As the West's long battle with Soviet Communism draws to a close, practical men in America and elsewhere ponder a…
As the West’s long battle with Soviet Communism draws to a close, practical men in America and elsewhere ponder a novel question: how to bring forth a lawful, prosperous, and secure order from the rubble of the former Soviet Union. For many statesmen, diplomats, and captains of industry, the answer is already clear: we should rely upon foreign-aid policies, skillfully designed and massively financed. Through existing agencies or new ones, it is argued, such transfers will speed the transition from Communism to market democracies for hundreds of millions of people.
Yet the ongoing dramas in Moscow, and the attention these have commanded, have obscured the fact that America and other Western states are already experimenting with a series of aid programs for ex-Communist countries. The recipients in question are the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. The population of those five former members of the Warsaw pact—Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria—totals nearly 100 million (and will be larger still if Yugoslavia and Albania are added to their ranks), and while the sums involved are not historic, neither are they trifling. The United States, for example, has already authorized over $1.5 billion in grants for Eastern Europe and has guaranteed several times that amount in subsidized loans through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the new European Bank.
There is every indication that the new U.S. programs for the ex-Communist countries will build upon the tradition and experience of American aid programs in other parts of the world. Thus, in Poland the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is helping with “two model cooperative [housing] developments of 100 units total”; Bulgaria is receiving 300,000 metric tons of surplus feed grain for its livestock; and previously pro-natalist Romania is now the beneficiary of a “priority program” in the field of family planning. In light of these continuities, it may be appropriate not only to consider the prospects for aid for these post-Communist societies, but to reflect more generally on the performance of American “development assistance” to date.
We can begin with a simple thought experiment. What would we have expected the economies, societies, and polities of Eastern Europe to look like in 1990 if those five countries had been recipients of American development assistance over the previous two decades?
Like all such experiments, this one is necessarily speculative. But we can pursue it by comparing various characteristics of the countries of Eastern Europe immediately after their revolutions of 1989 with those of the dozens of African, Asian, and Latin American countries that did in fact enjoy steady flows of bilateral American development assistance during the 1970’s and 1980’s.
One strikingly unhealthy characteristic of the East European states is the inability to manage external debt. Over the course of the 1980’s, the governments of Poland and Romania (and also Yugoslavia) not only failed to repay their international creditors on the schedules to which they were contractually committed, but sought and obtained debt-relief agreements from them. At the time of its liquidation, the international finances of Hungary’s Communist government had also become precarious. After the collapse of Communism in the German Democratic Republic, previously secret documents showed that the state’s external hard-currency debts were nearly twice as great as officially acknowledged. And a few months after the demise of the Zhivkov regime, Bulgaria suspended its repayments of both interest and principal to its hard-currency creditors.
During the 1980’s, such debt crises were also characteristic of the states that had been long-term recipients of bilateral American development assistance. During that decade alone, by the World Bank’s count, 45 of the 74 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean which were receiving direct economic assistance from USAID sought and obtained debt-relief agreements.
Compounding the financial difficulties of Eastern Europe’s Communist states was their determination to maintain nonconvertible currencies which would restrict the role of international trade in the local economy. This meant that before 1989, for all practical purposes, the currencies of Eastern Europe were nearly worthless in the open market.
Such nonconvertibility, or limited convertibility, is also characteristic of the currencies minted by the states that have been receiving economic assistance from the United States over the past two decades. According to the IMF, only ten of the more than 70 countries today receiving bilateral economic assistance from the United States are deemed to have “independently floating” (that is, spontaneously convertible) currencies—and there are reasons to believe this may be a generous estimate.
In the late 1980’s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe bore the disfiguring scars of decades of socialist planning. The structures of their economies had been severely deformed. Their central governments, which had arrogated utterly dominant roles for themselves within the local economy, had amassed vast networks of state-owned enterprises. Without regard to consumers, these governments had directed forced-pace transitions out of agriculture and into state-owned heavy industries. They depressed private consumption and diverted funds into state investment, not on the basis of economic calculation but as a matter of political principle.
Parallel distortions are just as evident in the economies of long-term recipients of American aid. For example, the ratio of central-government spending to national output in Egypt—the principal U.S. aid recipient in Africa—was about the same as in Poland or Romania during the 1980’s. The Comoro Islands, Jamaica, Jordan, Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are some other long-term recipients whose ratios of central spending to output seem roughly to match Poland’s and Romania’s. By the same token, the war against agriculture, and against the consumer, looks to have been taken as far in some recipient countries as in Soviet-occupied Europe, or even farther. By the World Bank’s reckoning, the share of agriculture in the economies of Zimbabwe, Jamaica, Peru, and Jordan was lower in the 1980’s than in Hungary. And such long-term recipients as the People’s Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Ivory Coast have evidently managed to achieve ratios of private consumption to national product nearly as low as in Jaruzelski’s Poland.
For obvious reasons, the Communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe did not attract significant quantities of foreign capital for direct private investment during the 1980’s. Such inflows were also negligible for long-term recipients of American development assistance during those years. This systemic inability to attract voluntary investment from abroad speaks to the business climate of the countries in question. The factors affecting business climate, difficult to quantify, include such things as the state of civil order, the extent to which law presides, and the degree of hostility toward the rights of the individual (including the right to property)—in short, the quality of the civil and political liberties that the local population may be said to enjoy. In many recipient states, as in the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, that quality was, to say the least, low.
One can, of course, identify a number of characteristic differences between the policies and practices of today’s East European states and the group of states involved in long-term participation in U.S. development programs. But in many important areas, what seems most striking is precisely the lack of distinct differences.
Our thought experiment thus points to a fundamental question. If the conditions of the present states of Eastern Europe cannot be distinguished by such meaningful economic and political criteria from those of governments that have been obtaining American funds and development advice these last few decades, why should U.S. aid be expected to help Eastern Europe evolve away from its current characteristics—much less in the direction of self-sustaining economic growth or open, liberal polities?
The fact is that American development-assistance policies, for many years, have been more likely to lead a prospective beneficiary toward an Eastern Europe-style economic morass than to help it escape from one toward economic health and self-sufficiency. To understand why this should be so, we need a quick glance at the past.
In its early years, American development aid (or “technical assistance,” as it was called at the time) was extended to governments in the free world to help them participate more fully in the liberal international economic order that had been created after World War II. To American policy-makers, the primacy of private and commercial effort was self-evident. So too, in their minds, was the link between government policies and local prospects for material advance.
American development-assistance programs were tested by many minor challenges in the 1950’s and 1960’s, but they were shaken to their foundations by the Vietnam war. A confusion between the political and economic objectives of foreign aid, already evident in the discussions that surrounded USAID’s founding in 1961, was permanently impressed upon the agency by the Johnson administration’s decision to harness it to the war-winning effort. The programs that emerged in the field in response to these pressures—refugee relief, relocation projects, “pacification” programs, and the like—were not, in fact, meant to be judged by economic criteria. Severing the link between the living standards of local populations and the productive capacities of their economies had previously been regarded as a matter of enormous practical and moral hazard; during the Vietnam war, U.S. aid programs embraced the principle of such a separation, and sought to enforce it widely in practice.
Ironically, the new approach was soon globalized by American critics of the war. By the early 1970’s, the U.S. foreign-aid budget was the battlefield for a sort of guerrilla action against the President by a Congress discontented with the course and conduct of his Southeast Asian policy. After repeated failures to obtain its requested appropriations, the Nixon administration agreed to a congressional rewriting of the aid mandate in 1973. This was the so-called “New Directions” legislation, which remains in force today.
The “New Directions” language instructed USAID to focus its attention directly on the poorest of the poor: not only to reach them, but to “satisfy their basic needs and [enable them to] lead lives of decency, dignity, and hope.” This “Basic Human Needs Mandate,” as it came to be known, not only authorized but seemingly required development policy to involve itself in the uplifting of local living standards through direct provision of goods and services—much as had been done in Vietnam. Though theoretical arguments were advanced to explain the contributions such activities would make toward the goal of self-sustaining development, the practical result was to mandate not development but long-term relief programs. Significantly, the “New Directions” legislation did not require, or even urge, American agencies to monitor the impact of recipient governments’ policies and practices on the economies they supervised.
With the “lessons of Vietnam” thus perversely codified into its new operating procedures, American development-aid programs, originally based on the premise of strict conditionality, became a vehicle for unconditional resource transfers. With the decline in conditionality, “graduations” out of the U.S. aid program also came to a virtual end—despite the fact that graduation, by its very nature, is one of the criteria by which the success of policies designed to promote self-sustaining economic development can be measured. In 1989, an unusually frank report by USAID acknowledged this and other problems:
Somewhere between 1949 and the present, the original concept of development assistance as a transitional means of helping developing countries “meet their own needs” has been lost. . . . All too often, dependency seems to have won out over development. . . . Only a handful of countries that started receiving U.S. assistance in the 1950’s and 1960’s has ever graduated from dependent status. . . . Where development has worked, and is working, the key has been economic growth. And this is largely the result of individual nations making the right policy choices. . . .
What about the role of American aid in fostering political liberalization in recipient countries? Long-term receipt of American development assistance has certainly not prevented a transition toward a more open and participatory political order, as happened in much of Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980’s. Yet similar transitions took place in Latin countries that did not enjoy bilateral American economic-aid programs at the time. Moreover, many long-term recipients in other regions during the same decade did not undergo liberalization. So the record in this regard is equivocal at best.
In sum, an East European government seeking assistance from America’s existing aid apparatus would be engaged in a singular act of faith, for there is little in the record to suggest that these programs contribute to economic liberalization or development, while there is considerable evidence to the contrary.
Is, then, the story of America’s postwar international economic policy one of unremitting failure? Quite the contrary: the framework for trade and finance that the United States helped to fashion in the 1940’s is surely one of the more extraordinary successes in the history of international relations; indeed, it is one of the few whose accomplishments may have exceeded the hopes of its creators.
Moreover, specific American interventions are widely thought to have succeeded as well. For example, American assistance is commonly considered instrumental to the postwar recoveries and expansions of Western Europe and Japan, and later to the dynamic growth of such newly industrializing economies as Taiwan and South Korea. Advocates of aid initiatives for Eastern Europe, indeed, sometimes make their case by broad analogy with these earlier experiences. Are they right to do so?
Like the words “democracy” and “freedom,” “Marshall Plan” is a phrase that evokes a warm and favorable response. But while the Plan is often invoked, its actual objectives, applications, and results suffer from a strange neglect.
