the author have exhibited some interest in credible allegations, backed up by archival documentation, that Nixon’s aides conspired to tie his hands, preventing him from moving to block Butterfield’s testimony? Was Nixon unentitled to due process and a chance to press an executive-privilege claim over Butterfield’s testimony and the tapes whose existence he was disclosing?
Or would thorough exploration of such matters lead to uncomfortable questions about Woodward’s seminal role in the events that led to the Butterfield bombshell?T
here is still more that Woodward chooses to ignore in his book about Alexander Butterfield—such as Butterfield’s conclusion that Alexander Haig, while turning over documents to investigators in the summer of 1974, sought to replace a Butterfield memorandum from 1970 with a forged copy that redacted several incriminating references to Haig in the original. (“He was the chief suspect,” Butterfield told the authors of Silent Coup about the forgery.) The substance of the 1970 memo, and the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the forgery, are not important in this context; I mention it simply by way of asking how an author can aspire to a comprehensive portrait of a U.S. official yet show zero interest (zilch!) in an episode in which his protagonist discovered himself to have been the victim of a forgery, with the original and the fake both reproduced in the official volumes of evidence published by the House Judiciary Committee.
In short, The Last of the President’s Men warrants careful handling. It requires a near-encyclopedic knowledge of the Nixon presidency just to know what’s not in it, and why such omissions are telling. Suffice to say that whoever undertakes someday to write the definitive biography of Bob Woodward will have much to decipher and unravel, and that the legend’s own books—absent a candid autobiography—will be of only limited value in the enterprise.
2 Not until October 2000 did I become the first researcher to obtain from the National Archives the tapes of the December 21 evening session, as well as the tapes of all of Nixon’s follow-up meetings and telephone calls relating to the Moorer-Radford affair. The contents of these tapes I published in a lengthy article for the Atlantic Monthly, entitled “Nixon and the Chiefs,” in April 2002.
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Bob Woodward’s Sins of Omission
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Exactly one week later, a Star Wars cantina of the American extremist right featuring everyone from David Duke to a white-nationalist Twitter personality named “Baked Alaska” gathered in Charlottesville, Virginia, to protest the removal of a statue honoring the Confederate general Robert E. Lee. A video promoting the gathering railed against “the international Jewish system, the capitalist system, and the forces of globalism.” Amid sporadic street battles between far-right and “antifa” (anti-fascist) activists, a neo-Nazi drove a car into a crowd of peaceful counterprotestors, killing a 32-year-old woman.
Here, in the time span of just seven days, was the dual nature of contemporary American anti-Semitism laid bare. The most glaring difference between these two displays of hate lies not so much in their substance—both adhere to similar conspiracy theories articulating nefarious, world-altering Jewish power—but rather their self-characterization. The animosity expressed toward Jews in Charlottesville was open and unambiguous, with demonstrators proudly confessing their hatred in the familiar language of Nazis and European fascists.
The socialists in Chicago, meanwhile, though calling for a literal second Holocaust on the shores of the Mediterranean, would fervently and indignantly deny they are anti-Semitic. On the contrary, they claim the mantle of “anti-fascism” and insist that this identity naturally makes them allies of the Jewish people. As for those Jews who might oppose their often violent tactics, they are at best bystanders to fascism, at worst collaborators in “white supremacy.”
So, whereas white nationalists explicitly embrace a tribalism that excludes Jews regardless of their skin color, the progressives of the DSA and the broader “woke” community conceive of themselves as universalists—though their universalism is one that conspicuously excludes the national longings of Jews and Jews alone. And whereas the extreme right-wingers are sincere in their anti-Semitism, the socialists who called for the elimination of Israel are just as sincere in their belief that they are not anti-Semitic, even though anti-Semitism is the inevitable consequence of their rhetoric and worldview.
The sheer bluntness of far-right anti-Semitism makes it easier to identify and stigmatize as beyond the pale; individuals like David Duke and the hosts of the “Daily Shoah” podcast make no pretense of residing within the mainstream of American political debate. But the humanist appeals of the far left, whose every libel against the Jewish state is paired with a righteous invocation of “justice” for the Palestinian people, invariably trigger repetitive and esoteric debates over whether this or that article, allusion, allegory, statement, policy, or political initiative is anti-Semitic or just critical of Israel. What this difference in self-definition means is that there is rarely, if ever, any argument about the substantive nature of right-wing anti-Semitism (despicable, reprehensible, wicked, choose your adjective), while the very existence of left-wing anti-Semitism is widely doubted and almost always indignantly denied by those accused of practicing it.T o be sure, these recent manifestations of anti-Semitism occur on the left and right extremes. And statistics tell a rather comforting story about the state of anti-Semitism in America. Since the Anti-Defamation League began tracking it in 1979, anti-Jewish hate crime is at an historic low; indeed, it has been declining since a recent peak of 1,554 incidents in 2006. America, for the most part, remains a very philo-Semitic country, one of the safest, most welcoming countries for Jews on earth. A recent Pew poll found Jews to be the most admired religious group in the United States.1 If American Jews have anything to dread, it’s less anti-Semitism than the loss of Jewish peoplehood through assimilation, that is being “loved to death” by Gentiles.2 Few American Jews can say that anti-Semitism has a seriously deleterious impact on their life, that it has denied them educational or employment opportunities, or that they fear for the physical safety of themselves or their families because of their Jewish identity.
The question is whether the extremes are beginning to move in on the center. In the past year alone, the DSA’s rolls tripled from 8,000 to 25,000 dues-paying members, who have established a conspicuous presence on social media reaching far beyond what their relatively miniscule numbers attest. The DSA has been the subject of widespread media coverage, ranging from the curious to the adulatory. The white supremacists, meanwhile, found themselves understandably heartened by the strange difficulty President Donald Trump had in disavowing them. He claimed, in fact, that there had been some “very fine people” among their ranks. “Thank you President Trump for your honesty & courage to tell the truth about #Charlottesville,” tweeted David Duke, while the white-nationalist Richard Spencer said, “I’m proud of him for speaking the truth.”
Indeed, among the more troubling aspects of our highly troubling political predicament—and one that, from a Jewish perspective, provokes not a small amount of angst—is that so many ideas, individuals, and movements that could once reliably be categorized as “extreme,” in the literal sense of articulating the views of a very small minority, are no longer so easily dismissed. The DSA is part of a much broader revival of the socialist idea in America, as exemplified by the growing readership of journals like Jacobin and Current Affairs, the popularity of the leftist Chapo Trap House podcast, and the insurgent presidential campaign of self-described democratic socialist Bernie Sanders—who, according to a Harvard-Harris poll, is now the most popular politician in the United States. Since 2015, the average age of a DSA member dropped from 64 to 30, and a 2016 Harvard poll found a majority of Millennials do not support capitalism.
Meanwhile, the Republican Party of Donald Trump offers “nativism and culture war wedges without the Reaganomics,” according to Nicholas Grossman, a lecturer in political science at the University of Illinois. A party that was once reliably internationalist and assertive against Russian aggression now supports a president who often preaches isolationism and never has even a mildly critical thing to say about the KGB thug ruling over the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
Like ripping the bandage off an ugly and oozing wound, Trump’s presidential campaign unleashed a bevy of unpleasant social forces that at the very least have an indirect bearing on Jewish welfare. The most unpleasant of those forces has been the so-called alternative right, or “alt-right,” a highly race-conscious political movement whose adherents are divided on the “JQ” (Jewish Question). Throughout last year’s campaign, Jewish journalists (this author included) were hit with a barrage of luridly anti-Semitic Twitter messages from self-described members of the alt-right. The tamer missives instructed us to leave America for Israel, others superimposed our faces onto the bodies of concentration camp victims.3
I do not believe Donald Trump is himself an anti-Semite, if only because anti-Semitism is mainly a preoccupation—as distinct from a prejudice—and Trump is too narcissistic to indulge any preoccupation other than himself. And there is no evidence to suggest that he subscribes to the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories favored by his alt-right supporters. But his casual resort to populism, nativism, and conspiracy theory creates a narrative environment highly favorable to anti-Semites.
