A consensus has been developing lately on what the main problem is in the Middle East, and what needs to…
A consensus has been developing lately on what the main problem is in the Middle East, and what needs to be done about it. This consensus is shared by a large and growing majority of the international community, including most Western diplomats, our European allies, business executives in the United States and Europe, and many intellectuals, policy analysts, and political observers. It includes people who would otherwise line up on widely divergent or even opposing political sides. In the United States, for example, it is not only many Democratic and Republican foreign-policy analysts who share in this consensus, but the conservative, business-oriented Right and the radical Left. Indeed, it is the only thing that Time magazine, John Connally, Jesse Jackson, Bechtel, the Fluor Corporation, Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., J. William Fulbright, George Ball, the Nation, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Jimmy Carter, and Gerald Ford have in common.
The main tenets of the consensus are that the Camp David accords are an insufficient basis for seeking peace in the Middle East; that the PLO (or at least a dominant faction within it) is prepared to accept peace with Israel in return for Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank, the Gaza strip, and East Jerusalem, and in return for the establishment of a PLO state; that Saudi Arabia is a moderate force, a country whose wealth and leadership can be relied upon to aid the pursuit of peace; that enhancing the security of the states of the Persian Gulf is a means of insuring energy supplies and also of protecting Western interests; and that the major impediment to a policy based on the foregoing propositions is the Jews of the United States—just as, in the Middle East, Prime Minister Begin’s government is the cause of the current crisis.
These ideas are starkly different from those held by elite opinion just a few years ago. There have, of course, always been deep divisions in America about our Middle East policy. The difference now lies in the widespread acceptance of attitudes previously considered quite controversial: disillusionment with Israel, willingness to deal with the PLO, growing faith in Saudi Arabia. Since these attitudes are not shared by the majority of American Jews, they have inevitably generated conflict when they have been put to the test of policy, as in the bitter fight over the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia. One palpable consequence of the new consensus is that it has inhibited the exploration of alternative U.S. policies in the Middle East.
How did this new approach emerge so rapidly over the last few years? For one thing, there is the increased power and leverage available to the Arab oil producers as a consequence of the world energy crisis. It is true that the recent oil glut has somewhat dissipated the effect of that leverage, but despite the current surplus, the OPEC price of oil is still punishingly high—the same barrel which cost $12.70 in 1979 now costs $34.00—and the sums accruing to the oil producers are correspondingly vast. Saudia Arabia is expected to earn $1.69 trillion in oil revenue in the 1980’s. Such a sum will buy huge commercial and arms contracts for the growing Saudi industrial infrastructure. It will also buy Washington lobbyists and support for Saudi programs and policies from those who profit from them.
What motivates the corporate-Right sector in this regard is clear: the Saudis possess both money and oil in quantities large enough to fuel passions for profit aplenty. What is less easily explainable is the support Saudi Arabia receives from the Left. After all, the Riyadh government may be exotic but it is not exactly a paragon of human rights or civil liberties. Indeed, on the surface, it is precisely the type of repressive right-wing regime that in Latin America, Africa, and Asia would be an object of opprobrium. Yet whatever the Saudis’ internal practices, externally they support left-wing regimes and movements, and primarily the PLO, with its network of contact and support within radical movements worldwide, as well as governments like those of Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the Saudis, like most American leftists and many liberals, are opposed to U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. They recently offered the Omanis a $1.2 billion bribe to terminate their involvement with the U.S., and they will not allow American troops on their own soil. The Saudi unwillingness to cooperate with U.S. foreign-policy aims in the Middle East provides an additional source of appeal to the Left.
Another important factor in the development of the new consensus is the sympathy which has grown for the Palestinian cause among the Western intellectual elite. In the post-1967 period the Palestinians have come to be successfully depicted as dispossessed and long-suffering anti-imperialists, while Israel has come to be associated with a variety of intellectually discredited causes: imperialism, colonialism, racism, anti-Communism. That the PLO sought and still seeks to displace Israel as a whole has been a fact largely denied in the interests of forming this new intellectual attitude.
The consensus of opinion leads inexorably to policy implications. Given the widespread nature of the consensus, it is not surprising that several of these policies are already being adopted—though they differ markedly from approaches pursued in previous years.
First, since a settlement of the Palestinian question is seen as central to American interests, both diplomatic and corporate, those who accept the consensus usually favor dealing with the PLO directly—as do, of course, those who view such dealings as the path toward a just resolution of the Palestinian issue.
Second, the prevailing consensus reinforces a traditional State Department preference for comprehensive approaches to Arab-Israeli problems. Most U.S. officials would clearly like to see a rapprochement between Egypt and its Arab critics, and especially between Cairo and Riyadh. Yet given the uncompromising stance taken in most Arab capitals toward Israel, Egypt’s reemergence within the Arab world can only occur realistically through a “broadening”—i.e., an abandonment—of the Camp David framework. That is a price advocates of the consensus are ready to pay, and in pursuit of this goal they have pointed to the failure of the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel to produce an agreed-upon solution to the Palestinian problem, and hence to the need for an alternative to Camp David.
Third, the consensus leads toward a concentration on Saudi Arabia as a pillar—if not the single pillar—of U.S. policy in the Gulf and perhaps the Middle East as a whole. To bolster the Saudi regime—seen as the crucial element in spreading the peace and in maintaining stability throughout the region as a whole—a policy of massive arms sales has been advanced, and justified as being in the strategic interests of the United States.
Fourth, adherents of the consensus favor putting pressure on Israel to agree to major concessions, and tend to view with skepticism or hostility Israel’s justifications of its position. Not surprisingly, this stance has led to tensions in the “special relationship” between Israel and the U.S. In the first year of the Reagan administration, multiple crises occurred between the two countries over such issues as the U.S. sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia; the significance of the placement of Syrian missiles in Lebanon; the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Beirut; the Fahd plan for a Middle East settlement; the application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights; and so forth. In each of these situations the reflex reaction of the nation’s foreign-policy elite, both inside and outside the government, was to find fault with Israeli actions and explanations. On three occasions in 1981, indeed, the U.S. broke written agreements with Israel in order to punish behavior seen as unjustified—a tribute to the growing confidence of the consensus position.