As its official name—the European Recovery Program (ERP)—reminds us, the Marshall Plan’s aim was to restore devastated economies. That is, the stated objective was to help its West European recipients reattain their prewar levels of output. Although two decades of brisk and virtually uninterrupted economic expansion came on the heels of the Plan, the ERP itself was not designed to foment self-sustained growth. Quite simply, it was not a program for development.
Specific aspects of the Marshall Plan, moreover, raise questions about its actual contribution to the recovery.
Under Nazi occupation, the vanquished economies of Europe had been brought under a comprehensive system of controls, through which they were to be harnessed to the German war effort. After World War II, some of these controls stayed in place over most of the liberated economies. Moreover, the ERP actually required recipient states to engage in economic planning in order to obtain aid. Needless to say, this approach encouraged statist impulses on the part of beneficiary governments. In more than one country Marshall aid was used to postpone rather than hasten economic adjustments or “privatizations”; occasionally, as in Italy, there actually emerged the spectacle of a government struggling—against the wishes of its ERP financiers—to pursue a liberal economic program.
There was another problem. In its first two years, the Marshall Plan established a complex system of bilateral drawing rights among European recipients of aid. The result of this “Little Marshall Plan” was to subsidize governments with overvalued currencies and large trade deficits and to penalize governments that attempted to maintain discipline in their accounts. Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s Minister for Economic Affairs from 1949 to 1963, once estimated that Belgium lost four-fifths of its dollar aid in the first years of the Marshall Plan due to these perverse incentives.
In recent years scholars approaching the Marshall Plan from widely divergent perspectives have drawn a similar conclusion: the ERP’s contributions to European recovery may have been more complex and less dramatic than is commonly assumed. This is not to say that American aid was inconsequential to Western Europe’s economic recovery and subsequent boom. In fact the United States played an important and even decisive role; but precisely how it did so is not always appreciated.
Two interventions require special mention. The first was the American security guarantee that was provided to Western Europe initially through the informal Pax Americana of 1945 to 1949, and thereafter through the formal obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). America’s political and military commitment to the continental regimes imparted to these regimes a quality they would otherwise have manifestly lacked: credibility. That credibility conduced to stability, and it promoted business confidence in these localities, not only in the eyes of the domestic populace, but in the eyes of foreign investors as well.
Second, the Marshall Plan gave a belated push to European integration—that is, to economic liberalization. Alongside the founding of NATO came the organization of the European Payments Union (EPU). The EPU laid the basis for currency convertibility among its members (although full convertibility was only to come later). In so doing, it also generated competitive pressures for the reduction of trade barriers and tariffs. In retrospect, the EPU can be seen as having paved the way for the specialization that helped to propel Western Europe’s postwar economic advance. But even at the time, contemporary observers counted the EPU as one of the Marshall Plan’s most important accomplishments—no less important, perhaps, in that it helped to undo some of the work that the Plan itself had originally financed.
The U.S. occupation of Japan—“Japan’s American interlude,” as one scholar has described it—lasted from 1945 until April 1952. Accustomed as we have become to Japanese prosperity, it may be difficult to remember just how hard-pressed the country was during those years. At the end of the occupation, economic conditions seemed favorable only in comparison to the catastrophic year following the unconditional surrender. In 1951, industrial output was still significantly below its 1937 levels. Foreign trade did not reattain its prewar volume until the mid-1950’s—well after the occupation was concluded. By almost any economic measure, Japan’s postwar recovery was slower than Western Europe’s.
Between mid-1945 and mid-1950, the United States extended considerable financial assistance to Japan. Under the program of Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), total transfers during that period exceeded $1.8 billion (roughly $7-8 billion at today’s prices). None of this aid, however, was earmarked for development, and only a portion of it was allocated to the tasks of reconstruction. As the “R” in GARIOA indicates, much of the money went to relief, through direct handouts or by provision of supplies to make-work industries. On this regimen of relief, recuperation was halting: as late as 1949, the official index of manufacturing activity was at barely half its 1937 level.
Relief-oriented aid was only part of the economy’s problem. Allied officials were, for several years, ambivalent about the prospect of a Japanese economic recovery. They concentrated instead on imposing a radical political and social transformation upon the archipelago. It required a number of regional events, including the collapse of the Nationalist government in China and the Communist surprise attack in Korea, to impress policy-makers in Washington with the importance of Japanese recovery.
In itself, the determination that the occupiers would not postively obstruct economic restoration was of course significant. As for interventions encouraging economic growth, the inadvertent played a role alongside the deliberate. The Korean war, for example, was a great windfall for the Japanese economy, resulting in a regional trade boom and occasioning major U.S. infusions into the domestic economy. America’s subsequent designation of Japan as the principal forward base in its Asian security system not only sparked business confidence in the country, but brought very tangible economic benefits as well. In the five years after the outbreak of the Korean war, U.S. “special-procurement” expenditures in Japan totaled $4 billion. Other U.S. military activities had a further impact on the domestic economy.
America’s less accidental contribution came through what the scholar Jerome B. Cohen once called our “sponsorship” of Japan. In his recounting:
After the signing of the peace treaty [between Japan and its erstwhile enemies] in 1952, the United States government sponsored Japan’s reentry into world trade relationships, concluding reciprocal trade agreements with Japan, securing admission to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and using its own tariff concessions to other nations to secure favorable treatment for Japan. United States firms concluded a large number of technical-assistance contracts with Japanese companies which enabled them to obtain the latest know-how, patents, copyrights, and machinery and equipment, as well as training for their technicians. The U.S. International Cooperation Agency [the precursor to AID] established a Productivity Center in Japan to help Japanese industries become more efficient and competitive. . . .
In short, the United States made it easier for Japan to undertake the outward-looking economic policy that its leaders already clearly wished to pursue.
Any account of the “American interlude” in Japan that neglects the political and social revolutions wrought by the occupiers would be critically incomplete. Indeed, many people in both Japan and the United States would argue that the occupation’s principal accomplishment was to prepare the country for liberal democracy.
The American-written constitution that was presented to a defeated Japanese nation is still in force today. Its very authorship speaks broadly to the exceptional circumstances under which Japan’s political and social transition from dictatorship was executed. If, today, there is a debate among Western students of Japan about the degree to which the country qualifies as an open society or a liberal order, that debate only serves to remind us of the limits to be expected of policies aimed at promoting democratization—even under the most favorable auspices imaginable.
Korea and Taiwan
Unlike Japan and Western Europe, Taiwan and Korea received significant amounts of American assistance expressly for the purposes of development. Between 1949 and 1961 alone, AID’s predecessor organizations transferred over $1.2 billion to Taiwan and over $2 billion to Korea (sums whose totals would be much higher if adjusted to their purchasing power in today’s dollars). Thereafter, a remarkable economic boom ensued—and continued—in both countries. Between the early 1960’s and the late 1980’s, according to official statistics, real per-capita output increased by a factor of over six in South Korea, and by still more in Taiwan. In their broad outlines, the experiences of these two countries would seem to present the strongest case for the positive potential of development assistance.
The case looks somewhat different, however, when it is examined more closely. During the period of maximum inflows, for example, South Korea’s economic growth was unexceptional. In 1953-55 and 1960-62, by one estimate, the South Korean GNP rose by 4 percent a year; per-capita growth would have been less than 1.5 percent a year by that reckoning.
The phenomenon of indifferent growth in the face of massive inflows of aid was, inescapably, related to official policies. The Rhee government may have had its virtues, but it created a distorted and politicized economic environment that discouraged savings, investment, and trade, among other things. Students of the Korean economy have even described the Rhee policies as “aid-maximizing,” in the sense that the South Korean government seemed willing to imperil its own economy to prove the need for the foreign bequests it wished to obtain.
Rapid economic growth commenced in South Korea only in the 1960’s, after the Park regime embraced an export-oriented policy. The factors influencing that decision were diverse, but U.S. aid also figured in the shift, albeit in a negative way: in late 1962, American officials discreetly informed their Korean counterparts that U.S. economic aid—which then accounted for as much as half of the South Korean government’s official revenues—would be cut back sharply in the coming years, and eventually curtailed. This prospect could not but have concentrated the mind wonderfully.
In Taiwan, circumstances were not as extreme, but the patterns were similar. Per-capita economic growth there was probably more rapid than in Korea between 1953 and 1962, and accelerated sharply after 1962. Just as in Korea, if at a somewhat earlier date, the Taiwanese government had been informed that American economic aid would be shut off; just as in Korea, the government subsequently embraced an outward-looking economic policy.
One should not conclude that American aid per se was extraneous to the progress of these two highly successful economies. Both countries faced very real military threats from Communist rivals; the survival of neither Taiwan nor South Korea was a foregone conclusion. The American security commitment to both countries figured incalculably in their development, and American military aid also played a major role in their domestic economies. For both Korea and Taiwan, this political and military support had the effect of preserving the possibility of rapid economic growth, even as that growth itself seems to have been brought about in some measure by the systematic reduction of development-assistance funding.
Reviewed as a group, then, the success stories of U.S. economic assistance do not seem to offer any immediate or obvious encouragement to the new initiatives now being contemplated for Eastern Europe. Few of the components that figured importantly in these earlier successes are likely to be replicable today. Other components are no longer necessary to replicate, since they already exist.
For example, although the several states of Eastern Europe may or may not ultimately choose to join the NATO alliance, they are unlikely to require the sorts of security guarantees and military aid that Western Europe, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea variously enjoyed. It is also hard to imagine that these countries, long subjugated to a Soviet-style dictatorship, would now voluntarily invite the United States or other governments to exercise even temporary mastery over their arrangements to fashion new constitutional or civil orders. Finally, the international trade and finance markets so vitally important to the earlier success stories are already in place for East European countries to avail themselves of.
What about conditions in Eastern Europe itself? First and foremost, it may be misleading to think of the region as a region. “Eastern Europe” was defined, indeed created, by Soviet occupation. With the passing of that occupation, many of the differences that have historically characterized the area are again more easily perceived. The populations differ by language, religion, cultural heritage—even by alphabet. They also differ in their political and legal traditions. There is no reason to expect that those differences, which were not erased under the common experience of occupation, will disappear in the near future.
Second, political developments vary signficantly from one state to the next. In Prague, the current Minister of Finance is an avowed disciple of Milton Friedman; in Romania, by contrast, both polity and personnel mark a continuity between the old regime and the new. As one observer has commented, “the age of uniformity is over.” This is true of prospects for political liberalization as well as of prospects for economic development.