Nativism, of which Trump was an early and active practitioner, is never good for the Jews, no matter how affluent or comfortable they may be and notwithstanding whether they are even the target of its particular wrath. Racial divisions, which by any measure have grown significantly worse in the year since Trump was elected, hurt all Americans, obviously, but they have a distinct impact on Jews, who are left in a precarious position as racial identities calcify. Not only are the newly emboldened white supremacists of the alt-right invariably anti-Semites, but in the increasingly racialist taxonomy of the progressive left—which more and more mainstream liberals are beginning to parrot—Jews are considered possessors of “white privilege” and, thus, members of the class to be divested of its “power” once the revolution comes. In the racially stratified society that both extremes envision, Jews lose out, simultaneously perceived (by the far right) as wily allies and manipulators of ethnic minorities in a plot to mongrelize America and (by the far left) as opportunistic “Zionists” ingratiating themselves with a racist and exploitative “white” establishment that keeps minorities down.T his politics is bad for all Americans, and Jewish Americans in particular. More and more, one sees the racialized language of the American left being applied to the Middle East conflict, wherein Israel (which is, in point of fact, one of the most racially diverse countries in the world) is referred to as a “white supremacist” state no different from that of apartheid South Africa. In a book just published by MIT Press, ornamented with a forward by Cornel West and entitled “Whites, Jews, and Us,” a French-Algerian political activist named Houria Bouteldja asks, “What can we offer white people in exchange for their decline and for the wars that will ensue?” Drawing the Jews into her race war, Bouteldja, according to the book’s jacket copy, “challenges widespread assumptions among the left in the United States and Europe—that anti-Semitism plays any role in Arab–Israeli conflicts, for example, or that philo-Semitism doesn’t in itself embody an oppressive position.” Jew-hatred is virtuous, and appreciation of the Jews is racism.
Few political activists of late have done more to racialize the Arab–Israeli conflict—and, through insidious extension of the American racial hierarchy, designate American Jews as oppressors—than the Brooklyn-born Arab activist Linda Sarsour. An organizer of the Women’s March, Sarsour has seamlessly insinuated herself into a variety of high-profile progressive campaigns, a somewhat incongruent position given her reactionary views on topics like women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. (“10 weeks of PAID maternity leave in Saudi Arabia,” she tweets. “Yes PAID. And ur worrying about women driving. Puts us to shame.”) Sarsour, who is of Palestinian descent, claims that one cannot simultaneously be a feminist and a Zionist, when it is the exact opposite that is true: No genuine believer in female equality can deny the right of Israel to exist. The Jewish state respects the rights of women more than do any of its neighbors. In an April 2017 interview, Sarsour said that she had become a high-school teacher for the purpose of “inspiring young people of color like me.” Just three months earlier, however, in a video for Vox, Sarsour confessed, “When I wasn’t wearing hijab I was just some ordinary white girl from New York City.” The donning of Muslim garb, then, confers a racial caste of “color,” which in turn confers virtue, which in turn confers a claim on political power.
This attempt to describe the Israeli–Arab conflict in American racial vernacular marks Jews as white (a perverse mirror of Nazi biological racism) and thus implicates them as beneficiaries of “structural racism,” “white privilege,” and the whole litany of benefits afforded to white people at birth in the form of—to use Ta-Nehisi Coates’s abstruse phrase—the “glowing amulet” of “whiteness.” “It’s time to admit that Arthur Balfour was a white supremacist and an anti-Semite,” reads the headline of a recent piece in—where else? —the Forward, incriminating Jewish nationalism as uniquely perfidious by dint of the fact that, like most men of his time, a (non-Jewish) British official who endorsed the Zionist idea a century ago held views that would today be considered racist. Reading figures like Bouteldja and Sarsour brings to mind the French philosopher Pascal Bruckner’s observation that “the racialization of the world has to be the most unexpected result of the antidiscrimination battle of the last half-century; it has ensured that the battle continuously re-creates the curse from which it is trying to break free.”
If Jews are white, and if white people—as a group—enjoy tangible and enduring advantages over everyone else, then this racially essentialist rhetoric ends up with Jews accused of abetting white supremacy, if not being white supremacists themselves. This is one of the overlooked ways in which the term “white supremacy” has become devoid of meaning in the age of Donald Trump, with everyone and everything from David Duke to James Comey to the American Civil Liberties Union accused of upholding it. Take the case of Ben Shapiro, the Jewish conservative polemicist. At the start of the school year, Shapiro was scheduled to give a talk at UC Berkeley, his alma matter. In advance, various left-wing groups put out a call for protest in which they labeled Shapiro—an Orthodox Jew—a “fascist thug” and “white supremacist.” An inconvenient fact ignored by Shapiro’s detractors is that, according to the ADL, he was the top target of online abuse from actual white supremacists during the 2016 presidential election. (Berkeley ultimately had to spend $600,000 protecting the event from leftist rioters.)
A more pernicious form of this discourse is practiced by left-wing writers who, insincerely claiming to have the interests of Jews at heart, scold them and their communal organizations for not doing enough in the fight against anti-Semitism. Criticizing Jews for not fully signing up with the “Resistance” (which in form and function is fast becoming the 21st-century version of the interwar Popular Front), they then slyly indict Jews for being complicit in not only their own victimization but that of the entire country at the hands of Donald Trump. The first and foremost practitioner of this bullying and rather artful form of anti-Semitism is Jeet Heer, a Canadian comic-book critic who has achieved some repute on the American left due to his frenetic Twitter activity and availability when the New Republic needed to replace its staff that had quit en masse in 2014. Last year, when Heer came across a video of a Donald Trump supporter chanting “JEW-S-A” at a rally, he declared on Twitter: “We really need to see more comment from official Jewish groups like ADL on way Trump campaign has energized anti-Semitism.”
But of course “Jewish groups” have had plenty to say about the anti-Semitism expressed by some Trump supporters—too much, in the view of their critics. Just two weeks earlier, the ADL had released a report analyzing over 2 million anti-Semitic tweets targeting Jewish journalists over the previous year. This wasn’t the first time the ADL raised its voice against Trump and the alt-right movement he emboldened, nor would it be the last. Indeed, two minutes’ worth of Googling would have shown Heer that his pronouncements about organizational Jewish apathy were wholly without foundation.4
It’s tempting to dismiss Heer’s observation as mere “concern trolling,” a form of Internet discourse characterized by insincere expressions of worry. But what he did was nastier. Immediately presented with evidence for the inaccuracy of his claims, he sneered back with a bit of wisdom from the Jewish sage Hillel the Elder, yet cast as mild threat: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me?” In other words: How can you Jews expect anyone to care about your kind if you don’t sufficiently oppose—as arbitrarily judged by moi, Jeet Heer—Donald Trump?
