To the Editor:
I should like to express my appreciation to COMMENTARY and Samuel McCracken for “The War Against the Atom” [September], . . . a welcome addition to the popular literature on this important topic. Misinformation pervades the nuclear controversy at all levels of discussion. . . . What bothers me most about this problem is the extent to which the mass media (TV documentaries in particular) have presented almost exclusively the truth according to Ralph Nader . . . and company. TV producers appear to have succumbed once again to the temptation to acquire a larger audience by spreading the story that thousands are going to be killed rather than presenting scientific explanations in excess of three sentences which indicate that this might not happen. A recent petition campaign by those opposed to nuclear power, in which thousands of dollars were spent, received 2,300 scientists’ signatures and was given extensive press coverage. Meanwhile, a privately-circulated petition supporting nuclear power received 50,000 scientists’ signatures but almost no press coverage. What explains these performances by those allegedly committed to the public’s “right to know”?
Albuquerque, New Mexico
To the Editor:
I can’t tell you how refreshing it is to read an article like Samuel McCracken’s, refuting the distortions presented by the anti-nuclear groups. . . .
To the Editor:
Samuel McCracken’s patient and knowledgeable plea for developing our nuclear power capabilities deserves the highest praise. When he gives short shrift to the chances of tapping other energy sources, however, he leaves himself open to rebuttals. In the September 16, 1977 issue of Science, two authorities on solar energy, A.F. Hildebrandt and L.L. Vant-Hull, convincingly argue in favor of mirror systems in 100-megawatt units for which the sun-drenched deserts of the Southwest are a first-site choice. Transmission of electrical energy to population centers 1,000 miles away is, of course, no problem. Since, according to the article, one 100-megawatt plant covers about 1.4 square miles, 1000 megawatts (Mr. McCracken’s figure) can be produced by mirrors and towers covering 14 square miles and not 50 square miles, the figure cited by Mr. McCracken. It is clear, however, that even 50 square miles is a mere fraction of the land surface available in the U.S. for mirror systems, once they are backed up by the necessary industrial capacity for installing them.
To the Editor:
I wish to commend Samuel McCracken for his excellent article. Those of us who are familiar with nuclear power have been distressed by the many one-sided, often sensational, anti-nuclear articles which have appeared in the press. Replies to these attacks are often deemed not newsworthy and are buried in the back pages or not published at all. I hope that Mr. McCracken’s well-reasoned defense of nuclear power will be carefully read by many who adopted the anti-nuclear viewpoint on the basis of limited or biased information.
I must, however, disagree with Mr. McCracken on one point: the superiority of the Canadian heavy-water reactor [CANDU] to current U.S. reactors. Although the reactor core of a CANDU reactor consists of a great many relatively small high-pressure pipes, containing coolant, these pipes are gathered together by headers. The CANDU reactor coolant then flows in very large pipes to heat exchangers where steam is generated. The likelihood of one of these pipes rupturing is very, very low, but no lower than the likelihood of one of the coolant pipes of the U.S. design rupturing. A rupture of one of the large pipes in either design would have about the same consequences to the system. Emergency core-cooling systems may be expected to protect the public in both cases.
The CANDU system has been studied widely by manufaturers and utilities in the United States. All of these studies have concluded that, under U.S. conditions, a CANDU plant would have power costs considerably above those of current U.S. designs. There is no point in building a U.S. demonstration plant when utilities consider such a plant financially unattractive and when large operating plants in Canada are readily available for study.
Department of Chemical and Nuclear Engineering
University of Cincinnati
To the Editor:
The issues of nuclear energy—the extent of our current and future need for it, the problems of its safe expansion as a substitute for fossil fuels, the special questions associated with the widespread international dissemination of the technology and facilities for production of plutonium or highly enriched uranium-235, both capable of use as explosives—these are very complex issues, too serious to be treated in the flip and supercilious fashion adopted by Samuel McCracken. Certainly one does not need to be a nuclear physicist to understand and analyze these issues; but a minimum adherence to the facts would seem to be required of those who wish to influence public decision-making in this realm.
It is not the purpose of this letter to detail the numerous scientific errors in the article (radioactivity is not neutron emission; thorium is not a fissionable element; the first experimental nuclear power reactors were not breeders; there is no physical law that prohibits the production, in a reactor, of more fuel than is consumed; etc., etc.). Mr. McCracken is after all not a scientist, let alone a nuclear physicist. But he should surely be expected to check his journalistic sources. Thus, his reference to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists as one of the “organizations . . . active in opposition [to nuclear power]” exhibits a woeful lack of familiarity with the sources he professes to have studied.
Any perusal of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists over the last few years would reveal at least as many articles in favor of nuclear power as in opposition—indeed, the entire spectrum of views on the future of nuclear power has, to the best of the ability of the editors, been covered in the most factual and dispassionate fashion of which the editors have been capable. Unfortunately, with the current polarization of views, such knee-jerk conservatism as Mr. McCracken’s—where one is either on the side of the establishment or automatically suspect—seems to be in the ascendancy. It would be a tragic loss to American intellectual life if the traditional open-minded approach of the American intellectual and academic community should be preempted by the zealots now pretending to speak on our behalf.
Bernard T. Feld
Editor-in-Chief, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Department of Physics, MIT
To the Editor:
. . .“The War Against the Atom” by Samuel McCracken . . . is replete with statements that pose as scientific truth but are in fact half-truths and errors. I have attempted in this lengthy letter to point out many of these statements . . . [but] a proper criticism would require a letter much longer than the original article. . . .
I will discuss in detail one example, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and then point out, briefly, the very many errors and half-truths which appear in the article.
Environmentalists, arms-control people, and most Americans are concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The danger of diverting plutonium, were it separated from spent fuel, is real, and the possibility of its use as a nuclear bomb is also real. This is a problem which responsible persons take seriously. What does Mr. McCracken have to say?
Mr. McCracken downplays the usefulness of reactor-grade plutonium as a bomb source, and blames environmentalists for spreading lies. He claims that building a bomb from reactor-grade plutonium is difficult because such plutonium “is heavily contaminated with Pu-240, which can cause a bomb to explode prematurely and fizzle.” He goes on to add that it doesn’t “matter whether plutonium is an ideal substance for terrorism as long as enough people think it is,” and, for that, “prospective terrorists are getting a good deal of help from those who go about spreading lurid falsehoods . . . about the ease with which the plutonium in reactors can be made into bombs.”
Mr. McCracken is wrong. Reactor-grade plutonium of simple design can make a bomb. The methods for making such a bomb and the quantities needed are documented in the unclassified literature. The distinction between military and civilian plutonium is essentially false. According to a study by California’s Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory, even relatively simple designs using any grade of plutonium could produce “effective, highly powerful” weapons with an explosive yield equivalent to between 1,000 and 20,000 tons of TNT. . . . Richard A. Bowen, of the Division of International Security Affairs of the Energy Research and Development Administration [ERDA], has stated that the U.S. has indeed detonated a device fabricated of reactor-grade plutonium. . . . Responsible persons would say, therefore, that plutonium needs to be safeguarded both here and abroad, or, in the alternative, that it ought not to be separated from spent fuel. The latter is the position of the Sierra Club. If plutonium is safeguarded, the methods must be adequate and yet consistent with the ideals of a democratic society. It is untrue and malicious to state that establishing a repressive mechanism to track down terrorists who make false claims is a problem which is “largely the creature of the anti-nuclear movement.”
Mr. McCracken believes that it would not be easy to smuggle plutonium out of a reprocessing plant because gram quantities are detectable. But there are better methods of smuggling plutonium out of a reprocessing plant than taking gram quantities in one’s thermos. It is far easier to build up the noise level in the accounting system by removing kilogram quantities from the process lines, secreting them within the plant, and reinserting them in the process lines. After doing this several times, several kilograms could be taken at once. The material could leave the plant with the radioactive trash. A reading of recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] documents on plutonium accountability and my knowledge of reprocessing plants make me believe that this scenario is credible.
I might add, in passing, that plutonium is not the only material which must be safeguarded, if separated. My favorite is neptunium-237 which has no stray neutrons, will not detonate prematurely, is not toxic, and is therefore easy to work with. . . . In addition, several americium and curium isotopes also have a rather small critical mass. Yet no mention of any of this is made in Mr. McCracken’s article.
Next comes a series of statements by Mr. McCracken, followed by my own comments.
1. Radiation Dangers (Routine Operation)
Mr. McCracken’s view of radiation dangers during routine reactor operation is that the radiation emitted is small compared to background radiation, and that the evidence that small amounts of radiation produce genetic damage and cancer is inconclusive. It is my opinion that the only proper evaluation of health effects is in comparison with alternative methods of generating, or conserving, electricity. Contrary to Mr. McCracken’s view, I believe that the health effects due to coal and nuclear generation during normal operation are comparable and that there is substantial proof that small amounts of radiation produce genetic damage and cancer.
McCracken: If one lives next to the property line of a nuclear reactor, the NRC permits an added [radiation] exposure of 5 mrem a year . . . —in practice, no reactor comes near the permitted maximum.
Comment: The boundary dose due to both liquid and gas discharges is 10 mrem a year. . . . This limit does not include direct radiation from solid radioactive waste. It one were to stand at the ME gate of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 in Oswego, New York, for a year, one would receive a dose of 1437 mrem (year 1976); I have not studied other reactors. . . .
If more than one reactor is sited in an area, then the allowable dose is multiplied. In Oswego, New York, there will be three reactors operating shortly and the allowable dose will be three times the 10 mrem a year limit.
Mr. McCracken does not discuss the occupational exposures at a reactor and at other components of the nuclear-fuel cycle. But they should be included since they contribute to the health effects due to reactor operation and contribute to the genetic effects in the general population. The industry-wide average for occupational exposure is 1000 “person”-rems due to a 1000-MWe reactor operating for a year. This is a much greater contributor to health effects than the 10 mrem per year boundary dose.
It is not only the releases from a reactor itself which must be considered, but from all support facilities as well, since they are integral to reactor operation. After all, if one includes the health effects due to mining coal, one must include the health effects due to mining uranium, etc. Effluents from uranium mill tailings, and reprocessing and high-level waste solidification, if recycling of plutonium is allowed, must also be included, and the health effects must be counted for the full radioactive life of the emitted radionuclides. . . .
McCracken: If one moves from Dallas to Denver, the additional annual exposure is nearly 100 mrem . . . [yet] Colorado’s cancer incidence is lower than the national average.
Comment: As is well known, there are many factors responsible for cancer incidence, among these, air and water quality and food additives. The cancer incidence in Buffalo, New York, is twice the national average, due primarily to the effluents from the steel industry. Environmentalists, and the Sierra Club in particular, are concerned with all environmental pollutants, including radiation. Perhaps the cancer incidence in Colorado would be lower still but for the additional natural background radiation.
McCracken: It is not generally realized that this assumption [that minute amounts of radiation result in genetic damage to human beings] rests on laboratory results with animals that appear to be contradicted by actual experience with humans.
Comment: This statement by Mr. McCracken is wrong. I cite the following studies:
Mondan, et al. (“Radiation-Induced Head and Neck Tumors,” Lancet, February 1975) examined the records of 11,000 migrants to Israel who had been administered X-rays in order to control tina capitis of the scalp (ringworm). They found a very high risk of thyroid carcinoma . . . and the mean dose was only 6.5 rad.
Alice Stewart, et al. (“Radiation Dose Effects in Relation to Obstetric X-rays and Childhood Cancers,” Lancet, June 6, 1970) studied many thousands of children who received in utero doses of 0.2 to 0.8 rad and found mortality from leukemia and other forms of cancer to be 50 per cent higher on the average among these exposed children than among the unexposed controls.
Irwin Bross (in several papers discussed in the “Proceedings of the Congressional Conference on Low Level Radiation,” Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., May 4, 1976) has shown that there are groups in the population with a very high susceptibility to radiation damage. Children with diseases such as asthma, hives, eczema, allergy, pneumonia, dysentery, or rheumatic fever have a 5000 per-cent greater risk of leukemia as a result of exposure to X-rays than do children not so exposed.
Mancuso, Stewart, and Kneale in a study of 35,000 workers at the Hanford storage facility in Washington over a twenty-nine year period showed a statistically significant increase in four types of cancers (myeloid neoplasm, breast cancer, pancreatic tumors, and lung cancer). The results are about sixty times greater than those predicted by the National Academy of Sciences in the . . . BEIR report. . . .
McCracken: Nuclear reactors, routinely operated, are among the most negligible emitters of radiation, and thus among the most negligible causes of cancer from radiation.
Comment: Most environmentalists would agree that “reactors, routinely operated, are among the most negligible emitters of radiation.” However, occupational exposures and other fuel-cycle emitters must be included in the calculatons, and the associated health effects of these are not negligible. Let me consider just one of these factors, uranium mill tailings. Reactors need uranium ore; the residue is left in a uranium mill-tailings pile. These tailings release radon gas and will do so for very long periods of time. The NRC evaluates the healths effects due to the tailings pile for a period of forty years; the number of health effects, in this case lung cancers, is 0.144 for each year’s operation of a 1000-MWe reactor. This is not too serious. But what is the scientific justification for assuming that no health effects occur after forty years? If, instead, one considers the health effects over the full radioactive life of the mill-tailings pile, assuming a constant population, one obtains the number 396 health effects. . . . It is possible to reduce these mill-tailings health effects at a very minimal cost, but this is not the present practice of the industry.
McCracken: This . . . is the cost per year of one large coal-fired plant: between 31 and 111 lives a year. These deaths . . . are of actual people who die every year in order that coal-fired plants may be operated. In contrast, when we calculate all the deaths caused by a 1000-MWe light-water reactor—including all those killed by the fuel cycle, by the operation of the reactor, and by waste disposal—we arrive at a total of one-half a death a year. . . . The hypothetical deaths of nuclear energy are still no more than that. But the actual deaths caused by other technologies are countable and many. . . . Far from being our most dangerous source of energy, nuclear energy is our safest.
Comment: The calculation of one-half a death a year from nuclear plants is based on erroneous assumptions and is not a prudent estimate for health-planning purposes. The NRC unjustifiably evaluates health effects over a forty-year period, though the radiation produced will be present in the environment for very long periods. . . .
In addition, nuclear cancers don’t wear flags—that is, it is difficult to identify those cancers specifically caused by nuclear energy, except for cancers which occur in uranium miners, a unique type of cancer. But to call nuclear-caused cancers, which contribute to the general cancer rate, “hypothetical,” is irresponsible; these deaths are as real as, and as comparable in magnitude to, those caused by coal. . . . The deaths caused by reprocessing and high-level waste solidification are hypothetical because these facilities are hypothetical; there are none operable at present. . . .
McCracken: A typical coal-fired plant has a level of radioactive emission greater than that allowed for a nuclear plant. . . . If the NRC had responsibility for regulating our coal-fired plants, they would have to be shut down.
Comment: Coal does contain uranium. The average uranium concentration is one part per million. In the operation of a 1000-MWe coal plant for one year, about 3 million tons of coal are burned containing 3 tons of uranium. This is to be contrasted with 162 tons of uranium mined to generate electricity from a 1000-MWe nuclear reactor for one year. Thus, the health effects are about fifty times greater for nuclear plants. . . .
McCracken: The solid wastes carted away to the dump from coal-fired plants total tens of millions of tons a year. . . . These contain not only such non-radioactive poisons as mercury, selenium, vanadium, and benzopyrene, but radioactive materials such as uranium and thorium in amounts that would be impermissible for emission from a nuclear plant.
Comment: It is not well understood that the wastes from the nuclear industry are comparable in volume to those produced by coal. The fly ash resulting from burning coal is about 3 x 105 tons due to operation of a 1000-MWe coal-fired plant for one year. The mass of the mill-tailings pile due to one year’s operation of a nuclear reactor is 105 tons per year; there are additional waste sources in the nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, the waste volumes are comparable. As indicated, the uranium mill tailings contain much more radioactivity than that contained in a fly-ash pile. If one used a large part of the foreseeable resources of uranium, 2 million tons, and continued the present disposal philosophy, the expected number of lung cancers would be 45 per year due to mill tailings, and this death rate would continue for tens of thousands of years. . . .
Solar vs. Nuclear:
McCracken: Solar power is less promising as a means of central generation. . . . [The use of mirror systems that boil water to spin conventional turbogenerators is] at present too expensive to contemplate. Additionally, the photo-voltaic system requires very large land areas. With luck, a 1000-megawatt plant would occupy 50 square miles.
Comment: Solar power is most promising as a decentralized energy source for heating and cooling homes. Of course not much additional land area is required since houses need roofs anyway. But what about generating electricity in central locations? The plant which is “too expensive to contemplate” is being built in Southern California as a joint project with ERDA and a local utility.
It has been the frequent complaint of nuclear zealots that central-station solar generation would require enormous land areas. If one compares the land area requirements to generate electricity in the next twenty-five years, one finds that solar requires about twice as much land area as nuclear; this figure was developed by the NRC staff. . . . However, the land figures for nuclear power do not take into account the fact that land occupied by mill tailings will be occupied essentially forever, nor do the figures take into account the fact that “solar” land can be used for the next twenty-five years with no increase, whereas more and more land would be required for nuclear generation. . . .
Coal vs. Nuclear: . . . From my perspective, the economics are not very clear because of the large uncertainties in both fuel cycles. Utilities at the present time are building both coal and nuclear facilities. Some utilities claim that coal is cheaper, . . . some that nuclear is cheaper. What is true is that the closer the coal plant is to the coal fields, the more the scale tilts toward coal. However, future uncertainties appear to override these cost differences.
Contrary to Mr. McCracken’s remarks, environmentalists have in a very minor way increased the construction time for nuclear reactors and therefore the costs. This has been well researched by Irwin Bupp of Harvard University (Technology Review).
The rise in electric rates that our senior citizens, those on fixed income, and poor persons must pay is a national disgrace. . . . It is my belief, and economists may disagree with me, that the electric-rate structure does not take into account properly the fact that this sector of the population conserves electricity and is not responsible for the addition of new facilities, which is the reason for the rising rates in the first place; they don’t own appliances with which to “burn” electricity. . . . If long-run, incremental-cost pricing were instituted, the “fat cats” who increased consumption would pay more for each unit added and the rate structure would be inverted. This would force large users to conserve as well. To blame environmentalists, who are in support of conservation, for the plight of the poor is a bad joke.
3. Radioactive Waste Disposal
McCracken: The technology Cor disposal, which has been demonstrated in a pilot project at Hanford, and actually used in Europe, involves first “calcining” the waste to a sand-like substance of greatly reduced hulk, and then using this “sand” as a component to make glass,
Comment: Radioactive wastes from the military program have been generated at Hanford for over thirty years now and there is still no viable program for removing these materials from the living environment. These materials must be continually watched. Since over 10 per cent of the tanks have leaked, ERDA has embarked on a program of drying the material to a salt cake within the tanks while removing the short-term high-heat radionuclides. While this action has “solved” the problem in the short term, what will happen to the remaining toxic material within the tank? The material will remain toxic for very long periods of time. Will the material be placed in a salt mine? How will this be done? ERDA has said that the material will be moved to a Federal Repository salt mine near Carlsbad, New Mexico, at a cost of about $60 billion. What about the commercial high-level wastes which sit in a tank at West Valley, New York? That material is much more toxic than the Hanford wastes, and the tank has a useful life of forty years. The company, a subsidiary of Getty Oil, has asked the state of New York to take over the whole problem. The estimated cost for disposal, by methods yet to be developed, is $0.5 billion.
So much for the bad news. Now for the bad news. The calcination method has been demonstrated in a pilot project at Idaho (not Hanford, as Mr, McCracken states). The fuel was low burn-up (much lower in radioactivity than commercial fuel), the amounts were not large, the detailed radioactive releases to the environment have not been published. If this is the prize project of the industry, why is it being kept “under wraps?”. . . .
Since radioactive wastes have been generated for over thirty years, another question might be, why haven’t these facilities been constructed already?. . . .
McCracken: If there were an immediate need for such storage [in a Federal Repository], it would no doubt have already been implemented. But the fact is that there are not now enough wastes in inventory to make such a process economical, and there will not he for some years.
Comment: There is a very pressing need for a Federal Repository to accept spent-fuel elements from nuclear reactors; several reactors may have to close down in the next few yean; because of this nuclear constipation problem. Besides, there are many, many tons of military high-level wastes at Hanford, Savannah River, and Idaho. There is a considerable amount of calcine material at Idaho. A lot of research and development can be done. Exactly what amounts of radioactive waste would make the process “economic”? It appears to be a poor excuse for the past thirty years of inaction.
After discussing this “fact-is-stranger-than-fiction” article at some length, I remain perplexed as to why it was published. It is not an objective analysis of the industry. It is nothing more than a pro-nuclear advertisement.
Chair, Nuclear Subcommittee of the Energy Policy Committee
Buffalo, New York
To the Editor:
. . . Samuel McCracken’s piece is a puzzle, full of half-truths and distortions. As one of those whom he labels a “scientific illiterate,” I will not comment on the technical inaccuracies of the article, leaving that task to knowledgeable, accomplished anti-nuclear scientists who will surely rise to the occasion.