Third, conditions are still evolving, and retain at least a degree of fluidity. The volatility of the landscape at the moment not only makes it less useful to focus on current events (such as proposed or pending measures for policy reform), but also limits the ability to generalize about problems and opportunities.
Yet the diversity and fluidity of conditions in Eastern Europe today are in a sense also a boon to analysis, for they serve to emphasize two problems that are central to these societies’ prospects. Both derive from the region’s Soviet “interlude.”
The first and arguably most important obstacle to economic and political development is the pervasive institutional maladaptation wrought by Soviet rule. Such maladjustment, unfortunately, goes beyond even the irrational process of central economic planning and the cumbersome, expensive system of socialist management. For in the exercise of Communist power, the socialist rulers of Eastern Europe spent more than four decades destroying the institutional framework of a civil order in these countries. It was not only the framework of property rights, and individual rights, that came under assault, but the very rule of law itself.
The political implications of this are clear enough. Scarcely less important, though, are its economic implications. Economic historians are in general agreement that the rise of the Western world was directly and inextricably linked to the new institutional arrangements it developed, and perhaps none of those arrangements was more important than the framework of legal protections for individuals that included the right of enforceable private contracts. The populations of Eastern Europe have been separated from that framework for more than four decades. The majority have no memory of firsthand exposure to it, to say nothing of personal familiarity.
This suggests that the institutional obstacles to Eastern Europe’s development are much greater than would seem to be implied by today’s intense discussions about, and proposals for, privatization of state-owned enterprises. To be sure, disendowing the states of the assets they have taken for themselves will be an immense task. Over the course of Margaret Thatcher’s eleven-year tenure as Prime Minister, the British government succeeded in transferring something less than 5 percent of the country’s output from government ownership back to private hands; in Eastern Europe, the privatizations now contemplated are greater by far. These are ambitious undertakings. But how much more ambitious by comparison will be the task of establishing a permanent, legitimate arrangement for the protection of individual rights and the enforcement of private contracts.
Institutional maladjustment is not the only enormous obstacle to development in Eastern Europe. Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany are also beset by what might be described as a crisis of human capital. Perhaps the most telling evidence of that crisis has been the long-term deterioration of health conditions in both the USSR and its former satellites. The deterioration is represented very clearly in the local patterns of mortality. Between the mid-1960’s and the mid-1980’s, age-standardized death rates in the USSR and Soviet-occupied Europe actually rose. No other region of the world reported such a trend, and, in fact, no other industrial country has ever experienced such a general and long-term peacetime decline in public health. By the late 1980’s, Eastern Europe’s lowest death rates (East Germany) were substantially higher than Western Europe’s highest ones (Ireland), and also higher than those reported for such Latin American societies as Argentina, Chile, and even Mexico.
One need not posit a tight, mechanistic relationship between levels of health and levels of output to appreciate the significance of these facts. By its very nature, rising mortality imposes constraints upon the productive capacities of the societies affected. Moreover, because rising mortality trends are so anomalous in the modern era, they suggest the possibility that other, more poorly measured aspects of human capital may also have been affected.
Can American development assistance specifically assist in relieving these obstacles to development in Eastern Europe? It is very difficult to imagine how. AID has no comparative advantage in helping to build the foundations of a civil order. Nor was it designed for helping to arrest mortality increases in industrial societies, or even for contributing to the preservation and augmentation of human capital in such places.
What is true of AID’s limitations applies more generally to the entire field of development policy. A conventionally trained development economist may offer advice to a policy-maker on how to get prices right, or achieve balances in the macroeconomy, or devise realistic measures for stabilization. There is merit in such activities, but for societies that were forced to march down the perverted path of Soviet-style socialism, they are hardly central to the problems at hand.
Overcoming the legacy of the immediate past is likely to require bold and fundamental departures from existing practices and arrangements in each of the countries of Eastern Europe. Respected local voices—Vaclav Klaus in Czechoslovakia, Janos Kornai in Hungary, Jan Winiecki in Poland, Ognian Pishev in Bulgaria, and many others—recognize as much, and urge immediate and decisive action. Such voices, indeed, offer the one cheering note in an otherwise thoroughly discouraging picture, for a number of the officials who will be receiving our development assistance may turn out to be wiser and braver than those dispensing it. Thus, in an address to a September 1990 meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Vaclav Klaus announced, “We know that there have been cases where major financial assistance caused the deceleration, not the acceleration, of the necessary systematic changes that we consider of the utmost importance.” Though these were simple words, they were telling—for the highest officials at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been unable to utter them publicly.
To the contrary, after tens of billions of dollars wasted in loans for “policy reform” over the past decade, Western development-assistance policy-makers are once again in the midst of a debate about the proper “sequencing” of the “reforms” they envision. In its recent (1990) recommendations to Poland, the World Bank urged the Polish government against undue speed in privatization:
In recognition . . . of the fact that immediate privatization may not be advisable and/or feasible, the government needs to explore alternative forms of manager/ownership whose key objective would be to introduce greater competition and efficiency in resource use.
It spoke in favor of a similar caution toward capital markets:
It would be important to lay the groundwork for a future capital market . . . so that . . . [it] could start functioning when price and other adjustments allow for an improved valuation of capital stock.
It advised against a “ ‘one-shot’ approach [in which] all major adjustment measures would be implemented rapidly,” warning that “the costs of the approach need to be carefully considered.” Instead, it advocated as “most promising” a “third, intermediate approach” consisting of a “vigorous stabilization program complemented by an adjustment program phased over two to three years,” and presumably by privatizations at some later date. The report did, however, conclude that its proposed “measures need to be supported by substantial foreign assistance”; indeed, it implies that Poland should be a recipient of various forms of Western financial aid on into the 21st century.
In the face of such rarefied and even surreal deliberations, it is a relief to turn to the wisdom which seems so obvious to East European exponents of fast, radical transformation; namely, that the longer the transition to an independent, liberal order is delayed, the lower the ultimate chances of its success.
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How Not to Aid Eastern Europe
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Here, in the time span of just seven days, was the dual nature of contemporary American anti-Semitism laid bare. The most glaring difference between these two displays of hate lies not so much in their substance—both adhere to similar conspiracy theories articulating nefarious, world-altering Jewish power—but rather their self-characterization. The animosity expressed toward Jews in Charlottesville was open and unambiguous, with demonstrators proudly confessing their hatred in the familiar language of Nazis and European fascists.
The socialists in Chicago, meanwhile, though calling for a literal second Holocaust on the shores of the Mediterranean, would fervently and indignantly deny they are anti-Semitic. On the contrary, they claim the mantle of “anti-fascism” and insist that this identity naturally makes them allies of the Jewish people. As for those Jews who might oppose their often violent tactics, they are at best bystanders to fascism, at worst collaborators in “white supremacy.”
So, whereas white nationalists explicitly embrace a tribalism that excludes Jews regardless of their skin color, the progressives of the DSA and the broader “woke” community conceive of themselves as universalists—though their universalism is one that conspicuously excludes the national longings of Jews and Jews alone. And whereas the extreme right-wingers are sincere in their anti-Semitism, the socialists who called for the elimination of Israel are just as sincere in their belief that they are not anti-Semitic, even though anti-Semitism is the inevitable consequence of their rhetoric and worldview.
The sheer bluntness of far-right anti-Semitism makes it easier to identify and stigmatize as beyond the pale; individuals like David Duke and the hosts of the “Daily Shoah” podcast make no pretense of residing within the mainstream of American political debate. But the humanist appeals of the far left, whose every libel against the Jewish state is paired with a righteous invocation of “justice” for the Palestinian people, invariably trigger repetitive and esoteric debates over whether this or that article, allusion, allegory, statement, policy, or political initiative is anti-Semitic or just critical of Israel. What this difference in self-definition means is that there is rarely, if ever, any argument about the substantive nature of right-wing anti-Semitism (despicable, reprehensible, wicked, choose your adjective), while the very existence of left-wing anti-Semitism is widely doubted and almost always indignantly denied by those accused of practicing it.T o be sure, these recent manifestations of anti-Semitism occur on the left and right extremes. And statistics tell a rather comforting story about the state of anti-Semitism in America. Since the Anti-Defamation League began tracking it in 1979, anti-Jewish hate crime is at an historic low; indeed, it has been declining since a recent peak of 1,554 incidents in 2006. America, for the most part, remains a very philo-Semitic country, one of the safest, most welcoming countries for Jews on earth. A recent Pew poll found Jews to be the most admired religious group in the United States.1 If American Jews have anything to dread, it’s less anti-Semitism than the loss of Jewish peoplehood through assimilation, that is being “loved to death” by Gentiles.2 Few American Jews can say that anti-Semitism has a seriously deleterious impact on their life, that it has denied them educational or employment opportunities, or that they fear for the physical safety of themselves or their families because of their Jewish identity.
The question is whether the extremes are beginning to move in on the center. In the past year alone, the DSA’s rolls tripled from 8,000 to 25,000 dues-paying members, who have established a conspicuous presence on social media reaching far beyond what their relatively miniscule numbers attest. The DSA has been the subject of widespread media coverage, ranging from the curious to the adulatory. The white supremacists, meanwhile, found themselves understandably heartened by the strange difficulty President Donald Trump had in disavowing them. He claimed, in fact, that there had been some “very fine people” among their ranks. “Thank you President Trump for your honesty & courage to tell the truth about #Charlottesville,” tweeted David Duke, while the white-nationalist Richard Spencer said, “I’m proud of him for speaking the truth.”
Indeed, among the more troubling aspects of our highly troubling political predicament—and one that, from a Jewish perspective, provokes not a small amount of angst—is that so many ideas, individuals, and movements that could once reliably be categorized as “extreme,” in the literal sense of articulating the views of a very small minority, are no longer so easily dismissed. The DSA is part of a much broader revival of the socialist idea in America, as exemplified by the growing readership of journals like Jacobin and Current Affairs, the popularity of the leftist Chapo Trap House podcast, and the insurgent presidential campaign of self-described democratic socialist Bernie Sanders—who, according to a Harvard-Harris poll, is now the most popular politician in the United States. Since 2015, the average age of a DSA member dropped from 64 to 30, and a 2016 Harvard poll found a majority of Millennials do not support capitalism.