If this sort of critique were coming from a Jewish donor upset that his preferred organization wasn’t doing enough to combat anti-Semitism, or a Gentile with a proven record of concern for Jewish causes, it wouldn’t have turned the stomach. What made Heer’s interjection revolting is that, to put it mildly, he’s not exactly known for being sympathetic toward the Jewish plight. In 2015, Heer put his name to a petition calling upon an international comic-book festival to drop the Israeli company SodaStream as a co-sponsor because the Jewish state is “built on the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinian communities and sustained through racism and discrimination.” Heer’s name appeared alongside that of Carlos Latuff, a Brazilian cartoonist who won second place in the Iranian government’s 2006 International Holocaust Cartoon Competition. For his writings on Israel, Heer has been praised as being “very good on the conflict” by none other than Philip Weiss, proprietor of the anti-Semitic hate site Mondoweiss.
In light of this track record, Heer’s newfound concern about anti-Semitism appeared rather dubious. Indeed, the bizarre way in which he expressed this concern—as, ultimately, a critique not of anti-Semitism per se but of the country’s foremost Jewish civil-rights organization—suggests he cares about anti-Semitism insofar as its existence can be used as a weapon to beat his political adversaries. And since the incorrigibly Zionist American Jewish establishment ranks high on that list (just below that of Donald Trump and his supporters), Heer found a way to blame it for anti-Semitism. And what does that tell you? It tells you that—presented with a 16-second video of a man chanting “JEW-S-A” at a Donald Trump rally—Heer’s first impulse was to condemn not the anti-Semite but the Jews.
Heer isn’t the only leftist (or New Republic writer) to assume this rhetorical cudgel. In a piece entitled “The Dismal Failure of Jewish Groups to Confront Trump,” one Stephen Lurie attacked the ADL for advising its members to stay away from the Charlottesville “Unite the Right Rally” and let police handle any provocations from neo-Nazis. “We do not have a Jewish organizational home for the fight against fascism,” he quotes a far-left Jewish activist, who apparently thinks that we live in the Weimar Republic and not a stable democracy in which law-enforcement officers and not the balaclava-wearing thugs of antifa maintain the peace. Like Jewish Communists of yore, Lurie wants to bully Jews into abandoning liberalism for the extreme left, under the pretext that mainstream organizations just won’t cut it in the fight against “white supremacy.” Indeed, Lurie writes, some “Jewish institutions and power players…have defended and enabled white supremacy.” The main group he fingers with this outrageous slander is the Republican Jewish Coalition, the implication being that this explicitly partisan Republican organization’s discrete support for the Republican president “enables white supremacy.”
It is impossible to imagine Heer, Lurie, or other progressive writers similarly taking the NAACP to task for its perceived lack of concern about racism, or castigating the Human Rights Campaign for insufficiently combating homophobia. No, it is only the cowardice of Jews that is condemned—condemned for supposedly ignoring a form of bigotry that, when expressed on the left, these writers themselves ignore or even defend. The logical gymnastics of these two New Republic writers is what happens when, at base, one fundamentally resents Jews: You end up blaming them for anti-Semitism. Blaming Jews for not sufficiently caring enough about anti-Semitism is emotionally the same as claiming that Jews are to blame for anti-Semitism. Both signal an envy and resentment of Jews predicated upon a belief that they have some kind of authority that the claimant doesn’t and therefore needs to undermine.T his past election, one could not help but notice how the media seemingly discovered anti-Semitism when it emanated from the right, and then only when its targets were Jews on the left. It was enough to make one ask where they had been when left-wing anti-Semitism had been a more serious and pervasive problem. From at least 1996 (the year Pat Buchanan made his last serious attempt at securing the GOP presidential nomination) to 2016 (when the Republican presidential nominee did more to earn the support of white supremacists and neo-Nazis than any of his predecessors), anti-Semitism was primarily a preserve of the American left. In that two-decade period—spanning the collapse of the Oslo Accords and rise of the Second Intifada to the rancorous debate over the Iraq War and obsession with “neocons” to the presidency of Barack Obama and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—anti-Israel attitudes and anti-Semitic conspiracy made unprecedented inroads into respectable precincts of the American academy, the liberal intelligentsia, and the Democratic Party.
The main form that left-wing anti-Semitism takes in the United States today is unhinged obsession with the wrongs, real or perceived, of the state of Israel, and the belief that its Jewish supporters in the United States exercise a nefarious control over the levers of American foreign policy. In this respect, contemporary left-wing anti-Semitism is not altogether different from that of the far right, though it usually lacks the biological component deeming Jews a distinct and inferior race. (Consider the left-wing anti-Semite’s eagerness to identify and promote Jewish “dissidents” who can attest to their co-religionists’ craftiness and deceit.) The unholy synergy of left and right anti-Semitism was recently epitomized by former CIA agent and liberal stalwart Valerie Plame’s hearty endorsement, on Twitter, of an article written for an extreme right-wing website by a fellow former CIA officer named Philip Giraldi: “America’s Jews Are Driving America’s Wars.” Plame eventually apologized for sharing the article with her 50,000 followers, but not before insisting that “many neocon hawks are Jewish” and that “just FYI, I am of Jewish descent.”
The main fora in which left-wing anti-Semitism appears is academia. According to the ADL, anti-Semitic incidents on college campuses doubled from 2014 to 2015, the latest year that data are available. Writing in National Affairs, Ruth Wisse observes that “not since the war in Vietnam has there been a campus crusade as dynamic as the movement of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions against Israel.” Every academic year, a seeming surfeit of controversies erupt on campuses across the country involving the harassment of pro-Israel students and organizations, the disruption of events involving Israeli speakers (even ones who identify as left-wing), and blatantly anti-Semitic outbursts by professors and student activists. There was the Oberlin professor of rhetoric, Joy Karega, who posted statements on social media claiming that Israel had created ISIS and had orchestrated the murderous attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris. There is the Rutgers associate professor of women’s and gender studies, Jasbir Puar, who popularized the ludicrous term “pinkwashing” to defame Israel’s LGBT acceptance as a massive conspiracy to obscure its oppression of Palestinians. Her latest book, The Right to Maim, academically peer-reviewed and published by Duke University Press, attacks Israel for sparing the lives of Palestinian civilians, accusing its military of “shooting to maim rather than to kill” so that it may keep “Palestinian populations as perpetually debilitated, and yet alive, in order to control them.”
One could go on and on about such affronts not only to Jews and supporters of Israel but to common sense, basic justice, and anyone who believes in the prudent use of taxpayer dollars. That several organizations exist solely for the purpose of monitoring anti-Israel and anti-Semitic agitation on American campuses attests to the prolificacy of the problem. But it’s unclear just how reflective these isolated examples of the college experience really are. A 2017 Stanford study purporting to examine the issue interviewed 66 Jewish students at five California campuses noted for “being particularly fertile for anti-Semitism and for having an active presence of student groups critical of Israel and Zionism.” It concluded that “contrary to widely shared impressions, we found a picture of campus life that is neither threatening nor alarmist…students reported feeling comfortable on their campuses, and, more specifically, comfortable as Jews on their campuses.” To the extent that Jewish students do feel pressured, the report attempted to spread the blame around, indicting pro-Israel activists alongside those agitating against it. “[Survey respondents] fear that entering political debate, especially when they feel the social pressures of both Jewish and non-Jewish activist communities, will carry social costs that they are unwilling to bear.”