Finally, the belief has taken hold that the American Jewish community has too much “power,” which it exercises in blind support of Israel’s policy whether or not that policy coincides with the national interests of the United States. To a number of advocates of the consensus position, something needs to be done, and soon, about the influence of the Jewish “lobby” in Washington.
Is there anything to be said, on the merits, for the new consensus? Unfortunately there is not. Its assumptions are flawed, its analysis is inaccurate, and the tactics it espouses are unlikely to achieve the objectives of peace and stability for which they are presumably designed.
With respect to the PLO, the questions that immediately arise are whether that organization has indeed become more moderate, whether its objectives are compatible with our own, and what a policy of dealing with the PLO would bring about.
Many supporters of the Palestinian cause assert that it is only domestic politics which has prevented the United States from dealing directly with an essentially moderate PLO. But the record reveals a very different picture: Palestinian Arab politics is a case history in the institutional refusal to compromise. Long before the United States set conditions for talking with the PLO, the Palestinians had repeatedly rejected any partition of the British Mandate, and in 1947 rejected the United Nations partition plan. In 1975 the U.S. set only two minimal conditions to direct negotiations with the PLO—recognition of Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO was not even asked to abjure terrorism or to rewrite its national covenant, which calls not only for the destruction of Israel but also for the departure from the country of most of its Jewish inhabitants. Yet PLO policy still did not change. In 1977 the Carter administration, in overtures to the PLO, suggested that mere acceptance of UN Resolution 242 would suffice as a minimal condition—but the PLO spurned even this opportunity for a major diplomatic breakthrough, as it subsequently refused to join the Camp David peace process, which won back for Anwar Sadat all the Egyptian territory captured in 1967. Instead, the PLO continued its long-standing campaign of terror and murder directed at any West Bank or Gaza leaders suspected of peaceful inclinations. Today the PLO remains firmly opposed to “American imperialism” and continues to maintain close association with the USSR from which it still receives directly or indirectly the major portion of its supplies and equipment.
Many observers argue that if the PLO came to power, these problems would largely disappear. Citing hints from individual spokesmen, they claim that the PLO would move away from the Soviet Union once its objectives were achieved. Given the internal differences and disunity within the organization, such isolated hints are meaningless. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that a PLO mini-state on the West Bank would not have irredentist goals—against Israel and Jordan and perhaps Lebanon as well—and the Soviet Union would still be the power most able and willing to assist such aims. A weak and internally divided Palestinian state would be a home to terrorist tendencies. A strong one might rapidly overturn any restrictions placed upon it and confront the United States with a dilemma even more unpalatable than the difficulties we face today. Either we would have to cave in and accept the new realities, with devastating results to the area’s stability and our own credibility, or we would have to become the protector of a weakened Israel, which would place us in a far more uncomfortable position than in the past.
The proponents of a PLO state ask us to believe that the Palestinians, a destabilizing force in other countries, would suddenly become a stabilizing force for the entire region. They base this conclusion on the idea that terrorists—in this case the PLO under Arafat—become moderate once they are running their own government. Supporters of this position often cite Menachem Begin’s transformation from guerrilla leader to Prime Minister. But even if one ignores the historical difference that Begin’s Irgun focused on military targets while the PLO attacks innocent women and children, there is the even more crucial difference that Begin did not achieve power until almost thirty years after the establishment of the Jewish state. Indeed, it is doubtful that the Zionists would have received the public support they did during the 1940’s if Begin had represented the movement instead of being the leader of a minority, and a tiny minority at that. The Zionists were led in those years by such men as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion—there are no analogous moderate figures in the PLO today.
The notion that PLO leaders will be transformed upon achieving power blinks the many examples of the opposite tendency. To cite but a few recent “terrorist statesmen”: Idi Amin in Uganda, Pol Pot in Cambodia, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq. American hostages in Iran were held not by a subsidiary terrorist group but by a sovereign government. Indeed, there is far more evidence that terrorists continue to employ terrorist methods when they become leaders of sovereign governments than evidence to the contrary.
Nor would the presence of a PLO state help resolve the problems faced by the United States in the area. In the last few years we have seen the replacement of the Shah of Iran by an unstable and anti-American regime; a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the strengthening of Soviet bases of operations in South Yemen and Ethiopia; a war between the two Yemens, and another between the oil-producing states of Iran and Iraq. None of these developments was connected to the Palestinian question. A PLO state is not going to resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict, the problem of internal instability in the Gulf, the future of Iran, Afghanistan, or the Horn of Africa, or the problem of Libya’s expansionist designs. There is also no reason to believe that a PLO state would help the U.S. gain bases on Saudi soil, or bring about changes in OPEC or Saudi oil policy, or result in reduced oil revenues in Arab coffers. The contrary is more likely.
For all these reasons, working for the creation of a PLO state is decidedly not in American interests.
If the new consenus is simply wrong in its assessment of the possible role of the PLO, its position on the need to expand the Camp David framework is a more complex matter. It is true that the autonomy talks, after two and a half years, have not succeeded in producing an agreement; yet the question remains of what alternatives are available, and what are the implications of a different course of action.
For many people the autonomy talks have been tainted from the outset through being associated with the original agreement between Egypt and Israel, which was of course rejected by the Saudis on the “Right” and the PLO on the “Left.” Many who now declare the autonomy framework to be at or near demise were actually convinced from the outset that the talks could not succeed.
The death notices for Camp David ignore the successes achieved in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship itself. And as for the autonomy talks, extenuating circumstances have undoubtedly slowed progress. These circumstances include the intrinsic difficulties and complexities of the issues, which demand time and patience to resolve; the delays caused by the U.S. and Israeli elections; such external developments as American preoccupation with the Iranian hostages and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and 1980, the Syrian missile crisis, and the Israeli raid on Osirak in the spring of 1981; the assassination of Anwar Sadat; the opposition to the talks of supposedly pro-Western Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan) as well as of elements within two successive American administrations; and a whole series of specific events which have sent unfortunate signals to both the Israelis and the Egyptians. Over the last two years there has been little opportunity for the autonomy discussions to be conducted with complete seriousness, undisturbed by the maneuvering of players seeking to destroy them. Domestic politics in both Egypt and Israel have often added to the confusion.