What disturbs me, however, is Mr. McCracken’s application of such labels to others when his own credentials seem to lack the scientific literacy he claims is a prerequisite to an intelligent discussion of nuclear power. Can a man who, according to his brief biography, has published articles on an encyclopedia scandal, on classroom quackery, and on something called the population controllers actually consider himself a scientific literate in comparison with the recognized scientists who are speaking out cogently for their beliefs on the nuclear issue?
While I make no claims to scientific literacy, I can claim some expertise at editorial literacy—enough to recognize that an article whose every mention of nuclear opponents must be accompanied by such phrases as “anti-nuclear dogma . . . suffused with ignorance, sensationalism, and downright dishonesty. . .” is relying less on rational and cool argument than on refutation by emphatic denial.
Mr. McCracken’s swipes at those he disagrees with do nothing to bring forward a balanced view of the controversy. It would have been a better service to your readers if COMMENTARY had refrained from printing an article that adds more “routine yelps of hysteria”—to use Mr. McCracken’s words—to an already muddled issue.
San Francisco, California
To the Editor:
COMMENTARY has performed a useful service in presenting points of view on controversial matters, and no one can fault it for publishing an article favorable to nuclear energy. However, “The War Against the Atom,” is far from dispassionate. . . .
The validity of the article is demolished by its tone. With trigger words the author dismisses opinions that differ from his, and with ad hominem arguments disparages opponents. His case is not supported by such phrases as “extremely ignorant,” “suffused with ignorance,” “sensationalism,” “downright dishonesty,” “melodramatic piffle,” “a classic Big Lie,” “Ralph Nader’s secular sanctity,” “an advocate whose concern is not with truth but with propaganda,” “anti-nuclear advocates should wish to perpetuate the lie,” “statistical demagoguery,” “perverse use of the facts,” “spurious ground,” “constant misstatements to the contrary by people who should know better,” “false nostrums,” etc.
Mr. McCracken would have us believe that all opposition is conducted by a “lobby” of emotional people and is without scientific formulation. Yet among the opponents are nuclear physicists, geneticists, and medical experts such as, for example, Nobel Laureates Harold Urey (one of the developers of atomic fission), George Wald, James D. Watson, Linus Pauling, and Hannes Olof Alfven. In addition, there are Dr. John W. Gofman and Arthur R. Tamplin (who worked for the Atomic Energy Commission for many years), David R. Inglis, Paul R. Ehrlich, and John T. Edsall. Dr. Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb, stated that he considered a nuclear bomb “a relatively safe instrument” compared with a nuclear power plant. Dr. George L. Weil, a former colleague of Enrico Fermi, involved in the Manhattan Project, pointed out the dangers of nuclear plants and their waste of energy.
Each of these men has opposed nuclear plants because of their inherent danger, because of their effect on the environment, the risk to which they put human health and life, or because of the unsolved potential horrors from nuclear wastes. And let us not forget the engineers of the General Electric Company who resigned because they did not feel nuclear power plants could be made safe, and the man in charge of security who did not believe nuclear materials were adequately protected.
Mr. McCracken assures us that the problem of long-term storage of nuclear wastes, the plutonium in which has a half-life of some 250,000 years, can easily be solved. Storage in salt mines in Kansas was hailed as a solution a few years ago until it was discovered that water seepage from a nearby salt mine might spread the pollution from the wastes. This is just one example out of many of human fallibility in such a critical area and of the dangerous slighting of environmental factors. . . .
Mr. McCracken ignores the 1960 statement of the National Academy of Sciences pointing out the improper disposal of nuclear wastes and the “job of finding safe, permanent disposal sites.” There has been little progress made in this area since that statement. Ignored is the statement by the Government Accounting Office to the effect that after decades of work neither the AEC nor the Energy Research and Development Agency has demonstrated acceptable long-or short-term means of storage and/ or disposal of high-level wastes. . . .
Mr. McCracken makes the argument that after all we are subject to radiation from outer space and uranium in the earth. In effect he is saying: so what’s a little more from nuclear plants? The point is that flora and fauna, including the human race, have adapted to these forms of radiation implicit in the environment in the course of evolution. But when you add man-made radiation you are adding something to which animals and vegetation have not had to adapt in their evolution. It is a bit like saying that because you can drive safely with one drink you can drive safely with three.
Mr. McCracken fails to consider that over the years the AEC, step by step, reduced the amount of radioactivity to which a human could be safely subject. Like Mr. McCracken, the AEC pooh-poohed independent scientific criticism; nevertheless, it had to change its standards.
One of the great dangers which Mr. McCracken pooh-poohs is that plutonium might be used by terrorists. From the literature available it has been shown that a college student can make a bomb and that only a few pounds of plutonium are necessary for such a bomb. Granted it might not be the most efficient bomb. Nevertheless, we know the extremes to which terrorists have gone to blackmail nations in the last few years. They can make bombs. They can blackmail nations with such bombs. Contrary to Mr. McCracken’s optimism, there has been a deficit found in the inventories of nuclear materials in the hands of United States agencies and at least one of its contractors.
According to Mr. McCracken, “The most common assertion one hears . . . is the flat statement that we do not know how to dispose of high-level wastes which must be isolated from contact with the biosphere for many thousands of years.” He flatly states, in spite of all the evidence, that “this challenge has already been met,” and that its endless repetition is the equivalent of “a classic Big Lie.” In addition to some of the scientists already referred to, the “big liars” include the National Council of Churches. He dismisses their opposition as an “intrusion of theology into science, which awoke echoes of Galileo’s encounter with the Inquisition.” Now, really! What the National Council of Churches was pointing out was that to protect humanity (and the entire eco-system in which humanity lives) for thousands of years would, in the long run, lead to a police state, the end of democracy, and the end of freedom of thought, just the reverse of the Galileo situation.
Enough has been said now to demonstrate the biases, anti-social tone, and irrelevance of Mr. Mc-Cracken’s article. There are a number of other errors and omissions in the piece, but space is too limited to consider them. Another fifteen-page article would be necessary.
New York City
To the Editor:
. . . In a footnote on p. 36, Samuel McCracken identifies us as “General Electric engineers who resigned over the issue of nuclear safety” and cautions his readers to be skeptical of us. He states, moreover, that “members of a para-religious organization” had guaranteed us an income “should our anti-nuclear activities prove insufficiently lucrative.” That statement is false. None of us was guaranteed an income by anyone, and none of us has continued to be a participant in the General Electric Profit Sharing Plan, though we do continue to own a small number of shares of GE stock. We request a retraction.
It is indeed regrettable to us that, after having gone through the obvious effort of researching a field in which he apparently has had no experience and little technical understanding, Mr. McCracken missed the opportunity to do something really constructive about the widening gap in the nuclear debate. . . . Instead, his article is belittling and demeaning to many reputable people in this country and amounts to more rocks being thrown to the benefit of no one.
Richard B. Hubbard
Dale G. Bridenbaugh
Gregory C. Minor
MHB Technical Associates
Palo Alto, California
To the Editor:
Samuel McCracken’s article on nuclear safety is a well-prepared compendium of the nuclear industry’s arguments in defense of itself, but as such it suffers from the defect of ignoring criticisms to which the industry has been unable to develop a reponse.
Nowhere in the article is there mention of the very serious charge, which has been repeatedly made and documented by most of the critics whom Mr. McCracken attacks, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission) is under the thumb of the nuclear industry and has allowed plants to be designed and operated in an unsafe manner.
Mr. McCracken’s failure to address this charge is illustrated by his casual reference to the most serious and revealing nuclear accident of recent years. He dismisses the accident with the single sentence: “It is often said that . . . in 1975 a fire in the Browns Ferry plant in Alabama came very close to causing a meltdown. . . .” I suppose he uses the phrase “It is often said . . .” to imply that there is doubt about the statement’s validity. As one who has investigated and written about the Browns Ferry fire in detail, I can assure him that the the plant did indeed come close to a meltdown. However, a far more important fact about the fire is that it revealed gross incompetence and negligence on the NRC’s part in enforcing safety standards not only at Browns Ferry but throughout the nuclear industry. Here are some of the facts that the fire revealed:
1. Instead of inspecting the operation of nuclear plants, the NRC allows the licensees to do their own inspecting and in the process to ignore many NRC rules. The Browns Ferry fire was caused by the careless action of workmen engaged in a major construction job in a critical room of the reactor while it was in operation. (The room was the so-called “cable spreading room” that exists in every reactor, where control cables from all over the plant converge before being fed into the control room, which is located directly above. This is perhaps the most vulnerable spot in every plant, its Achilles heel.) . . .
Though this dangerous job had been going on for several weeks before the fire—and though prior to the big fire there had already been a half-dozen smaller ones that spread—the NRC’s safety inspectors were not even aware that any work was being done in this critical room. This is because NRC inspectors don’t inspect plants. They merely visit the plants’ management offices and inspect management’s records, which they depend on to reveal safety problems. (As far as can be determined, no NRC inspector ever went inside the Browns Ferry spreading room. One inspector visited the plant the day before the fire, but when he left the premises he was in complete ignorance of the construction job.)
The fact that the plant’s operator, the Tennessee Valley Authority, did not inform the NRC either of the job in progress, or of the fires it had caused, was a violation of one of the NRC’s most important safety rules. . . . Subsequent to the fire, the NRC did not find TVA guilty of a “violation” of its rules, which could have carried severe penalties. Instead, it merely wrote a letter to TVA citing it for an “infraction,” which carried no penalties of any kind. . . .
2. In order to help keep nuclear construction costs down, the NRC allows its licensees to incorporate unsafe design features in their plants. One of the basic safety principles of nuclear design is the concept known as “separation.” This demands that all primary safety devices (pumps, generators, etc.) be physically separated from their emergency back-up units so that a single accident cannot knock them all out; for the same reason, the various devices’ control cables must be routed to the control room along separate paths. In 1973, two years before the Browns Ferry fire, the NRC’s (then AEC’s) Director of Regulatory Standards wrote a memo saying . . . there was an “urgent need” to split control cables between two separate spreading rooms, and he put an “A-plus” priority on the necessity for a rule requiring dual spreading rooms.
However, an industry technical association, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [IEEE], refused to okay the two-spreading-room requirement, since two rooms would cost more than one; as a result, no such rule was written. . . .
At the Browns Ferry plant, which in 1975 was brand-new and was considered a model of advanced design and construction, the spreading room was so jammed with cables (tens of thousands of them, filling the space wall to wall and floor to ceiling) that there was no room for safety aisles for firefighters. . . .
3. The NRC allows plants to be built with specific items of equipment that it knows to be defective. At the time of the Browns Ferry fire, the only standard for judging the combustibility of cables was drawn up by the IEEE. As was well known at the time to both the NRC and the nuclear industry, this standard, called IEEE-383, allowed highly combustible cables to be classified as non-combustible. Nevertheless, the NRC allowed the industry to use IEEE-383 as its sole criterion for cable combustibility. This was the reason the Browns Ferry fire spread so rapidly; many of the “non-combustible” cables acted literally as kindling, sending flames shooting up to the trays full of cables only a few inches above them and splattering flaming drops of molten plastic on other trays only a few inches to the side or below.
These are just a sampling of the instances of NRC dereliction that were revealed by the Browns Ferry fire. Since all of this happened two and a half years ago and has been fully documented in a half-dozen reports by insurance companies, the Underwriters Laboratory, and the NRC itself, one would think that by now the agency would have changed some of its defective rules and practices. But it has not done this. Its basic inspection policy is the same: to allow licensees to inspect themselves and to depend on them for information about dangerous conditions. It still has no rule requiring dual spreading rooms, and almost all plants now in the design and construction stage have single spreading rooms. Its sole cable combustibility standard continues to be IEEE-383. Thus, not only do currently operating plants still suffer from the same defects as those revealed at Browns Ferry, but plants will continue to be put into operation for many years to come with the same defects.
Incidentally, Mr. McCracken cites the AEC/NRC-sponsored Rasmussen Report as proving that the chance of a meltdown accident is extremely remote. He might be interested to learn that the Rasmussen Report—which was issued before the Browns Ferry fire and purported to analyze every conceivable “accident chain” that could lead to a meltdown—failed even to mention the possibility of a fire occurring in a spreading room.
I would be interested to learn from Mr. McCracken why his article ignored the charges of NRC negligence and misfeasance in safety enforcement that have been made by Ralph Nader, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and others whom he accuses of demagoguery. I would also be interested to hear whether, in view of the facts revealed by the Browns Ferry fire and its aftermath, he believes that U.S. nuclear plants are built and operated as safely as they should be.
James Nathan Miller
Pleasantville, New York
Samuel McCracken writes:
Edmond Edward has pinpointed a very serious problem that becomes more apparent the more one studies the nuclear debate. Not only do the media themselves seem almost universally anti-nuclear when stating opinion, but their preference is clearly manifested in their factual coverage.
The Boston Globe, for example, now regularly uses the highly charged label “nuke” on headlines and editorial titles. A recent story in the same paper reporting the bare fact that the government had exploded some sort of device using reactor plutonium began with a lead that the story itself did not support, announcing that the explosion had erased all doubts about just how useful reactor plutonium might be for bombs.
Recently, ABC broadcast a documentary on nuclear power divided into two separate productions, one against and one for. The brilliantly done pro-nuclear half, narrated by Jules Bergman, publicized a large number of important facts that normally never appear in media discussions of nuclear power. (A team of army assault commandos was shown taking fourteen hours to blast their way into a plutonium repository with high explosives, and there were photographs of trucks carrying plutonium shipping casks crashing into walls at 80 miles an hour without damage to the casks.) But even more striking was the anti-nuclear half. It was freed of the necessity to balance the argument, and yet aside from an animation showing a loss-of-coolant accident that simply ignored the emergency cooling systems, it was barely distinguishable from the conventional coverage on TV, which is not balanced at all.
It is difficult not to agree with so generous a critic as Ludwig Seligsberger, but I am not so persuaded as he of the utility of mirror solar plants. Although they take up less space than non-mirror plants, 14 square miles is still very much larger than the area required by a nuclear plant. As a fellow-townsman of Mr. Seligsberger’s, I am acutely aware that there is no desert within a couple of thousand miles of where I live. Moreover, the cost projections for such plants remain dismaying. No one would be happier than I were central solar generation to prove successful in the long run, but I don’t think it’s wise to base national policy on the hope that it will. Nuclear power already works.
Joel Weisman’s comments are very useful, but I remain a little perplexed as to why CANDU reactors work in Canada and won’t work here, and I still wonder whether Edward Teller is not right in diagnosing their fatal disease as the NIH syndrome—Not Invented Here. I suggested that nuclear opponents worried about proliferation urge the acquisition of a CANDU reactor for research purposes primarily as a more useful activity to occupy them. But there also seems to me to be great promise in the thorium-cycle heavy-water reactor, and we ought not sit back unless we assume that it will be developed anyway, and as fast as possible, in Canada.
Having denied that he plans to detail my “numerous scientific errors,” Bernard T. Feld details four truths implying four errors on my part.
“Radioactivity is not neutron emission.” I never defined radioactivity thus or indeed in any other way. Although neutron emission is a form—far from the only one—of radiation (whence the neutron bomb) the only type of radiation I specifically identified as such was alpha particle emission. A minimum adherence to the text of an essay would appear to be required of those who wish to criticize it.
“The first experimental nuclear power reactors were not breeders.” Although Mr. Feld neglects to tell us what he considers to have been the first experimental reactor to generate power, he appears to be simply in error on this point. The first generation of power in a nuclear reactor occurred in 1952, by the AEC’s EBR-1 reactor in Idaho. F’or the details, I refer the interested reader to The Atomic Shield, by R. G. Hewlett and F. Duncan. A minimum adherence to the historical record would likewise seem to be required of critics.
“There is no physical law that prohibits the production, in a reactor, of more fuel than is consumed.” Quite so. That is what I said in my article. I denied, correctly enough, that a breeder reactor can create more fuel than it consumes. I then went on to say that a breeder “can produce more plutonium from U-238 than it burns.” Again, I wish Mr. Feld were a more careful reader than he appears to have been.
“Thorium is not a fissionable element.” As it happens, I did at one point carelessly refer to thorium, which is fertile, as fissionable. I did not repeat this inconsequential error in my discussion of reactors using thorium. None of the other “errors,” had they in fact been such, would have been consequential. I presume that had Mr. Feld thought he found errors that actually affected the argument, he would have cited them.
“Etc., etc.” Such vague allegations of further error are a shabby tactic, foreign to respectable intellectual controversy. No doubt Mr. Feld is aware that there is no way to rebut an unspecified charge of this sort. As soon as I received a copy of his letter, I wrote him asking for a specification of these other errors. In his reply he presented what he called a “total list.” It contained no errors but rather a list of truths. Four of the nine duplicated his list above, but he has withdrawn his inaccurate claim that the first experimental power reactor was not a breeder, now noting accurately but pointlessly that the first commercial reactors were not breeders. His other statements are, with one exception, true statements about nuclear power that either agree with my article or which are not contradicted by it. The exception is my regrettable but inconsequential omission of the brief existence of neptunium-239 in the series of reactions by which Pu-239 is produced from U-238. Thus, Mr. Feld finds my work scientifically accurate save for unimportant errors.
I am sorry that Mr. Feld was so offended by my characterization of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. I meant not to characterize the balance of editorial selection, of which there is some, if one understands that despite the magazine’s title, the pieces against nuclear energy are often written by people who are not scientists at all, let alone atomic ones; I meant, rather, to characterize the editorial policy. Mr. Feld himself is the author of an editorial that praises the Carter energy policy, that is, which accepts a substantial portion of the anti-nuclear dogma.
Mr. Feld’s reference to “knee-jerk conservatism” would be merely laughable to anyone who knows my work. As a matter of fact, if one considers the issue in ideological terms, the conservatives—indeed, the reactionaries—are those who wish to dismantle a new energy system and replace it with an older one. And the key issues are not ideological, but technical: whether or not nuclear fission is an acceptably safe form of power generation. Mr. Feld does not address this issue. Even had he got my ideology right, he should not judge my views on that basis, any more than I ought to judge the scientific quality of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists merely because it criticized Israel for the raid on Entebbe.
I am puzzled by his bizarre claim that I pretend to speak for the American intellectual and academic community. Nonsense. I speak for myself alone and he can cite no word of mine to the contrary.
Although the labor is arduous, I cannot beg off dealing with Marvin Resnikoff’s many errors—and worse.
He begins by hopelessly entangling two issues that are quite separate. The first is nuclear proliferation, i.e., the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that do not have them. As I said, I believe that the spread of breeder technology makes such proliferation possible. I also believe the spread of breeder technology to be inevitable, whatever the United States does about it. Our present policy denies us the benefits of breeders without preventing proliferation. But this issue is irrelevant to reactor-grade plutonium. Any nation with a light-water reactor can operate it so as to produce weapons-grade plutonium. It would be even simpler to produce weapons-grade plutonium in research reactors, as the Indians appear to have done.
The second issue is whether terrorists could acquire reactor-grade plutonium from the fuel cycle and use it to make bombs. Contrary to Mr. Resnikoff’s statement, I did not assert the impossibility of such bombs, merely the great difficulty.
I am not quite certain what he means by “reactor-grade plutonium of simple design.” Plutonium itself has no design, simple or complex. Perhaps he is trying to say that a bomb of simple design can utilize reactor-grade plutonium. The Lawrence-Livermore report he mentions is still classified except for the fact that a device has been exploded; thus I cannot comment on it. Perhaps he has had a peek.
And the fact that ERDA has exploded a device made from reactor plutonium tells us nothing about the usefulness of reactor plutonium for terrorist bombs. Nothing could be more likely—or less relevant—than that an advanced nuclear power should be able to make some sort of explosive device out of reactor plutonium. Mr. Resnikoff does not note that the yield, efficiency, and size of the “device” are still classified. The fact that ERDA called it a “device” is strongly suggestive that it was not a practical bomb.
I never suggested that plutonium ought not to be safeguarded, merely that it can be safeguarded by methods consistent with a democratic society. The fact that we have safeguarded the plutonium used in weapons production without repressive measures is persuasive evidence for this belief.
Mr. Resnikoff’s vague scenario for stealing plutonium is no more than that. His mere assertion that he finds it credible does not pass for serious argument on the matter.
I did not deal with such fissionables as neptunium-237 because no one is proposing to separate them from reactor fuel. It should be noted that this separation is not something that can be done by a mad terrorist in his basement—it would require an expensive reprocessing plant suited to the purpose. When and if someone proposes to undertake such separation, it will be necessary to develop safeguards.
Having thoroughly obfuscated the question of plutonium, Mr. Resnikoff launches into an extraordinary series of half-truths and untruths.
- I nowhere expressed doubt that radiation can cause cancer. Indeed, since I stated in so many words my belief that it can, I wonder whether Mr. Resnikoff and I are referring to the same article. I also maintained that the total number of cancer deaths caused by nuclear energy is very low, much less per megawatt than the number of deaths caused by coal.
- Mr. Resnikoff is correct in pointing out that my figure for the maximum public dose was for gaseous emissions, but when liquid emissions are included, the total is not 10 mrem but 8. That is, the permitted level is greater by an amount less than the extra radiation one absorbs flying across the country, or that a resident of Dallas might get from a three-week visit to Denver, or that anyone might get from six months working in a building faced with granite.