Yet by its own admission, the report “only engaged students who were either unengaged or minimally engaged in organized Jewish life on their campuses.” Researchers made a study of anti-Semitism, then, by interviewing the Jews least likely to experience it. “Most people don’t really think I’m Jewish because I look very Latina…it doesn’t come up in conversation,” one such student said in an interview. Ultimately, the report revealed more about the attitudes of unengaged (and, thus, uninformed) Jews than about the state of anti-Semitism on college campuses. That may certainly be useful in its own right as a means of understanding how unaffiliated Jews view debates over Israel, but it is not an accurate marker of developments on college campuses more broadly.
A more extensive 2016 Brandeis study of Jewish students at 50 schools found 34 percent agreed at least “somewhat” that their campus has a hostile environment toward Israel. Yet the variation was wide; at some schools, only 3 percent agreed, while at others, 70 percent did. Only 15 percent reported a hostile environment towards Jews. Anti-Semitism was found to be more prevalent at public universities than private ones, with the determinative factor being the presence of a Students for Justice in Palestine chapter on campus. Important context often lost in conversations about campus anti-Semitism, and reassuring to those concerned about it, is that it is simply not the most important issue roiling higher education. “At most schools,” the report found, “fewer than 10 percent of Jewish students listed issues pertaining to either Jews or Israel as among the most pressing on campus.”F or generations, American Jews have depended on anti-Semitism’s remaining within a moral quarantine, a cordon sanitaire, and America has reliably kept this societal virus contained. While there are no major signs that this barricade is breaking down in the immediate future, there are worrying indications on the political horizon.
Surveying the situation at the international level, the declining global position of the United States—both in terms of its hard military and economic power relative to rising challengers and its position as a credible beacon of liberal democratic values—does not portend well for Jews, American or otherwise. American leadership of the free world, has, in addition to ensuring Israel’s security, underwritten the postwar liberal world order. And it is the constituent members of that order, the liberal democratic states, that have served as the best guarantor of the Jews’ life and safety over their 6,000-year history. Were America’s global leadership role to diminish or evaporate, it would not only facilitate the rise of authoritarian states like Iran and terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda, committed to the destruction of Israel and the murder of Jews, but inexorably lead to a worldwide rollback of liberal democracy, an outcome that would inevitably redound to the detriment of Jews.
Domestically, political polarization and the collapse of public trust in every American institution save the military are demolishing what little confidence Americans have left in their system and governing elites, not to mention preparing the ground for some ominous political scenarios. Widely cited survey data reveal that the percentage of American Millennials who believe it “essential” to live in a liberal democracy hovers at just over 25 percent. If Trump is impeached or loses the next election, a good 40 percent of the country will be outraged and susceptible to belief in a stab-in-the-back theory accounting for his defeat. Whom will they blame? Perhaps the “neoconservatives,” who disproportionately make up the ranks of Trump’s harshest critics on the right?
Ultimately, the degree to which anti-Semitism becomes a problem in America hinges on the strength of the antibodies within the country’s communal DNA to protect its pluralistic and liberal values. But even if this resistance to tribalism and the cult of personality is strong, it may not be enough to abate the rise of an intellectual and societal disease that, throughout history, thrives upon economic distress, xenophobia, political uncertainty, ethnic chauvinism, conspiracy theory, and weakening democratic norms.
1 Somewhat paradoxically, according to FBI crime statistics, the majority of religiously based hate crimes target Jews, more than double the amount targeting Muslims. This indicates more the commitment of the country’s relatively small number of hard-core anti-Semites than pervasive anti-Semitism.
4 The ADL has had to maintain a delicate balancing act in the age of Trump, coming under fire by many conservative Jews for a perceived partisan tilt against the right. This makes Heer’s complaint all the more ignorant — and unhelpful.
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Review of 'The Once and Future Liberal' By Mark Lilla
Lilla, a professor at Columbia University, tells us that “the story of how a successful liberal politics of solidarity became a failed pseudo-politics of identity is not a simple one.” And about this, he’s right. Lilla quotes from the feminist authors of the 1977 Combahee River Collective Manifesto: “The most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression.” Feminists looked to instantiate the “radical” and electrifying phrase which insisted that “the personal is political.” The phrase, argues Lilla, was generally seen in “a somewhat Marxist fashion to mean that everything that seems personal is in fact political.”
The upshot was fragmentation. White feminists were deemed racist by black feminists—and both were found wanting by lesbians, who also had black and white contingents. “What all these groups wanted,” explains Lilla, “was more than social justice and an end to the [Vietnam] war. They also wanted there to be no space between what they felt inside and what they saw and did in the world.” He goes on: “The more obsessed with personal identity liberals become, the less willing they become to engage in reasoned political debate.” In the end, those on the left came to a realization: “You can win a debate by claiming the greatest degree of victimization and thus the greatest outrage at being subjected to questioning.”
But Lilla’s insights into the emotional underpinnings of political correctness are undercut by an inadequate, almost bizarre sense of history. He appears to be referring to the 1970s when, zigzagging through history, he writes that “no recognition of personal or group identity was coming from the Democratic Party, which at the time was dominated by racist Dixiecrats and white union officials of questionable rectitude.”
What is he talking about? Is Lilla referring to the Democratic Party of Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and George McGovern? Is he referring obliquely to George Wallace? If so, why is Wallace never mentioned? Lilla seems not to know that it was the 1972 McGovern Democratic Convention that introduced minority seating to be set aside for blacks and women.
At only 140 pages, this is a short book. But even so, Lilla could have devoted a few pages to Frankfurt ideologist Herbert Marcuse and his influence on the left. In the 1960s, Marcuse argued that leftists and liberals were entitled to restrain centrist and conservative speech on the grounds that the universities had to act as a counterweight to society at large. But this was not just rhetoric; in the campus disruption of the early 1970s at schools such as Yale, Cornell, and Amherst, Marcuse’s ideals were pushed to the fore.
If Lilla’s argument comes off as flaccid, perhaps that’s because the aim of The Once and Future Liberal is more practical than principled. “The only way” to protect our rights, he tells the reader, “is to elect liberal Democratic governors and state legislators who’ll appoint liberal state attorneys.” According to Lilla, “the paradox of identity liberalism” is that it undercuts “the things it professes to want,” namely political power. He insists, rightly, that politics has to be about persuasion but then contradicts himself in arguing that “politics is about seizing power to defend the truth.” In other words, Lilla wants a better path to total victory.
Given what Lilla, descending into hysteria, describes as “the Republican rage for destruction,” liberals and Democrats have to win elections lest the civil rights of blacks, women, and gays are rolled back. As proof of the ever-looming danger, he notes that when the “crisis of the mid-1970s threatened…the country turned not against corporations and banks, but against liberalism.” Yet he gives no hint of the trail of liberal failures that led to the crisis of the mid-’70s. You’d never know reading Lilla, for example, that the Black Power movement intensified racial hostilities that were then further exacerbated by affirmative action and busing. And you’d have no idea that, at considerable cost, the poverty programs of the Great Society failed to bring poorer African Americans into the economic mainstream. Nor does Lilla deal with the devotion to Keynesianism that produced inflation without economic growth during the Carter presidency.