Nevertheless, premature declarations that the venture is doomed are misplaced. The implicit assumption behind such declarations is that there are viable alternatives. Yet outside the autonomy framework the prospects for a successful agreement appear even less likely. If Israel and Egypt, who have already agreed on peace between themselves, cannot agree on a plan for the West Bank and Gaza, why should other participants, who have demonstrated less interest in peace, be more accommodating? The United States has consistently failed to convince King Hussein of Jordan to join the talks. Other possibilities—a Geneva conference, a meeting at the United Nations or under UN auspices—all involve the USSR and raise the question of how to handle PLO involvement.
Those who support an alternative to Camp David never explain how it would be possible to coax Israel into a process whose rules and format will inevitably be less advantageous to it than the discussions with Egypt. Since 1974, the Egyptian-Israeli dialogue has been the only viable arena for Middle East negotiations. It has already produced four agreements—the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement of January 1974, Sinai II in September 1975, the Camp David accords, and the peace treaty of March 1979. All of these ultimately successful negotiations were accompanied by gloomy predictions and an atmosphere of crisis. In 1975 Henry Kissinger, and in 1977 Jimmy Carter, toyed with the idea of broadening the process, only to discover that such a course of action was not viable. In the autonomy talks Cairo and Jerusalem are dealing not with relations between each other but with the incredibly more complex Palestinian question. It is not surprising that progress has been slow.
Since the negotiators are constantly being given artificial deadlines beyond which autonomy is supposed to be doomed, it may be useful to recall the fate of previous timetables. It took Henry Kissinger thirty-three days and many missed deadlines to conclude a disengagement agreement with Syria in 1974. He arbitrarily set March 1975 as the point after which negotiations on Sinai II would fail; they succeeded in August. At Camp David, December 1978 was set as the point of agreement on an Egyptian-Israeli’ peace treaty; success occurred in March 1979. Diplomacy is not a labor negotiation; though deadlines may on occasion be useful, it is psychologically debilitating for those involved continually to face junctures after which the opportunity for negotiations is assumed to have passed. It is especially damaging when accompanied by a constant diplomatic flirtation with those opposed to the process. As hints and rumors mount of a new approach (such as one centering on the Fahd plan), both sides are bound to become nervous. With other parties clamoring for PLO involvement in a settlement, the pressures on Egypt and Israel increase. Cairo is forced to insist on conditions that will inevitably lead to an independent Palestinian state, and Israel is forced to intensify its efforts to prevent that outcome.
It is often forgotten that the autonomy talks are not intended to design the permanent future of the West Bank or the Palestinian question. According to the original agreement, they are only supposed to create a set of conditions—ground rules of authority and administration, including a self-governing council—which will last for five years, with negotiations on a permanent solution to begin by the end of the third year. This framework provides a period for trial and error and further negotiations.
Pressures from within and without the region detract from this timetable. Both sides calculate that in such an atmosphere, their position after an agreement will be weakened. In a negative international climate each side is likely to conclude that it is better off without any agreement than with one that does not protect it from increased criticism and pressure.
Here the U.S. role becomes especially crucial. Washington may not be the sole determinant of success or failure, but as the most powerful participant, and the only one of the three not directly affected by the issues, it wields enormous influence. Success is unlikely so long as U.S. leaders are hesitant to back Camp David and so long as both sides anticipate future U.S. pressure or dramatic unilateral action. The U.S. may not be able to determine what Egypt and Israel do, but it can encourage success by avoiding urgency or desperation on the one hand, and indifference on the other.
A major impetus for altering the Camp David framework is Saudi opposition to the process. Yet paradoxically the notion continues to hold sway that the Saudis are essential for spreading the peace negotiations beyond Egypt and Israel. Ronald Reagan has become the prime proponent of this theory:
. . . I believe the Saudis are the key to spreading the peace throughout the Mideast instead of just having it confined to Israel and Egypt.
The idea that the Saudis are critical to U.S. efforts in the Middle East has historical origins dating back to the 1930’s. During World War II Saudi Arabia was the only noncombatant to receive lend-lease aid. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis President Eisenhower toyed with the idea of building up the Saudis into a counterweight to Nasser’s Egypt as a vehicle for U.S. influence throughout the Arab world. On each of his eleven trips to the Middle East as Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger visited Saudi Arabia. The roots of the current Saudi position of honor are traceable to the aftermath of the October 1973 war; since then, Saudi prestige has grown. With the fall of the Shah, Washington began to view the Saudis as the last pillar of U.S. policy in the Gulf. Now, in an administration committed to a world view valuing dollar diplomacy and monetary power, the Saudis are regarded as the linchpin of U.S. policy in the Middle East as a whole, and critical to expanding the peace process.
This perspective on the Saudis is based on fundamental assumptions about their internal stability at home and the reliability of their foreign policy. Thus, the huge Saudi family is pictured as in control of an intricate system in which a delicate compromise has been accomplished between religion and politics, the needs of tradition and the opportunities of modernization. In their regional role, the Saudis are seen by the consensus as an important anti-Communist, pro-Western instrument during a disturbing period of upheaval. Not only are they important for progress in the Arab-Israeli dispute, but they will also use their wealth and influence to bring settlements to intra-Arab conflicts (as in Lebanon), to coax countries like Egypt and Somalia away from the Soviet Union, to withstand any onslaught—military or ideological—from the Ayatollah’s Iran. In energy matters, the Saudis are seen as responsible leaders who will maintain stability against such radicals as Libya and Iraq.
The fact that this image of the Saudis is inaccurate has serious implications for the course on which U.S. policy is currently embarked. Although Saudi Arabia’s moderation has become an article of faith to most Westerners dealing with the Middle East, it is a mirage. The Saudis have established their dominant position in the Arabian peninsula in this century by aggressive expansionism, by the breaking of agreements, and by an imperialistic foreign policy. Throughout this period they have been one of the least compromising of the Arab states toward Jews and Zionist aspirations. As leaders of the Muslim world, they also have a long history of hostility toward the West.