The boundary dose does not include direct radiation from solid waste for the good reason that this radiation does not reach the boundary. One might assume from Mr. Resnikoff that the ME gate at Nine Mile Point is the main entrance, but it is not at the boundary, but well within the plant, at the internal boundary between Units I and II. It is about fifty feet from a waste-storage building. To say that if one were to stand at this gate solidly for a year one would absorb 1457 mrem is like saying that someone who keeps his head in a pail of water for a year will die. The remark is true but irrelevant. People don’t stand at the gate for a year, but drive through it; and their total yearly exposure must be within limits that vary as to age, previous exposure, and other factors but which are always substantially lower than Mr. Resnikoff’s figure.
Finally, his figure can be put into perspective by realizing that a full set of back X-rays might expose one to the equivalent of 32,000 mrem in a few minutes—more than most nuclear workers receive in a decade.
The 10-mrem limit is a reactor-design figure, set to establish targets for designers. In a sense, then, Mr. Resnikoff is correct in saying that when there are three reactors at a site, the design maxima can be multiplied by three. But only in theory, for as part of the licensing process, the NRC establishes limits for each site, taking into account its special characteristics, such as closeness to a city. These site limits are not expanded by the addition of another reactor. Mr. Resnikoff ignores this, as well as the fact that if a plant should actually reach 4 per cent of its permitted emission, it must conduct an investigation and report to the NRC.
- I did not deal explicitly with occupational doses at nuclear reactors, although they are included in the figures I cited for deaths caused by a 1000-MWe nuclear reactor. Considering the 100 coal miners or so killed each year, and the thousands who die from black lung disease, I am surprised that Mr. Resnikoff raises the issue at all. Nuclear energy is occupationally far more benign than the only practical alternative source.
- I clearly cited Colorado’s low cancer rate to indicate the comparative insignificance of radiation as a cause of cancer, not to deny its existence.
- Mr. Resnikoff quotes my statement that there is no evidence from actual experience with human beings that radiation causes genetic damage to them, and then cities four studies purporting to contradict me. Incredible as it may seem, not one of these four studies deals with genetic damage. I hardly know which is more disturbing: to think that Mr. Resnikoff does not understand what genetic damage is, or that he does understand it and cites these studies knowing that they are irrelevant.
There is a further unintended irony in the first two studies: the mean dose given the Israeli children is said to be “only” 6.5 rad—a dose equivalent to 6,500 mrems, or 650 times the exposure allowed at the boundary line for a nuclear reactor by the NRC’s design guides, and 650,000 times the exposure incurred from living within a 50-mile range of a nuclear reactor. This exposure, it should be remembered, is itself only 1 per cent of the exposure from color television. One needs to appreciate that: the average American is more threatened by the radiation from color television than from nuclear reactors. The doses reported in the Lancet article, ranging from 300 to 800 mrems, are still many times the exposure permitted at the boundary of a reactor. These X-ray exposures are, of course, low-level radiation, and that they are so much greater than the radiation from nuclear reactors shows how minimal reactor radiation really is.
The issue here is not whether people will get cancer from nuclear energy. Of course they will. But they will get very much less of it than from the alternative: coal.
- Next, Mr. Resnikoff alleges that I did not consider health effects from the fuel cycle. But I did, for these were calculated in the figure cited for the total health effect of a 1000-MWe plant. Further, he engages in a weird bit of numerology, conflating total cancers and cancers per year. If the NRC were to claim—as it does not—that the health effects of a tailings pile were limited to a forty-year period, there might be some point to Mr. Resnikoff’s objection to the figure of 0.144 lung cancers a year. Mr. Resnikoff does not note that by burning up uranium a 1000-MWe reactor also reduces the amount of radioactivity in the biosphere. Bernard Cohen has pointed out that nuclear reactors burn up considerable amounts of U-234, a major source of radon, and that any true accounting of the medical effects of nuclear generation must include these credits as well as debits. Cohen suggests that over a 500,000-year span, one 1000-MWe nuclear reactor would save 130 lives through the burn-up of U-234. It might be remembered that through 500,000 years of operation a 1000-MWe coal-fired plant would kill between 15,000,000 and 55,000,000 people.
With regard to reducing the risk from mill tailings, I naturally support any reasonable measures to lower the already small health risk from nuclear power. But I am opposed to proposals vastly to increase our health risks by abandoning nuclear power.
- In his next comment, Mr. Resnikoff continues his conflation of yearly figures and total figures. The “hypothetical” deaths to which I referred were not deaths from cancer, which do occur, if not in numbers comparable to those caused by coal, but from reactor accidents, some of which will, inevitably, occur over a very long time span, and which must be figured into the total.
- Mr. Resnikoff’s discussion of the relative radioactivity of coal and uranium would be merely amusing if it did not come from a scientist. First of all, uranium is not the only radioactive element in coal. There is also radium, polonium, and thorium. More important, the radioactive material in a nuclear reactor is not blown out of a smokestack, but carefully contained within the reactor with only minor emission permitted. The fact is that coal-fired plants emit considerably more radioactive material into the atmosphere—by one estimate, several hundred times more—than is permitted for nuclear plants. The amounts are in either case trivial, and I cited those for coal only to suggest the inconsistency of the anti-nuclear lobby.
- Even by Mr. Resnikoff’s reckoning, a coal-fired plant produces approximately three times the solid waste of a nuclear plant. And as much as 10 per cent is disposed of as landfill, little of it in locations as remote as the typical uranium mill. But mill tailings are not an inescapable part of a nuclear economy. A breeder economy could be run for hundreds of years on the U-238 tails now left from the enrichment process; there would be no need for further mining; and existing tailings could be buried.
- Mr. Resnikoff’s statement that a centralized solar plant “is being built” in Southern California is false. No construction contracts have been let for this facility, which is estimated to cost some $125 million for a plant of 10-megawatt capacity. That is to say, this plant, when completed, would supply approximately 1 per cent of the electricity produced by a contemporary nuclear plant. To equal the capacity of such a plant would require 10 such solar plants, costing—if there are no overruns—$12.5 billion, a capital cost at least ten times the nuclear equivalent. If there are economies of scale in making large, single plants, they are not demonstrated in plants “being built.” One must remember that nuclear power is frequently attacked as being too capital-intensive. These data are a commentary on the practicality of such plants, as well as on Mr. Resnikoff’s disturbingly carefree approach to facts.
- On area requirements for solar power, Mr. Resnikoff’s technique is to inflate the area required for a nuclear plant by adding the mill-tailings area and then to claim that solar plants require “only” twice as much space He ignores the fact that the uranium mills are located in comparatively remote areas, while many of the solar plants would have to be located near centers of population.
- Mr. Resnikoff claims that environmentalists have contributed very little to the delay in constructing reactors and thus to reactor costs. He then cites an article by Irwin Bupp of Harvard in support of this claim. Anyone who turns to the Bupp article (Technology Review, February 1975) will find that Mr. Resnikoff’s claim is a shocking misrepresentation. The Bupp article contains these statements: “. . . intervention of concerned organizations and individuals at the public-hearing stage of the AEC’s licensing procedures has directly caused delays of a year of longer in the construction of certain reactors—Vermont Yankee, San Onofre . . . another delaying and costly development was the so-called Calvert Cliffs Decision, which established that nuclear plants, like all other projects, had to file thorough environmental impact statements . . the ruling contributed significantly to nuclear plant construction-cost increases.” Bupp notes that the cost of a given reactor is closely dependent on the length of the licensing period, and gives an example of how, in a single case, intervenors raised the cost of the Millstone #2 reactor in Connecticut by some $5 million. And, finally, the article refers quite explicitly to “the crucial role of the opponents of nuclear power in the cost picture.”
- He is wise to suggest that economists may disagree with his claim that the old and the poor do not own appliances. He does not trouble to cite any evidence for this bizarre assertion, although given his ingenious use of the Bupp article, just about anything—Gilgamesh, probably—would serve. To suggest that incremental cost pricing, which would drive up prices and taxes, would somehow benefit the old and poor, is Mr. Resnikoff’s own bad little joke.
- He roasts most of the ancient chestnuts on waste disposal. The military wastes at Hanford are in any event irrelevant to the future of nuclear power. They are already there and will have to be dealt with no matter what is done about power generation. As it happens, the majority of the high-level wastes at West Valley are not commercial but military, reprocessed out of material from a government plutonium reactor at Hanford. The problems at West Valley are at least partially attributable to a premature move into a disposal process when there was no urgent need to do so. These problems too will be with us whatever happens to nuclear power, and may in fact prove useful in further refining existing processes.
- Some educational progress has been made when a nuclear critic actually admits the existence of the calcination-vitrification process, but Mr. Resnikoff treats it with a fierce skepticism that he would not and does not apply to solar technology.
- The problem of storing spent fuel elements is, in the short run, irrelevant to the development of final storage facilities. The fuel-rod problem could be solved either by restarting fuel reprocessing or by building larger storage facilities for the fuel rods themselves. In the absence of reprocessing, even a fully functioning calcination and vitrification process could do nothing to relieve the fuel-rod problem.
Mr. Resnikoff’s letter demonstrates with dreadful clarity the intellectual confusion and shabby practice that pervade anti-nuclear extremism.
I have not called Frances Gendlin a scientific illiterate, but if she wishes so to identify herself, I cannot dispute the characterization.
Although she will not specify them, her illiteracy does not keep her from seeing darkly hinted inaccuracies in my article. Perhaps Mr. Resnikoff is the knowledgeable and accomplished anti-nuclear scientist of whom she speaks.
Miss Gendlin appears to believe that the world is divided between professional scientists and scientific illiterates. But there is of course a middle ground. Miss Gendlin holds the curious view that certain of my articles prove by their very topics that I cannot be scientifically literate, although she does not indicate how this may be. Certainly I am not as qualified as the body of scientists who have spoken out against nuclear energy. On the other hand, neither am I as qualified as the even larger and more precisely qualified body of scientists who have spoken out in support of it. I am surprised that Miss Gendlin would suggest that we laymen ought to sit back and listen to the scientists, because if we do that, we will support nuclear energy.
Miss Gendlin is apparently unaware of the fact that no Nobel laureate in nuclear physics opposes nuclear energy, while several Nobel physics laureates with qualification in the nuclear area, including Hans Bethe and Eugene Wigner, support it. She also seems unaware that the American Health Physics Society, with a membership of 3,400 scientists who are experts on the biological effects of radiation, has endorsed nuclear power, as has a large number of other professional associations in the relevant fields. In 1975, 25,000 scientists and engineers presented a petition supporting the development of nuclear energy to the President.
The scientists opposing nuclear energy are, on the whole, qualified in areas far from nuclear energy. Apparently Miss Gendlin and James Marshall naively believe that qualification in one area of science is qualification in all, a position equivalent to believing that if one knows sociology one also knows French. Mr. Marshall’s list includes several biologists, several chemists, and an astrophysicist. The preeminent nuclear authority on the list is Dr. Edward Teller. What are we to make of Mr. Marshall’s claim that Dr. Teller is anti-nuclear? Teller, who travels about at his own expense opposing nuclear moratoria!
Unable to dispute me on content, Miss Gendlin disputes me on tone and is joined in this by Mr. Marshall. It appears that people judge my tone by whether they agree with me; several of my commentators and correspondents, nuclear physicists among them, have praised my dispassionate tone. If Miss Gendlin and Mr. Marshall will reread me a little more carefully, they will see that I reserve my passion not for discussions of facts but for those who distort them. Miss Gendlin and Mr. Marshall reverse this process.
In dealing with waste disposal, Mr. Marshall simply repeats arguments already refuted in my article. If he disagrees with this refutation, surely it is up to him to show how and why.
The concept of “man-made” radiation, Mr. Marshall’s novel contribution to the nuclear debate, has no scientific basis. Radioactivity is, after all, an entirely natural phenomenon, a fact that has, oddly enough, not endeared it to the customary proponents of the “natural.” And Mr. Marshall’s arithmetic is shaky. Nuclear energy does not multiply background radiation by a factor of 3; rather, it increases it at most by about twelve-thousandths of 1 per cent.
Mr. Marshall’s discussion of terrorists does not get around the essential problem I propounded in my article: if it is really so easy for a gang of terrorists to develop a nuclear capability, why does it appear to be so hard for nation-states?
Mr. Marshall’s final paragraph is a good example of the carelessness of many nuclear opponents. He begins by implying that I cited the National Council of Churches on the question of radioactive waste. But I did not; the statement of the Council I quoted was on the use of plutonium as fuel. He then says that the Council “pointed out” that protecting us from nuclear wastes “would, in the long run, lead to a police state.” But the Council’s claim that this would be the result of using plutonium for fuel is no more than a claim, one that is contradicted by the fact that we safeguard weapons plutonium without any such repressive machinery. The nuclear debate is badly served when people like Mr. Marshall repeat unsubstantiated claims as if they were fact.
In Company with other critics, Messrs. Hubbard, Bridenbaugh, and Minor provide a minimum of specificity, preferring to make accusations of “belittling” and “demeaning” rather than grasping the technical and scientific issues involved.
In my statement abut the income available to the three engineers I was following a report in the September 8, 1976 Energy Daily, which reported such an arrangement with the Union of Concerned Scientists, Project Survival, and the successor to Californians for Nuclear Safeguards. I understand from a highly-placed source at MHB Technical Associates that its principals did in fact have a consulting contract with at least Project Survival that provided them with a monthly income of $1,500 each, this figure having been chosen as being what they needed to live on, and I learn from the Union of Concerned Scientists that MHB continues to do consulting work for it. I suspect that the difference of opinion between us may hang on the word “guarantee.” I did not mean to imply that there was any agreement to provide a life sinecure.
I am reassured to learn that it is through stock ownership, rather than through the GE profit-sharing plan, that Messrs. Hubbard, Bridenbaugh and Minor continue to share in GE profits. It makes all the difference in the world.
It is curious that James Nathan Miller should call my article a “compendium of the nuclear industry’s arguments,” since I did not go to the industry for my arguments. His objection is in large part to my having written an article on the topic I did rather than on another one. My primary concern was not with remediable defects in the regulatory structure, but rather with the extremist view that nuclear energy is too dangerous to be used, and the manifold errors underlying this claim. I mentioned the problem of insuring adequate regulation in passing while discussing the nuclear referenda.
As for the Browns Ferry fire itself, “coming close to a meltdown” is really not a very precise term. I would agree with Mr. Miller that there was an extraordinary amount of human error involved, not only in the design of the plant but also in the initiation of the fire and its aftermath. Nuclear technology is regularly held to be fragile and unforgiving, to be unable to tolerate any error. Yet at Browns Ferry it forgave and tolerated much. As Petr Beckmann has pointed out, the real victims of the Browns Ferry fire have been those killed by the coal-fired generation made necessary during the repair of the reactor.
If Mr. Miller had read my article more carefully, he would have noted that I expressed reservations about the Rassmussen Report, including its possibly inadequate attention to common-mode failure, probably the most dangerous element in reactor fires.
I do not believe that anything in this world is done as well as it should be. Arguing that nuclear power is too dangerous to permit, however, is likely to make it more rather than less difficult to improve its excellent safety record.
Must-Reads from Magazine
t can be said that the Book of Samuel launched the American Revolution. Though antagonistic to traditional faith, Thomas Paine understood that it was not Montesquieu, or Locke, who was inscribed on the hearts of his fellow Americans. Paine’s pamphlet Common Sense is a biblical argument against British monarchy, drawing largely on the text of Samuel.
Today, of course, universal biblical literacy no longer exists in America, and sophisticated arguments from Scripture are all too rare. It is therefore all the more distressing when public intellectuals, academics, or religious leaders engage in clumsy acts of exegesis and political argumentation by comparing characters in the Book of Samuel to modern political leaders. The most common victim of this tendency has been the central character in the Book of Samuel: King David.
Most recently, this tendency was made manifest in the writings of Dennis Prager. In a recent defense of his own praise of President Trump, Prager wrote that “as a religious Jew, I learned from the Bible that God himself chose morally compromised individuals to accomplish some greater good. Think of King David, who had a man killed in order to cover up the adultery he committed with the man’s wife.” Prager similarly argued that those who refuse to vote for a politician whose positions are correct but whose personal life is immoral “must think God was pretty flawed in voting for King David.”
Prager’s invocation of King David was presaged on the left two decades ago. The records of the Clinton Presidential Library reveal that at the height of the Lewinsky scandal, an email from Dartmouth professor Susannah Heschel made its way into the inbox of an administration policy adviser with a similar comparison: “From the perspective of Jewish history, we have to ask how Jews can condemn President Clinton’s behavior as immoral, when we exalt King David? King David had Batsheva’s husband, Uriah, murdered. While David was condemned and punished, he was never thrown off the throne of Israel. On the contrary, he is exalted in our Jewish memory as the unifier of Israel.”
One can make the case for supporting politicians who have significant moral flaws. Indeed, America’s political system is founded on an awareness of the profound tendency to sinfulness not only of its citizens but also of its statesmen. “If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” James Madison informs us in the Federalist. At the same time, anyone who compares King David to the flawed leaders of our own age reveals a profound misunderstanding of the essential nature of David’s greatness. David was not chosen by God despite his moral failings; rather, David’s failings are the lens that reveal his true greatness. It is in the wake of his sins that David emerges as the paradigmatic penitent, whose quest for atonement is utterly unlike that of any other character in the Bible, and perhaps in the history of the world.
While the precise nature of David’s sins is debated in the Talmud, there is no question that they are profound. Yet it is in comparing David to other faltering figures—in the Bible or today—that the comparison falls flat. This point is stressed by the very Jewish tradition in whose name Prager claimed to speak.
It is the rabbis who note that David’s predecessor, Saul, lost the kingship when he failed to fulfill God’s command to destroy the egregiously evil nation of Amalek, whereas David commits more severe sins and yet remains king. The answer, the rabbis suggest, lies not in the sin itself but in the response. Saul, when confronted by the prophet Samuel, offers obfuscations and defensiveness. David, meanwhile, is similarly confronted by the prophet Nathan: “Thou hast killed Uriah the Hittite with the sword, and hast taken his wife to be thy wife, and hast slain him with the sword of the children of Ammon.” David’s immediate response is clear and complete contrition: “I have sinned against the Lord.” David’s penitence, Jewish tradition suggests, sets him apart from Saul. Soon after, David gave voice to what was in his heart at the moment, and gave the world one of the most stirring of the Psalms:
Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy lovingkindness: according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgressions.
Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin. For I acknowledge my transgressions: and my sin is ever before me.
. . . Deliver me from bloodguiltiness, O God, thou God of my salvation: and my tongue shall sing aloud of thy righteousness.
O Lord, open thou my lips; and my mouth shall shew forth thy praise.
For thou desirest not sacrifice; else would I give it: thou delightest not in burnt offering.
The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.
The tendency to link David to our current age lies in the fact that we know more about David than any other biblical figure. The author Thomas Cahill has noted that in a certain literary sense, David is the only biblical figure that is like us at all. Prior to the humanist autobiographies of the Renaissance, he notes, “we can count only a few isolated instances of this use of ‘I’ to mean the interior self. But David’s psalms are full of I’s.” In David’s Psalms, Cahill writes, we “find a unique early roadmap to the inner spirit—previously mute—of ancient humanity.”
At the same time, a study of the Book of Samuel and of the Psalms reveals how utterly incomparable David is to anyone alive today. Haym Soloveitchik has noted that even the most observant of Jews today fail to feel a constant intimacy with God that the simplest Jew of the premodern age might have felt, that “while there are always those whose spirituality is one apart from that of their time, nevertheless I think it safe to say that the perception of God as a daily, natural force is no longer present to a significant degree in any sector of modern Jewry, even the most religious.” Yet for David, such intimacy with the divine was central to his existence, and the Book of Samuel and the Psalms are an eternal testament to this fact. This is why simple comparisons between David and ourselves, as tempting as they are, must be resisted. David Wolpe, in his book about David, attempts to make the case as to why King David’s life speaks to us today: “So versatile and enduring is David in our culture that rare is the week that passes without some public allusion to his life…We need to understand David better because we use his life to comprehend our own.”
The truth may be the opposite. We need to understand David better because we can use his life to comprehend what we are missing, and how utterly unlike our lives are to his own. For even the most religious among us have lost the profound faith and intimacy with God that David had. It is therefore incorrect to assume that because of David’s flaws it would have been, as Amos Oz has written, “fitting for him to reign in Tel Aviv.” The modern State of Israel was blessed with brilliant leaders, but to which of its modern warriors or statesmen should David be compared? To Ben Gurion, who stripped any explicit invocation of the Divine from Israel’s Declaration of Independence? To Moshe Dayan, who oversaw the reconquest of Jerusalem, and then immediately handed back the Temple Mount, the locus of King David’s dreams and desires, to the administration of the enemies of Israel? David’s complex humanity inspires comparison to modern figures, but his faith, contrition, and repentance—which lie at the heart of his story and success—defy any such engagement.
And so, to those who seek comparisons to modern leaders from the Bible, the best rule may be: Leave King David out of it.
Three attacks in Britain highlight the West’s inability to see the threat clearly
This lack of seriousness manifests itself in several ways. It’s perhaps most obvious in the failure to reform Britain’s chaotic immigration and dysfunctional asylum systems. But it’s also abundantly clear from the grotesque underfunding and under-resourcing of domestic intelligence. In MI5, Britain has an internal security service that is simply too small to do its job effectively, even if it were not handicapped by an institutional culture that can seem willfully blind to the ideological roots of the current terrorism problem.