Despite his discursive ambling through the recent history of American political life, Lilla has a one-word explanation for identity politics: Reaganism. “Identity,” he writes, is “Reaganism for lefties.” What’s crucial in combating Reaganism, he argues, is to concentrate on our “shared political” status as citizens. “Citizenship is a crucial weapon in the battle against Reaganite dogma because it brings home that fact that we are part of a legitimate common enterprise.” But then he asserts that the “American right uses the term citizenship today as a means of exclusion.” The passage might lead the reader to think that Lilla would take up the question of immigration and borders. But he doesn’t, and the closing passages of the book dribble off into characteristic zigzags. Lilla tells us that “Black Lives Matter is a textbook example of how not to build solidarity” but then goes on, without evidence, to assert the accuracy of the Black Lives Matter claim that African-Americans have been singled out for police mistreatment.
It would be nice to argue that The Once and Future Liberal is a near miss, a book that might have had enduring importance if only it went that extra step. But Lilla’s passing insights on the perils of a politically correct identity politics drown in the rhetoric of conventional bromides that fill most of the pages of this disappointing book.
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n Athens several years ago, I had dinner with a man running for the national parliament. I asked him whether he thought he had a shot at winning. He was sure of victory, he told me. “I have hired a very famous political consultant from Washington,” he said. “He is the man who elected Reagan. Expensive. But the best.”
The political genius he then described was a minor political flunky I had met in Washington long ago, a more-or-less anonymous member of the Republican National Committee before he faded from view at the end of Ronald Reagan’s second term. Mutual acquaintances told me he still lived in a nice neighborhood in Northern Virginia, but they never could figure out what the hell he did to earn his money. (This is a recurring mystery throughout the capital.) I had to come to Greece to find the answer.
It is one of the dark arts of Washington, this practice of American political hacks traveling to faraway lands and suckering foreign politicians into paying vast sums for splashy, state-of-the-art, essentially worthless “services.” And it’s perfectly legal. Paul Manafort, who briefly managed Donald Trump’s campaign last summer, was known as a pioneer of the globe-trotting racket. If he hadn’t, as it were, veered out of his gutter into the slightly higher lane of U.S. presidential politics, he likely could have hoovered cash from the patch pockets of clueless clients from Ouagadougou to Zagreb for the rest of his natural life and nobody in Washington would have noticed.
But he veered, and now he and a colleague find themselves indicted by Robert Mueller, the Inspector Javert of the Russian-collusion scandal. When those indictments landed, they instantly set in motion the familiar scramble. Trump fans announced that the indictments were proof that there was no collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russians—or, in the crisp, emphatic phrasing of a tweet by the world’s Number One Trump Fan, Donald Trump: “NO COLLUSION!!!!” The Russian-scandal fetishists in the press corps replied in chorus: It’s still early! Javert required more time, and so will Mueller, and so will they.
A good Washington scandal requires a few essential elements. One is a superabundance of information. From these data points, conspiracy-minded reporters can begin to trace associations, warranted or not, and from the associations, they can infer motives and objectives with which, stretched together, they can limn a full-blown conspiracy theory. The Manafort indictment released a flood of new information, and at once reporters were pawing for nuggets that might eventually form a compelling case for collusion.
They failed to find any because Manafort’s indictment, in essence, involved his efforts to launder his profits from his international political work, not his work for the Trump campaign. Fortunately for the obsessives, another element is required for a good scandal: a colorful cast. The various Clinton scandals brought us Asian money-launderers and ChiCom bankers, along with an entire Faulkner-novel’s worth of bumpkins, sharpies, and backwoods swindlers, plus that intern in the thong. Watergate, the mother lode of Washington scandals, featured a host of implausible characters, from the central-casting villain G. Gordon Liddy to Sam Ervin, a lifelong segregationist and racist who became a hero to liberals everywhere.
Here, at last, is one area where the Russian scandal has begun to show promise. Manafort and his business partner seem too banal to hold the interest of anyone but a scandal obsessive. Beneath the pile of paper Mueller dumped on them, however, another creature could be seen peeking out shyly. This would be the diminutive figure of George Papadopoulos. An unpaid campaign adviser to Trump, Papadopoulos pled guilty to lying to the FBI about the timing of his conversations with Russian agents. He is quickly becoming the stuff of legend.
Papadopoulos is an exemplar of a type long known to American politics. He is the nebbish bedazzled by the big time—achingly ambitious, though lacking the skill, or the cunning, to climb the greasy pole. So he remains at the periphery of the action, ever eager to serve. Papadopoulos’s résumé, for a man under 30, is impressively padded. He said he served as the U.S. representative to the Model United Nations in 2012, though nobody recalls seeing him there. He boasted of a four-year career at the Hudson Institute, though in fact he spent one year there as an unpaid intern and three doing contract research for one of Hudson’s scholars. On his LinkedIn page, he listed himself as a keynote speaker at a Greek American conference in 2008, but in fact he participated only in a panel discussion. The real keynoter was Michael Dukakis.
With this hunger for achievement, real or imagined, Papadopoulos could not let a presidential campaign go by without climbing aboard. In late 2015, he somehow attached himself to Ben Carson’s campaign. He was never paid and lasted four months. His presence went largely unnoticed. “If there was any work product, I never saw it,” Carson’s campaign manager told Time. The deputy campaign manager couldn’t even recall his name. Then suddenly, in April 2016, Papadopoulos appeared on a list of “foreign-policy advisers” to Donald Trump—and, according to Mueller’s court filings, resolved to make his mark by acting as a liaison between Trump’s campaign and the Russian government.
While Mueller tells the story of Papadopoulos’s adventures in the dry, Joe Friday prose of a legal document, it could easily be the script for a Peter Sellers movie from the Cold War era. The young man’s résumé is enough to impress the campaign’s impressionable officials as they scavenge for foreign-policy advisers: “Hey, Corey! This dude was in the Model United Nations!”
Papadopoulus (played by Sellers) sets about his mission. A few weeks after signing on to the campaign, he travels to Europe, where he meets a mysterious “Professor” (Peter Ustinov). “Initially the Professor seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos,” says Mueller’s indictment. A likely story! Yet when Papadopoulus lets drop that he’s an adviser to Trump, the Professor suddenly “appeared to take great interest” in him. They arrange a meeting in London to which the Professor invites a “female Russian national” (Elke Sommer). Without much effort, the femme fatale convinces Papadopoulus that she is Vladimir Putin’s niece. (“I weel tell z’American I em niece of Great Leader! Zat idjut belief ennytink!”) Over the next several months our hero sends many emails to campaign officials and to the Professor, trying to arrange a meeting between them. As far we know from the indictment, nothing came of his mighty efforts.
And there matters lay until January 2017, when the FBI came calling. Agents asked Papadopoulos about his interactions with the Russians. Even though he must have known that hundreds of his emails on the subject would soon be available to the FBI, he lied and told the agents that the contacts had occurred many months before he joined the campaign. History will record Papadopoulos as the man who forgot that emails carry dates on them. After the FBI interview, according to the indictment, he tried to destroy evidence with the same competence he has brought to his other endeavors. He closed his Facebook account, on which several communications with the Russians had taken place. He threw out his old cellphone. (That should do it!) After that, he began wearing a blindfold, on the theory that if he couldn’t see the FBI, the FBI couldn’t see him.
I made that last one up, obviously. For now, the great hope of scandal hobbyists is that Papadopoulus was wearing a wire between the time he secretly pled guilty and the time his plea was made public. This would have allowed him to gather all kinds of incriminating dirt in conversations with former colleagues. And the dirt is there, all right, as the Manafort indictment proves. Unfortunately for our scandal fetishists, so far none of it shows what their hearts most desire: active collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign.