Meanwhile, the Republican Party of Donald Trump offers “nativism and culture war wedges without the Reaganomics,” according to Nicholas Grossman, a lecturer in political science at the University of Illinois. A party that was once reliably internationalist and assertive against Russian aggression now supports a president who often preaches isolationism and never has even a mildly critical thing to say about the KGB thug ruling over the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
Like ripping the bandage off an ugly and oozing wound, Trump’s presidential campaign unleashed a bevy of unpleasant social forces that at the very least have an indirect bearing on Jewish welfare. The most unpleasant of those forces has been the so-called alternative right, or “alt-right,” a highly race-conscious political movement whose adherents are divided on the “JQ” (Jewish Question). Throughout last year’s campaign, Jewish journalists (this author included) were hit with a barrage of luridly anti-Semitic Twitter messages from self-described members of the alt-right. The tamer missives instructed us to leave America for Israel, others superimposed our faces onto the bodies of concentration camp victims.3
I do not believe Donald Trump is himself an anti-Semite, if only because anti-Semitism is mainly a preoccupation—as distinct from a prejudice—and Trump is too narcissistic to indulge any preoccupation other than himself. And there is no evidence to suggest that he subscribes to the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories favored by his alt-right supporters. But his casual resort to populism, nativism, and conspiracy theory creates a narrative environment highly favorable to anti-Semites.
Nativism, of which Trump was an early and active practitioner, is never good for the Jews, no matter how affluent or comfortable they may be and notwithstanding whether they are even the target of its particular wrath. Racial divisions, which by any measure have grown significantly worse in the year since Trump was elected, hurt all Americans, obviously, but they have a distinct impact on Jews, who are left in a precarious position as racial identities calcify. Not only are the newly emboldened white supremacists of the alt-right invariably anti-Semites, but in the increasingly racialist taxonomy of the progressive left—which more and more mainstream liberals are beginning to parrot—Jews are considered possessors of “white privilege” and, thus, members of the class to be divested of its “power” once the revolution comes. In the racially stratified society that both extremes envision, Jews lose out, simultaneously perceived (by the far right) as wily allies and manipulators of ethnic minorities in a plot to mongrelize America and (by the far left) as opportunistic “Zionists” ingratiating themselves with a racist and exploitative “white” establishment that keeps minorities down.T his politics is bad for all Americans, and Jewish Americans in particular. More and more, one sees the racialized language of the American left being applied to the Middle East conflict, wherein Israel (which is, in point of fact, one of the most racially diverse countries in the world) is referred to as a “white supremacist” state no different from that of apartheid South Africa. In a book just published by MIT Press, ornamented with a forward by Cornel West and entitled “Whites, Jews, and Us,” a French-Algerian political activist named Houria Bouteldja asks, “What can we offer white people in exchange for their decline and for the wars that will ensue?” Drawing the Jews into her race war, Bouteldja, according to the book’s jacket copy, “challenges widespread assumptions among the left in the United States and Europe—that anti-Semitism plays any role in Arab–Israeli conflicts, for example, or that philo-Semitism doesn’t in itself embody an oppressive position.” Jew-hatred is virtuous, and appreciation of the Jews is racism.
Few political activists of late have done more to racialize the Arab–Israeli conflict—and, through insidious extension of the American racial hierarchy, designate American Jews as oppressors—than the Brooklyn-born Arab activist Linda Sarsour. An organizer of the Women’s March, Sarsour has seamlessly insinuated herself into a variety of high-profile progressive campaigns, a somewhat incongruent position given her reactionary views on topics like women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. (“10 weeks of PAID maternity leave in Saudi Arabia,” she tweets. “Yes PAID. And ur worrying about women driving. Puts us to shame.”) Sarsour, who is of Palestinian descent, claims that one cannot simultaneously be a feminist and a Zionist, when it is the exact opposite that is true: No genuine believer in female equality can deny the right of Israel to exist. The Jewish state respects the rights of women more than do any of its neighbors. In an April 2017 interview, Sarsour said that she had become a high-school teacher for the purpose of “inspiring young people of color like me.” Just three months earlier, however, in a video for Vox, Sarsour confessed, “When I wasn’t wearing hijab I was just some ordinary white girl from New York City.” The donning of Muslim garb, then, confers a racial caste of “color,” which in turn confers virtue, which in turn confers a claim on political power.
This attempt to describe the Israeli–Arab conflict in American racial vernacular marks Jews as white (a perverse mirror of Nazi biological racism) and thus implicates them as beneficiaries of “structural racism,” “white privilege,” and the whole litany of benefits afforded to white people at birth in the form of—to use Ta-Nehisi Coates’s abstruse phrase—the “glowing amulet” of “whiteness.” “It’s time to admit that Arthur Balfour was a white supremacist and an anti-Semite,” reads the headline of a recent piece in—where else? —the Forward, incriminating Jewish nationalism as uniquely perfidious by dint of the fact that, like most men of his time, a (non-Jewish) British official who endorsed the Zionist idea a century ago held views that would today be considered racist. Reading figures like Bouteldja and Sarsour brings to mind the French philosopher Pascal Bruckner’s observation that “the racialization of the world has to be the most unexpected result of the antidiscrimination battle of the last half-century; it has ensured that the battle continuously re-creates the curse from which it is trying to break free.”
If Jews are white, and if white people—as a group—enjoy tangible and enduring advantages over everyone else, then this racially essentialist rhetoric ends up with Jews accused of abetting white supremacy, if not being white supremacists themselves. This is one of the overlooked ways in which the term “white supremacy” has become devoid of meaning in the age of Donald Trump, with everyone and everything from David Duke to James Comey to the American Civil Liberties Union accused of upholding it. Take the case of Ben Shapiro, the Jewish conservative polemicist. At the start of the school year, Shapiro was scheduled to give a talk at UC Berkeley, his alma matter. In advance, various left-wing groups put out a call for protest in which they labeled Shapiro—an Orthodox Jew—a “fascist thug” and “white supremacist.” An inconvenient fact ignored by Shapiro’s detractors is that, according to the ADL, he was the top target of online abuse from actual white supremacists during the 2016 presidential election. (Berkeley ultimately had to spend $600,000 protecting the event from leftist rioters.)
A more pernicious form of this discourse is practiced by left-wing writers who, insincerely claiming to have the interests of Jews at heart, scold them and their communal organizations for not doing enough in the fight against anti-Semitism. Criticizing Jews for not fully signing up with the “Resistance” (which in form and function is fast becoming the 21st-century version of the interwar Popular Front), they then slyly indict Jews for being complicit in not only their own victimization but that of the entire country at the hands of Donald Trump. The first and foremost practitioner of this bullying and rather artful form of anti-Semitism is Jeet Heer, a Canadian comic-book critic who has achieved some repute on the American left due to his frenetic Twitter activity and availability when the New Republic needed to replace its staff that had quit en masse in 2014. Last year, when Heer came across a video of a Donald Trump supporter chanting “JEW-S-A” at a rally, he declared on Twitter: “We really need to see more comment from official Jewish groups like ADL on way Trump campaign has energized anti-Semitism.”
But of course “Jewish groups” have had plenty to say about the anti-Semitism expressed by some Trump supporters—too much, in the view of their critics. Just two weeks earlier, the ADL had released a report analyzing over 2 million anti-Semitic tweets targeting Jewish journalists over the previous year. This wasn’t the first time the ADL raised its voice against Trump and the alt-right movement he emboldened, nor would it be the last. Indeed, two minutes’ worth of Googling would have shown Heer that his pronouncements about organizational Jewish apathy were wholly without foundation.4
It’s tempting to dismiss Heer’s observation as mere “concern trolling,” a form of Internet discourse characterized by insincere expressions of worry. But what he did was nastier. Immediately presented with evidence for the inaccuracy of his claims, he sneered back with a bit of wisdom from the Jewish sage Hillel the Elder, yet cast as mild threat: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me?” In other words: How can you Jews expect anyone to care about your kind if you don’t sufficiently oppose—as arbitrarily judged by moi, Jeet Heer—Donald Trump?
If this sort of critique were coming from a Jewish donor upset that his preferred organization wasn’t doing enough to combat anti-Semitism, or a Gentile with a proven record of concern for Jewish causes, it wouldn’t have turned the stomach. What made Heer’s interjection revolting is that, to put it mildly, he’s not exactly known for being sympathetic toward the Jewish plight. In 2015, Heer put his name to a petition calling upon an international comic-book festival to drop the Israeli company SodaStream as a co-sponsor because the Jewish state is “built on the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinian communities and sustained through racism and discrimination.” Heer’s name appeared alongside that of Carlos Latuff, a Brazilian cartoonist who won second place in the Iranian government’s 2006 International Holocaust Cartoon Competition. For his writings on Israel, Heer has been praised as being “very good on the conflict” by none other than Philip Weiss, proprietor of the anti-Semitic hate site Mondoweiss.
In light of this track record, Heer’s newfound concern about anti-Semitism appeared rather dubious. Indeed, the bizarre way in which he expressed this concern—as, ultimately, a critique not of anti-Semitism per se but of the country’s foremost Jewish civil-rights organization—suggests he cares about anti-Semitism insofar as its existence can be used as a weapon to beat his political adversaries. And since the incorrigibly Zionist American Jewish establishment ranks high on that list (just below that of Donald Trump and his supporters), Heer found a way to blame it for anti-Semitism. And what does that tell you? It tells you that—presented with a 16-second video of a man chanting “JEW-S-A” at a Donald Trump rally—Heer’s first impulse was to condemn not the anti-Semite but the Jews.
Heer isn’t the only leftist (or New Republic writer) to assume this rhetorical cudgel. In a piece entitled “The Dismal Failure of Jewish Groups to Confront Trump,” one Stephen Lurie attacked the ADL for advising its members to stay away from the Charlottesville “Unite the Right Rally” and let police handle any provocations from neo-Nazis. “We do not have a Jewish organizational home for the fight against fascism,” he quotes a far-left Jewish activist, who apparently thinks that we live in the Weimar Republic and not a stable democracy in which law-enforcement officers and not the balaclava-wearing thugs of antifa maintain the peace. Like Jewish Communists of yore, Lurie wants to bully Jews into abandoning liberalism for the extreme left, under the pretext that mainstream organizations just won’t cut it in the fight against “white supremacy.” Indeed, Lurie writes, some “Jewish institutions and power players…have defended and enabled white supremacy.” The main group he fingers with this outrageous slander is the Republican Jewish Coalition, the implication being that this explicitly partisan Republican organization’s discrete support for the Republican president “enables white supremacy.”