Saudi Arabia, a country with a small population and a turbulent history, is undergoing social and political upheaval as a consequence of newly acquired petro-billions. The notion that this fragile state can lead the Arab world to a new era of peace with Israel would be laughable if it were not being embraced by many of the most powerful people in the world. In his news conference aboard Air Force One returning from President Sadat’s funeral, Jimmy Carter expressed the contradictory views which have become typical of the American attitude toward the Saudis:
. . . Sadat became,’ in public at least, a pariah among the Arabs. But when I would meet with the Arab leaders, the Saudis in particular, they were hoping that this peace process would succeed. But it’s almost impossible for an Arab to step forward because of a threat of assassination or violence within their own fragile government. They don’t have the stability of a Sadat, Jordan has a weak nation. He [Hussein] is a weak leader. And the same with [Syrian President Hafez] Assad, who has a minority position in his own country. And, of course, the Saudi Arabians also have a fragile country with a tiny population, no great military strength and enormous wealth. So they don’t have the courage of Sadat and they don’t have the solid foundation that Sadat had of support of his people.
Carter argued as if political fragility and support for peace were synonymous. We are repeatedly asked by him and others to believe that the Saudis are in favor of the peace process even though they have often stated that they regard Israel—not the Soviet Union—as their principal adversary. We are also asked to ignore the effort they have expended to undermine the Camp David agreements, not only by supporting radicals like Syria and the PLO but by using their wealth to keep such states as Morocco and Jordan from supporting the accords, and by cutting off financial assistance to Egypt. The Fahd plan, recently offered as proof of Saudi moderation, is only a series of demands for Israeli concessions with no provisions for negotiation or compromise. How different the post-1979 period in the Middle East would have been if Saudi influence had truly been exercised in favor of American efforts.
Despite its money and oil, Saudi Arabia is a backward society, with weak political institutions, suffering from the shock of sudden urbanization and a potentially explosive maldistribution of wealth. Its leadership must strike a balance between the 18th and 20th centuries, between Islamic revivalism and the impact of Western culture. These are not conditions which encourage confidence in a solid future.
Nor, contrary to the widespread image, has Saudi Arabia acted as America’s ally within OPEC. Saudi actions are guided by geological realities and the principles of economic self-interest. The Saudis do not link their decisions on production and price to progress in the Arab-Israeli dispute or to attitudes of amity, common culture, or partnership with the United States. Not only did they institute the original embargo in 1973, but they have continued to exact tribute from the West when and as they could. U.S. Senate approval of the sale of sixty F-15’s to Saudi Arabia was followed within a year not by a reduction but by a trebling of the price of oil. The announced sale of the AWACS was followed twenty-four hours later by a cut in production and a price rise of $2.00 in the cost of a barrel of oil. (After five hundred days, from this price increase alone, the Saudis will have paid for the $8.5 billion arms package.) Meanwhile, the countries which continue to suffer the most from OPEC actions are those Third World nations unfortunate enough to lack energy supplies and therefore compelled to sacrifice their future economic security on the altar of increased costs. The resulting chaos in many of these countries is likely to provide fertile ground for upheaval and subversion.
The consensus thus endorses a policy toward the Persian Gulf which is fundamentally antithetical to American global aims. It is also antithetical to the aims of Saudi Arabia’s friends both on the Left and the Right. Despite the Left’s solicitude for the Third World, the Saudis and their OPEC allies are major contributors to the expanded debt and economic decline of many of these states over the last decade. And notwithstanding the Left’s concern to prevent nuclear proliferation, the Saudis have been major financial backers of a potential Pakistani nuclear weapon. On the other side, despite the Right’s concern with the problem of international terrorism, the Saudi Arabia it wishes to strengthen is the major financial backer of the PLO—the leading terrorist organization in the world, whose guerrillas are active against American objectives even in Central America. Saudi funds also contribute to the purchase of Soviet arms in the Middle East.
Accepting the consensus on Saudi Arabia leads to a completely self-cancelling policy. The U.S. supports an Egyptian-Israeli peace, but the Saudis work to undermine it. We oppose terrorism, but the Saudis finance it. We oppose Russian advances in the area, but the Saudis indirectly assist the strengthening of the Soviet position. The consensus is leading the United States into a vise. If the current Riyadh regime survives, American dependence on Saudi insecurity and uncertainty will likely increase. If it is overthrown, the radical forces in the area will likely emerge even stronger.
In either case, the Saudis will be unable (and perhaps unwilling) to withstand Soviet gains, as the American position declines further. The current direction of U.S. policy with respect to Saudi Arabia is leading to potential disaster.
The approach one takes to arms sales in the Persian Gulf is determined largely by the interpretation one accepts of the reliability and stability of the regimes there. Since 1973, the U.S. alone has agreed to sell Saudi Arabia $42.5 billion worth of military equipment. Riyadh has become America’s largest purchaser of weapons, accounting for 36 percent of all U.S. foreign military sales since 1973. In 1970, it ranked thirty-fifth in world military expenditures and spent $.4 billion on arms; in 1980, by contrast, it ranked sixth, spending $20.7 billion, more per citizen on “defense” ($2,500) than any other country in the world. In 1981, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Saudi figure was up to $27.7 billion. (By comparison, the Israelis in 1981 spent $7.3 billion, the Italians $8.9 billion, and the Japanese $11.5 billion.) Given the mutually compatible addictions of the West to cash and the Arabs to arms, this process will surely continue. While the profit motive is not inconsequential, however, ultimately our government’s approval of these arms sales rests on the premise that Saudi Arabia can survive and will work in consonance with American interests.
A truer understanding of Saudi Arabia than the one prevailing in Washington leads to very different conclusions. In general, it is difficult to understand how the tiny and ill-prepared armed forces of the Gulf will assimilate the West’s most sophisticated weaponry without suffering serious internal instability and the leaking of Western secrets to radical and pro-Soviet elements. It is even more difficult to fathom how these massive shipments of arms will enhance Western security or even insure the stable flow of energy supplies. As the fall of the Shah and the Iran-Iraq war should have amply demonstrated, sophisticated arms are more likely to advance regional disintegration than stability, and hence to facilitate the rise of radical forces.