In 2009, Jonathan Evans, then head of MI5, confessed at a parliamentary hearing about the London bus and subway attacks of 2005 that his organization only had sufficient resources to “hit the crocodiles close to the boat.” It was an extraordinary metaphor to use, not least because of the impression of relative impotence that it conveys. MI5 had by then doubled in size since 2001, but it still boasted a staff of only 3,500. Today it’s said to employ between 4,000 and 5,000, an astonishingly, even laughably, small number given a UK population of 65 million and the scale of the security challenges Britain now faces. (To be fair, the major British police forces all have intelligence units devoted to terrorism, and the UK government’s overall counterterrorism strategy involves a great many people, including social workers and schoolteachers.)
You can also see that unseriousness at work in the abject failure to coerce Britain’s often remarkably sedentary police officers out of their cars and stations and back onto the streets. Most of Britain’s big-city police forces have adopted a reactive model of policing (consciously rejecting both the New York Compstat model and British “bobby on the beat” traditions) that cripples intelligence-gathering and frustrates good community relations.
If that weren’t bad enough, Britain’s judiciary is led by jurists who came of age in the 1960s, and who have been inclined since 2001 to treat terrorism as an ordinary criminal problem being exploited by malign officials and politicians to make assaults on individual rights and to take part in “illegal” foreign wars. It has long been almost impossible to extradite ISIS or al-Qaeda–linked Islamists from the UK. This is partly because today’s English judges believe that few if any foreign countries—apart from perhaps Sweden and Norway—are likely to give terrorist suspects a fair trial, or able to guarantee that such suspects will be spared torture and abuse.
We have a progressive metropolitan media elite whose primary, reflexive response to every terrorist attack, even before the blood on the pavement is dry, is to express worry about an imminent violent anti-Muslim “backlash” on the part of a presumptively bigoted and ignorant indigenous working class. Never mind that no such “backlash” has yet occurred, not even when the young off-duty soldier Lee Rigby was hacked to death in broad daylight on a South London street in 2013.
Another sign of this lack of seriousness is the choice by successive British governments to deal with the problem of internal terrorism with marketing and “branding.” You can see this in the catchy consultant-created acronyms and pseudo-strategies that are deployed in place of considered thought and action. After every atrocity, the prime minister calls a meeting of the COBRA unit—an acronym that merely stands for Cabinet Office Briefing Room A but sounds like a secret organization of government superheroes. The government’s counterterrorism strategy is called CONTEST, which has four “work streams”: “Prevent,” “Pursue,” “Protect,” and “Prepare.”
Perhaps the ultimate sign of unseriousness is the fact that police, politicians, and government officials have all displayed more fear of being seen as “Islamophobic” than of any carnage that actual terror attacks might cause. Few are aware that this short-term, cowardly, and trivial tendency may ultimately foment genuine, dangerous popular Islamophobia, especially if attacks continue.R
ecently, three murderous Islamist terror attacks in the UK took place in less than a month. The first and third were relatively primitive improvised attacks using vehicles and/or knives. The second was a suicide bombing that probably required relatively sophisticated planning, technological know-how, and the assistance of a terrorist infrastructure. As they were the first such attacks in the UK, the vehicle and knife killings came as a particular shock to the British press, public, and political class, despite the fact that non-explosive and non-firearm terror attacks have become common in Europe and are almost routine in Israel.
The success of all three plots indicates troubling problems in British law-enforcement practice and culture, quite apart from any other failings on the parts of the state in charge of intelligence, border control, and the prevention of radicalization. At the time of writing, the British media have been full of encomia to police courage and skill, not least because it took “only” eight minutes for an armed Metropolitan Police team to respond to and confront the bloody mayhem being wrought by the three Islamist terrorists (who had ploughed their rented van into people on London Bridge before jumping out to attack passersby with knives). But the difficult truth is that all three attacks would be much harder to pull off in Manhattan, not just because all NYPD cops are armed, but also because there are always police officers visibly on patrol at the New York equivalents of London’s Borough Market on a Saturday night. By contrast, London’s Metropolitan police is a largely vehicle-borne, reactive force; rather than use a physical presence to deter crime and terrorism, it chooses to monitor closed-circuit street cameras and social-media postings.
Since the attacks in London and Manchester, we have learned that several of the perpetrators were “known” to the police and security agencies that are tasked with monitoring potential terror threats. That these individuals were nevertheless able to carry out their atrocities is evidence that the monitoring regime is insufficient.
It also seems clear that there were failures on the part of those institutions that come under the leadership of the Home Office and are supposed to be in charge of the UK’s border, migration, and asylum systems. Journalists and think tanks like Policy Exchange and Migration Watch have for years pointed out that these systems are “unfit for purpose,” but successive governments have done little to take responsible control of Britain’s borders. When she was home secretary, Prime Minister Theresa May did little more than jazz up the name, logo, and uniforms of what is now called the “Border Force,” and she notably failed to put in place long-promised passport checks for people flying out of the country. This dereliction means that it is impossible for the British authorities to know who has overstayed a visa or whether individuals who have been denied asylum have actually left the country.
It seems astonishing that Youssef Zaghba, one of the three London Bridge attackers, was allowed back into the country. The Moroccan-born Italian citizen (his mother is Italian) had been arrested by Italian police in Bologna, apparently on his way to Syria via Istanbul to join ISIS. When questioned by the Italians about the ISIS decapitation videos on his mobile phone, he declared that he was “going to be a terrorist.” The Italians lacked sufficient evidence to charge him with a crime but put him under 24-hour surveillance, and when he traveled to London, they passed on information about him to MI5. Nevertheless, he was not stopped or questioned on arrival and had not become one of the 3,000 official terrorism “subjects of interest” for MI5 or the police when he carried out his attack. One reason Zaghba was not questioned on arrival may have been that he used one of the new self-service passport machines installed in UK airports in place of human staff after May’s cuts to the border force. Apparently, the machines are not yet linked to any government watch lists, thanks to the general chaos and ineptitude of the Home Office’s efforts to use information technology.
The presence in the country of Zaghba’s accomplice Rachid Redouane is also an indictment of the incompetence and disorganization of the UK’s border and migration authorities. He had been refused asylum in 2009, but as is so often the case, Britain’s Home Office never got around to removing him. Three years later, he married a British woman and was therefore able to stay in the UK.
But it is the failure of the authorities to monitor ringleader Khuram Butt that is the most baffling. He was a known and open associate of Anjem Choudary, Britain’s most notorious terrorist supporter, ideologue, and recruiter (he was finally imprisoned in 2016 after 15 years of campaigning on behalf of al-Qaeda and ISIS). Butt even appeared in a 2016 TV documentary about ISIS supporters called The Jihadist Next Door. In the same year, he assaulted a moderate imam at a public festival, after calling him a “murtad” or apostate. The imam reported the incident to the police—who took six months to track him down and then let him off with a caution. It is not clear if Butt was one of the 3,000 “subjects of interest” or the additional 20,000 former subjects of interest who continue to be the subject of limited monitoring. If he was not, it raises the question of what a person has to do to get British security services to take him seriously as a terrorist threat; if he was in fact on the list of “subjects of interest,” one has to wonder if being so designated is any barrier at all to carrying out terrorist atrocities. It’s worth remembering, as few do here in the UK, that terrorists who carried out previous attacks were also known to the police and security services and nevertheless enjoyed sufficient liberty to go at it again.B
ut the most important reason for the British state’s ineffectiveness in monitoring terror threats, which May addressed immediately after the London Bridge attack, is a deeply rooted institutional refusal to deal with or accept the key role played by Islamist ideology. For more than 15 years, the security services and police have chosen to take note only of people and bodies that explicitly espouse terrorist violence or have contacts with known terrorist groups. The fact that a person, school, imam, or mosque endorses the establishment of a caliphate, the stoning of adulterers, or the murder of apostates has not been considered a reason to monitor them.
This seems to be why Salman Abedi, the Manchester Arena suicide bomber, was not being watched by the authorities as a terror risk, even though he had punched a girl in the face for wearing a short skirt while at university, had attended the Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Didsbury Mosque, was the son of a Libyan man whose militia is banned in the UK, had himself fought against the Qaddafi regime in Libya, had adopted the Islamist clothing style (trousers worn above the ankle, beard but no moustache), was part of a druggy gang subculture that often feeds individuals into Islamist terrorism, and had been banned from a mosque after confronting an imam who had criticized ISIS.
It was telling that the day after the Manchester Arena suicide-bomb attack, you could hear security officials informing radio and TV audiences of the BBC’s flagship morning-radio news show that it’s almost impossible to predict and stop such attacks because the perpetrators “don’t care who they kill.” They just want to kill as many people as possible, he said.
Surely, anyone with even a basic familiarity with Islamist terror attacks over the last 15 or so years and a nodding acquaintance with Islamist ideology could see that the terrorist hadn’t just chosen the Ariana Grande concert in Manchester Arena because a lot of random people would be crowded into a conveniently small area. Since the Bali bombings of 2002, nightclubs, discotheques, and pop concerts attended by shameless unveiled women and girls have been routinely targeted by fundamentalist terrorists, including in Britain. Among the worrying things about the opinion offered on the radio show was that it suggests that even in the wake of the horrific Bataclan attack in Paris during a November 2015 concert, British authorities may not have been keeping an appropriately protective eye on music venues and other places where our young people hang out in their decadent Western way. Such dereliction would make perfect sense given the resistance on the part of the British security establishment to examining, confronting, or extrapolating from Islamist ideology.
The same phenomenon may explain why authorities did not follow up on community complaints about Abedi. All too often when people living in Britain’s many and diverse Muslim communities want to report suspicious behavior, they have to do so through offices and organizations set up and paid for by the authorities as part of the overall “Prevent” strategy. Although criticized by the left as “Islamophobic” and inherently stigmatizing, Prevent has often brought the government into cooperative relationships with organizations even further to the Islamic right than the Muslim Brotherhood. This means that if you are a relatively secular Libyan émigré who wants to report an Abedi and you go to your local police station, you are likely to find yourself speaking to a bearded Islamist.
From its outset in 2003, the Prevent strategy was flawed. Its practitioners, in their zeal to find and fund key allies in “the Muslim community” (as if there were just one), routinely made alliances with self-appointed community leaders who represented the most extreme and intolerant tendencies in British Islam. Both the Home Office and MI5 seemed to believe that only radical Muslims were “authentic” and would therefore be able to influence young potential terrorists. Moderate, modern, liberal Muslims who are arguably more representative of British Islam as a whole (not to mention sundry Shiites, Sufis, Ahmmadis, and Ismailis) have too often found it hard to get a hearing.
Sunni organizations that openly supported suicide-bomb attacks in Israel and India and that justified attacks on British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan nevertheless received government subsidies as part of Prevent. The hope was that in return, they would alert the authorities if they knew of individuals planning attacks in the UK itself.
It was a gamble reminiscent of British colonial practice in India’s northwest frontier and elsewhere. Not only were there financial inducements in return for grudging cooperation; the British state offered other, symbolically powerful concessions. These included turning a blind eye to certain crimes and antisocial practices such as female genital mutilation (there have been no successful prosecutions relating to the practice, though thousands of cases are reported every year), forced marriage, child marriage, polygamy, the mass removal of girls from school soon after they reach puberty, and the epidemic of racially and religiously motivated “grooming” rapes in cities like Rotherham. (At the same time, foreign jihadists—including men wanted for crimes in Algeria and France—were allowed to remain in the UK as long as their plots did not include British targets.)
This approach, simultaneously cynical and naive, was never as successful as its proponents hoped. Again and again, Muslim chaplains who were approved to work in prisons and other institutions have sometimes turned out to be Islamist extremists whose words have inspired inmates to join terrorist organizations.
Much to his credit, former Prime Minister David Cameron fought hard to change this approach, even though it meant difficult confrontations with his home secretary (Theresa May), as well as police and the intelligence agencies. However, Cameron’s efforts had little effect on the permanent personnel carrying out the Prevent strategy, and cooperation with Islamist but currently nonviolent organizations remains the default setting within the institutions on which the United Kingdom depends for security.
The failure to understand the role of ideology is one of imagination as well as education. Very few of those who make government policy or write about home-grown terrorism seem able to escape the limitations of what used to be called “bourgeois” experience. They assume that anyone willing to become an Islamist terrorist must perforce be materially deprived, or traumatized by the experience of prejudice, or provoked to murderous fury by oppression abroad. They have no sense of the emotional and psychic benefits of joining a secret terror outfit: the excitement and glamor of becoming a kind of Islamic James Bond, bravely defying the forces of an entire modern state. They don’t get how satisfying or empowering the vengeful misogyny of ISIS-style fundamentalism might seem for geeky, frustrated young men. Nor can they appreciate the appeal to the adolescent mind of apocalyptic fantasies of power and sacrifice (mainstream British society does not have much room for warrior dreams, given that its tone is set by liberal pacifists). Finally, they have no sense of why the discipline and self-discipline of fundamentalist Islam might appeal so strongly to incarcerated lumpen youth who have never experienced boundaries or real belonging. Their understanding is an understanding only of themselves, not of the people who want to kill them.
Review of 'White Working Class' By Joan C. Williams
Williams is a prominent feminist legal scholar with degrees from Yale, MIT, and Harvard. Unbending Gender, her best-known book, is the sort of tract you’d expect to find at an intersectionality conference or a Portlandia bookstore. This is why her insightful, empathic book comes as such a surprise.
Books and essays on the topic have accumulated into a highly visible genre since Donald Trump came on the American political scene; J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy planted itself at the top of bestseller lists almost a year ago and still isn’t budging. As with Vance, Williams’s interest in the topic is personal. She fell “madly in love with” and eventually married a Harvard Law School graduate who had grown up in an Italian neighborhood in pre-gentrification Brook-lyn. Williams, on the other hand, is a “silver-spoon girl.” Her father’s family was moneyed, and her maternal grandfather was a prominent Reform rabbi.
The author’s affection for her “class-migrant” spouse and respect for his family’s hardships—“My father-in-law grew up on blood soup,” she announces in her opening sentence—adds considerable warmth to what is at bottom a political pamphlet. Williams believes that elite condescension and “cluelessness” played a big role in Trump’s unexpected and dreaded victory. Enlightening her fellow elites is essential to the task of returning Trump voters to the progressive fold where, she is sure, they rightfully belong.
Liberals were not always so dense about the working class, Williams observes. WPA murals and movies like On the Waterfront showed genuine fellow feeling for the proletariat. In the 1970s, however, the liberal mood changed. Educated boomers shifted their attention to “issues of peace, equal rights, and environmentalism.” Instead of feeling the pain of Arthur Miller and John Steinbeck characters, they began sneering at the less enlightened. These days, she notes, elite sympathies are limited to the poor, people of color (POC), and the LGBTQ population. Despite clear evidence of suffering—stagnant wages, disappearing manufacturing jobs, declining health and well-being—the working class gets only fly-over snobbery at best and, more often, outright loathing.
Williams divides her chapters into a series of explainers to questions she has heard from her clueless friends and colleagues: “Why Does the Working Class Resent the Poor?” “Why Does the Working Class Resent Professionals but Admire the Rich?” “Why Doesn’t the Working Class Just Move to Where the Jobs Are?” “Is the Working Class Just Racist?” She weaves her answers into a compelling picture of a way of life and worldview foreign to her targeted readers. Working-class Americans have had to struggle for whatever stability and comfort they have, she explains. Clocking in for midnight shifts year after year, enduring capricious bosses, plant closures, and layoffs, they’re reliant on tag-team parenting and stressed-out relatives for child care. The campus go-to word “privileged” seems exactly wrong.
Proud of their own self-sufficiency and success, however modest, they don’t begrudge the self-made rich. It’s snooty professionals and the dysfunctional poor who get their goat. From their vantage point, subsidizing the day care for a welfare mother when they themselves struggle to manage care on their own dime mocks both their hard work and their beliefs. And since, unlike most professors, they shop in the same stores as the dependent poor, they’ve seen that some of them game the system. Of course that stings.
White Working Class is especially good at evoking the alternate economic and mental universe experienced by Professional and Managerial Elites, or “PMEs.” PMEs see their non-judgment of the poor, especially those who are “POC,” as a mark of their mature understanding that we live in an unjust, racist system whose victims require compassion regardless of whether they have committed any crime. At any rate, their passions lie elsewhere. They define themselves through their jobs and professional achievements, hence their obsession with glass ceilings.
Williams tells the story of her husband’s faux pas at a high-school reunion. Forgetting his roots for a moment, the Ivy League–educated lawyer asked one of his Brooklyn classmates a question that is the go-to opener in elite social settings: “What do you do?” Angered by what must have seemed like deliberate humiliation by this prodigal son, the man hissed: “I sell toilets.”
Instead of stability and backyard barbecues with family and long-time neighbors and maybe the occasional Olive Garden celebration, PMEs are enamored of novelty: new foods, new restaurants, new friends, new experiences. The working class chooses to spend its leisure in comfortable familiarity; for the elite, social life is a lot like networking. Members of the professional class may view themselves as sophisticated or cosmopolitan, but, Williams shows, to the blue-collar worker their glad-handing is closer to phony social climbing and their abstract, knowledge-economy jobs more like self-important pencil-pushing.
White Working Class has a number of proposals for creating the progressive future Williams would like to see. She wants to get rid of college-for-all dogma and improve training for middle-skill jobs. She envisions a working-class coalition of all races and ethnicities bolstered by civics education with a “distinctly celebratory view of American institutions.” In a saner political environment, some of this would make sense; indeed, she echoes some of Marco Rubio’s 2016 campaign themes. It’s little wonder White Working Class has already gotten the stink eye from liberal reviewers for its purported sympathies for racists.
Alas, impressive as Williams’s insights are, they do not always allow her to transcend her own class loyalties. Unsurprisingly, her own PME biases mostly come to light in her chapters on race and gender. She reduces immigration concerns to “fear of brown people,” even as she notes elsewhere that a quarter of Latinos also favor a wall at the southern border. This contrasts startlingly with her succinct observation that “if you don’t want to drive working-class whites to be attracted to the likes of Limbaugh, stop insulting them.” In one particularly obtuse moment, she asserts: “Because I study social inequality, I know that even Malia and Sasha Obama will be disadvantaged by race, advantaged as they are by class.” She relies on dubious gender theories to explain why the majority of white women voted for Trump rather than for his unfairly maligned opponent. That Hillary Clinton epitomized every elite quality Williams has just spent more than a hundred pages explicating escapes her notice. Williams’s own reflexive retreat into identity politics is itself emblematic of our toxic divisions, but it does not invalidate the power of this astute book.
When music could not transcend evil
he story of European classical music under the Third Reich is one of the most squalid chapters in the annals of Western culture, a chronicle of collective complaisance that all but beggars belief. Without exception, all of the well-known musicians who left Germany and Austria in protest when Hitler came to power in 1933 were either Jewish or, like the violinist Adolf Busch, Rudolf Serkin’s father-in-law, had close family ties to Jews. Moreover, most of the small number of non-Jewish musicians who emigrated later on, such as Paul Hindemith and Lotte Lehmann, are now known to have done so not out of principle but because they were unable to make satisfactory accommodations with the Nazis. Everyone else—including Karl Böhm, Wilhelm Furtwängler, Walter Gieseking, Herbert von Karajan, and Richard Strauss—stayed behind and served the Reich.
The Berlin and Vienna Philharmonics, then as now Europe’s two greatest orchestras, were just as willing to do business with Hitler and his henchmen, firing their Jewish members and ceasing to perform the music of Jewish composers. Even after the war, the Vienna Philharmonic was notorious for being the most anti-Semitic orchestra in Europe, and it was well known in the music business (though never publicly discussed) that Helmut Wobisch, the orchestra’s principal trumpeter and its executive director from 1953 to 1968, had been both a member of the SS and a Gestapo spy.
The management of the Berlin Philharmonic made no attempt to cover up the orchestra’s close relationship with the Third Reich, no doubt because the Nazi ties of Karajan, who was its music director from 1956 until shortly before his death in 1989, were a matter of public record. Yet it was not until 2007 that a full-length study of its wartime activities, Misha Aster’s The Reich’s Orchestra: The Berlin Philharmonic 1933–1945, was finally published. As for the Vienna Philharmonic, its managers long sought to quash all discussion of the orchestra’s Nazi past, steadfastly refusing to open its institutional archives to scholars until 2008, when Fritz Trümpi, an Austrian scholar, was given access to its records. Five years later, the Viennese, belatedly following the precedent of the Berlin Philharmonic, added a lengthy section to their website called “The Vienna Philharmonic Under National Socialism (1938–1945),” in which the damning findings of Trümpi and two other independent scholars were made available to the public.
Now Trümpi has published The Political Orchestra: The Vienna and Berlin Philharmonics During the Third Reich, in which he tells how they came to terms with Nazism, supplying pre- and postwar historical context for their transgressions.1 Written in a stiff mixture of academic jargon and translatorese, The Political Orchestra is ungratifying to read. Even so, the tale that it tells is both compelling and disturbing, especially to anyone who clings to the belief that high art is ennobling to the spirit.U
nlike the Vienna Philharmonic, which has always doubled as the pit orchestra for the Vienna State Opera, the Berlin Philharmonic started life in 1882 as a fully independent, self-governing entity. Initially unsubsidized by the state, it kept itself afloat by playing a grueling schedule of performances, including “popular” non-subscription concerts for which modest ticket prices were levied. In addition, the orchestra made records and toured internationally at a time when neither was common.