It is impossible to imagine Heer, Lurie, or other progressive writers similarly taking the NAACP to task for its perceived lack of concern about racism, or castigating the Human Rights Campaign for insufficiently combating homophobia. No, it is only the cowardice of Jews that is condemned—condemned for supposedly ignoring a form of bigotry that, when expressed on the left, these writers themselves ignore or even defend. The logical gymnastics of these two New Republic writers is what happens when, at base, one fundamentally resents Jews: You end up blaming them for anti-Semitism. Blaming Jews for not sufficiently caring enough about anti-Semitism is emotionally the same as claiming that Jews are to blame for anti-Semitism. Both signal an envy and resentment of Jews predicated upon a belief that they have some kind of authority that the claimant doesn’t and therefore needs to undermine.T his past election, one could not help but notice how the media seemingly discovered anti-Semitism when it emanated from the right, and then only when its targets were Jews on the left. It was enough to make one ask where they had been when left-wing anti-Semitism had been a more serious and pervasive problem. From at least 1996 (the year Pat Buchanan made his last serious attempt at securing the GOP presidential nomination) to 2016 (when the Republican presidential nominee did more to earn the support of white supremacists and neo-Nazis than any of his predecessors), anti-Semitism was primarily a preserve of the American left. In that two-decade period—spanning the collapse of the Oslo Accords and rise of the Second Intifada to the rancorous debate over the Iraq War and obsession with “neocons” to the presidency of Barack Obama and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—anti-Israel attitudes and anti-Semitic conspiracy made unprecedented inroads into respectable precincts of the American academy, the liberal intelligentsia, and the Democratic Party.
The main form that left-wing anti-Semitism takes in the United States today is unhinged obsession with the wrongs, real or perceived, of the state of Israel, and the belief that its Jewish supporters in the United States exercise a nefarious control over the levers of American foreign policy. In this respect, contemporary left-wing anti-Semitism is not altogether different from that of the far right, though it usually lacks the biological component deeming Jews a distinct and inferior race. (Consider the left-wing anti-Semite’s eagerness to identify and promote Jewish “dissidents” who can attest to their co-religionists’ craftiness and deceit.) The unholy synergy of left and right anti-Semitism was recently epitomized by former CIA agent and liberal stalwart Valerie Plame’s hearty endorsement, on Twitter, of an article written for an extreme right-wing website by a fellow former CIA officer named Philip Giraldi: “America’s Jews Are Driving America’s Wars.” Plame eventually apologized for sharing the article with her 50,000 followers, but not before insisting that “many neocon hawks are Jewish” and that “just FYI, I am of Jewish descent.”
The main fora in which left-wing anti-Semitism appears is academia. According to the ADL, anti-Semitic incidents on college campuses doubled from 2014 to 2015, the latest year that data are available. Writing in National Affairs, Ruth Wisse observes that “not since the war in Vietnam has there been a campus crusade as dynamic as the movement of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions against Israel.” Every academic year, a seeming surfeit of controversies erupt on campuses across the country involving the harassment of pro-Israel students and organizations, the disruption of events involving Israeli speakers (even ones who identify as left-wing), and blatantly anti-Semitic outbursts by professors and student activists. There was the Oberlin professor of rhetoric, Joy Karega, who posted statements on social media claiming that Israel had created ISIS and had orchestrated the murderous attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris. There is the Rutgers associate professor of women’s and gender studies, Jasbir Puar, who popularized the ludicrous term “pinkwashing” to defame Israel’s LGBT acceptance as a massive conspiracy to obscure its oppression of Palestinians. Her latest book, The Right to Maim, academically peer-reviewed and published by Duke University Press, attacks Israel for sparing the lives of Palestinian civilians, accusing its military of “shooting to maim rather than to kill” so that it may keep “Palestinian populations as perpetually debilitated, and yet alive, in order to control them.”
One could go on and on about such affronts not only to Jews and supporters of Israel but to common sense, basic justice, and anyone who believes in the prudent use of taxpayer dollars. That several organizations exist solely for the purpose of monitoring anti-Israel and anti-Semitic agitation on American campuses attests to the prolificacy of the problem. But it’s unclear just how reflective these isolated examples of the college experience really are. A 2017 Stanford study purporting to examine the issue interviewed 66 Jewish students at five California campuses noted for “being particularly fertile for anti-Semitism and for having an active presence of student groups critical of Israel and Zionism.” It concluded that “contrary to widely shared impressions, we found a picture of campus life that is neither threatening nor alarmist…students reported feeling comfortable on their campuses, and, more specifically, comfortable as Jews on their campuses.” To the extent that Jewish students do feel pressured, the report attempted to spread the blame around, indicting pro-Israel activists alongside those agitating against it. “[Survey respondents] fear that entering political debate, especially when they feel the social pressures of both Jewish and non-Jewish activist communities, will carry social costs that they are unwilling to bear.”
Yet by its own admission, the report “only engaged students who were either unengaged or minimally engaged in organized Jewish life on their campuses.” Researchers made a study of anti-Semitism, then, by interviewing the Jews least likely to experience it. “Most people don’t really think I’m Jewish because I look very Latina…it doesn’t come up in conversation,” one such student said in an interview. Ultimately, the report revealed more about the attitudes of unengaged (and, thus, uninformed) Jews than about the state of anti-Semitism on college campuses. That may certainly be useful in its own right as a means of understanding how unaffiliated Jews view debates over Israel, but it is not an accurate marker of developments on college campuses more broadly.
A more extensive 2016 Brandeis study of Jewish students at 50 schools found 34 percent agreed at least “somewhat” that their campus has a hostile environment toward Israel. Yet the variation was wide; at some schools, only 3 percent agreed, while at others, 70 percent did. Only 15 percent reported a hostile environment towards Jews. Anti-Semitism was found to be more prevalent at public universities than private ones, with the determinative factor being the presence of a Students for Justice in Palestine chapter on campus. Important context often lost in conversations about campus anti-Semitism, and reassuring to those concerned about it, is that it is simply not the most important issue roiling higher education. “At most schools,” the report found, “fewer than 10 percent of Jewish students listed issues pertaining to either Jews or Israel as among the most pressing on campus.”F or generations, American Jews have depended on anti-Semitism’s remaining within a moral quarantine, a cordon sanitaire, and America has reliably kept this societal virus contained. While there are no major signs that this barricade is breaking down in the immediate future, there are worrying indications on the political horizon.
Surveying the situation at the international level, the declining global position of the United States—both in terms of its hard military and economic power relative to rising challengers and its position as a credible beacon of liberal democratic values—does not portend well for Jews, American or otherwise. American leadership of the free world, has, in addition to ensuring Israel’s security, underwritten the postwar liberal world order. And it is the constituent members of that order, the liberal democratic states, that have served as the best guarantor of the Jews’ life and safety over their 6,000-year history. Were America’s global leadership role to diminish or evaporate, it would not only facilitate the rise of authoritarian states like Iran and terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda, committed to the destruction of Israel and the murder of Jews, but inexorably lead to a worldwide rollback of liberal democracy, an outcome that would inevitably redound to the detriment of Jews.
Domestically, political polarization and the collapse of public trust in every American institution save the military are demolishing what little confidence Americans have left in their system and governing elites, not to mention preparing the ground for some ominous political scenarios. Widely cited survey data reveal that the percentage of American Millennials who believe it “essential” to live in a liberal democracy hovers at just over 25 percent. If Trump is impeached or loses the next election, a good 40 percent of the country will be outraged and susceptible to belief in a stab-in-the-back theory accounting for his defeat. Whom will they blame? Perhaps the “neoconservatives,” who disproportionately make up the ranks of Trump’s harshest critics on the right?
Ultimately, the degree to which anti-Semitism becomes a problem in America hinges on the strength of the antibodies within the country’s communal DNA to protect its pluralistic and liberal values. But even if this resistance to tribalism and the cult of personality is strong, it may not be enough to abate the rise of an intellectual and societal disease that, throughout history, thrives upon economic distress, xenophobia, political uncertainty, ethnic chauvinism, conspiracy theory, and weakening democratic norms.
1 Somewhat paradoxically, according to FBI crime statistics, the majority of religiously based hate crimes target Jews, more than double the amount targeting Muslims. This indicates more the commitment of the country’s relatively small number of hard-core anti-Semites than pervasive anti-Semitism.
4 The ADL has had to maintain a delicate balancing act in the age of Trump, coming under fire by many conservative Jews for a perceived partisan tilt against the right. This makes Heer’s complaint all the more ignorant — and unhelpful.
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Review of 'The Once and Future Liberal' By Mark Lilla
Lilla, a professor at Columbia University, tells us that “the story of how a successful liberal politics of solidarity became a failed pseudo-politics of identity is not a simple one.” And about this, he’s right. Lilla quotes from the feminist authors of the 1977 Combahee River Collective Manifesto: “The most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression.” Feminists looked to instantiate the “radical” and electrifying phrase which insisted that “the personal is political.” The phrase, argues Lilla, was generally seen in “a somewhat Marxist fashion to mean that everything that seems personal is in fact political.”
The upshot was fragmentation. White feminists were deemed racist by black feminists—and both were found wanting by lesbians, who also had black and white contingents. “What all these groups wanted,” explains Lilla, “was more than social justice and an end to the [Vietnam] war. They also wanted there to be no space between what they felt inside and what they saw and did in the world.” He goes on: “The more obsessed with personal identity liberals become, the less willing they become to engage in reasoned political debate.” In the end, those on the left came to a realization: “You can win a debate by claiming the greatest degree of victimization and thus the greatest outrage at being subjected to questioning.”
But Lilla’s insights into the emotional underpinnings of political correctness are undercut by an inadequate, almost bizarre sense of history. He appears to be referring to the 1970s when, zigzagging through history, he writes that “no recognition of personal or group identity was coming from the Democratic Party, which at the time was dominated by racist Dixiecrats and white union officials of questionable rectitude.”
What is he talking about? Is Lilla referring to the Democratic Party of Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and George McGovern? Is he referring obliquely to George Wallace? If so, why is Wallace never mentioned? Lilla seems not to know that it was the 1972 McGovern Democratic Convention that introduced minority seating to be set aside for blacks and women.
At only 140 pages, this is a short book. But even so, Lilla could have devoted a few pages to Frankfurt ideologist Herbert Marcuse and his influence on the left. In the 1960s, Marcuse argued that leftists and liberals were entitled to restrain centrist and conservative speech on the grounds that the universities had to act as a counterweight to society at large. But this was not just rhetoric; in the campus disruption of the early 1970s at schools such as Yale, Cornell, and Amherst, Marcuse’s ideals were pushed to the fore.