Massive arms sales to Saudi Arabia also raise the potential of future conflict between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Although Western analysts focus on the Persian Gulf, the Saudis have continued to demonstrate their concern about Israel by upgrading three bases near its territory, at Tabuq, Turaif, and Quraiyat. Thus, Saudi Arabia is rapidly becoming a confrontation state with Israel. By the second half of this decade, the forces of the two countries could become involved in combat, either directly or in a more general regional conflict. It was certainly not in the American interest to create this additional catalyst of Middle East tensions.
As Robert W. Tucker has repeatedly pointed out in these pages,1 the most important effect of these sales is to grant American officials a false sense of confidence that U.S. security interests in the area will be protected. The Saudis themselves have made it clear that—regardless of F-15’s and AWACS—they will not permit the expansion of U.S. facilities and are opposed to the presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf. To judge from past behavior, it is inconceivable that the U.S. will be able to control the future uses by Saudi Arabia of this weaponry or that the two countries will establish a working partnership, especially since the Saudis—if they survive—mean to pursue a more nonaligned policy.
When other arguments fail, the supporters of arms sales rely on the proposition that unless we sell, the Europeans will. This curious posture abrogates our responsibility for our own policy and our leadership in the Western alliance. It also assumes an equivalence between American and European equipment which the Arab states of the area obviously do not accept; otherwise they would deal with the Europeans exclusively and avoid the political controversies that arise when they buy in the U.S. As in the case of AWACS, U.S. equipment is often irreplaceable. Moreover, we can hardly expect to influence allied policy when we ourselves have taken the lead in the sale of weapons. One suspects the Europeans are being used as excuses for policies determined on other grounds.
It is also said that if we do not sell, the Gulf states will purchase their weapons from the Russians. This reveals the total lack of faith in the reliability of particular client states in the area which American policy-makers are otherwise at pains to deny. What is worse, it surrenders to the Kremlin the initiative for determining our policy. By offering weapons to the Gulf states the Soviets cannot lose. Either they will acquire new clients or they will goad the U.S. into damaging its own interests by overarming individual countries to counter potential Russian moves.
All this is yet a further reflection of the tendency within the consensus to accept the demands of local states as the basis for determining U.S. policy. In this way our policy becomes hostage to regimes that are too divided to fend for themselves and too weak to do us any good.
The question remains as to whether the consensus is accurate in its criticism of Israel and in particular the government of Prime Minister Begin.
Begin’s is not the first Israeli government to annoy the United States. Such tensions have been endemic to the relationship from the outset. One President, for example, threatened that if Israel did not withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory immediately and did not alter its negotiating strategy, “this government would have no other course than to undertake a substantial review of its attitude toward Israel.” The President so furious with Israeli actions was not Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, or Reagan, but Harry Truman at the end of 1948.
It is difficult to imagine any Israeli government that would accept the policies advocated by the new consensus. While Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State, long before Begin became Prime Minister, many U.S. officials were labeling Israeli policy “intransigent.” Israel was accused of having a weak, collegial government incapable of making the necessary concessions. When in mid-1977 the country elected a strong leadership, which then proceeded to make the most sweeping concessions in the nation’s history, the criticism only continued.
This particular pattern has been in place ever since October 1973, when it began to appear to Western elites that the solution to the energy crisis lay in an Arab-Israeli settlement. Recently Richard Nixon attracted shocked attention when he denounced America’s Jews and the Begin government for their opposition to the AWACS sale, but as early as December 1973 he had told a group of Governors:
The only way we’re going to solve the crisis is to end the oil embargo, and the only way we’re going to end the embargo is to get the Israelis to act reasonable. I hate to use the word blackmail, but we’ve got to do some things to get them to behave.
By 1975, Zbigniew Brzezinski was writing:
It is impossible to seek a resolution to the energy problem without tackling head-on—and doing so in an urgent fashion—the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without a settlement of that issue in the near future, any stable arrangement in the energy area is simply not possible.
These attitudes have not been affected either by the fall of the Shah or the Iran-Iraq war (both unrelated to Israel) or, on the other hand, by Israel’s agreement to return to Egypt the oilfields, air bases, and settlements of the Sinai.
The Begin government’s hawkish style and its tendency to invite international isolation are undeniably factors to be taken into consideration. But what is ignored in all the tactical and even the substantive criticisms of the Begin government are the actual concessions it has already made—which are enormous—and the continuing unwillingness of most Arab countries to accept a peace process which does not guarantee their maximal demands from the outset.
The critical question, however, is not Begin’s flexibility or lack of it, but whether or not the American policies he opposes are in fact in American interests. To advocates of the consensus, Begin is a disaster because he is trying to prevent its ideas from being adopted and effected. But if the consensus is wrong in its estimate of American interests, Begin appears in an altogether different light. The question then becomes how the U.S. and Israel can work together on such mutual concerns as the peace process and strategic cooperation, goals for which America has as much responsibility as Israel.
The recent application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights and the American response to it—suspension of the strategic cooperation agreement—are symptomatic of what is wrong with the U.S.-Israel relationship. The episode reflects a shocking lack of understanding by each side of developments within the other. As a consequence, both governments are currently taking actions that strengthen those who advocate a more independent policy line.
Prime Minister Begin’s decision to extend Israeli law to the Golan may have been superb domestic politics; it preempted Israeli hawks who have been opposed to the withdrawal from Sinai and who have been arguing for intervention in Lebanon. The act itself was of minimal scope—only ratifying the application of Israeli law which had operated de facto in the area since 1969—and it was followed by a statement by Israel’s ambassador to the UN that all issues in dispute with Syria remained negotiable. But in terms of Israel’s relations with the United States it was at best ill-advised, reflecting a lack of recognition of the new consensus here.