These activities made it possible for the Berlin Philharmonic to develop into an internationally renowned ensemble whose fabled collective virtuosity was widely seen as a symbol of German musical distinction. Furtwängler, the orchestra’s principal conductor, declared in 1932 that the German music in which it specialized was “one of the very few things that actually contribute to elevating [German] prestige.” Hence, he explained, the need for state subsidy, which he saw as “a matter of [national] prestige, that is, to some extent a requirement of national prudence.” By then, though, the orchestra was already heavily subsidized by the city of Berlin, thus paving the way for its takeover by the Nazis.
The Vienna Philharmonic, by contrast, had always been subsidized. Founded in 1842 when the orchestra of what was then the Vienna Court Opera decided to give symphonic concerts on its own, it performed the Austro-German classics for an elite cadre of longtime subscribers. By restricting membership to local players and their pupils, the orchestra cultivated what Furtwängler, who spent as much time conducting in Vienna as in Berlin, described as a “homogeneous and distinct tone quality.” At once dark and sweet, it was as instantly identifiable—and as characteristically Viennese—as the strong, spicy bouquet of a Gewürztraminer wine.
Unlike the Berlin Philharmonic, which played for whoever would pay the tab and programmed new music as a matter of policy, the Vienna Philharmonic chose not to diversify either its haute-bourgeois audience or its conservative repertoire. Instead, it played Beethoven, Brahms, Haydn, Mozart, and Schubert (and, later, Bruckner and Richard Strauss) in Vienna for the Viennese. Starting in the ’20s, the orchestra’s recordings consolidated its reputation as one of the world’s foremost instrumental ensembles, but its internal culture remained proudly insular.
What the two orchestras had in common was a nationalistic ethos, a belief in the superiority of Austro-German musical culture that approached triumphalism. One of the darkest manifestations of this ethos was their shared reluctance to hire Jews. The Berlin Philharmonic employed only four Jewish players in 1933, while the Vienna Philharmonic contained only 11 Jews at the time of the Anschluss, none of whom was hired after 1920. To be sure, such popular Jewish conductors as Otto Klemperer and Bruno Walter continued to work in Vienna for as long as they could. Two months before the Anschluss, Walter led and recorded a performance of the Ninth Symphony of Gustav Mahler, his musical mentor and fellow Jew, who from 1897 to 1907 had been the director of the Vienna Court Opera and one of the Philharmonic’s most admired conductors. But many members of both orchestras were open supporters of fascism, and not a few were anti-Semites who ardently backed Hitler. By 1942, 62 of the 123 active members of the Vienna Philharmonic were Nazi party members.
The admiration that Austro-German classical musicians had for Hitler is not entirely surprising since he was a well-informed music lover who declared in 1938 that “Germany has become the guardian of European culture and civilization.” He made the support of German art, music very much included, a key part of his political program. Accordingly, the Berlin Philharmonic was placed under the direct supervision of Joseph Goebbels, who ensured the cooperation of its members by repeatedly raising their salaries, exempting them from military service, and guaranteeing their old-age pensions. But there had never been any serious question of protest, any more than there would be among the members of the Vienna Philharmonic when the Nazis gobbled up Austria. Save for the Jews and one or two non-Jewish players who were fired for reasons of internal politics, the musicians went along unhesitatingly with Hitler’s desires.
With what did they go along? Above all, they agreed to the scrubbing of Jewish music from their programs and the dismissal of their Jewish colleagues. Some Jewish players managed to escape with their lives, but seven of the Vienna Philharmonic’s 11 Jews were either murdered by the Nazis or died as a direct result of official persecution. In addition, both orchestras performed regularly at official government functions and made tours and other public appearances for propaganda purposes, and both were treated as gems in the diadem of Nazi culture.
As for Furtwängler, the most prominent of the Austro-German orchestral conductors who served the Reich, his relationship to Nazism continues to be debated to this day. He had initially resisted the firing of the Berlin Philharmonic’s Jewish members and protected them for as long as he could. But he was also a committed (if woolly-minded) nationalist who believed that German music had “a different meaning for us Germans than for other nations” and notoriously declared in an open letter to Goebbels that “we all welcome with great joy and gratitude . . . the restoration of our national honor.” Thereafter he cooperated with the Nazis, by all accounts uncomfortably but—it must be said—willingly. A monster of egotism, he saw himself as the greatest living exponent of German music and believed it to be his duty to stay behind and serve a cause higher than what he took to be mere party politics. “Human beings are free wherever Wagner and Beethoven are played, and if they are not free at first, they are freed while listening to these works,” he naively assured a horrified Arturo Toscanini in 1937. “Music transports them to regions where the Gestapo can do them no harm.”O
nce the war was over, the U.S. occupation forces decided to enlist the Berlin Philharmonic in the service of a democratic, anti-Soviet Germany. Furtwängler and Herbert von Karajan, who succeeded him as principal conductor, were officially “de-Nazified” and their orchestra allowed to function largely undisturbed, though six Nazi Party members were fired. The Vienna Philharmonic received similarly privileged treatment.
Needless to say, there was more to this decision than Cold War politics. No one questioned the unique artistic stature of either orchestra. Moreover, the Vienna Philharmonic, precisely because of its insularity, was now seen as a living museum piece, a priceless repository of 19th-century musical tradition. Still, many musicians and listeners, Jews above all, looked askance at both orchestras for years to come, believing them to be tainted by Nazism.
Indeed they were, so much so that they treated many of their surviving Jewish ex-members in a way that can only be described as vicious. In the most blatant individual case, the violinist Szymon Goldberg, who had served as the Berlin Philharmonic’s concertmaster under Furtwängler, was not allowed to reassume his post in 1945 and was subsequently denied a pension. As for the Vienna Philharmonic, the fact that it made Helmut Wobisch its executive director says everything about its deep-seated unwillingness to face up to its collective sins.
Be that as it may, scarcely any prominent musicians chose to boycott either orchestra. Leonard Bernstein went so far as to affect a flippant attitude toward the morally equivocal conduct of the Austro-German artists whom he encountered in Europe after the war. Upon meeting Herbert von Karajan in 1954, he actually told his wife Felicia that he had become “real good friends with von Karajan, whom you would (and will) adore. My first Nazi.”
At the same time, though, Bernstein understood what he was choosing to overlook. When he conducted the Vienna Philharmonic for the first time in 1966, he wrote to his parents:
I am enjoying Vienna enormously—as much as a Jew can. There are so many sad memories here; one deals with so many ex-Nazis (and maybe still Nazis); and you never know if the public that is screaming bravo for you might contain someone who 25 years ago might have shot me dead. But it’s better to forgive, and if possible, forget. The city is so beautiful, and so full of tradition. Everyone here lives for music, especially opera, and I seem to be the new hero.
Did Bernstein sell his soul for the opportunity to work with so justly renowned an orchestra—and did he get his price by insisting that its members perform the symphonies of Mahler, with which he was by then closely identified? It is a fair question, one that does not lend itself to easy answers.
Even more revealing is the case of Bruno Walter, who never forgave Furtwängler for staying behind in Germany, informing him in an angry letter that “your art was used as a conspicuously effective means of propaganda for the regime of the Devil.” Yet Walter’s righteous anger did not stop him from conducting in Vienna after the war. Born in Berlin, he had come to identify with the Philharmonic so closely that it was impossible for him to seriously consider quitting its podium permanently. “Spiritually, I was a Viennese,” he wrote in Theme and Variations, his 1946 autobiography. In 1952, he made a second recording with the Vienna Philharmonic of Mahler’s Das Lied von der Erde, whose premiere he had conducted in 1911 and which he had recorded in Vienna 15 years earlier. One wonders what Walter, who had converted to Christianity but had been driven out of both his native lands for the crime of being Jewish, made of the text of the last movement: “My friend, / On this earth, fortune has not been kind to me! / Where do I go?”
As for the two great orchestras of the Third Reich, both have finally acknowledged their guilt and been forgiven, at least by those who know little of their past. It would occur to no one to decline on principle to perform with either group today. Such a gesture would surely be condemned as morally ostentatious, an exercise in what we now call virtue-signaling. Yet it is impossible to forget what Samuel Lipman wrote in 1993 in Commentary apropos the wartime conduct of Furtwängler: “The ultimate triumph of totalitarianism, I suppose it can be said, is that under its sway only a martyred death can be truly moral.” For the only martyrs of the Berlin and Vienna Philharmonics were their Jews. The orchestras themselves live on, tainted and beloved.
He knows what to reveal and what to conceal, understands the importance of keeping the semblance of distance between oneself and the story of the day, and comprehends the ins and outs of anonymous sourcing. Within days of his being fired by President Trump on May 9, for example, little green men and women, known only as his “associates,” began appearing in the pages of the New York Times and Washington Post to dispute key points of the president’s account of his dismissal and to promote Comey’s theory of the case.
“In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty,” the New York Times reported on May 11. “Comey Demurred.” The story was a straightforward narrative of events from Comey’s perspective, capped with an obligatory denial from the White House. The next day, the Washington Post reported, “Comey associates dispute Trump’s account of conversations.” The Post did not identify Comey’s associates, other than saying that they were “people who have worked with him.”
Maybe they were the same associates who had gabbed to the Times. Or maybe they were different ones. Who can tell? Regardless, the story these particular associates gave to the Post was readable and gripping. Comey, the Post reported, “was wary of private meetings and discussions with the president and did not offer the assurance, as Trump has claimed, that Trump was not under investigation as part of the probe into Russian interference in last year’s election.”
On May 16, Michael S. Schmidt of the Times published his scoop, “Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation.” Schmidt didn’t see the memo for himself. Parts of it were read to him by—you guessed it—“one of Mr. Comey’s associates.” The following day, Robert Mueller was appointed special counsel to oversee the Russia investigation. On May 18, the Times, citing “two people briefed” on a call between Comey and the president, reported, “Comey, Unsettled by Trump, Is Said to Have Wanted Him Kept at a Distance.” And by the end of that week, Comey had agreed to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee.
As his testimony approached, Comey’s people became more aggressive in their criticisms of the president. “Trump Should Be Scared, Comey Friend Says,” read the headline of a CNN interview with Brookings Institution fellow Benjamin Wittes. This “Comey friend” said he was “very shocked” when he learned that President Trump had asked Comey for loyalty. “I have no doubt that he regarded the group of people around the president as dishonorable,” Wittes said.
Comey, Wittes added, was so uncomfortable at the White House reception in January honoring law enforcement—the one where Comey lumbered across the room and Trump whispered something in his ear—that, as CNN paraphrased it, he “stood in a position so that his blue blazer would blend in with the room’s blue drapes in an effort for Trump to not notice him.” The integrity, the courage—can you feel it?
On June 6, the day before Comey’s prepared testimony was released, more “associates” told ABC that the director would “not corroborate Trump’s claim that on three separate occasions Comey told the president he was not under investigation.” And a “source with knowledge of Comey’s testimony” told CNN the same thing. In addition, ABC reported that, according to “a source familiar with Comey’s thinking,” the former director would say that Trump’s actions stopped short of obstruction of justice.
Maybe those sources weren’t as “familiar with Comey’s thinking” as they thought or hoped? To maximize the press coverage he already dominated, Comey had authorized the Senate Intelligence Committee to release his testimony ahead of his personal interview. That testimony told a different story than what had been reported by CNN and ABC (and by the Post on May 12). Comey had in fact told Trump the president was not under investigation—on January 6, January 27, and March 30. Moreover, the word “obstruction” did not appear at all in his written text. The senators asked Comey if he felt Trump obstructed justice. He declined to answer either way.
My guess is that Comey’s associates lacked Comey’s scalpel-like, almost Jesuitical ability to make distinctions, and therefore misunderstood what he was telling them to say to the press. Because it’s obvious Comey was the one behind the stories of Trump’s dishonesty and bad behavior. He admitted as much in front of the cameras in a remarkable exchange with Senator Susan Collins of Maine.
Comey said that, after Trump tweeted on May 12 that he’d better hope there aren’t “tapes” of their conversations, “I asked a friend of mine to share the content of the memo with a reporter. Didn’t do it myself, for a variety of reasons. But I asked him to, because I thought that might prompt the appointment of a special counsel. And so I asked a close friend of mine to do it.”
Collins asked whether that friend had been Wittes, known to cable news junkies as Comey’s bestie. Comey said no. The source for the New York Times article was “a good friend of mine who’s a professor at Columbia Law School,” Daniel Richman.
Every time I watch or read that exchange, I am amazed. Here is the former director of the FBI just flat-out admitting that, for months, he wrote down every interaction he had with the president of the United States because he wanted a written record in case the president ever fired or lied about him. And when the president did fire and lie about him, that director set in motion a series of public disclosures with the intent of not only embarrassing the president, but also forcing the appointment of a special counsel who might end up investigating the president for who knows what. And none of this would have happened if the president had not fired Comey or tweeted about him. He told the Senate that if Trump hadn’t dismissed him, he most likely would still be on the job.
Rarely, in my view, are high officials so transparent in describing how Washington works. Comey revealed to the world that he was keeping a file on his boss, that he used go-betweens to get his story into the press, that “investigative journalism” is often just powerful people handing documents to reporters to further their careers or agendas or even to get revenge. And as long as you maintain some distance from the fallout, and stick to the absolute letter of the law, you will come out on top, so long as you have a small army of nightingales singing to reporters on your behalf.
“It’s the end of the Comey era,” A.B. Stoddard said on Special Report with Bret Baier the other day. On the contrary: I have a feeling that, as the Russia investigation proceeds, we will be hearing much more from Comey. And from his “associates.” And his “friends.” And persons “familiar with his thinking.”
In April, COMMENTARY asked a wide variety of writers,
thinkers, and broadcasters to respond to this question: Is free speech under threat in the United States? We received twenty-seven responses. We publish them here in alphabetical order.
Floyd AbramsFree expression threatened? By Donald Trump? I guess you could say so.
When a president engages in daily denigration of the press, when he characterizes it as the enemy of the people, when he repeatedly says that the libel laws should be “loosened” so he can personally commence more litigation, when he says that journalists shouldn’t be allowed to use confidential sources, it is difficult even to suggest that he has not threatened free speech. And when he says to the head of the FBI (as former FBI director James Comey has said that he did) that Comey should consider “putting reporters in jail for publishing classified information,” it is difficult not to take those threats seriously.
The harder question, though, is this: How real are the threats? Or, as Michael Gerson put it in the Washington Post: Will Trump “go beyond mere Twitter abuse and move against institutions that limit his power?” Some of the president’s threats against the institution of the press, wittingly or not, have been simply preposterous. Surely someone has told him by now that neither he nor Congress can “loosen” libel laws; while each state has its own libel law, there is no federal libel law and thus nothing for him to loosen. What he obviously takes issue with is the impact that the Supreme Court’s 1964 First Amendment opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan has had on state libel laws. The case determined that public officials who sue for libel may not prevail unless they demonstrate that the statements made about them were false and were made with actual knowledge or suspicion of that falsity. So his objection to the rules governing libel law is to nothing less than the application of the First Amendment itself.
In other areas, however, the Trump administration has far more power to imperil free speech. We live under an Espionage Act, adopted a century ago, which is both broad in its language and uncommonly vague in its meaning. As such, it remains a half-open door through which an administration that is hostile to free speech might walk. Such an administration could initiate criminal proceedings against journalists who write about defense- or intelligence-related topics on the basis that classified information was leaked to them by present or former government employees. No such action has ever been commenced against a journalist. Press lawyers and civil-liberties advocates have strong arguments that the law may not be read so broadly and still be consistent with the First Amendment. But the scope of the Espionage Act and the impact of the First Amendment upon its interpretation remain unknown.
A related area in which the attitude of an administration toward the press may affect the latter’s ability to function as a check on government relates to the ability of journalists to protect the identity of their confidential sources. The Obama administration prosecuted more Espionage Act cases against sources of information to journalists than all prior administrations combined. After a good deal of deserved press criticism, it agreed to expand the internal guidelines of the Department of Justice designed to limit the circumstances under which such source revelation is demanded. But the guidelines are none too protective and are, after all, simply guidelines. A new administration is free to change or limit them or, in fact, abandon them altogether. In this area, as in so many others, it is too early to judge the ultimate treatment of free expression by the Trump administration. But the threats are real, and there is good reason to be wary.
Floyd Abrams is the author of The Soul of the First Amendment (Yale University Press, 2017).
Ayaan Hirsi AliFreedom of speech is being threatened in the United States by a nascent culture of hostility to different points of view. As political divisions in America have deepened, a conformist mentality of “right thinking” has spread across the country. Increasingly, American universities, where no intellectual doctrine ought to escape critical scrutiny, are some of the most restrictive domains when it comes to asking open-ended questions on subjects such as Islam.
Legally, speech in the United States is protected to a degree unmatched in almost any industrialized country. The U.S. has avoided unpredictable Canadian-style restrictions on speech, for example. I remain optimistic that as long as we have the First Amendment in the U.S., any attempt at formal legal censorship will be vigorously challenged.
Culturally, however, matters are very different in America. The regressive left is the forerunner threatening free speech on any issue that is important to progressives. The current pressure coming from those who call themselves “social-justice warriors” is unlikely to lead to successful legislation to curb the First Amendment. Instead, censorship is spreading in the cultural realm, particularly at institutions of higher learning.
The way activists of the regressive left achieve silence or censorship is by creating a taboo, and one of the most pernicious taboos in operation today is the word “Islamophobia.” Islamists are similarly motivated to rule any critical scrutiny of Islamic doctrine out of order. There is now a university center (funded by Saudi money) in the U.S. dedicated to monitoring and denouncing incidences of “Islamophobia.”
The term “Islamophobia” is used against critics of political Islam, but also against progressive reformers within Islam. The term implies an irrational fear that is tainted by hatred, and it has had a chilling effect on free speech. In fact, “Islamophobia” is a poorly defined term. Islam is not a race, and it is very often perfectly rational to fear some expressions of Islam. No set of ideas should be beyond critical scrutiny.
To push back in this cultural realm—in our universities, in public discourse—those favoring free speech should focus more on the message of dawa, the set of ideas that the Islamists want to promote. If the aims of dawa are sufficiently exposed, ordinary Americans and Muslim Americans will reject it. The Islamist message is a message of divisiveness, misogyny, and hatred. It’s anachronistic and wants people to live by tribal norms dating from the seventh century. The best antidote to Islamic extremism is the revelation of what its primary objective is: a society governed by Sharia. This is the opposite of censorship: It is documenting reality. What is life like in Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Northern Nigerian States? What is the true nature of Sharia law?
Islamists want to hide the true meaning of Sharia, Jihad, and the implications for women, gays, religious minorities, and infidels under the veil of “Islamophobia.” Islamists use “Islamophobia” to obfuscate their vision and imply that any scrutiny of political Islam is hatred and bigotry. The antidote to this is more exposure and more speech.
As pressure on freedom of speech increases from the regressive left, we must reject the notions that only Muslims can speak about Islam, and that any critical examination of Islamic doctrines is inherently “racist.”
Instead of contorting Western intellectual traditions so as not to offend our Muslim fellow citizens, we need to defend the Muslim dissidents who are risking their lives to promote the human rights we take for granted: equality for women, tolerance of all religions and orientations, our hard-won freedoms of speech and thought.
It is by nurturing and protecting such speech that progressive reforms can emerge within Islam. By accepting the increasingly narrow confines of acceptable discourse on issues such as Islam, we do dissidents and progressive reformers within Islam a grave disservice. For truly progressive reforms within Islam to be possible, full freedom of speech will be required.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the founder of the AHA Foundation.
Lee C. BollingerI know it is too much to expect that political discourse mimic the measured, self-questioning, rational, footnoting standards of the academy, but there is a difference between robust political debate and political debate infected with fear or panic. The latter introduces a state of mind that is visceral and irrational. In the realm of fear, we move beyond the reach of reason and a sense of proportionality. When we fear, we lose the capacity to listen and can become insensitive and mean.
Our Constitution is well aware of this fact about the human mind and of its negative political consequences. In the First Amendment jurisprudence established over the past century, we find many expressions of the problematic state of mind that is produced by fear. Among the most famous and potent is that of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California in 1927, one of the many cases involving aggravated fears of subversive threats from abroad. “It is the function of (free) speech,” he said, “to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.” “Men feared witches,” Brandeis continued, “and burned women.”
Today, our “witches” are terrorists, and Brandeis’s metaphorical “women” include the refugees (mostly children) and displaced persons, immigrants, and foreigners whose lives have been thrown into suspension and doubt by policies of exclusion.
The same fears of the foreign that take hold of a population inevitably infect our internal interactions and institutions, yielding suppression of unpopular and dissenting voices, victimization of vulnerable groups, attacks on the media, and the rise of demagoguery, with its disdain for facts, reason, expertise, and tolerance.
All of this poses a very special obligation on those of us within universities. Not only must we make the case in every venue for the values that form the core of who we are and what we do, but we must also live up to our own principles of free inquiry and fearless engagement with all ideas. This is why recent incidents on a handful of college campuses disrupting and effectively censoring speakers is so alarming. Such acts not only betray a basic principle but also inflame a rising prejudice against the academic community, and they feed efforts to delegitimize our work, at the very moment when it’s most needed.