If Lilla’s argument comes off as flaccid, perhaps that’s because the aim of The Once and Future Liberal is more practical than principled. “The only way” to protect our rights, he tells the reader, “is to elect liberal Democratic governors and state legislators who’ll appoint liberal state attorneys.” According to Lilla, “the paradox of identity liberalism” is that it undercuts “the things it professes to want,” namely political power. He insists, rightly, that politics has to be about persuasion but then contradicts himself in arguing that “politics is about seizing power to defend the truth.” In other words, Lilla wants a better path to total victory.
Given what Lilla, descending into hysteria, describes as “the Republican rage for destruction,” liberals and Democrats have to win elections lest the civil rights of blacks, women, and gays are rolled back. As proof of the ever-looming danger, he notes that when the “crisis of the mid-1970s threatened…the country turned not against corporations and banks, but against liberalism.” Yet he gives no hint of the trail of liberal failures that led to the crisis of the mid-’70s. You’d never know reading Lilla, for example, that the Black Power movement intensified racial hostilities that were then further exacerbated by affirmative action and busing. And you’d have no idea that, at considerable cost, the poverty programs of the Great Society failed to bring poorer African Americans into the economic mainstream. Nor does Lilla deal with the devotion to Keynesianism that produced inflation without economic growth during the Carter presidency.
Despite his discursive ambling through the recent history of American political life, Lilla has a one-word explanation for identity politics: Reaganism. “Identity,” he writes, is “Reaganism for lefties.” What’s crucial in combating Reaganism, he argues, is to concentrate on our “shared political” status as citizens. “Citizenship is a crucial weapon in the battle against Reaganite dogma because it brings home that fact that we are part of a legitimate common enterprise.” But then he asserts that the “American right uses the term citizenship today as a means of exclusion.” The passage might lead the reader to think that Lilla would take up the question of immigration and borders. But he doesn’t, and the closing passages of the book dribble off into characteristic zigzags. Lilla tells us that “Black Lives Matter is a textbook example of how not to build solidarity” but then goes on, without evidence, to assert the accuracy of the Black Lives Matter claim that African-Americans have been singled out for police mistreatment.
It would be nice to argue that The Once and Future Liberal is a near miss, a book that might have had enduring importance if only it went that extra step. But Lilla’s passing insights on the perils of a politically correct identity politics drown in the rhetoric of conventional bromides that fill most of the pages of this disappointing book.
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n Athens several years ago, I had dinner with a man running for the national parliament. I asked him whether he thought he had a shot at winning. He was sure of victory, he told me. “I have hired a very famous political consultant from Washington,” he said. “He is the man who elected Reagan. Expensive. But the best.”
The political genius he then described was a minor political flunky I had met in Washington long ago, a more-or-less anonymous member of the Republican National Committee before he faded from view at the end of Ronald Reagan’s second term. Mutual acquaintances told me he still lived in a nice neighborhood in Northern Virginia, but they never could figure out what the hell he did to earn his money. (This is a recurring mystery throughout the capital.) I had to come to Greece to find the answer.
It is one of the dark arts of Washington, this practice of American political hacks traveling to faraway lands and suckering foreign politicians into paying vast sums for splashy, state-of-the-art, essentially worthless “services.” And it’s perfectly legal. Paul Manafort, who briefly managed Donald Trump’s campaign last summer, was known as a pioneer of the globe-trotting racket. If he hadn’t, as it were, veered out of his gutter into the slightly higher lane of U.S. presidential politics, he likely could have hoovered cash from the patch pockets of clueless clients from Ouagadougou to Zagreb for the rest of his natural life and nobody in Washington would have noticed.
But he veered, and now he and a colleague find themselves indicted by Robert Mueller, the Inspector Javert of the Russian-collusion scandal. When those indictments landed, they instantly set in motion the familiar scramble. Trump fans announced that the indictments were proof that there was no collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russians—or, in the crisp, emphatic phrasing of a tweet by the world’s Number One Trump Fan, Donald Trump: “NO COLLUSION!!!!” The Russian-scandal fetishists in the press corps replied in chorus: It’s still early! Javert required more time, and so will Mueller, and so will they.
A good Washington scandal requires a few essential elements. One is a superabundance of information. From these data points, conspiracy-minded reporters can begin to trace associations, warranted or not, and from the associations, they can infer motives and objectives with which, stretched together, they can limn a full-blown conspiracy theory. The Manafort indictment released a flood of new information, and at once reporters were pawing for nuggets that might eventually form a compelling case for collusion.
They failed to find any because Manafort’s indictment, in essence, involved his efforts to launder his profits from his international political work, not his work for the Trump campaign. Fortunately for the obsessives, another element is required for a good scandal: a colorful cast. The various Clinton scandals brought us Asian money-launderers and ChiCom bankers, along with an entire Faulkner-novel’s worth of bumpkins, sharpies, and backwoods swindlers, plus that intern in the thong. Watergate, the mother lode of Washington scandals, featured a host of implausible characters, from the central-casting villain G. Gordon Liddy to Sam Ervin, a lifelong segregationist and racist who became a hero to liberals everywhere.
Here, at last, is one area where the Russian scandal has begun to show promise. Manafort and his business partner seem too banal to hold the interest of anyone but a scandal obsessive. Beneath the pile of paper Mueller dumped on them, however, another creature could be seen peeking out shyly. This would be the diminutive figure of George Papadopoulos. An unpaid campaign adviser to Trump, Papadopoulos pled guilty to lying to the FBI about the timing of his conversations with Russian agents. He is quickly becoming the stuff of legend.
Papadopoulos is an exemplar of a type long known to American politics. He is the nebbish bedazzled by the big time—achingly ambitious, though lacking the skill, or the cunning, to climb the greasy pole. So he remains at the periphery of the action, ever eager to serve. Papadopoulos’s résumé, for a man under 30, is impressively padded. He said he served as the U.S. representative to the Model United Nations in 2012, though nobody recalls seeing him there. He boasted of a four-year career at the Hudson Institute, though in fact he spent one year there as an unpaid intern and three doing contract research for one of Hudson’s scholars. On his LinkedIn page, he listed himself as a keynote speaker at a Greek American conference in 2008, but in fact he participated only in a panel discussion. The real keynoter was Michael Dukakis.
With this hunger for achievement, real or imagined, Papadopoulos could not let a presidential campaign go by without climbing aboard. In late 2015, he somehow attached himself to Ben Carson’s campaign. He was never paid and lasted four months. His presence went largely unnoticed. “If there was any work product, I never saw it,” Carson’s campaign manager told Time. The deputy campaign manager couldn’t even recall his name. Then suddenly, in April 2016, Papadopoulos appeared on a list of “foreign-policy advisers” to Donald Trump—and, according to Mueller’s court filings, resolved to make his mark by acting as a liaison between Trump’s campaign and the Russian government.
While Mueller tells the story of Papadopoulos’s adventures in the dry, Joe Friday prose of a legal document, it could easily be the script for a Peter Sellers movie from the Cold War era. The young man’s résumé is enough to impress the campaign’s impressionable officials as they scavenge for foreign-policy advisers: “Hey, Corey! This dude was in the Model United Nations!”
Papadopoulus (played by Sellers) sets about his mission. A few weeks after signing on to the campaign, he travels to Europe, where he meets a mysterious “Professor” (Peter Ustinov). “Initially the Professor seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos,” says Mueller’s indictment. A likely story! Yet when Papadopoulus lets drop that he’s an adviser to Trump, the Professor suddenly “appeared to take great interest” in him. They arrange a meeting in London to which the Professor invites a “female Russian national” (Elke Sommer). Without much effort, the femme fatale convinces Papadopoulus that she is Vladimir Putin’s niece. (“I weel tell z’American I em niece of Great Leader! Zat idjut belief ennytink!”) Over the next several months our hero sends many emails to campaign officials and to the Professor, trying to arrange a meeting between them. As far we know from the indictment, nothing came of his mighty efforts.
And there matters lay until January 2017, when the FBI came calling. Agents asked Papadopoulos about his interactions with the Russians. Even though he must have known that hundreds of his emails on the subject would soon be available to the FBI, he lied and told the agents that the contacts had occurred many months before he joined the campaign. History will record Papadopoulos as the man who forgot that emails carry dates on them. After the FBI interview, according to the indictment, he tried to destroy evidence with the same competence he has brought to his other endeavors. He closed his Facebook account, on which several communications with the Russians had taken place. He threw out his old cellphone. (That should do it!) After that, he began wearing a blindfold, on the theory that if he couldn’t see the FBI, the FBI couldn’t see him.
I made that last one up, obviously. For now, the great hope of scandal hobbyists is that Papadopoulus was wearing a wire between the time he secretly pled guilty and the time his plea was made public. This would have allowed him to gather all kinds of incriminating dirt in conversations with former colleagues. And the dirt is there, all right, as the Manafort indictment proves. Unfortunately for our scandal fetishists, so far none of it shows what their hearts most desire: active collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign.
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An affair to remember
All this changed with the release in 1967 of Arthur Penn’s Bonnie and Clyde and Mike Nichols’s The Graduate. These two films, made in nouveau European style, treated familiar subjects—a pair of Depression-era bank robbers and a college graduate in search of a place in the adult world—in an unmistakably modern manner. Both films were commercial successes that catapulted their makers and stars into the top echelon of what came to be known as “the new Hollywood.”
Bonnie and Clyde inaugurated a new era in which violence on screen simultaneously became bloodier and more aestheticized, and it has had enduring impact as a result. But it was The Graduate that altered the direction of American moviemaking with its specific appeal to younger and hipper moviegoers who had turned their backs on more traditional cinematic fare. When it opened in New York in December, the movie critic Hollis Alpert reported with bemusement that young people were lining up in below-freezing weather to see it, and that they showed no signs of being dismayed by the cold: “It was as though they all knew they were going to see something good, something made for them.”