On the American side, the suspension of the strategic accord represented the kind of overreaction which is built into the consensus, with its demand for placing distance between the United States and Israel. If American officials genuinely believed that the accord was in U.S. interests, then its suspension was irrational. If strategic cooperation was not considered useful to the U.S., the agreement should not have been concluded in the first place. The agreement was originally favored by those within the administration who believed it would serve as a means of controlling Israel (others feared that it would interfere with future American operations in the area and would dampen the possibilities of cooperation with the Arab states). The agreement, a payoff for the conflict with Israel over the AWACS, was justified as a means of preventing unexpected and unwanted actions by the Israeli government. In the course of internal administration wrangling, the agreement was so diluted that it ended up aligning Jerusalem with the United States against the Soviet Union for no discernible reward in return. Thus one had the worst of both worlds: both governments were dissatisfied with the outcome, Washington because it went too far and Jerusalem because it did not go far enough, Not surprisingly, within days of its conclusion it became the cause rather than the cure of future tension.
There is a disingenuous quality to the constant criticism of Israel. Intransigent or immoderate Arab actions are explained away by reference to internal or regional developments: the Saudis are afraid of the radicals; Arafat is a moderate but cannot act without the extremists in the PLO; Assad is worried about his internal opposition; etc. But when Menachem Begin, the leader of a democratic government, takes account of his opposition, somehow this is regarded as impermissible.
The contradiction in U.S. attitudes is reinforced by Israel’s standing as an ally, and as a particularly friendly one at that. By now most West European countries—however democratic—do not share America’s global outlook. Israel, unlike most of its Arab neighbors, does. But this very acceptance of America’s global philosophy has been turned into a liability; Israeli contributions to American interests are taken for granted, and even denigrated. Great powers that treat their loyal allies with contempt should not be surprised when those (and other) allies begin to turn against them.
The bipartisan consensus presupposes tension and crisis with Israel. Indeed, it assumes that without tensions its policy will not work. What advocates of the consensus fail to explain is how American policy will function at all in the Middle East without close coordination with Jerusalem. Conflicts with Israel are bound to have a detrimental effect on America’s ability to promote a successful conclusion of the autonomy talks. The tragedy of recent American policy is that in Israeli eyes it has eroded the position of the U.S. as a viable guarantor of future arrangements. With each succeeding crisis in U.S.-Israel relations the Israelis become more accustomed to being criticized. In this way Washington has trained them to act irrespective of American concerns. The Israelis would have to be naive to place their trust in an American policy which cannot honor previous commitments to its own Congress (as in the F-15 add-ons), let alone to them (as in the strategic accord).
Criticism of Israel has placed the Jews of the West in a peculiarly uncomfortable position. When they themselves voice doubts about particular Israeli policies, such doubts are magnified and cited as proof of the dereliction of the Jerusalem government. By contrast, support of Israel—even on issues which command the wide support of non-Jews as well (as in the dispute over AWACS)—has led to charges of dual loyalty and excessive Jewish “power.” These charges emanate from quarters that see the Jews of Israel and the Diaspora as impediments to consensus policy.
In the summer 1981 issue of Foreign Affairs, Republican Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. of Maryland wrote that “ethnic politics, carried as they often have been to excess, have proven harmful to the national interest.” This, like most recent criticism of “ethnic lobbies,” is actually directed expressly against the American Jewish community for its support of Israel. Similar sentiments have come from Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R., Calif.):
It should not be anti-Semitic to say that the Israeli lobby is powerful or that this lobby has controlled the Congress on issues involving Israel.
And the same attitude was reflected in the conscious decision of the pro-AWACS forces to portray the issue as a choice between Begin and Reagan, complaining about foreign influence (as the President did at one point) even while encouraging direct Saudi lobbying on behalf of the sale, and murmuring darkly about the undue power of Israel’s Jewish supporters. Former President Nixon said explicitly that had it not been for some American Jews, the sale would not have become controversial—as if none of the other, mostly non-Jewish, opponents, including three-fourths of the House and about one-half the Senate, could think for themselves.
These arguments, of course, have not the slightest connection with the pros and cons of whether the U.S. should sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia—indeed, they only reflect the weakness of the administration’s case. They also reflect widespread misconceptions about where the real influence on U.S. policy in the Middle East resides. The fact that the AWACS proposal could be offered in the first place was a monument to the American Jews’ lack of control over U.S. policy.
In any case, Presidents do not make their foreign-policy decisions with primary reference to domestic political considerations. Although Nixon frequently complains in his memoirs about the influence of the American Jewish community, he goes on to demonstrate how he acted in disregard of its preferences. Henry Kissinger, in White House Years, confirms that Nixon prided himself on his willingness to ignore domestic politics in his decision-making. It is true that actions favorable to Israel are often revealed before elections, and unfavorable actions delayed until afterward, but in general Presidents seek to act in ways that they believe to be consistent with the national interest or, as Truman often put it, “what is right.” Indeed, they often bend over backward to avoid the accusation of acting for political benefit. Eisenhower in his memoirs points with pride to his rebuke of Israel during the Suez crisis in the days before the 1956 election—despite warnings that he would be punished at the polls.
The most disturbing aspect of the “ethnic-lobbies” argument, however, is that it concentrates on one type of influence over American foreign policy while ignoring the effect of such interests as bankers, corporations, labor, political ideologues, the press and media, religious groups, the universities, think tanks. In particular, the AWACS debate demonstrates the influence that corporations and foreign oil producers—especially Saudi Arabia—can exercise over the decision-making process.
Long before Charles Mathias was discovering problems with ethnic lobbies, Thomas Jefferson was warning us that “Merchants have no country of their own. Wherever they may be, they have no ties with the land or the soil. All they are interested in is the source of their profits.” The problem that we are facing today is the billions of dollars available to oil producers, which enable them to dazzle diplomatic and’ military officials, corporation executives, and academics. The opportunities for conflict of interest are infinite. The ability of the Libyans to buy high technology, former CIA officials, university professorships, mercenaries, and even assassins points to the kind of danger we will continue to face over the next years.
To economists the interchange of dollars is simply a recycling mechanism, but these exchanges are having a significant impact (which is likely to grow) on American politics and American society. “Good politics is good business,” one Saudi businessman told his American clients during the AWACS debate. When former Senator J. William Fulbright speaks out on Middle East issues, few Americans realize that his law firm, Hogan and Hartson, is now registered as a foreign agent for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The conflict of interest which the profit motive encourages is likely to continue to pollute and corrupt any attempts at serious discussion of U.S. Middle East policy.