I do not for a second support the view that this generation has an unhealthy aversion to engaging differences of opinion. That is a modern trope of polarization, as is the portrayal of universities as hypocritical about academic freedom and political correctness. But now, in this environment especially, universities must be at the forefront of defending the rights of all students and faculty to listen to controversial voices, to engage disagreeable viewpoints, and to make every effort to demonstrate our commitment to the sort of fearless and spirited debate that we are simultaneously asking of the larger society. Anyone with a voice can shout over a speaker; but being able to listen to and then effectively rebut those with whom we disagree—particularly those who themselves peddle intolerance—is one of the greatest skills our education can bestow. And it is something our democracy desperately needs more of. That is why, I say to you now, if speakers who are being denied access to other campuses come here, I will personally volunteer to introduce them, and listen to them, however much I may disagree with them. But I will also never hesitate to make clear why I disagree with them.
Lee C. Bollinger is the 19th president of Columbia University and the author of Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open: A Free Press for a New Century. This piece has been excerpted from President Bollinger’s May 17 commencement address.
Richard A. Epstein
Today, the greatest threat to the constitutional protection of freedom of speech comes from campus rabble-rousers who invoke this very protection. In their book, the speech of people like Charles Murray and Heather Mac Donald constitutes a form of violence, bordering on genocide, that receives no First Amendment protection. Enlightened protestors are both bound and entitled to shout them down, by force or other disruptive actions, if their universities are so foolish as to extend them an invitation to speak. Any indignant minority may take the law into its own hands to eradicate the intellectual cancer before it spreads on their own campus.
By such tortured logic, a new generation of vigilantes distorts the First Amendment doctrine: Speech becomes violence, and violence becomes heroic acts of self-defense. The standard First Amendment interpretation emphatically rejects that view. Of course, the First Amendment doesn’t let you say what you want when and wherever you want to. Your freedom of speech is subject to the same limitations as your freedom of action. So you have no constitutional license to assault other people, to lie to them, or to form cartels to bilk them in the marketplace. But folks such as Murray, Mac Donald, and even Yiannopoulos do not come close to crossing into that forbidden territory. They are not using, for example, “fighting words,” rightly limited to words or actions calculated to provoke immediate aggression against a known target. Fighting words are worlds apart from speech that provokes a negative reaction in those who find your speech offensive solely because of the content of its message.
This distinction is central to the First Amendment. Fighting words have to be blocked by well-tailored criminal and civil sanctions lest some people gain license to intimidate others from speaking or peaceably assembling. The remedy for mere offense is to speak one’s mind in response. But it never gives anyone the right to block the speech of others, lest everyone be able to unilaterally increase his sphere of action by getting really angry about the beliefs of others. No one has the right to silence others by working himself into a fit of rage.
Obviously, it is intolerable to let mutual animosity generate factional warfare, whereby everyone can use force to silence rivals. To avoid this war of all against all, each side claims that only its actions are privileged. These selective claims quickly degenerate into a form of viewpoint discrimination, which undermines one of the central protections that traditional First Amendment law erects: a wall against each and every group out to destroy the level playing field on which robust political debate rests. Every group should be at risk for having its message fall flat. The new campus radicals want to upend that understanding by shutting down their adversaries if their universities do not. Their aggression must be met, if necessary, by counterforce. Silence in the face of aggression is not an acceptable alternative.
Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law.
David FrenchWe’re living in the midst of a troubling paradox. At the exact same time that First Amendment jurisprudence has arguably never been stronger and more protective of free expression, millions of Americans feel they simply can’t speak freely. Indeed, talk to Americans living and working in the deep-blue confines of the academy, Hollywood, and the tech sector, and you’ll get a sense of palpable fear. They’ll explain that they can’t say what they think and keep their jobs, their friends, and sometimes even their families.
The government isn’t cracking down or censoring; instead, Americans are using free speech to destroy free speech. For example, a social-media shaming campaign is an act of free speech. So is an economic boycott. So is turning one’s back on a public speaker. So is a private corporation firing a dissenting employee for purely political reasons. Each of these actions is largely protected from government interference, and each one represents an expression of the speaker’s ideas and values.
The problem, however, is obvious. The goal of each of these kinds of actions isn’t to persuade; it’s to intimidate. The goal isn’t to foster dialogue but to coerce conformity. The result is a marketplace of ideas that has been emptied of all but the approved ideological vendors—at least in those communities that are dominated by online thugs and corporate bullies. Indeed, this mindset has become so prevalent that in places such as Portland, Berkeley, Middlebury, and elsewhere, the bullies and thugs have crossed the line from protected—albeit abusive—speech into outright shout-downs and mob violence.
But there’s something else going on, something that’s insidious in its own way. While politically correct shaming still has great power in deep-blue America, its effect in the rest of the country is to trigger a furious backlash, one characterized less by a desire for dialogue and discourse than by its own rage and scorn. So we’re moving toward two Americas—one that ruthlessly (and occasionally illegally) suppresses dissenting speech and the other that is dangerously close to believing that the opposite of political correctness isn’t a fearless expression of truth but rather the fearless expression of ideas best calculated to enrage your opponents.
The result is a partisan feedback loop where right-wing rage spurs left-wing censorship, which spurs even more right-wing rage. For one side, a true free-speech culture is a threat to feelings, sensitivities, and social justice. The other side waves high the banner of “free speech” to sometimes elevate the worst voices to the highest platforms—not so much to protect the First Amendment as to infuriate the hated “snowflakes” and trigger the most hysterical overreactions.
The culturally sustainable argument for free speech is something else entirely. It reminds the cultural left of its own debt to free speech while reminding the political right that a movement allegedly centered around constitutional values can’t abandon the concept of ordered liberty. The culture of free speech thrives when all sides remember their moral responsibilities—to both protect the right of dissent and to engage in ideological combat with a measure of grace and humility.
David French is a senior writer at National Review.
Pamela GellerThe real question isn’t whether free speech is under threat in the United States, but rather, whether it’s irretrievably lost. Can we get it back? Not without war, I suspect, as is evidenced by the violence at colleges whenever there’s the shamefully rare event of a conservative speaker on campus.
Free speech is the soul of our nation and the foundation of all our other freedoms. If we can’t speak out against injustice and evil, those forces will prevail. Freedom of speech is the foundation of a free society. Without it, a tyrant can wreak havoc unopposed, while his opponents are silenced.
With that principle in mind, I organized a free-speech event in Garland, Texas. The world had recently been rocked by the murder of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. My version of “Je Suis Charlie” was an event here in America to show that we can still speak freely and draw whatever we like in the Land of the Free. Yet even after jihadists attacked our event, I was blamed—by Donald Trump among others—for provoking Muslims. And if I tried to hold a similar event now, no arena in the country would allow me to do so—not just because of the security risk, but because of the moral cowardice of all intellectual appeasers.
Under what law is it wrong to depict Muhammad? Under Islamic law. But I am not a Muslim, I don’t live under Sharia. America isn’t under Islamic law, yet for standing for free speech, I’ve been:
- Prevented from running our advertisements in every major city in this country. We have won free-speech lawsuits all over the country, which officials circumvent by prohibiting all political ads (while making exceptions for ads from Muslim advocacy groups);
- Shunned by the right, shut out of the Conservative Political Action Conference;
- Shunned by Jewish groups at the behest of terror-linked groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations;
- Blacklisted from speaking at universities;
- Prevented from publishing books, for security reasons and because publishers fear shaming from the left;
- Banned from Britain.
A Seattle court accused me of trying to shut down free speech after we merely tried to run an FBI poster on global terrorism, because authorities had banned all political ads in other cities to avoid running ours. Seattle blamed us for that, which was like blaming a woman for being raped because she was wearing a short skirt.
This kind of vilification and shunning is key to the left’s plan to shut down all dissent from its agenda—they make legislation restricting speech unnecessary.
The same refusal to allow our point of view to be heard has manifested itself elsewhere. The foundation of my work is individual rights and equality for all before the law. These are the foundational principles of our constitutional republic. That is now considered controversial. Truth is the new hate speech. Truth is going to be criminalized.
The First Amendment doesn’t only protect ideas that are sanctioned by the cultural and political elites. If “hate speech” laws are enacted, who would decide what’s permissible and what’s forbidden? The government? The gunmen in Garland?
There has been an inversion of the founding premise of this nation. No longer is it the subordination of might to right, but right to might. History is repeatedly deformed with the bloody consequences of this transition.
Pamela Geller is the editor in chief of the Geller Report and president of the American Freedom Defense Initiative.
Jonah GoldbergOf course free speech is under threat in America. Frankly, it’s always under threat in America because it’s always under threat everywhere. Ronald Reagan was right when he said in 1961, “Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn’t pass it on to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the same.”
This is more than political boilerplate. Reagan identified the source of the threat: human nature. God may have endowed us with a right to liberty, but he didn’t give us all a taste for it. As with most finer things, we must work to acquire a taste for it. That is what civilization—or at least our civilization—is supposed to do: cultivate attachments to certain ideals. “Cultivate” shares the same Latin root as “culture,” cultus, and properly understood they mean the same thing: to grow, nurture, and sustain through labor.
In the past, threats to free speech have taken many forms—nationalist passion, Comstockery (both good and bad), political suppression, etc.—but the threat to free speech today is different. It is less top-down and more bottom-up. We are cultivating a generation of young people to reject free speech as an important value.
One could mark the beginning of the self-esteem movement with Nathaniel Branden’s 1969 paper, “The Psychology of Self-Esteem,” which claimed that “feelings of self-esteem were the key to success in life.” This understandable idea ran amok in our schools and in our culture. When I was a kid, Saturday-morning cartoons were punctuated with public-service announcements telling kids: “The most important person in the whole wide world is you, and you hardly even know you!”
The self-esteem craze was just part of the cocktail of educational fads. Other ingredients included multiculturalism, the anti-bullying crusade, and, of course, that broad phenomenon known as “political correctness.” Combined, they’ve produced a generation that rejects the old adage “sticks and stones can break my bones but words can never harm me” in favor of the notion that “words hurt.” What we call political correctness has been on college campuses for decades. But it lacked a critical mass of young people who were sufficiently receptive to it to make it a fully successful ideology. The campus commissars welcomed the new “snowflakes” with open arms; truly, these are the ones we’ve been waiting for.
“Words hurt” is a fashionable concept in psychology today. (See Psychology Today: “Why Words Can Hurt at Least as Much as Sticks and Stones.”) But it’s actually a much older idea than the “sticks and stones” aphorism. For most of human history, it was a crime to say insulting or “injurious” things about aristocrats, rulers, the Church, etc. That tendency didn’t evaporate with the Divine Right of Kings. Jonathan Haidt has written at book length about our natural capacity to create zones of sanctity, immune from reason.
And that is the threat free speech faces today. Those who inveigh against “hate speech” are in reality fighting “heresy speech”—ideas that do “violence” to sacred notions of self-esteem, racial or gender equality, climate change, and so on. Put whatever label you want on it, contemporary “social justice” progressivism acts as a religion, and it has no patience for blasphemy.
When Napoleon’s forces converted churches into stables, the clergy did not object on the grounds that regulations regarding the proper care and feeding of animals had been violated. They complained of sacrilege and blasphemy. When Charles Murray or Christina Hoff Summers visits college campuses, the protestors are behaving like the zealous acolytes of St. Jerome. Appeals to the First Amendment have as much power over the “antifa” fanatics as appeals to Odin did to champions of the New Faith.
That is the real threat to free speech today.
Jonah Goldberg is a senior editor at National Review and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
KC JohnsonIn early May, the Washington Post urged universities to make clear that “racist signs, symbols, and speech are off-limits.” Given the extraordinarily broad definition of what constitutes “racist” speech at most institutions of higher education, this demand would single out most right-of-center (and, in some cases, even centrist and liberal) discourse on issues of race or ethnicity. The editorial provided the highest-profile example of how hostility to free speech, once confined to the ideological fringe on campus, has migrated to the liberal mainstream.
The last few years have seen periodic college protests—featuring claims that significant amounts of political speech constitute “violence,” thereby justifying censorship—followed by even more troubling attempts to appease the protesters. After the mob scene that greeted Charles Murray upon his visit to Middlebury College, for instance, the student government criticized any punishment for the protesters, and several student leaders wanted to require that future speakers conform to the college’s “community standard” on issues of race, gender, and ethnicity. In the last few months, similar attempts to stifle the free exchange of ideas in the name of promoting diversity occurred at Wesleyan, Claremont McKenna, and Duke. Offering an extreme interpretation of this point of view, one CUNY professor recently dismissed dialogue as “inherently conservative,” since it reinforced the “relations of power that presently exist.”
It’s easy, of course, to dismiss campus hostility to free speech as affecting only a small segment of American public life—albeit one that trains the next generation of judges, legislators, and voters. But, as Jonathan Chait observed in 2015, denying “the legitimacy of political pluralism on issues of race and gender” has broad appeal on the left. It is only most apparent on campus because “the academy is one of the few bastions of American life where the political left can muster the strength to impose its political hegemony upon others.” During his time in office, Barack Obama generally urged fellow liberals to support open intellectual debate. But the current campus environment previews the position of free speech in a post-Obama Democratic Party, increasingly oriented around identity politics.
Waning support on one end of the ideological spectrum for this bedrock American principle should provide a political opening for the other side. The Trump administration, however, seems poorly suited to make the case. Throughout his public career, Trump has rarely supported free speech, even in the abstract, and has periodically embraced legal changes to facilitate libel lawsuits. Moreover, the right-wing populism that motivates Trump’s base has a long tradition of ideological hostility to civil liberties of all types. Even in campus contexts, conservatives have defended free speech inconsistently, as seen in recent calls that CUNY disinvite anti-Zionist fanatic Linda Sarsour as a commencement speaker.
In a sharply polarized political environment, awash in dubiously-sourced information, free speech is all the more important. Yet this same environment has seen both sides, most blatantly elements of the left on campuses, demand restrictions on their ideological foes’ free speech in the name of promoting a greater good.
KC Johnson is a professor of history at Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center.
Laura KipnisI find myself with a strange-bedfellows problem lately. Here I am, a left-wing feminist professor invited onto the pages of Commentary—though I’d be thrilled if it were still 1959—while fielding speaking requests from right-wing think tanks and libertarians who oppose child-labor laws.
Somehow I’ve ended up in the middle of the free-speech-on-campus debate. My initial crime was publishing a somewhat contentious essay about campus sexual paranoia that put me on the receiving end of Title IX complaints. Apparently I’d created a “hostile environment” at my university. I was investigated (for 72 days). Then I wrote up what I’d learned about these campus inquisitions in a second essay. Then I wrote about it all some more, in a book exposing the kangaroo-court elements of the Title IX process—and the extra-legal gag orders imposed on everyone caught in its widening snare.
I can’t really comment on whether more charges have been filed against me over the book. I’ll just say that writing about being a Title IX respondent could easily become a life’s work. I learned, shortly after writing this piece, that I and my publisher were being sued for defamation, among other things.
Is free speech under threat on American campuses? Yes. We know all about student activists who wish to shut down talks by people with opposing views. I got smeared with a bit of that myself, after a speaking invitation at Wellesley—some students made a video protesting my visit before I arrived. The talk went fine, though a group of concerned faculty circulated an open letter afterward also protesting the invitation: My views on sexual politics were too heretical, and might have offended students.
I didn’t take any of this too seriously, even as right-wing pundits crowed, with Wellesley as their latest outrage bait. It was another opportunity to mock student activists, and the fact that I was myself a feminist rather than a Charles Murray or a Milo Yiannopoulos, made them positively gleeful.
I do find myself wondering where all my new free-speech pals were when another left-wing professor, Steven Salaita, was fired (or if you prefer euphemism, “his job offer was withdrawn”) from the University of Illinois after he tweeted criticism of Israel’s Gaza policy. Sure the tweets were hyperbolic, but hyperbole and strong opinions are protected speech, too.
I guess free speech is easy to celebrate until it actually challenges something. Funny, I haven’t seen Milo around lately—so beloved by my new friends when he was bashing minorities and transgender kids. Then he mistakenly said something authentic (who knew he was capable of it!), reminiscing about an experience a lot of gay men have shared: teenage sex with older men. He tried walking it back—no, no, he’d been a victim, not a participant—but his fan base was shrieking about pedophilia and fleeing in droves. Gee, they were all so against “political correctness” a few minutes before.
It’s easy to be a free-speech fan when your feathers aren’t being ruffled. No doubt what makes me palatable to the anti-PC crowd is having thus far failed to ruffle them enough. I’m just going to have to work harder.
Laura Kipnis’s latest book is Unwanted Advances: Sexual Paranoia Comes to Campus.
Eugene KontorovichThe free and open exchange of views—especially politically conservative or traditionally religious ones—is being challenged. This is taking place not just at college campuses but throughout our public spaces and cultural institutions. James Watson was fired from the lab he led since 1968 and could not speak at New York University because of petty, censorious students who would not know DNA from LSD. Our nation’s founders and heroes are being “disappeared” from public commemoration, like Trotsky from a photograph of Soviet rulers.
These attacks on “free speech” are not the result of government action. They are not what the First Amendment protects against. The current methods—professional and social shaming, exclusion, and employment termination—are more inchoate, and their effects are multiplied by self-censorship. A young conservative legal scholar might find himself thinking: “If the late Justice Antonin Scalia can posthumously be deemed a ‘bigot’ by many academics, what chance have I?”
Ironically, artists and intellectuals have long prided themselves on being the first defenders of free speech. Today, it is the institutions of both popular and high culture that are the censors. Is there one poet in the country who would speak out for Ann Coulter?
The inhibition of speech at universities is part of a broader social phenomenon of making longstanding, traditional views and practices sinful overnight. Conservatives have not put up much resistance to this. To paraphrase Martin Niemöller’s famous dictum: “First they came for Robert E. Lee, and I said nothing, because Robert E. Lee meant nothing to me.”
The situation with respect to Israel and expressions of support for it deserves separate discussion. Even as university administrators give political power to favored ideologies by letting them create “safe spaces” (safe from opposing views), Jews find themselves and their state at the receiving end of claims of apartheid—modern day blood libels. It is not surprising if Jewish students react by demanding that they get a safe space of their own. It is even less surprising if their parents, paying $65,000 a year, want their children to have a nicer time of it. One hears Jewish groups frequently express concern about Jewish students feeling increasingly isolated and uncomfortable on campus.
But demanding selective protection from the new ideological commissars is unlikely to bring the desired results. First, this new ideology, even if it can be harnessed momentarily to give respite to harassed Jews on campus, is ultimately illiberal and will be controlled by “progressive” forces. Second, it is not so terrible for Jews in the Diaspora to feel a bit uncomfortable. It has been the common condition of Jews throughout the millennia. The social awkwardness that Jews at liberal arts schools might feel in being associated with Israel is of course one of the primary justifications for the Jewish State. Facing the snowflakes incapable of hearing a dissonant view—but who nonetheless, in the grip of intersectional ecstasy, revile Jewish self-determination—Jewish students should toughen up.
Eugene Kontorovich teaches constitutional law at Northwestern University and heads the international law department of the Kohelet Policy Forum in Jerusalem.
Nicholas LemannThere’s an old Tom Wolfe essay in which he describes being on a panel discussion at Princeton in 1965 and provoking the other panelists by announcing that America, rather than being in crisis, is in the middle of a “happiness explosion.” He was arguing that the mass effects of 20 years of post–World War II prosperity made for a larger phenomenon than the Vietnam War, the racial crisis, and the other primary concerns of intellectuals at the time.
In the same spirit, I’d say that we are in the middle of a free-speech explosion, because of 20-plus years of the Internet and 10-plus years of social media. If one understands speech as disseminated individual opinion, then surely we live in the free-speech-est society in the history of the world. Anybody with access to the unimpeded World Wide Web can say anything to a global audience, and anybody can hear anything, too. All threats to free speech should be understood in the context of this overwhelmingly reality.
It is a comforting fantasy that a genuine free-speech regime will empower mainly “good,” but previously repressed, speech. Conversely, repressive regimes that are candid enough to explain their anti-free-speech policies usually say that they’re not against free speech, just “bad” speech. We have to accept that more free speech probably means, in the aggregate, more bad speech, and also a weakening of the power, authority, and economic support for information professionals such as journalists. Welcome to the United States in 2017.
I am lucky enough to live and work on the campus of a university, Columbia, that has been blessedly free of successful attempts to repress free speech. Just in the last few weeks, Charles Murray and Dinesh D’Souza have spoken here without incident. But, yes, the evidently growing popularity of the idea that “hate speech” shouldn’t be permitted on campuses is a problem, especially, it seems, at small private liberal-arts colleges. We should all do our part, and I do, by frequently and publicly endorsing free-speech principles. Opposing the BDS movement falls squarely into that category.
It’s not just on campuses that free-speech vigilance is needed, though. The number-one threat to free speech, to my mind, is that the wide-open Web has been replaced by privately owned platforms such as Facebook and Google as the way most people experience the public life of the Internet. These companies are committed to banning “hate speech,” and they are eager to operate freely in countries, like China, that don’t permit free political speech. That makes for a far more consequential constrained environment than any campus’s speech code.