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An affair to remember
All this changed with the release in 1967 of Arthur Penn’s Bonnie and Clyde and Mike Nichols’s The Graduate. These two films, made in nouveau European style, treated familiar subjects—a pair of Depression-era bank robbers and a college graduate in search of a place in the adult world—in an unmistakably modern manner. Both films were commercial successes that catapulted their makers and stars into the top echelon of what came to be known as “the new Hollywood.”
Bonnie and Clyde inaugurated a new era in which violence on screen simultaneously became bloodier and more aestheticized, and it has had enduring impact as a result. But it was The Graduate that altered the direction of American moviemaking with its specific appeal to younger and hipper moviegoers who had turned their backs on more traditional cinematic fare. When it opened in New York in December, the movie critic Hollis Alpert reported with bemusement that young people were lining up in below-freezing weather to see it, and that they showed no signs of being dismayed by the cold: “It was as though they all knew they were going to see something good, something made for them.”
The Graduate, whose aimless post-collegiate title character is seduced by the glamorous but neurotic wife of his father’s business partner, is part of the common stock of American reference. Now, a half-century later, it has become the subject of a book-length study, Beverly Gray’s Seduced by Mrs. Robinson: How The Graduate Became the Touchstone of a Generation.1 As is so often the case with pop-culture books, Seduced by Mrs. Robinson is almost as much about its self-absorbed Baby Boomer author (“The Graduate taught me to dance to the beat of my own drums”) as its subject. It has the further disadvantage of following in the footsteps of Mark Harris’s magisterial Pictures at a Revolution: Five Movies and the Birth of the New Hollywood (2008), in which the film is placed in the context of Hollywood’s mid-’60s cultural flux. But Gray’s book offers us a chance to revisit this seminal motion picture and consider just why it was that The Graduate spoke to Baby Boomers in a distinctively personal way.T he Graduate began life in 1963 as a novella of the same name by Charles Webb, a California-born writer who saw his book not as a comic novel but as a serious artistic statement about America’s increasingly disaffected youth. It found its way into the hands of a producer named Lawrence Turman who saw The Graduate as an opportunity to make the cinematic equivalent of Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye. Turman optioned the book, then sent it to Mike Nichols, who in 1963 was still best known for his comic partnership with Elaine May but had just made his directorial debut with the original Broadway production of Barefoot in the Park.
Both men saw that The Graduate posed a problem to anyone seeking to put it on the screen. In Turman’s words, “In the book the character of Benjamin Braddock is sort of a whiny pain in the fanny [whom] you want to shake or spank.” To this end, they turned to Buck Henry, who had co-created the popular TV comedy Get Smart with Mel Brooks, to write a screenplay that would retain much of Webb’s dryly witty dialogue (“I think you’re the most attractive of all my parents’ friends”) while making Benjamin less priggish.
Nichols’s first major act was casting Dustin Hoffman, an obscure New York stage actor pushing 30, for the title role. No one but Nichols seems to have thought him suitable in any way. Not only was Hoffman short and nondescript-looking, but he was unmistakably Jewish, whereas Benjamin is supposedly the scion of a newly monied WASP family from southern California. Nevertheless, Nichols decided he wanted “a short, dark, Jewish, anomalous presence, which is how I experience myself,” in order to underline Benjamin’s alienation from the world of his parents.
Nichols filled the other roles in equally unexpected ways. He hired the Oscar winner Anne Bancroft, only six years Hoffman’s senior, to play the unbalanced temptress who lures Benjamin into her bed, then responds with volcanic rage when he falls in love with her beautiful daughter Elaine. He and Henry also steered clear of on-screen references to the campus protests that had only recently started to convulse America. Instead, he set The Graduate in a timeless upper-middle-class milieu inhabited by people more interested in social climbing than self-actualization—the same milieu from which Benjamin is so alienated that he is reduced to near-speechlessness whenever his family and their friends ask him what he plans to do now that he has graduated.
The film’s only explicit allusion to its cultural moment is the use on the soundtrack of Simon & Garfunkel’s “The Sound of Silence,” the painfully earnest anthem of youthful angst that is for all intents and purposes the theme song of The Graduate. Nevertheless, Henry’s screenplay leaves little doubt that the film was in every way a work of its time and place. As he later explained to Mark Harris, it is a study of “the disaffection of young people for an environment that they don’t seem to be in sync with.…Nobody had made a film specifically about that.”
This aspect of The Graduate is made explicit in a speech by Benjamin that has no direct counterpart in the novel: “It’s like I was playing some kind of game, but the rules don’t make any sense to me. They’re being made up by all the wrong people. I mean, no one makes them up. They seem to make themselves up.”
The Graduate was Nichols’s second film, following his wildly successful movie version of Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?. Albee’s play was a snarling critique of the American dream, which he believed to be a snare and a delusion. The Graduate had the same skeptical view of postwar America, but its pessimism was played for laughs. When Benjamin is assured by a businessman in the opening scene that the secret to success in America is “plastics,” we are meant to laugh contemptuously at the smugness of so blinkered a view of life. Moreover, the contempt is as real as the laughter: The Graduate has it both ways. For the same reason, the farcical quality of the climactic scene (in which Benjamin breaks up Elaine’s marriage to a handsome young WASP and carts her off to an unknown fate) is played without musical underscoring, a signal that what Benjamin is doing is really no laughing matter.
The youth-oriented message of The Graduate came through loud and clear to its intended audience, which paid no heed to the mixed reviews from middle-aged reviewers unable to grasp what Nichols and Henry were up to. Not so Roger Ebert, the newly appointed 25-year-old movie critic of the Chicago Sun-Times, who called The Graduate “the funniest American comedy of the year…because it has a point of view. That is to say, it is against something.”
Even more revealing was the response of David Brinkley, then the co-anchor of NBC’s nightly newscast, who dismissed The Graduate as “frantic nonsense” but added that his college-age son and his classmates “liked it because it said about the parents and others what they would have said about us if they had made the movie—that we are self-centered and materialistic, that we are licentious and deeply hypocritical about it, that we try to make them into walking advertisements for our own affluence.”
A year after the release of The Graduate, a film-industry report cited in Pictures at a Revolution revealed that “48 percent of all movie tickets in America were now being sold to filmgoers under the age of 24.” A very high percentage of those tickets were to The Graduate and Bonnie and Clyde. At long last, Hollywood had figured out what the Baby Boomers wanted to see.A nd how does The Graduate look a half-century later? To begin with, it now appears to have been Mike Nichols’s creative “road not taken.” In later years, Nichols became less an auteur than a Hollywood director who thought like a Broadway director, choosing vehicles of solid middlebrow-liberal appeal and serving them faithfully without imposing a strong creative vision of his own. In The Graduate, by contrast, he revealed himself to be powerfully aware of the same European filmmaking trends that shaped Bonnie and Clyde. Within a naturalistic framework, he deployed non-naturalistic “new wave” cinematographic techniques with prodigious assurance—and he was willing to end The Graduate on an ambiguous note instead of wrapping it up neatly and pleasingly, letting the camera linger on the unsure faces of Hoffman and Ross as they ride off into an unsettling future.
It is this ambiguity, coupled with Nichols’s prescient decision not to allow The Graduate to become a literal portrayal of American campus life in the troubled mid-’60s, that has kept the film fresh. But The Graduate is fresh in a very particular way: It is a young person’s movie, the tale of a boy-man terrified by the prospect of growing up to be like his parents. Therein lay the source of its appeal to young audiences. The Graduate showed them what they, too, feared most, and hinted at a possible escape route.