In short, American policy is undergoing severe difficulties in the Middle East because a bipartisan consensus is urging tactics which are based on an inaccurate understanding of reality and which lead in directions inimical to American interests. But there is an alternative view—one which above all spares us our growing subordination to Saudi Arabia, and releases us from the burden of identifying Saudi interests with our own.
The Saudis prefer an Arab world united behind their leadership. For this reason and for others, adherents of the consensus have entertained visions of a comprehensive solution to the Middle East crisis. But as far as the U.S. is concerned, working toward a comprehensive solution is a way of encouraging, rather than discouraging, radical destabilization and crisis. As the Carter administration discovered when it sought to arrange a Geneva conference in 1977, attempts to unify the Arab world give undue influence to uncompromising states like Syria, which can block initiatives that moderates on their own are not strong enough to accept. The only way the United States could deal with the Arab world as a whole would be to adopt positions consistent with the least compromising states. Since Washington can never move far enough to satisfy these states, any comprehensive policy is bound to fail. American concessions are only followed by increased demands, as Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter discovered in 1974, 1975, and 1977. We would be better served by separating the issues into manageable categories, and by dealing with states individually.
The alternative view also frees us from preoccupation with the Palestinian question. For even if the Palestinian issue could somehow miraculously be solved, the many competing states in the area are hardly likely to discontinue their rivalries and conflicts. In the meantime, the U.S. has many more problems in the area beyond the West Bank: the future of Iran, Afghanistan, the Yemens, Lebanon, the Horn; the protection of sea lanes and oil supplies; the prevention of the spread of Soviet and radical influence; the general instability of the entire region.
The alternative view suggests that the Palestinian question is more likely to be resolved in a different context. By regarding the autonomy talks as a process without deadlines, the U.S. could play a more positive role in the negotiations. The Saudis may say that a Palestinian solution is an immediate requirement, but the U.S., which has a complex set of interests in the area, must be concerned with the details—and that takes time. Encouraging rather than downplaying the process of normalization between Egypt and Israel would be one positive step.
Just as the alternative view urges attention to a diversity of interests beyond the Palestinian question, so too it urges avoidance of a single “pillar” of U.S. policy. Rather, it would urge the development of close relations with countries which have traditionally played strategic roles in the area and which are today friendly to the United States and sympathetic to the peace process. Besides Egypt, obvious candidates include Oman and Turkey, as well as Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan. Each offers facilities and a geographical location which could be critical to future U.S. efforts.
The alternative perspective also places Israel in a totally different light, for it recognizes the elementary importance of gaining Israel’s trust and confidence as a means of promoting further negotiations. In security terms, it identifies Israel as an asset rather than a liability. Until he assumed office, Ronald Reagan was the most articulate American politician arguing this point. As he wrote in August 1979:
The fall of Iran has increased Israel’s value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely; other pro-Western states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf kingdoms, are weak and vulnerable. Israel’s strength derives from the reality that her affinity with the West is not dependent on the survival of an autocratic or capricious ruler. Israel has the democratic will, national cohesion, technological capacity, and military fiber to stand forth as America’s trusted ally. . . .
The consensus asks Americans to rely on unstable regimes, to engage in dialogue with terrorist movements, and to relinquish U.S. independence and freedom of maneuver to wealthy sheikdoms. It is ultimately based on an unholy coalition of the Left and the Right. What masquerades as a common view of the national interest is in fact nothing more than a temporary marriage of convenience between different groups, each of which is pursuing its own interest.
The consensus is leading the U.S. into positions which are inherently self-destructive, and which will culminate logically in the restriction of energy supplies, the victory of radical and pro-Soviet forces, and the decline of U.S. influence. If we do not change our ways, the consequences are likely to be stark indeed.
1 See especially “The Middle East: Carterism Without Carter?” (September 1981) and “Appeasement & the AWACS” (December 1981).
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The Middle East: A Consensus of Error
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Last year, we asked experts to examine Candidate Trump’s policy proposals. This year, we’ve asked them to examine how he has executed these proposals in office.
On Trade By Scott Lincicome
Last year, economic, legal, and geopolitical calamity lurked in the shadows of almost every trade-policy promise made by presidential candidate Donald Trump. Eight months into the Trump presidency, those problems have—thankfully—not yet materialized. Instead, Trump trade policy has been a mixture of bluster, disappointment, relief, and uncertainty. This last category warrants close attention: In the coming months, Trump’s dangerous trade ambitions could remain in check, thus keeping a global trade system alive. Or politics, legal ambiguity, and Trump’s own emotional impulses could deal that system a fatal blow.
There is no doubt that President Trump has already done serious damage to the United States’ longstanding position as a world leader on trade policy, the American political consensus in favor of trade liberalization, and Republican views of trade and globalization. His constant vituperation has offended U.S. allies and trading partners, causing them to turn to Europe, Asia, or Latin America in search of alternatives to the once-welcoming and predictable U.S. market. He has accelerated (not started) the American retreat from the World Trade Organization, further wounding a multilateral trading system that was a U.S. invention—an invention that has, contrary to popular belief, served U.S. economic and foreign-policy interests well since the 1940s.
Trump’s day-one withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership—the flawed-yet-deserving Asia-Pacific trade agreement started by President Bush and ultimately signed by President Obama—has left vacuums in both Asia-Pacific trade and international economic law. TPP was far from perfect, but it was widely supported by U.S. trade and foreign-policy experts because of its economic and geopolitical benefits. The deal contained important new rules for 21st-century issues such as e-commerce, GMOs, and state-owned enterprises. Moreover, it would have provided small but significant benefits for U.S. workers and the economy, while cementing the United States’s influence in a region increasingly covered by China’s shadow. Now, TPP parties are working to complete a “TPP-11” deal that excludes the United States, while China is negotiating its own version of the TPP—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. And many of TPP’s novel provisions are being relitigated in contentious NAFTA renegotiations with Canada and Mexico (both TPP parties).