Also, Donald Trump regularly engages in presidentially unprecedented rhetoric demonizing people who disagree with him. He seems to think this is all in good fun, but, as we have already seen at his rallies, not everybody hears it that way. The place where Trumpism will endanger free speech isn’t in the center—the White House press room—but at the periphery, for example in the way that local police handle bumptious protestors and the journalists covering them. This is already happening around the country. If Trump were as disciplined and knowledgeable as Vladimir Putin or Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which so far he seems not to be, then free speech could be in even more serious danger from government, which in most places is its usual main enemy.
Nicholas Lemann is a professor at Columbia Journalism School and a staff writer for the New Yorker.
Michael J. LewisFree speech is a right but it is also a habit, and where the habit shrivels so will the right. If free speech today is in headlong retreat—everywhere threatened by regulation, organized harassment, and even violence—it is in part because our political culture allowed the practice of persuasive oratory to atrophy. The process began in 1973, an unforeseen side effect of Roe v. Wade. Legislators were delighted to learn that by relegating this divisive matter of public policy to the Supreme Court and adopting a merely symbolic position, they could sit all the more safely in their safe seats.
Since then, one crucial question of public policy after another has been punted out of the realm of politics and into the judicial. Issues that might have been debated with all the rhetorical agility of a Lincoln and a Douglas, and then subjected to a process of negotiation, compromise, and voting, have instead been settled by decree: e.g., Chevron, Kelo, Obergefell. The consequences for speech have been pernicious. Since the time of Pericles, deliberative democracy has been predicated on the art of persuasion, which demands the forceful clarity of thought and expression without which no one has ever been persuaded. But a legislature that relegates its authority to judges and regulators will awaken to discover its oratorical culture has been stunted. When politicians, rather than seeking to convince and win over, prefer to project a studied and pleasant vagueness, debate withers into tedious defensive performance. It has been decades since any presidential debate has seen any sustained give and take over a matter of policy. If there is any suspense at all, it is only the possibility that a fatigued or peeved candidate might blurt out that tactless shard of truth known as a gaffe.
A generation accustomed to hearing platitudes smoothly dispensed from behind a teleprompter will find the speech of a fearless extemporaneous speaker to be startling, even disquieting; unfamiliar ideas always are. Unhappily, they have been taught to interpret that disquiet as an injury done to them, rather than as a premise offered to them to consider. All this would not have happened—certainly not to this extent—had not our deliberative democracy decided a generation ago that it preferred the security of incumbency to the risks of unshackled debate. The compulsory contraction of free speech on college campuses is but the logical extension of the voluntary contraction of free speech in our political culture.
Michael J. Lewis’s new book is City of Refuge: Separatists and Utopian Town Planning (Princeton University Press).
Heather Mac DonaldThe answer to the symposium question depends on how powerful the transmission belt is between academia and the rest of the country. On college campuses, violence and brute force are silencing speakers who challenge left-wing campus orthodoxies. These totalitarian outbreaks have been met with listless denunciations by college presidents, followed by . . . virtually nothing. As of mid-May, the only discipline imposed for 2017’s mass attacks on free speech at UC Berkeley, Middlebury, and Clare-mont McKenna College was a letter of reprimand inserted—sometimes only temporarily—into the files of several dozen Middlebury students, accompanied by a brief period of probation. Previous outbreaks of narcis-sistic incivility, such as the screaming-girl fit at Yale and the assaults on attendees of Yale’s Buckley program, were discreetly ignored by college administrators.
Meanwhile, the professoriate unapologetically defends censorship and violence. After the February 1 riot in Berkeley to prevent Milo Yiannapoulos from speaking, Déborah Blocker, associate professor of French at UC Berkeley, praised the rioters. They were “very well-organized and very efficient,” Blocker reported admiringly to her fellow professors. “They attacked property but they attacked it very sparingly, destroying just enough University property to obtain the cancellation order for the MY event and making sure no one in the crowd got hurt” (emphasis in original). (In fact, perceived Milo and Donald Trump supporters were sucker-punched and maced; businesses downtown were torched and vandalized.) New York University’s vice provost for faculty, arts, humanities, and diversity, Ulrich Baer, displayed Orwellian logic by claiming in a New York Times op-ed that shutting down speech “should be understood as an attempt to ensure the conditions of free speech for a greater group of people.”
Will non-academic institutions take up this zeal for outright censorship? Other ideological products of the left-wing academy have been fully absorbed and operationalized. Racial victimology, which drives much of the campus censorship, is now standard in government and business. Corporate diversity trainers counsel that bias is responsible for any lack of proportional racial representation in the corporate ranks. Racial disparities in school discipline and incarceration are universally attributed to racism rather than to behavior. Public figures have lost jobs for violating politically correct taboos.
Yet Americans possess an instinctive commitment to the First Amendment. Federal judges, hardly an extension of the Federalist Society, have overwhelmingly struck down campus speech codes. It is hard to imagine that they would be any more tolerant of the hate-speech legislation so prevalent in Europe. So the question becomes: At what point does the pressure to conform to the elite worldview curtail freedom of thought and expression, even without explicit bans on speech?
Social stigma against conservative viewpoints is not the same as actual censorship. But the line can blur. The Obama administration used regulatory power to impose a behavioral conformity on public and private entities. School administrators may have technically still possessed the right to dissent from novel theories of gender, but they had to behave as if they were fully on board with the transgender revolution when it came to allowing boys to use girls’ bathrooms and locker rooms.
Had Hillary Clinton had been elected president, the federal bureaucracy would have mimicked campus diversocrats with even greater zeal. That threat, at least, has been avoided. Heresies against left-wing dogma may still enter the public arena, if only by the back door. The mainstream media have lurched even further left in the Trump era, but the conservative media, however mocked and marginalized, are expanding (though Twitter and Facebook’s censorship of conservative speakers could be a harbinger of more official silencing).
Outside the academy, free speech is still legally protected, but its exercise requires ever greater determination.
Heather Mac Donald is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and the author of The War on Cops.
John McWhorterThere is a certain mendacity, as Brick put it in Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, in our discussion of free speech on college campuses. Namely, none of us genuinely wish that absolutely all issues be aired in the name of education and open-mindedness. To insist so is to pretend that civilized humanity makes nothing we could call advancement in philosophical consensus.
I doubt we need “free speech” on issues such as whether slavery and genocide are okay, whether it has been a mistake to view women as men’s equals, or to banish as antique the idea that whites are a master race while other peoples represent a lower rung on the Darwinian scale. With all due reverence of John Stuart Mill’s advocacy for the regular airing of even noxious views in order to reinforce clarity on why they were rejected, we are also human beings with limited time. A commitment to the Enlightenment justifiably will decree that certain views are, indeed, no longer in need of discussion.
However, our modern social-justice warriors are claiming that this no-fly zone of discussion is vaster than any conception of logic or morality justifies. We are being told that questions regarding the modern proposals about cultural appropriation, about whether even passing infelicitous statements constitute racism in the way that formalized segregation and racist disparagement did, or about whether social disparities can be due to cultural legacies rather than structural impediments, are as indisputably egregious, backwards, and abusive as the benighted views of the increasingly distant past.
That is, the new idea is not only that discrimination and inequality still exist, but that to even question the left’s utopian expectation on such matters justifies the same furious, sloganistic and even physically violent resistance that was once levelled against those designated heretics by a Christian hegemony.
Of course the protesters in question do not recognize themselves in a portrait as opponents of something called heresy. They suppose that Galileo’s opponents were clearly wrong but that they, today, are actually correct in a way that no intellectual or moral argument could coherently deny.
As such, we have students allowed to decree college campuses as “racist” when they are the least racist spaces on the planet—because they are, predictably given the imperfection of humans, not perfectly free of passingly unsavory interactions. Thinkers invited to talk for a portion of an hour from the right rather than the left and then have dinner with a few people and fly home are treated as if they were reanimated Hitlers. The student of color who hears a few white students venturing polite questions about the leftist orthodoxy is supported in fashioning these questions as “racist” rhetoric.
The people on college campuses who openly and aggressively spout this new version of Christian (or even Islamist) crusading—ironically justifying it as a barricade against “fascist” muzzling of freedom when the term applies ominously well to the regime they are fostering—are a minority. However, the sawmill spinning blade of their rhetoric has succeeding in rendering opposition as risky as espousing pedophilia, such that only those natively open to violent criticism dare speak out. The latter group is small. The campus consensus thereby becomes, if only at moralistic gunpoint à la the ISIS victim video, a strangled hard-leftism.
Hence freedom of speech is indeed threatened on today’s college campuses. I have lost count of how many of my students, despite being liberal Democrats (many of whom sobbed at Hillary Clinton’s loss last November), have told me that they are afraid to express their opinions about issues that matter, despite the fact that their opinions are ones that any liberal or even leftist person circa 1960 would have considered perfectly acceptable.
Something has shifted of late, and not in a direction we can legitimately consider forwards.
John McWhorter teaches linguistics, philosophy, and music history at Columbia University and is the author of The Language Hoax, Words on the Move, and Talking Back, Talking Black.
Kate Bachelder OdellIt’s 2021, and Harvard Square has devolved into riots: Some 120 people are injured in protests, and the carnage includes fire-consumed cop cars and smashed-in windows. The police discharge canisters of tear gas, and, after apprehending dozens of protesters, enforce a 1:45 A.M. curfew. Anyone roaming the streets after hours is subject to arrest. About 2,000 National Guardsmen are prepared to intervene. Such violence and disorder is also roiling Berkeley and other elite and educated areas.
Oh, that’s 1970. The details are from the Harvard Crimson’s account of “anti-war” riots that spring. The episode is instructive in considering whether free speech is under threat in the United States. Almost daily, there’s a new YouTube installment of students melting down over viewpoints of speakers invited to one campus or another. Even amid speech threats from government—for example, the IRS’s targeting of political opponents—nothing has captured the public’s attention like the end of free expression at America’s institutions of higher learning.
Yet disruption, confusion, and even violence are not new campus phenomena. And it’s hard to imagine that young adults who deployed brute force in the 1960s and ’70s were deeply committed to the open and peaceful exchange of ideas.
There may also be reason for optimism. The rough and tumble on campus in the 1960s and ’70s produced a more even-tempered ’80s and ’90s, and colleges are probably heading for another course correction. In covering the ruckuses at Yale, Missouri, and elsewhere, I’ve talked to professors and students who are figuring out how to respond to the illiberalism, even if the reaction is delayed. The University of Chicago put out a set of free-speech principles last year, and others schools such as Princeton and Purdue have endorsed them.
The NARPs—Non-Athletic Regular People, as they are sometimes known on campus—still outnumber the social-justice warriors, who appear to be overplaying their hand. Case in point is the University of Missouri, which experienced a precipitous drop in enrollment after instructor Melissa Click and her ilk stoked racial tensions last spring. The college has closed dorms and trimmed budgets. Which brings us to another silver lining: The economic model of higher education (exorbitant tuition to pay ever more administrators) may blow up traditional college before the fascists can.
Note also that the anti-speech movement is run by rich kids. A Brookings Institution analysis from earlier this year discovered that “the average enrollee at a college where students have attempted to restrict free speech comes from a family with an annual income $32,000 higher than that of the average student in America.” Few rank higher in average income than those at Middlebury College, where students evicted scholar Charles Murray in a particularly ugly scene. (The report notes that Murray was received respectfully at Saint Louis University, “where the median income of students’ families is half Middlebury’s.”) The impulses of over-adulated 20-year-olds may soon be tempered by the tyranny of having to show up for work on a daily basis.
None of this is to suggest that free speech is enjoying some renaissance either on campus or in America. But perhaps as the late Wall Street Journal editorial-page editor Robert Bartley put it in his valedictory address: “Things could be worse. Indeed, they have been worse.”
Kate Bachelder Odell is an editorial writer for the Wall Street Journal.
Jonathan RauchIs free speech under threat? The one-syllable answer is “yes.” The three-syllable answer is: “Yes, of course.” Free speech is always under threat, because it is not only the single most successful social idea in all of human history, it is also the single most counterintuitive. “You mean to say that speech that is offensive, untruthful, malicious, seditious, antisocial, blasphemous, heretical, misguided, or all of the above deserves government protection?” That seemingly bizarre proposition is defensible only on the grounds that the marketplace of ideas turns out to be the most powerful engine of knowledge, prosperity, liberty, social peace, and moral advancement that our species has had the good fortune to discover.
Every new generation of free-speech advocates will need to get up every morning and re-explain the case for free speech and open inquiry—today, tomorrow, and forever. That is our lot in life, and we just need to be cheerful about it. At discouraging moments, it is helpful to remember that the country has made great strides toward free speech since 1798, when the Adams administration arrested and jailed its political critics; and since the 1920s, when the U.S. government banned and burned James Joyce’s great novel Ulysses; and since 1954, when the government banned ONE, a pioneering gay journal. (The cover article was a critique of the government’s indecency censors, who censored it.) None of those things could happen today.
I suppose, then, the interesting question is: What kind of threat is free speech under today? In the present age, direct censorship by government bodies is rare. Instead, two more subtle challenges hold sway, especially, although not only, on college campuses. The first is a version of what I called, in my book Kindly Inquisitors, the humanitarian challenge: the idea that speech that is hateful or hurtful (in someone’s estimation) causes pain and thus violates others’ rights, much as physical violence does. The other is a version of what I called the egalitarian challenge: the idea that speech that denigrates minorities (again, in someone’s estimation) perpetuates social inequality and oppression and thus also is a rights violation. Both arguments call upon administrators and other bureaucrats to defend human rights by regulating speech rights.
Both doctrines are flawed to the core. Censorship harms minorities by enforcing conformity and entrenching majority power, and it no more ameliorates hatred and injustice than smashing thermometers ameliorates global warming. If unwelcome words are the equivalent of bludgeons or bullets, then the free exchange of criticism—science, in other words—is a crime. I could go on, but suffice it to say that the current challenges are new variations on ancient themes—and they will be followed, in decades and centuries to come, by many, many other variations. Memo to free-speech advocates: Our work is never done, but the really amazing thing, given the proposition we are tasked to defend, is how well we are doing.
Jonathan Rauch is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of Kindly Inquisitors: The New Attacks on Free Thought.
Nicholas Quinn RosenkranzSpeech is under threat on American campuses as never before. Censorship in various forms is on the rise. And this year, the threat to free speech on campus took an even darker turn, toward actual violence. The prospect of Milo Yiannopoulos speaking at Berkeley provoked riots that caused more than $100,000 worth of property damage on the campus. The prospect of Charles Murray speaking at Middlebury led to a riot that put a liberal professor in the hospital with a concussion. Ann Coulter’s speech at Berkeley was cancelled after the university determined that none of the appropriate venues could be protected from “known security threats” on the date in question.
The free-speech crisis on campus is caused, at least in part, by a more insidious campus pathology: the almost complete lack of intellectual diversity on elite university faculties. At Yale, for example, the number of registered Republicans in the economics department is zero; in the psychology department, there is one. Overall, there are 4,410 faculty members at Yale, and the total number of those who donated to a Republican candidate during the 2016 primaries was three.
So when today’s students purport to feel “unsafe” at the mere prospect of a conservative speaker on campus, it may be easy to mock them as “delicate snowflakes,” but in one sense, their reaction is understandable: If students are shocked at the prospect of a Republican behind a university podium, perhaps it is because many of them have never before laid eyes on one.
To see the connection between free speech and intellectual diversity, consider the recent commencement speech of Harvard President Drew Gilpin Faust:
Universities must be places open to the kind of debate that can change ideas….Silencing ideas or basking in intellectual orthodoxy independent of facts and evidence impedes our access to new and better ideas, and it inhibits a full and considered rejection of bad ones. . . . We must work to ensure that universities do not become bubbles isolated from the concerns and discourse of the society that surrounds them. Universities must model a commitment to the notion that truth cannot simply be claimed, but must be established—established through reasoned argument, assessment, and even sometimes uncomfortable challenges that provide the foundation for truth.
Faust is exactly right. But, alas, her commencement audience might be forgiven a certain skepticism. After all, the number of registered Republicans in several departments at Harvard—e.g., history and psychology—is exactly zero. In those departments, the professors themselves may be “basking in intellectual orthodoxy” without ever facing “uncomfortable challenges.” This may help explain why some students will do everything in their power to keep conservative speakers off campus: They notice that faculty hiring committees seem to do exactly the same thing.
In short, it is a promising sign that true liberal academics like Faust have started speaking eloquently about the crucial importance of civil, reasoned disagreement. But they will be more convincing on this point when they hire a few colleagues with whom they actually disagree.
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz is a professor of law at Georgetown. He serves on the executive committee of Heterodox Academy, which he co-founded, on the board of directors of the Federalist Society, and on the board of directors of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE).
Ben ShapiroIn February, I spoke at California State University in Los Angeles. Before my arrival, professors informed students that a white supremacist would be descending on the school to preach hate; threats of violence soon prompted the administration to cancel the event. I vowed to show up anyway. One hour before the event, the administration backed down and promised to guarantee that the event could go forward, but police officers were told not to stop the 300 students, faculty, and outside protesters who blocked and assaulted those who attempted to attend the lecture. We ended up trapped in the auditorium, with the authorities telling students not to leave for fear of physical violence. I was rushed from campus under armed police guard.
Is free speech under assault?
Of course it is.
On campus, free speech is under assault thanks to a perverse ideology of intersectionality that claims victim identity is of primary value and that views are a merely secondary concern. As a corollary, if your views offend someone who outranks you on the intersectional hierarchy, your views are treated as violence—threats to identity itself. On campus, statements that offend an individual’s identity have been treated as “microaggressions”–actual aggressions against another, ostensibly worthy of violence. Words, students have been told, may not break bones, but they will prompt sticks and stones, and rightly so.
Thus, protesters around the country—leftists who see verbiage as violence—have, in turn, used violence in response to ideas they hate. Leftist local authorities then use the threat of violence as an excuse to ideologically discriminate against conservatives. This means public intellectuals like Charles Murray being run off of campus and his leftist professorial cohort viciously assaulted; it means Ann Coulter being targeted for violence at Berkeley; it means universities preemptively banning me and Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Condoleezza Rice and even Jason Riley.
The campus attacks on free speech are merely the most extreme iteration of an ideology that spans from left to right: the notion that your right to free speech ends where my feelings begin. Even Democrats who say that Ann Coulter should be allowed to speak at Berkeley say that nobody should be allowed to contribute to a super PAC (unless you’re a union member, naturally).
Meanwhile, on the right, the president’s attacks on the press have convinced many Republicans that restrictions on the press wouldn’t be altogether bad. A Vanity Fair/60 Minutes poll in late April found that 36 percent of Americans thought freedom of the press “does more harm than good.” Undoubtedly, some of that is due to the media’s obvious bias. CNN’s Jeff Zucker has targeted the Trump administration for supposedly quashing journalism, but he was silent when the Obama administration’s Department of Justice cracked down on reporters from the Associated Press and Fox News, and when hacks like Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes openly sold lies regarding Iran. But for some on the right, the response to press falsities hasn’t been to call for truth, but to instead echo Trumpian falsehoods in the hopes of damaging the media. Free speech is only important when people seek the truth. Leftists traded truth for tribalism long ago; in response, many on the right seem willing to do the same. Until we return to a common standard under which facts matter, free speech will continue to rest on tenuous grounds.
Ben Shapiro is the editor in chief of The Daily Wire and the host of The Ben Shapiro Show.
Judith ShulevitzIt’s tempting to blame college and university administrators for the decline of free speech in America, and for years I did just that. If the guardians of higher education won’t inculcate the habits of mind required for serious thinking, I thought, who will? The unfettered but civil exchange of ideas is the basic operation of education, just as addition is the basic operation of arithmetic. And universities have to teach both the unfettered part and the civil part, because arguing in a respectful manner isn’t something anyone does instinctively.
So why change my mind now? Schools still cling to speech codes, and there still aren’t enough deans like the one at the University of Chicago who declared his school a safe-space-free zone. My alma mater just handed out prizes for “enhancing race and/or ethnic relations” to two students caught on video harassing the dean of their residential college, one screaming at him that he’d created “a space for violence to happen,” the other placing his face inches away from the dean’s and demanding, “Look at me.” All this because they deemed a thoughtful if ill-timed letter about Halloween costumes written by the dean’s wife to be an act of racist aggression. Yale should discipline students who behave like that, even if they’re right on the merits (I don’t think they were, but that’s not the point). They certainly don’t deserve awards. I can’t believe I had to write that sentence.
But in abdicating their responsibilites, the universities have enabled something even worse than an attack on free speech. They’ve unleashed an assault on themselves. There’s plenty of free speech around; we know that because so much bad speech—low-minded nonsense—tests our constitutional tolerance daily, and that’s holding up pretty well. (As Nicholas Lemann observes elsewhere in this symposium, Facebook and Google represent bigger threats to free speech than students and administrators.) What’s endangered is good speech.
Universities were setting themselves up to be used. Provocateurs exploit the atmosphere on campus to goad overwrought students, then gleefully trash the most important bastion of our crumbling civil society. Higher education and everything it stands for—logical argument, the scientific method, epistemological rigor—start to look illegitimate. Voters perceive tenure and research and higher education itself as hopelessly partisan and unworthy of taxpayers’ money.
The press is a secondary victim of this process of delegitimization. If serious inquiry can be waved off as ideology, then facts won’t be facts and reporting can’t be trusted. All journalism will be equal to all other journalism, and all journalists will be reduced to pests you can slam to the ground with near impunity. Politicians will be able to say anything and do just about anything and there will be no countervailing authority to challenge them. I’m pretty sure that that way lies Putinism and Erdoganism. And when we get to that point, I’m going to start worrying about free speech again.