The Graduate, whose aimless post-collegiate title character is seduced by the glamorous but neurotic wife of his father’s business partner, is part of the common stock of American reference. Now, a half-century later, it has become the subject of a book-length study, Beverly Gray’s Seduced by Mrs. Robinson: How The Graduate Became the Touchstone of a Generation.1 As is so often the case with pop-culture books, Seduced by Mrs. Robinson is almost as much about its self-absorbed Baby Boomer author (“The Graduate taught me to dance to the beat of my own drums”) as its subject. It has the further disadvantage of following in the footsteps of Mark Harris’s magisterial Pictures at a Revolution: Five Movies and the Birth of the New Hollywood (2008), in which the film is placed in the context of Hollywood’s mid-’60s cultural flux. But Gray’s book offers us a chance to revisit this seminal motion picture and consider just why it was that The Graduate spoke to Baby Boomers in a distinctively personal way.T he Graduate began life in 1963 as a novella of the same name by Charles Webb, a California-born writer who saw his book not as a comic novel but as a serious artistic statement about America’s increasingly disaffected youth. It found its way into the hands of a producer named Lawrence Turman who saw The Graduate as an opportunity to make the cinematic equivalent of Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye. Turman optioned the book, then sent it to Mike Nichols, who in 1963 was still best known for his comic partnership with Elaine May but had just made his directorial debut with the original Broadway production of Barefoot in the Park.
Both men saw that The Graduate posed a problem to anyone seeking to put it on the screen. In Turman’s words, “In the book the character of Benjamin Braddock is sort of a whiny pain in the fanny [whom] you want to shake or spank.” To this end, they turned to Buck Henry, who had co-created the popular TV comedy Get Smart with Mel Brooks, to write a screenplay that would retain much of Webb’s dryly witty dialogue (“I think you’re the most attractive of all my parents’ friends”) while making Benjamin less priggish.
Nichols’s first major act was casting Dustin Hoffman, an obscure New York stage actor pushing 30, for the title role. No one but Nichols seems to have thought him suitable in any way. Not only was Hoffman short and nondescript-looking, but he was unmistakably Jewish, whereas Benjamin is supposedly the scion of a newly monied WASP family from southern California. Nevertheless, Nichols decided he wanted “a short, dark, Jewish, anomalous presence, which is how I experience myself,” in order to underline Benjamin’s alienation from the world of his parents.
Nichols filled the other roles in equally unexpected ways. He hired the Oscar winner Anne Bancroft, only six years Hoffman’s senior, to play the unbalanced temptress who lures Benjamin into her bed, then responds with volcanic rage when he falls in love with her beautiful daughter Elaine. He and Henry also steered clear of on-screen references to the campus protests that had only recently started to convulse America. Instead, he set The Graduate in a timeless upper-middle-class milieu inhabited by people more interested in social climbing than self-actualization—the same milieu from which Benjamin is so alienated that he is reduced to near-speechlessness whenever his family and their friends ask him what he plans to do now that he has graduated.
The film’s only explicit allusion to its cultural moment is the use on the soundtrack of Simon & Garfunkel’s “The Sound of Silence,” the painfully earnest anthem of youthful angst that is for all intents and purposes the theme song of The Graduate. Nevertheless, Henry’s screenplay leaves little doubt that the film was in every way a work of its time and place. As he later explained to Mark Harris, it is a study of “the disaffection of young people for an environment that they don’t seem to be in sync with.…Nobody had made a film specifically about that.”
This aspect of The Graduate is made explicit in a speech by Benjamin that has no direct counterpart in the novel: “It’s like I was playing some kind of game, but the rules don’t make any sense to me. They’re being made up by all the wrong people. I mean, no one makes them up. They seem to make themselves up.”
The Graduate was Nichols’s second film, following his wildly successful movie version of Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?. Albee’s play was a snarling critique of the American dream, which he believed to be a snare and a delusion. The Graduate had the same skeptical view of postwar America, but its pessimism was played for laughs. When Benjamin is assured by a businessman in the opening scene that the secret to success in America is “plastics,” we are meant to laugh contemptuously at the smugness of so blinkered a view of life. Moreover, the contempt is as real as the laughter: The Graduate has it both ways. For the same reason, the farcical quality of the climactic scene (in which Benjamin breaks up Elaine’s marriage to a handsome young WASP and carts her off to an unknown fate) is played without musical underscoring, a signal that what Benjamin is doing is really no laughing matter.
The youth-oriented message of The Graduate came through loud and clear to its intended audience, which paid no heed to the mixed reviews from middle-aged reviewers unable to grasp what Nichols and Henry were up to. Not so Roger Ebert, the newly appointed 25-year-old movie critic of the Chicago Sun-Times, who called The Graduate “the funniest American comedy of the year…because it has a point of view. That is to say, it is against something.”
Even more revealing was the response of David Brinkley, then the co-anchor of NBC’s nightly newscast, who dismissed The Graduate as “frantic nonsense” but added that his college-age son and his classmates “liked it because it said about the parents and others what they would have said about us if they had made the movie—that we are self-centered and materialistic, that we are licentious and deeply hypocritical about it, that we try to make them into walking advertisements for our own affluence.”
A year after the release of The Graduate, a film-industry report cited in Pictures at a Revolution revealed that “48 percent of all movie tickets in America were now being sold to filmgoers under the age of 24.” A very high percentage of those tickets were to The Graduate and Bonnie and Clyde. At long last, Hollywood had figured out what the Baby Boomers wanted to see.A nd how does The Graduate look a half-century later? To begin with, it now appears to have been Mike Nichols’s creative “road not taken.” In later years, Nichols became less an auteur than a Hollywood director who thought like a Broadway director, choosing vehicles of solid middlebrow-liberal appeal and serving them faithfully without imposing a strong creative vision of his own. In The Graduate, by contrast, he revealed himself to be powerfully aware of the same European filmmaking trends that shaped Bonnie and Clyde. Within a naturalistic framework, he deployed non-naturalistic “new wave” cinematographic techniques with prodigious assurance—and he was willing to end The Graduate on an ambiguous note instead of wrapping it up neatly and pleasingly, letting the camera linger on the unsure faces of Hoffman and Ross as they ride off into an unsettling future.
It is this ambiguity, coupled with Nichols’s prescient decision not to allow The Graduate to become a literal portrayal of American campus life in the troubled mid-’60s, that has kept the film fresh. But The Graduate is fresh in a very particular way: It is a young person’s movie, the tale of a boy-man terrified by the prospect of growing up to be like his parents. Therein lay the source of its appeal to young audiences. The Graduate showed them what they, too, feared most, and hinted at a possible escape route.
In the words of Beverly Gray, who saw The Graduate when it first came out in 1967: “The Graduate appeared in movie houses just as we young Americans were discovering how badly we wanted to distance ourselves from the world of our parents….That polite young high achiever, those loving but smothering parents, those comfortable but slightly bland surroundings: They combined to form an only slightly exaggerated version of my own cozy West L.A. world.”
Yet to watch The Graduate today—especially if you first saw it when much younger—is also to be struck by the extreme unattractiveness of its central character. Hoffman plays Benjamin not as the comically ineffectual nebbish of Jewish tradition but as a near-catatonic robot who speaks by turns in a flat monotone and a frightened nasal whine. It is impossible to understand why Mrs. Robinson would want to go to bed with such a mousy creature, much less why Elaine would run off with him—an impression that has lately acquired an overlay of retrospective irony in the wake of accusations that Hoffman has sexually harassed female colleagues on more than one occasion. Precisely because Benjamin is so unlikable, it is harder for modern-day viewers to identify with him in the same way as did Gray and her fellow Boomers. To watch a Graduate-influenced film like Noah Baumbach’s Kicking and Screaming (1995), a poignant romantic comedy about a group of Gen-X college graduates who deliberately choose not to get on with their lives, is to see a closely similar dilemma dramatized in an infinitely more “relatable” way, one in which the crippling anxiety of the principal characters is presented as both understandable and pitiable, thus making it funnier.
Be that as it may, The Graduate is a still-vivid snapshot of a turning point in American cultural history. Before Benjamin Braddock, American films typically portrayed men who were not overgrown, smooth-faced children but full-grown adults, sometimes misguided but incontestably mature. After him, permanent immaturity became the default position of Hollywood-style masculinity.
For this reason, it will be interesting to see what the Millennials, so many of whom demand to be shielded from the “triggering” realities of adult life, make of The Graduate if and when they come to view it. I have a feeling that it will speak to a fair number of them far more persuasively than it did to those of us who—unlike Benjamin Braddock—longed when young to climb the high hill of adulthood and see for ourselves what awaited us on the far side.
1 Algonquin, 278 pages
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“I think that’s best left to states and locales to decide,” DeVos replied. “If the underlying question is . . .”
Murphy interrupted. “You can’t say definitively today that guns shouldn’t be in schools?”
“Well, I will refer back to Senator Enzi and the school that he was talking about in Wapiti, Wyoming, I think probably there, I would imagine that there’s probably a gun in the school to protect from potential grizzlies.”
Murphy continued his line of questioning unfazed. “If President Trump moves forward with his plan to ban gun-free school zones, will you support that proposal?”
“I will support what the president-elect does,” DeVos replied. “But, senator, if the question is around gun violence and the results of that, please know that my heart bleeds and is broken for those families that have lost any individual due to gun violence.”
Because all this happened several million outrage cycles ago, you may have forgotten what happened next. Rather than mention DeVos’s sympathy for the victims of gun violence, or her support for federalism, or even her deference to the president, the media elite fixated on her hypothetical aside about grizzly bears.
“Betsy DeVos Cites Grizzly Bears During Guns-in-Schools Debate,” read the NBC News headline. “Citing grizzlies, education nominee says states should determine school gun policies,” reported CNN. “Sorry, Betsy DeVos,” read a headline at the Atlantic, “Guns Aren’t a Bear Necessity in Schools.”
DeVos never said that they were, of course. Nor did she “cite” the bear threat in any definitive way. What she did was decline the opportunity to make a blanket judgment about guns and schools because, in a continent-spanning nation of more than 300 million people, one standard might not apply to every circumstance.
After all, there might be—there are—cases when guns are necessary for security. Earlier this year, Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe signed into law a bill authorizing some retired police officers to carry firearms while working as school guards. McAuliffe is a Democrat.
In her answer to Murphy, DeVos referred to a private meeting with Senator Enzi, who had told her of a school in Wyoming that has a fence to keep away grizzly bears. And maybe, she reasoned aloud, the school might have a gun on the premises in case the fence doesn’t work.
As it turns out, the school in Wapiti is gun-free. But we know that only because the Washington Post treated DeVos’s offhand remark as though it were the equivalent of Alexander Butterfield’s revealing the existence of the secret White House tapes. “Betsy DeVos said there’s probably a gun at a Wyoming school to ward off grizzlies,” read the Post headline. “There isn’t.” Oh, snap!