In the words of Beverly Gray, who saw The Graduate when it first came out in 1967: “The Graduate appeared in movie houses just as we young Americans were discovering how badly we wanted to distance ourselves from the world of our parents….That polite young high achiever, those loving but smothering parents, those comfortable but slightly bland surroundings: They combined to form an only slightly exaggerated version of my own cozy West L.A. world.”
Yet to watch The Graduate today—especially if you first saw it when much younger—is also to be struck by the extreme unattractiveness of its central character. Hoffman plays Benjamin not as the comically ineffectual nebbish of Jewish tradition but as a near-catatonic robot who speaks by turns in a flat monotone and a frightened nasal whine. It is impossible to understand why Mrs. Robinson would want to go to bed with such a mousy creature, much less why Elaine would run off with him—an impression that has lately acquired an overlay of retrospective irony in the wake of accusations that Hoffman has sexually harassed female colleagues on more than one occasion. Precisely because Benjamin is so unlikable, it is harder for modern-day viewers to identify with him in the same way as did Gray and her fellow Boomers. To watch a Graduate-influenced film like Noah Baumbach’s Kicking and Screaming (1995), a poignant romantic comedy about a group of Gen-X college graduates who deliberately choose not to get on with their lives, is to see a closely similar dilemma dramatized in an infinitely more “relatable” way, one in which the crippling anxiety of the principal characters is presented as both understandable and pitiable, thus making it funnier.
Be that as it may, The Graduate is a still-vivid snapshot of a turning point in American cultural history. Before Benjamin Braddock, American films typically portrayed men who were not overgrown, smooth-faced children but full-grown adults, sometimes misguided but incontestably mature. After him, permanent immaturity became the default position of Hollywood-style masculinity.
For this reason, it will be interesting to see what the Millennials, so many of whom demand to be shielded from the “triggering” realities of adult life, make of The Graduate if and when they come to view it. I have a feeling that it will speak to a fair number of them far more persuasively than it did to those of us who—unlike Benjamin Braddock—longed when young to climb the high hill of adulthood and see for ourselves what awaited us on the far side.
1 Algonquin, 278 pages
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“I think that’s best left to states and locales to decide,” DeVos replied. “If the underlying question is . . .”
Murphy interrupted. “You can’t say definitively today that guns shouldn’t be in schools?”
“Well, I will refer back to Senator Enzi and the school that he was talking about in Wapiti, Wyoming, I think probably there, I would imagine that there’s probably a gun in the school to protect from potential grizzlies.”
Murphy continued his line of questioning unfazed. “If President Trump moves forward with his plan to ban gun-free school zones, will you support that proposal?”
“I will support what the president-elect does,” DeVos replied. “But, senator, if the question is around gun violence and the results of that, please know that my heart bleeds and is broken for those families that have lost any individual due to gun violence.”
Because all this happened several million outrage cycles ago, you may have forgotten what happened next. Rather than mention DeVos’s sympathy for the victims of gun violence, or her support for federalism, or even her deference to the president, the media elite fixated on her hypothetical aside about grizzly bears.
“Betsy DeVos Cites Grizzly Bears During Guns-in-Schools Debate,” read the NBC News headline. “Citing grizzlies, education nominee says states should determine school gun policies,” reported CNN. “Sorry, Betsy DeVos,” read a headline at the Atlantic, “Guns Aren’t a Bear Necessity in Schools.”
DeVos never said that they were, of course. Nor did she “cite” the bear threat in any definitive way. What she did was decline the opportunity to make a blanket judgment about guns and schools because, in a continent-spanning nation of more than 300 million people, one standard might not apply to every circumstance.
After all, there might be—there are—cases when guns are necessary for security. Earlier this year, Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe signed into law a bill authorizing some retired police officers to carry firearms while working as school guards. McAuliffe is a Democrat.
In her answer to Murphy, DeVos referred to a private meeting with Senator Enzi, who had told her of a school in Wyoming that has a fence to keep away grizzly bears. And maybe, she reasoned aloud, the school might have a gun on the premises in case the fence doesn’t work.
As it turns out, the school in Wapiti is gun-free. But we know that only because the Washington Post treated DeVos’s offhand remark as though it were the equivalent of Alexander Butterfield’s revealing the existence of the secret White House tapes. “Betsy DeVos said there’s probably a gun at a Wyoming school to ward off grizzlies,” read the Post headline. “There isn’t.” Oh, snap!
The article, like the one by NBC News, ended with a snarky tweet. The Post quoted user “Adam B.,” who wrote, “‘We need guns in schools because of grizzly bears.’ You know what else stops bears? Doors.” Clever.
And telling. It becomes more difficult every day to distinguish between once-storied journalistic institutions and the jabbering of anonymous egg-avatar Twitter accounts. The eagerness with which the press misinterprets and misconstrues Trump officials is something to behold. The “context” the best and brightest in media are always eager to provide us suddenly goes poof when the opportunity arises to mock, impugn, or castigate the president and his crew. This tendency is especially pronounced when the alleged gaffe fits neatly into a prefabricated media stereotype: that DeVos is unqualified, say, or that Rick Perry is, well, Rick Perry.
On November 2, the secretary of energy appeared at an event sponsored by Axios.com and NBC News. He described a recent trip to Africa:
It’s going to take fossil fuels to push power out to those villages in Africa, where a young girl told me to my face, “One of the reasons that electricity is so important to me is not only because I won’t have to try to read by the light of a fire, and have those fumes literally killing people, but also from the standpoint of sexual assault.” When the lights are on, when you have light, it shines the righteousness, if you will, on those types of acts. So from the standpoint of how you really affect people’s lives, fossil fuels is going to play a role in that.
This heartfelt story of the impact of electrification on rural communities was immediately distorted into a metaphor for Republican ignorance and cruelty.
“Energy Secretary Rick Perry Just Made a Bizarre Claim About Sexual Assault and Fossil Fuels,” read the Buzzfeed headline. “Energy Secretary Rick Perry Says Fossil Fuels Can Prevent Sexual Assault,” read the headline from NBC News. “Rick Perry Says the Best Way to Prevent Rape Is Oil, Glorious Oil,” said the Daily Beast.
“Oh, that Rick Perry,” wrote Gail Collins in a New York Times column. “Whenever the word ‘oil’ is mentioned, Perry responds like a dog on the scent of a hamburger.” You will note that the word “oil” is not mentioned at all in Perry’s remarks.
You will note, too, that what Perry said was entirely commonsensical. While the precise relation between public lighting and public safety is unknown, who can doubt that brightly lit areas feel safer than dark ones—and that, as things stand today, cities and towns are most likely to be powered by fossil fuels? “The value of bright street lights for dispirited gray areas rises from the reassurance they offer to some people who need to go out on the sidewalk, or would like to, but lacking the good light would not do so,” wrote Jane Jacobs in The Death and Life of Great American Cities. “Thus the lights induce these people to contribute their own eyes to the upkeep of the street.” But c’mon, what did Jane Jacobs know?
No member of the Trump administration so rankles the press as the president himself. On the November morning I began this column, I awoke to outrage that President Trump had supposedly violated diplomatic protocol while visiting Japan and its prime minister, Shinzo Abe. “President Trump feeds fish, winds up pouring entire box of food into koi pond,” read the CNN headline. An article on CBSNews.com headlined “Trump empties box of fish food into Japanese koi pond” began: “President Donald Trump’s visit to Japan briefly took a turn from formal to fishy.” A Bloomberg reporter traveling with the president tweeted, “Trump and Abe spooning fish food into a pond. (Toward the end, @potus decided to just dump the whole box in for the fish).”