Judith Shulevitz is a critic in New York.
Harvey SilverglateFree speech is, and has always been, threatened. The title of Nat Hentoff’s 1993 book Free Speech for Me – but Not for Thee is no less true today than at any time, even as the Supreme Court has accorded free speech a more absolute degree of protection than in any previous era.
Since the 1980s, the high court has decided most major free-speech cases in favor of speech, with most of the major decisions being unanimous or nearly so.
Women’s-rights advocates were turned back by the high court in 1986 when they sought to ban the sale of printed materials that, because deemed pornographic by some, were alleged to promote violence against women. Censorship in the name of gender–based protection thus failed to gain traction.
Despite the demands of civil-rights activists, the Supreme Court in 1992 declared cross-burning to be a protected form of expression in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, a decision later refined to strengthen a narrow exception for when cross-burning occurs primarily as a physical threat rather than merely an expression of hatred.
Other attempts at First Amendment circumvention have been met with equally decisive rebuff. When the Reverend Jerry Falwell sued Hustler magazine publisher Larry Flynt for defamation growing out of a parody depicting Falwell’s first sexual encounter as a drunken tryst with his mother in an outhouse, a unanimous Supreme Court lectured on the history of parody as a constitutionally protected, even if cruel, form of social and political criticism.
When the South Boston Allied War Veterans, sponsor of Boston’s Saint Patrick’s Day parade, sought to exclude a gay veterans’ group from marching under its own banner, the high court unanimously held that as a private entity, even though marching in public streets, the Veterans could exclude any group marching under a banner conflicting with the parade’s socially conservative message, notwithstanding public-accommodations laws. The gay group could have its own parade but could not rain on that of the conservatives.
Despite such legal clarity, today’s most potent attacks on speech are coming, ironically, from liberal-arts colleges. Ubiquitous “speech codes” limit speech that might insult, embarrass, or “harass,” in particular, members of “historically disadvantaged” groups. “Safe spaces” and “trigger warnings” protect purportedly vulnerable students from hearing words and ideas they might find upsetting. Student demonstrators and threats of violence have forced the cancellation of controversial speakers, left and right.
It remains unclear how much campus censorship results from politically correct faculty, control-obsessed student-life administrators, or students socialized and indoctrinated into intolerance. My experience suggests that the bureaucrats are primarily, although not entirely, to blame. When sued, colleges either lose or settle, pay a modest amount, and then return to their censorious ways.
This trend threatens the heart and soul of liberal education. Eventually it could infect the entire society as these students graduate and assume influential positions. Whether a resulting flood of censorship ultimately overcomes legal protections and weakens democracy remains to be seen.
Harvey Silverglate, a Boston-based lawyer and writer, is the co-author of The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America’s Campuses (Free Press, 1998). He co-founded the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education in 1999 and is on FIRE’s board of directors. He spent some three decades on the board of the ACLU of Massachusetts, two of those years as chairman. Silverglate taught at Harvard Law School for a semester during a sabbatical he took in the mid-1980s.
Christina Hoff SommersWhen Heather Mac Donald’s “blue lives matter” talk was shut down by a mob at Claremont McKenna College, the president of neighboring Pomona College sent out an email defending free speech. Twenty-five students shot back a response: “Heather Mac Donald is a fascist, a white supremacist . . . classist, and ignorant of interlocking systems of domination that produce the lethal conditions under which oppressed peoples are forced to live.”
Some blame the new campus intolerance on hypersensitive, over-trophied millennials. But the students who signed that letter don’t appear to be fragile. Nor do those who recently shut down lectures at Berkeley, Middlebury, DePaul, and Cal State LA. What they are is impassioned. And their passion is driven by a theory known as intersectionality.
Intersectionality is the source of the new preoccupation with microaggressions, cultural appropriation, and privilege-checking. It’s the reason more than 200 colleges and universities have set up Bias Response Teams. Students who overhear potentially “otherizing” comments or jokes are encouraged to make anonymous reports to their campus BRTs. A growing number of professors and administrators have built their careers around intersectionality. What is it exactly?
Intersectionality is a neo-Marxist doctrine that views racism, sexism, ableism, heterosexism, and all forms of “oppression” as interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Together these “isms” form a complex arrangement of advantages and burdens. A white woman is disadvantaged by her gender but advantaged by her race. A Latino is burdened by his ethnicity but privileged by his gender. According to intersectionality, American society is a “matrix of domination,” with affluent white males in control. Not only do they enjoy most of the advantages, they also determine what counts as “truth” and “knowledge.”
But marginalized identities are not without resources. According to one of intersectionality’s leading theorists, Patricia Collins (former president of the American Sociology Association), disadvantaged groups have access to deeper, more liberating truths. To find their voice, and to enlighten others to the true nature of reality, they require a safe space—free of microaggressive put-downs and imperious cultural appropriations. Here they may speak openly about their “lived experience.” Lived experience, according to intersectional theory, is a better guide to the truth than self-serving Western and masculine styles of thinking. So don’t try to refute intersectionality with logic or evidence: That only proves that you are part of the problem it seeks to overcome.
How could comfortably ensconced college students be open to a convoluted theory that describes their world as a matrix of misery? Don’t they flinch when they hear intersectional scholars like bell hooks refer to the U.S. as an “imperialist, white-supremacist, capitalist patriarchy”? Most take it in stride because such views are now commonplace in high-school history and social studies texts. And the idea that knowledge comes from lived experience rather than painstaking study and argument is catnip to many undergrads.
Silencing speech and forbidding debate is not an unfortunate by-product of intersectionality—it is a primary goal. How else do you dismantle a lethal system of oppression? As the protesting students at Claremont McKenna explained in their letter: “Free speech . . . has given those who seek to perpetuate systems of domination a platform to project their bigotry.” To the student activists, thinkers like Heather MacDonald and Charles Murray are agents of the dominant narrative, and their speech is “a form of violence.”
It is hard to know how our institutions of higher learning will find their way back to academic freedom, open inquiry, and mutual understanding. But as long as intersectional theory goes unchallenged, campus fanaticism will intensify.
Christina Hoff Sommers is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. She is the author of several books, including Who Stole Feminism? and The War Against Boys. She also hosts The Factual Feminist, a video blog. @Chsommers
John StosselYes, some college students do insane things. Some called police when they saw “Trump 2016” chalked on sidewalks. The vandals at Berkeley and the thugs who assaulted Charles Murray are disgusting. But they are a minority. And these days people fight back.
Someone usually videotapes the craziness. Yale’s “Halloween costume incident” drove away two sensible instructors, but videos mocking Yale’s snowflakes, like “Silence U,” make such abuse less likely. Groups like Young America’s Foundation (YAF) publicize censorship, and the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) sues schools that restrict speech.
Consciousness has been raised. On campus, the worst is over. Free speech has always been fragile. I once took cameras to Seton Hall law school right after a professor gave a lecture on free speech. Students seemed to get the concept. Sean, now a lawyer, said, “Protect freedom for thought we hate; otherwise you never have a society where ideas clash, and we come up with the best idea.” So I asked, “Should there be any limits?” Students listed “fighting words,” “shouting fire in a theater,” malicious libel, etc.— reasonable court-approved exceptions. But then they went further. Several wanted bans on “hate” speech, “No value comes out of hate speech,” said Javier. “It inevitably leads to violence.”
No it doesn’t, I argued, “Also, doesn’t hate speech bring ideas into the open, so you can better argue about them, bringing you to the truth?”
“No,” replied Floyd, “With hate speech, more speech is just violence.”
So I pulled out a big copy of the First Amendment and wrote, “exception: hate speech.”
Two students wanted a ban on flag desecration “to respect those who died to protect it.”
One wanted bans on blasphemy:
“Look at the gravity of the harm versus the value in blasphemy—the harm outweighs the value.”
Several wanted a ban on political speech by corporations because of “the potential for large corporations to improperly influence politicians.”
Finally, Jillian, also now a lawyer, wanted hunting videos banned.
“It encourages harm down the road.”
I asked her, incredulously, “you’re comfortable locking up people who make a hunting film?”
“Oh, yeah,” she said. “It’s unnecessary cruelty to feeling and sentient beings.”
So, I picked up my copy of the Bill of Rights again. After “no law . . . abridging freedom of speech,” I added: “Except hate speech, flag burning, blasphemy, corporate political speech, depictions of hunting . . . ”
That embarrassed them. “We may have gone too far,” said Sean. Others agreed. One said, “Cross out the exceptions.” Free speech survived, but it was a close call. Respect for unpleasant speech will always be thin. Then-Senator Hillary Clinton wanted violent video games banned. John McCain and Russ Feingold tried to ban political speech. Donald Trump wants new libel laws, and if you burn a flag, he tweeted, consequences might be “loss of citizenship or a year in jail!” Courts or popular opinion killed those bad ideas.
Free speech will survive, assuming those of us who appreciate it use it to fight those who would smother it.
John Stossel is a FOX News/FOX Business Network Contributor.
Warren TreadgoldEven citizens of dictatorships are free to praise the regime and to talk about the weather. The only speech likely to be threatened anywhere is the sort that offends an important and intolerant group. What is new in America today is a leftist ideology that threatens speech precisely because it offends certain important and intolerant groups: feminists and supposedly oppressed minorities.
So far this new ideology is clearly dominant only in colleges and universities, where it has become so strong that most controversies concern outside speakers invited by students, not faculty speakers or speakers invited by administrators. Most academic administrators and professors are either leftists or have learned not to oppose leftism; otherwise they would probably never have been hired. Administrators treat even violent leftist protestors with respect and are ready to prevent conservative and moderate outsiders from speaking rather than provoke protests. Most professors who defend conservative or moderate speakers argue that the speakers’ views are indeed noxious but say that students should be exposed to them to learn how to refute them. This is very different from encouraging a free exchange of ideas.
Although the new ideology began on campuses in the ’60s, it gained authority outside them largely by means of several majority decisions of the Supreme Court, from Roe (1973) to Obergefell (2015). The Supreme Court decisions that endanger free speech are based on a presumed consensus of enlightened opinion that certain rights favored by activists have the same legitimacy as rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution—or even more legitimacy, because the rights favored by activists are assumed to be so fundamental that they need no grounding in specific constitutional language. The Court majorities found restricting abortion rights or homosexual marriage, as large numbers of Americans wish to do, to be constitutionally equivalent to restricting black voting rights or interracial marriage. Any denial of such equivalence therefore opposes fundamental constitutional rights and can be considered hate speech, advocating psychological and possibly physical harm to groups like women seeking abortions or homosexuals seeking approval. Such speech may still be constitutionally protected, but acting upon it is not.
This ideology of forbidding allegedly offensive speech has spread to most of the Democratic Party and the progressive movement. Rather than seeing themselves as taking one side in a free debate, progressives increasingly argue (for example) that opposing abortion is offensive to women and supporting the police is offensive to blacks. Some politicians object so strongly to such speech that despite their interest in winning votes, they attack voters who disagree with them as racists or sexists. Expressing views that allegedly discriminate against women, blacks, homosexuals, and various other minorities can now be grounds for a lawsuit.
Speech that supposedly offends women or minorities has already cost some people their careers, their businesses, and their opportunities to deliver or hear speeches. Such intimidation is the intended result of an ideology that threatens free speech.
Warren Treadgold is a professor of history at Saint Louis University.
Matt WelchLike a sullen zoo elephant rocking back and forth from leg to leg, there is an oversized paradox we’d prefer not to see standing smack in the sightlines of most our policy debates. Day by day, even minute by minute, America simultaneously gets less free in the laboratory, but more free in the field. Individuals are constantly expanding the limits and applications of their own autonomy, even as government transcends prior restraints on how far it can reach into our intimate business.
So it is that the Internal Revenue Service can charge foreign banks with collecting taxes on U.S. citizens (therefore causing global financial institutions to shun many of the estimated 6 million-plus Americans who live abroad), even while block-chain virtuosos make illegal transactions wholly undetectable to authorities. It has never been easier for Americans to travel abroad, and it’s never been harder to enter the U.S. without showing passports, fingerprints, retinal scans, and even social-media passwords.
What’s true for banking and tourism is doubly true for free speech. Social media has given everyone not just a platform but a megaphone (as unreadable as our Facebook timelines have all become since last November). At the same time, the federal government during this unhappy 21st century has continuously ratcheted up prosecutorial pressure against leakers, whistleblowers, investigative reporters, and technology companies.
A hopeful bulwark against government encroachment unique to the free-speech field is the Supreme Court’s very strong First Amendment jurisprudence in the past decade or two. Donald Trump, like Hillary Clinton before him, may prattle on about locking up flag-burners, but Antonin Scalia and the rest of SCOTUS protected such expression back in 1990. Barack Obama and John McCain (and Hillary Clinton—she’s as bad as any recent national politician on free speech) may lament the Citizens United decision, but it’s now firmly legal to broadcast unfriendly documentaries about politicians without fear of punishment, no matter the electoral calendar.
But in this very strength lies what might be the First Amendment’s most worrying vulnerability. Barry Friedman, in his 2009 book The Will of the People, made the persuasive argument that the Supreme Court typically ratifies, post facto, where public opinion has already shifted. Today’s culture of free speech could be tomorrow’s legal framework. If so, we’re in trouble.
For evidence of free-speech slippage, just read around you. When both major-party presidential nominees react to terrorist attacks by calling to shut down corners of the Internet, and when their respective supporters are actually debating the propriety of sucker punching protesters they disagree with, it’s hard to escape the conclusion that our increasingly shrill partisan sorting is turning the very foundation of post-1800 global prosperity into just another club to be swung in our national street fight.
In the eternal cat-and-mouse game between private initiative and government control, the former is always advantaged by the latter’s fundamental incompetence. But what if the public willingly hands government the power to muzzle? It may take a counter-cultural reformation to protect this most noble of American experiments.
Matt Welch is the editor at large of Reason.
Adam. J. WhiteFree speech is indeed under threat on our university campuses, but the threat did not begin there and it will not end there. Rather, the campus free-speech crisis is a particularly visible symptom of a much more fundamental crisis in American culture.
The problem is not that some students, teachers, and administrators reject traditional American values and institutions, or even that they are willing to menace or censor others who defend those values and institutions. Such critics have always existed, and they can be expected to use the tools and weapons at their disposal. The problem is that our country seems to produce too few students, teachers, and administrators who are willing or able to respond to them.
American families produce children who arrive on campus unprepared for, or uninterested in, defending our values and institutions. For our students who are focused primarily on their career prospects (if on anything at all), “[c]ollege is just one step on the continual stairway of advancement,” as David Brooks observed 16 years ago. “They’re not trying to buck the system; they’re trying to climb it, and they are streamlined for ascent. Hence they are not a disputatious group.”
Meanwhile, parents bear incomprehensible financial burdens to get their kids through college, without a clear sense of precisely what their kids will get out of these institutions in terms of character formation or civic virtue. With so much money at stake, few can afford for their kids to pursue more than career prospects.
Those problems are not created on campus, but they are exacerbated there, as too few college professors and administrators see their institutions as cultivators of American culture and republicanism. Confronted with activists’ rage, they offer no competing vision of higher education—let alone a compelling one.
Ironically, we might borrow a solution from the Left. Where progressives would leverage state power in service of their health-care agenda, we could do the same for education. State legislatures and governors, recognizing the present crisis, should begin to reform and renegotiate the fundamental nature of state universities. By making state universities more affordable, more productive, and more reflective of mainstream American values, they will attract students—and create incentives for competing private universities to follow suit.
Let’s hope they do it soon, for what’s at stake is much more than just free speech on campus, or even free speech writ large. In our time, as in Tocqueville’s, “the instruction of the people powerfully contributes to the support of a democratic republic,” especially “where instruction which awakens the understanding is not separated from moral education which amends the heart.” We need our colleges to cultivate—not cut down—civic virtue and our capacity for self-government. “Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form,” Madison wrote in Federalist 55. If “there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government,” then “nothing less than the chains of despotism” can restrain us “from destroying and devouring one another.”
Adam J. White is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Cathy YoungA writer gets expelled from the World Science Fiction Convention for criticizing the sci-fi community’s preoccupation with racial and gender “inclusivity” while moderating a panel. An assault on free speech, or an exercise of free association? How about when students demand the disinvitation of a speaker—or disrupt the speech? When a critic of feminism gets banned from a social-media platform for unspecified “abuse”?
Such questions are at the heart of many recent free-speech controversies. There is no censorship by government; but how concerned should we be when private actors effectively suppress unpopular speech? Even in the freest society, some speech will—and should—be considered odious and banished to unsavory fringes. No one weeps for ostracized Holocaust deniers or pedophilia apologists.
But shunned speech needs to remain a narrow exception—or acceptable speech will inexorably shrink. As current Federal Communications Commission chairman Ajit Pai cautioned last year, First Amendment protections will be hollowed out unless undergirded by cultural values that support a free marketplace of ideas.
Sometimes, attacks on speech come from the right. In 2003, an Iraq War critic, reporter Chris Hedges, was silenced at Rockford College in Illinois by hecklers who unplugged the microphone and rushed the stage; some conservative pundits defended this as robust protest. Yet the current climate on the left—in universities, on social media, in “progressive” journalism, in intellectual circles—is particularly hostile to free expression. The identity-politics left, fixated on subtle oppressions embedded in everyday attitudes and language, sees speech-policing as the solution.
Is hostility to free-speech values on the rise? New York magazine columnist Jesse Singal argues that support for restrictions on public speech offensive to minorities has remained steady, and fairly high, since the 1970s. Perhaps. But the range of what qualifies as offensive—and which groups are to be shielded—has expanded dramatically. In our time, a leading liberal magazine, the New Republic, can defend calls to destroy a painting of lynching victim Emmett Till because the artist is white and guilty of “cultural appropriation,” and a feminist academic journal can be bullied into apologizing for an article on transgender issues that dares to mention “male genitalia.”
There is also a distinct trend of “bad” speech being squelched by coercion, not just disapproval. That includes the incidents at Middlebury College in Vermont and at Claremont McKenna in California, where mobs not only prevented conservative speakers—Charles Murray and Heather Mac Donald—from addressing audiences but physically threatened them as well. It also includes the use of civil-rights legislation to enforce goodthink in the workplace: Businesses may face stiff fines if they don’t force employees to call a “non-binary” co-worker by the singular “they,” even when talking among themselves.
These trends make a mockery of liberalism and enable the kind of backlash we have seen with Donald Trump’s election. But the backlash can bring its own brand of authoritarianism. It’s time to start rebuilding the culture of free speech across political divisions—a project that demands, above all, genuine openness and intellectual consistency. Otherwise it will remain, as the late, great Nat Hentoff put it, a call for “free speech for me, but not for thee.”
Cathy Young is a contributing editor at Reason.
Robert J. ZimmerFree speech is not a natural feature of human society. Many people are comfortable with free expression for views they agree with but would withhold this privilege for those they deem offensive. People justify such restrictions by various means: the appeal to moral certainty, political agendas, demand for change, opposing change, retaining power, resisting authority, or, more recently, not wanting to feel uncomfortable. Moral certainty about one’s views or a willingness to indulge one’s emotions makes it easy to assert that others are doing true damage or creating unacceptable offense simply by presenting a fundamentally different perspective.
The resulting challenges to free expression may come in the form of laws, threats, pressure (whether societal, group, or organizational), or self-censorship in the face of a prevailing consensus. Specific forms of challenge may be more or less pronounced as circumstances vary. But the widespread temptation to consider the silencing of “objectionable” viewpoints as acceptable implies that the challenge to free expression is always present.
The United States today is no exception. We benefit from the First Amendment, which asserts that the government shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. However, fostering a society supporting free expression involves matters far beyond the law. The ongoing and increasing demonization of one group by another creates a political and social environment conducive to suppressing speech. Even violent acts opposing speech can become acceptable or encouraged. Such behavior is evident at both political rallies and university events. Our greatest current threat to free expression is the emergence of a national culture that accepts the legitimacy of suppression of speech deemed objectionable by a segment of the population.
University and college campuses present a particularly vivid instance of this cultural shift. There have been many well-publicized episodes of speakers being disinvited or prevented from speaking because of their views. However, the problem is much deeper, as there is significant self-censorship on many campuses. Both faculty and students sometimes find themselves silenced by social and institutional pressures to conform to “acceptable” views. Ironically, the very mission of universities and colleges to provide a powerful and deeply enriching education for their students demands that they embrace and protect free expression and open discourse. Failing to do so significantly diminishes the quality of the education they provide.
My own institution, the University of Chicago, through the words and actions of its faculty and leaders since its founding, has asserted the importance of free expression and its essential role in embracing intellectual challenge. We continue to do so today as articulated by the Chicago Principles, which strongly affirm that “the University’s fundamental commitment is to the principle that debate or deliberation may not be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by some or even by most members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed.” It is only in such an environment that universities can fulfill their own highest aspirations and provide leadership by demonstrating the value of free speech within society more broadly. A number of universities have joined us in reinforcing these values. But it remains to be seen whether the faculty and leaders of many institutions will truly stand up for these values, and in doing so provide a model for society as a whole.
Robert J. Zimmer is the president of the University of Chicago.