The article, like the one by NBC News, ended with a snarky tweet. The Post quoted user “Adam B.,” who wrote, “‘We need guns in schools because of grizzly bears.’ You know what else stops bears? Doors.” Clever.
And telling. It becomes more difficult every day to distinguish between once-storied journalistic institutions and the jabbering of anonymous egg-avatar Twitter accounts. The eagerness with which the press misinterprets and misconstrues Trump officials is something to behold. The “context” the best and brightest in media are always eager to provide us suddenly goes poof when the opportunity arises to mock, impugn, or castigate the president and his crew. This tendency is especially pronounced when the alleged gaffe fits neatly into a prefabricated media stereotype: that DeVos is unqualified, say, or that Rick Perry is, well, Rick Perry.
On November 2, the secretary of energy appeared at an event sponsored by Axios.com and NBC News. He described a recent trip to Africa:
It’s going to take fossil fuels to push power out to those villages in Africa, where a young girl told me to my face, “One of the reasons that electricity is so important to me is not only because I won’t have to try to read by the light of a fire, and have those fumes literally killing people, but also from the standpoint of sexual assault.” When the lights are on, when you have light, it shines the righteousness, if you will, on those types of acts. So from the standpoint of how you really affect people’s lives, fossil fuels is going to play a role in that.
This heartfelt story of the impact of electrification on rural communities was immediately distorted into a metaphor for Republican ignorance and cruelty.
“Energy Secretary Rick Perry Just Made a Bizarre Claim About Sexual Assault and Fossil Fuels,” read the Buzzfeed headline. “Energy Secretary Rick Perry Says Fossil Fuels Can Prevent Sexual Assault,” read the headline from NBC News. “Rick Perry Says the Best Way to Prevent Rape Is Oil, Glorious Oil,” said the Daily Beast.
“Oh, that Rick Perry,” wrote Gail Collins in a New York Times column. “Whenever the word ‘oil’ is mentioned, Perry responds like a dog on the scent of a hamburger.” You will note that the word “oil” is not mentioned at all in Perry’s remarks.
You will note, too, that what Perry said was entirely commonsensical. While the precise relation between public lighting and public safety is unknown, who can doubt that brightly lit areas feel safer than dark ones—and that, as things stand today, cities and towns are most likely to be powered by fossil fuels? “The value of bright street lights for dispirited gray areas rises from the reassurance they offer to some people who need to go out on the sidewalk, or would like to, but lacking the good light would not do so,” wrote Jane Jacobs in The Death and Life of Great American Cities. “Thus the lights induce these people to contribute their own eyes to the upkeep of the street.” But c’mon, what did Jane Jacobs know?
No member of the Trump administration so rankles the press as the president himself. On the November morning I began this column, I awoke to outrage that President Trump had supposedly violated diplomatic protocol while visiting Japan and its prime minister, Shinzo Abe. “President Trump feeds fish, winds up pouring entire box of food into koi pond,” read the CNN headline. An article on CBSNews.com headlined “Trump empties box of fish food into Japanese koi pond” began: “President Donald Trump’s visit to Japan briefly took a turn from formal to fishy.” A Bloomberg reporter traveling with the president tweeted, “Trump and Abe spooning fish food into a pond. (Toward the end, @potus decided to just dump the whole box in for the fish).”
Except that’s not what Trump “decided.” In fact, Trump had done exactly what Abe had done a few seconds before. That fact was buried in write-ups of the viral video of Trump and the fish. “President Trump was criticized for throwing an entire box of fish food into a koi pond during his visit to Japan,” read a Tweet from the New York Daily News, linking to a report on phony criticism Trump received because of erroneous reporting from outlets like the News.
There’s an endless, circular, Möbius-strip-like quality to all this nonsense. Journalists are so eager to catch the president and his subordinates doing wrong that they routinely traduce the very canons of journalism they are supposed to hold dear. Partisan and personal animus, laziness, cynicism, and the oversharing culture of social media are a toxic mix. The press in 2017 is a lot like those Japanese koi fish: frenzied, overstimulated, and utterly mindless.
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Review of 'Lessons in Hope' By George Weigel
Standing before the eternal flame, a frail John Paul shed silent tears for 6 million victims, including some of his own childhood friends from Krakow. Then, after reciting verses from Psalm 31, he began: “In this place of memories, the mind and heart and soul feel an extreme need for silence. … Silence, because there are no words strong enough to deplore the terrible tragedy of the Shoah.” Parkinson’s disease strained his voice, but it was clear that the pope’s irrepressible humanity and spiritual strength had once more stood him in good stead.
George Weigel watched the address from NBC’s Jerusalem studios, where he was providing live analysis for the network. As he recalls in Lessons in Hope, his touching and insightful memoir of his time as the pope’s biographer, “Our newsroom felt the impact of those words, spoken with the weight of history bearing down on John Paul and all who heard him: normally a place of bedlam, the newsroom fell completely silent.” The pope, he writes, had “invited the world to look, hard, at the stuff of its redemption.”
Weigel, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, published his biography of John Paul in two volumes, Witness to Hope (1999) and The End and the Beginning (2010). His new book completes a John Paul triptych, and it paints a more informal, behind-the-scenes portrait. Readers, Catholic and otherwise, will finish the book feeling almost as though they knew the 264th successor of Peter. Lessons in Hope is also full of clerical gossip. Yet Weigel never loses sight of his main purpose: to illuminate the character and mind of the “emblematic figure of the second half of the twentieth century.”
The book’s most important contribution comes in its restatement of John Paul’s profound political thought at a time when it is sorely needed. Throughout, Weigel reminds us of the pope’s defense of the freedom of conscience; his emphasis on culture as the primary engine of history; and his strong support for democracy and the free economy.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the pope continued to promote these ideas in such encyclicals as Centesimus Annus. The 1991 document reiterated the Church’s opposition to socialist regimes that reduce man to “a molecule within the social organism” and trample his right to earn “a living through his own initiative.” Centesimus Annus also took aim at welfare states for usurping the role of civil society and draining “human energies.” The pope went on to explain the benefits, material and moral, of free enterprise within a democratic, rule-of-law framework.
Yet a libertarian manifesto Centesimus Annus was not. It took note of free societies’ tendency to breed spiritual poverty, materialism, and social incohesion, which in turn could lead to soft totalitarianism. John Paul called on state, civil society, and people of God to supply the “robust public moral culture” (in Weigel’s words) that would curb these excesses and ensure that free-market democracies are ordered to the common good.
When Weigel emerged as America’s preeminent interpreter of John Paul, in the 1980s and ’90s, these ideas were ascendant among Catholic thinkers. In addition to Weigel, proponents included the philosopher Michael Novak and Father Richard John Neuhaus of First Things magazine (both now dead). These were faithful Catholics (in Neuhaus’s case, a relatively late convert) nevertheless at peace with the free society, especially the American model. They had many qualms with secular modernity, to be sure. But with them, there was no question that free societies and markets are preferable to unfree ones.
How things have changed. Today all the energy in those Catholic intellectual circles is generated by writers and thinkers who see modernity as beyond redemption and freedom itself as the problem. For them, the main question is no longer how to correct the free society’s course (by shoring up moral foundations, through evangelization, etc.). That ship has sailed or perhaps sunk, according to this view. The challenges now are to protect the Church against progressivism’s blows and to see beyond the free society as a political horizon.
Certainly the trends that worried John Paul in Centesimus Annus have accelerated since the encyclical was issued. “The claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life” has become even more hegemonic than it was in 1991. “Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it” increasingly get treated as ideological lepers. And with the weakening of transcendent truths, ideas are “easily manipulated for reasons of power.”
Thus a once-orthodox believer finds himself or herself compelled to proclaim that there is no biological basis to gender; that men can menstruate and become pregnant; that there are dozens of family forms, all as valuable and deserving of recognition as the conjugal union of a man and a woman; and that speaking of the West’s Judeo-Christian patrimony is tantamount to espousing white supremacy. John Paul’s warnings read like a description of the present.
The new illiberal Catholics—a label many of these thinkers embrace—argue that these developments aren’t a distortion of the idea of the free society but represent its very essence. This is a mistake. Basic to the free society is the freedom of conscience, a principle enshrined in democratic constitutions across the West and, I might add, in the Catholic Church’s post–Vatican II magisterium. Under John Paul, religious liberty became Rome’s watchword in the fight against Communist totalitarianism, and today it is the Church’s best weapon against the encroachments of secular progressivism. The battle is far from lost, moreover. There is pushback in the courts, at the ballot box, and online. Sometimes it takes demagogic forms that should discomfit people of faith. Then again, there is a reason such pushback is called “reaction.”
A bigger challenge for Catholics prepared to part ways with the free society as an ideal is this: What should Christian politics stand for in the 21st century? Setting aside dreams of reuniting throne and altar and similar nostalgia, the most cogent answer offered by Catholic illiberalism is that the Church should be agnostic with respect to regimes. As Harvard’s Adrian Vermeule has recently written, Christians should be ready to jettison all “ultimate allegiances,” including to the Constitution, while allying with any party or regime when necessary.
What at first glance looks like an uncompromising Christian politics—cunning, tactical, and committed to nothing but the interests of the Church—is actually a rather passive vision. For a Christianity that is “radically flexible” in politics is one that doesn’t transform modernity from within. In practice, it could easily look like the Vatican Ostpolitik diplomacy that sought to appease Moscow before John Paul was elected.
Karol Wojtya discarded Ostpolitik as soon as he took the Petrine office. Instead, he preached freedom and democracy—and meant it. Already as archbishop of Krakow under Communism, he had created free spaces where religious and nonreligious dissidents could engage in dialogue. As pope, he expressed genuine admiration for the classically liberal and decidedly secular Vaclav Havel. He hailed the U.S. Constitution as the source of “ordered freedom.” And when, in 1987, the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet asked him why he kept fussing about democracy, seeing as “one system of government is as good as another,” the pope responded: No, “the people have a right to their liberties, even if they make mistakes in exercising them.”
The most heroic and politically effective Christian figure of the 20th century, in other words, didn’t follow the path of radical flexibility. His Polish experience had taught him that there are differences between regimes—that some are bound to uphold conscience and human dignity, even if they sometimes fall short of these commitments, while others trample rights by design. The very worst of the latter kind could even whisk one’s boyhood friends away to extermination camps. There could be no radical Christian flexibility after the Holocaust.