Except that’s not what Trump “decided.” In fact, Trump had done exactly what Abe had done a few seconds before. That fact was buried in write-ups of the viral video of Trump and the fish. “President Trump was criticized for throwing an entire box of fish food into a koi pond during his visit to Japan,” read a Tweet from the New York Daily News, linking to a report on phony criticism Trump received because of erroneous reporting from outlets like the News.
There’s an endless, circular, Möbius-strip-like quality to all this nonsense. Journalists are so eager to catch the president and his subordinates doing wrong that they routinely traduce the very canons of journalism they are supposed to hold dear. Partisan and personal animus, laziness, cynicism, and the oversharing culture of social media are a toxic mix. The press in 2017 is a lot like those Japanese koi fish: frenzied, overstimulated, and utterly mindless.
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Review of 'Lessons in Hope' By George Weigel
Standing before the eternal flame, a frail John Paul shed silent tears for 6 million victims, including some of his own childhood friends from Krakow. Then, after reciting verses from Psalm 31, he began: “In this place of memories, the mind and heart and soul feel an extreme need for silence. … Silence, because there are no words strong enough to deplore the terrible tragedy of the Shoah.” Parkinson’s disease strained his voice, but it was clear that the pope’s irrepressible humanity and spiritual strength had once more stood him in good stead.
George Weigel watched the address from NBC’s Jerusalem studios, where he was providing live analysis for the network. As he recalls in Lessons in Hope, his touching and insightful memoir of his time as the pope’s biographer, “Our newsroom felt the impact of those words, spoken with the weight of history bearing down on John Paul and all who heard him: normally a place of bedlam, the newsroom fell completely silent.” The pope, he writes, had “invited the world to look, hard, at the stuff of its redemption.”
Weigel, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, published his biography of John Paul in two volumes, Witness to Hope (1999) and The End and the Beginning (2010). His new book completes a John Paul triptych, and it paints a more informal, behind-the-scenes portrait. Readers, Catholic and otherwise, will finish the book feeling almost as though they knew the 264th successor of Peter. Lessons in Hope is also full of clerical gossip. Yet Weigel never loses sight of his main purpose: to illuminate the character and mind of the “emblematic figure of the second half of the twentieth century.”
The book’s most important contribution comes in its restatement of John Paul’s profound political thought at a time when it is sorely needed. Throughout, Weigel reminds us of the pope’s defense of the freedom of conscience; his emphasis on culture as the primary engine of history; and his strong support for democracy and the free economy.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the pope continued to promote these ideas in such encyclicals as Centesimus Annus. The 1991 document reiterated the Church’s opposition to socialist regimes that reduce man to “a molecule within the social organism” and trample his right to earn “a living through his own initiative.” Centesimus Annus also took aim at welfare states for usurping the role of civil society and draining “human energies.” The pope went on to explain the benefits, material and moral, of free enterprise within a democratic, rule-of-law framework.
Yet a libertarian manifesto Centesimus Annus was not. It took note of free societies’ tendency to breed spiritual poverty, materialism, and social incohesion, which in turn could lead to soft totalitarianism. John Paul called on state, civil society, and people of God to supply the “robust public moral culture” (in Weigel’s words) that would curb these excesses and ensure that free-market democracies are ordered to the common good.
When Weigel emerged as America’s preeminent interpreter of John Paul, in the 1980s and ’90s, these ideas were ascendant among Catholic thinkers. In addition to Weigel, proponents included the philosopher Michael Novak and Father Richard John Neuhaus of First Things magazine (both now dead). These were faithful Catholics (in Neuhaus’s case, a relatively late convert) nevertheless at peace with the free society, especially the American model. They had many qualms with secular modernity, to be sure. But with them, there was no question that free societies and markets are preferable to unfree ones.
How things have changed. Today all the energy in those Catholic intellectual circles is generated by writers and thinkers who see modernity as beyond redemption and freedom itself as the problem. For them, the main question is no longer how to correct the free society’s course (by shoring up moral foundations, through evangelization, etc.). That ship has sailed or perhaps sunk, according to this view. The challenges now are to protect the Church against progressivism’s blows and to see beyond the free society as a political horizon.
Certainly the trends that worried John Paul in Centesimus Annus have accelerated since the encyclical was issued. “The claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life” has become even more hegemonic than it was in 1991. “Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it” increasingly get treated as ideological lepers. And with the weakening of transcendent truths, ideas are “easily manipulated for reasons of power.”
Thus a once-orthodox believer finds himself or herself compelled to proclaim that there is no biological basis to gender; that men can menstruate and become pregnant; that there are dozens of family forms, all as valuable and deserving of recognition as the conjugal union of a man and a woman; and that speaking of the West’s Judeo-Christian patrimony is tantamount to espousing white supremacy. John Paul’s warnings read like a description of the present.
The new illiberal Catholics—a label many of these thinkers embrace—argue that these developments aren’t a distortion of the idea of the free society but represent its very essence. This is a mistake. Basic to the free society is the freedom of conscience, a principle enshrined in democratic constitutions across the West and, I might add, in the Catholic Church’s post–Vatican II magisterium. Under John Paul, religious liberty became Rome’s watchword in the fight against Communist totalitarianism, and today it is the Church’s best weapon against the encroachments of secular progressivism. The battle is far from lost, moreover. There is pushback in the courts, at the ballot box, and online. Sometimes it takes demagogic forms that should discomfit people of faith. Then again, there is a reason such pushback is called “reaction.”
A bigger challenge for Catholics prepared to part ways with the free society as an ideal is this: What should Christian politics stand for in the 21st century? Setting aside dreams of reuniting throne and altar and similar nostalgia, the most cogent answer offered by Catholic illiberalism is that the Church should be agnostic with respect to regimes. As Harvard’s Adrian Vermeule has recently written, Christians should be ready to jettison all “ultimate allegiances,” including to the Constitution, while allying with any party or regime when necessary.
What at first glance looks like an uncompromising Christian politics—cunning, tactical, and committed to nothing but the interests of the Church—is actually a rather passive vision. For a Christianity that is “radically flexible” in politics is one that doesn’t transform modernity from within. In practice, it could easily look like the Vatican Ostpolitik diplomacy that sought to appease Moscow before John Paul was elected.
Karol Wojtya discarded Ostpolitik as soon as he took the Petrine office. Instead, he preached freedom and democracy—and meant it. Already as archbishop of Krakow under Communism, he had created free spaces where religious and nonreligious dissidents could engage in dialogue. As pope, he expressed genuine admiration for the classically liberal and decidedly secular Vaclav Havel. He hailed the U.S. Constitution as the source of “ordered freedom.” And when, in 1987, the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet asked him why he kept fussing about democracy, seeing as “one system of government is as good as another,” the pope responded: No, “the people have a right to their liberties, even if they make mistakes in exercising them.”
The most heroic and politically effective Christian figure of the 20th century, in other words, didn’t follow the path of radical flexibility. His Polish experience had taught him that there are differences between regimes—that some are bound to uphold conscience and human dignity, even if they sometimes fall short of these commitments, while others trample rights by design. The very worst of the latter kind could even whisk one’s boyhood friends away to extermination camps. There could be no radical Christian flexibility after the Holocaust.