Mill vs. Mill
On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill. 
by Gertrude Himmelfarb. 
Knopf. 345 pp. $8.95.
This book is an intriguing combination of textual criticism, biographical sleuthing, and ideological commentary. The first part is a careful comparison of the argument of Mill's most celebrated work, On Liberty, with other writings of his. It demonstrates a profound contradiction in the conception of liberty between the chef d'oeuvre and other statements of Mill's. The second part offers a solution to the puzzle of this contradiction in terms of Mill's biography. The third part draws out the implications of the contradiction for the ideology of liberalism, both in Victorian England and today. It suggests that the case of “Mill versus Mill” continues to be very timely indeed.
The Mill of On Liberty argues “one very simple principle”—that the only legitimate limitation to the liberty of the individual is for the purpose of avoiding harm to others. Liberty here is elevated to the status of the principal if not the only value of social life. This absolutization in the conception of liberty contrasts sharply with the views presented in other works of Mill, where individual liberty, while always upheld as a very great value, is balanced with other values such as justice, order, or moral virtue. The Mill of On Liberty demands absolute liberty of thought and speech, contending that only then can truth emerge from the unrestrained clasp of rival opinions. The “other Mill” is skeptical about total freedom of expression, leaning instead toward the “authority of the best-instructed.”
Even more radically (and, as his contemporaries rightly understood, with great originality), the Mill of On Liberty insists on absolute liberty of action for the individual, limited only by the provision that no other individuals be harmed. Such liberty is deemed necessary for the full unfolding of individuality. Also, it is assumed that such liberty will lead to “experiments” in social life that, eventually, will improve the condition of all. The “other Mill,” by contrast, doubts whether most people are capable of making good use of full liberty of action. In that case, only a minority could benefit from such liberty of action. Generally, the Mill of On Liberty assigns an essentially negative role to society and the state, the role of protecting the liberty of the individual. The “other Mill” conceives of positive moral tasks for both society and the state.
Miss Himmelfarb believes that Mill was fully aware of this fundamental contradiction. She also rejects the possibility that the radicalization of On Liberty can be attributed to a “late Mill,” with the more moderate views belonging to the “early Mill.” The latter views, she maintains, can be found both in works that antedate On Liberty and in works that succeed it. In her opinion, the only reasonable explanation is that in On Liberty Mill deliberately exaggerated his formulations in order to cope with one particularly urgent problem that concerned him at the time. The absolutization in the conception of liberty, in other words, was tactical. This urgent problem, Miss Himmelfarb concludes, was the status of women in society. She arrives at this conclusion both through textual analysis (only in Mill's essays on women can comparably radical formulations be found) and through an examination of Mill's personal circumstances during the writing of On Liberty. Miss Himmelfarb (hardly an apologist for the new feminism) tells us that she came to this interpretation “with great reluctance,” but that it is the only One which finally makes sense of the available evidence. The woman in the case, of course, is the formidable Harriet Taylor, with whom Mill was joined in a “perfect relationship” for many years and whom he finally married. It is her influence that Miss Himmelfarb detects in the radical formulations of On Liberty as well as in Mill's general preoccupation with the emancipation of women.
The case of “Mill versus Mill” is presented by Miss Himmelfarb as paradigmatic of a deep-seated tension between two types of liberal thought. The presentation is reminiscent of the well known discussion by Isaiah Berlin (to whom Miss Himmelfarb refers approvingly) of the “positive” and “negative” concepts of liberty. Mill vacillates between the liberalism of the Whig tradition, in which liberty was embedded in a much broader view of moral progress, and liberalism understood as radical libertarianism. To some extent the tension is between two rival ideals, sometimes coinciding, sometimes in conflict—the ideal of society as a morally perfect community and the ideal of the perfectly free individual. Miss Himmelfarb believes that it is the Mill of On Liberty, not his moderate alter ego, who has been victorious. Citing recent controversies and legal decisions in Britain and in this country (for example, on the issues of pornography and the rights of the sexually deviant), she maintains that the formulations of On Liberty have attained the status of unexamined axioms in current liberal thought. She makes it very clear that she is unhappy about this, and she suggests that the best corrective to the Mill of On Liberty is the “other Mill.” The importance of such a corrective is eloquently stated in the final pages of the book: “Liberals have learned, at fearful cost, the lesson that absolute power corrupts absolutely. They have yet to learn that absolute liberty may also corrupt absolutely.”
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Miss Himmelfarb's argument is subtle, erudite, and in places gripping, but there are questions to be raised about her broader commentary. She is not really persuasive when she argues that the radical version of liberalism has won the day. It has done that, no doubt, in certain areas of private life—broadly speaking, in that sector of private activity to which the currently fashionable term “life styles” refers. As Miss Himmelfarb herself points out, however, it is a very different kind of liberalism which dominates the discussion of public issues, from government interventions in the economy to the rights of racial minorities. Even in movements addressing themselves to private life, the two varieties of liberalism often coexist in uneasy tension with each other (Miss Himmelfarb herself, once more, points this out in connection with the women's liberation movement). It would seem more plausible to say that the contradiction that afflicted Mill continues to afflict his spiritual descendants today. Looking at the matter in this way only underlines the “relevance” of Mill's ideological ambiguities.
It is debatable, moreover, whether Mill's influence has been as great as Miss Himmelfarb thinks. Certainly it is impossible to believe that the contradiction in his view of liberty still in evidence more than a century later, is simply the result of Mill's uxorious aberration. Although Miss Himmelfarb does not suggest this, the chain of influences discussed in her book is strictly in the realm of intellectual history. Yet the contradiction between the two conceptions of liberty and the concomitant two types of liberalism may also be put in a sociological frame of reference in which these movements of ideas are seen to interact with identifiable institutional processes. From this perspective modern individuation, and the ideologies pertaining to it, emerge as the result of the very specific social structures of modernity, and Mill's contradiction, far from being merely an individual idiosyncrasy, is seen to be endemic to modern society.
If this is so, there will continue to be great ambiguity about the gains and the costs of modern individuation. Often within the same minds there will be the urge of affirming the autonomy of the modern individual and the contrary urge to escape from the burden of autonomy. Furthermore, if the contradiction has an institutional base, any solution will require institutional forms. In other words, it will not be enough to invoke the “other Mill,” or any other intellectual mentor, to counteract the recent exaggerations in the theory and practice of liberty. (This point, by the way, has been understood very well by the critics of liberalism from the Left; unfortunately, they have understood little else about the matter.)
One small point of irritation: the only illustration in the book shows Mill in the company of his stepdaughter Helen (who took care of him after the death of his wife). It is a somewhat alarming picture, suggesting an aging Pinocchio in the clutches of a Turgenev heroine. Yet there is little mention of Helen Taylor in the book. Surely someone at Knopf could have unearthed a picture of Harriet.

On Liberty and Liberalism, by Gertrude Himmelfarb

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