All of this is disappointing, but it’s probably survivable and hardly the fire and brimstone of the Trump campaign trail (hence, the relief). Trump has repeatedly threatened tariffs and other forms of dangerous unilateral protectionism, but economic, legal, and political realities have intervened. For example, when Trump promised new “national security” tariffs on steel and aluminum under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the opposition from Congress, business groups, strategic allies, NGOs, and even members of Trump’s administration was unrelenting. As a result, planned tariffs have quietly been shelved (for now). Other presidential threats have similarly come and gone without major action, giving market participants some heartburn but little long-term pain. Only in the opaque area of trade remedies—antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard measures—has there been a marked uptick in U.S. protectionism. But this is the result of long and technical administrative proceedings initiated by U.S. industries or unions that formally petitioned the government under relevant domestic law—hardly the wave-of-the-hand actions that Trump promised.
Some measure of relief is warranted, but we’re not out of the woods just yet. Indeed, in the last eight months, Trump has publicly threatened to
- block steel and aluminum imports for national-security reasons or bring new cases against semiconductors and ships, under the aforementioned Section 232;
- withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U.S.-Korea FTA;
- slap tariffs on Chinese imports under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 because of alleged Chinese intellectual-property-rights violations; and
- impose onerous new “Buy American” requirements on U.S. pipelines and government-funded infrastructure projects.
And those are just the public threats. Behind closed doors, Trump has reportedly considered enacting sweeping import restrictions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The president reportedly yelled, “I want tariffs. Bring me some tariffs!” when told by his “globalist” advisers that legal and economic realities prevent him from imposing broad-based protectionism on a whim.
None of the threats on Trump’s wish list is officially off the table, and any one of them would have serious economic consequences: Steel tariffs alone would put more than 1.3 million American jobs at risk; NAFTA withdrawal could destroy 250,000 more; and several nations have promised immediate retaliation against American goods, services, or investment in response to Trumpian protectionism. Trump’s actions would also raise major legal issues. For example, the World Trade Organization’s broad, subjective “national security” exception wasn’t intended to be used as a get-out-of-jail free-card for steel tariffs, and a dispute over a member’s right to invoke it could imperil the multilateral trading system. Meanwhile, Trump’s withdrawal from a free-trade agreement without congressional consent would raise major constitutional questions as to whether the president had that authority and what would happen to the myriad U.S. tariffs and other commitments that were embedded in legislation and passed into law. Lawsuits over these and other issues surrounding presidential trade powers would throw billions of dollars of cross-border trade and investments into legal limbo.
The president’s unpredictability, political weakness, and clear affinity for protectionism, combined with ample (though ambiguous) legal authority to act unilaterally, mean that any one of his trade threats could still materialize in the coming months. The White House’s internationalists may have won the early battles, but the war will rage for as long as Trump is president. Continued vigilance and advocacy for the benefits of freer trade remain critical.
And congressional legislation clarifying and limiting the president’s trade powers might not be a bad idea either…just in case.
Click here to read what Scott Lincicome wrote about Candidate Trump and trade last year.
Scott Lincicome is an international trade attorney, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and visiting lecturer at Duke University Law School. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of his employer.
On Taxes By James Pethokoukis
At some point in his first term, President Donald Trump will likely sign legislation that cuts taxes by some amount for somebody. This modest prediction is based less on reading the political tea leaves than understanding conservative politics. If any issue made the modern Republican Party, it was tax cuts. Not surprising, then, that candidate Trump promised big cuts for individuals and businesses. And with the GOP now holding the White House and Congress, failure to deliver is almost unimaginable.
Of course it’s almost equally unimaginable that the Trump tax cuts will at all resemble the ambitious plans devised by Trump advisers during the campaign. There were two of those blueprints. The first, rolled out September 2015, proposed lowering the top personal rate to 25 percent from the current 39.6 percent, and cutting the corporate rate to 15 percent from the current 35 percent. Along with other changes, including eliminating the alternative minimum tax and estate tax, this initial plan might have lowered annual government revenue by a whopping $1 trillion a year or more (even if one assumes much faster economic growth).
This was, in other words, more a fantasy proposal cooked up by Reagan-era supply-siders than a serious effort to reform the tax code without worsening our historically high federal debt. Indeed, Trump’s sole purpose in signing on to the plan may have been to win over that very same group, still influential among base voters. Trump himself talked little about the plan while on the hustings, especially compared with immigration, trade, and The Wall.
The Trump campaign’s second bite at the apple a year later was a scaled-back plan, but still a colossal one. Instead of losing a trillion bucks a year, maybe the government would be out just a half trillion or so. Again, since the plan was unaccompanied by spending cuts elsewhere in the budget, it was more a set of glorified campaign talking points than a serious proposal. And like the first, Trump didn’t talk much about it.
So after Trump’s shock election, there really was no realistic Trump tax plan. No worries, however, since there was a House Republican tax plan all ready to go, with an enthusiastic House Speaker Paul Ryan ready to push it hard through the lower chamber. It was an ambitious proposal but one within reality, especially with a bit of fiscal tweaking. That plan called for, among other things, lowering the top personal rate to 33 percent and the corporate rate to 20 percent, immediately expensing new capital investment, and expanding the child tax credit.
And more so than the Trump campaign plans, the House plan intended to reform the tax code, not just cut taxes. For example, it eliminated all personal itemized deductions other than mortgage interest and charitable contributions. The House plan also made a stronger attempt to pay for the tax through a border-adjustment tax and limiting business-interest deductibility. All in all, the plan cost a couple of trillion dollars over a decade, not assuming economic feedback. On such a dynamic basis, according to Tax Foundation modeling, the House plan would reduce 10-year revenues by just under $200 billion.
So if Republicans really wanted to make their plan revenue neutral, it was certainly doable through relatively minor changes, such as less dramatic corporate or personal rate cuts. Yet the plan would still be a massive improvement over the status quo, both in terms of encouraging more domestic investment and providing middle-class tax relief.
With a detailed plan at the ready and Republicans running Washington, it is easy to understand why many in the GOP thought it reasonable to predict that Trump would be signing a mega tax bill by August of this year, just as Ronald Reagan did in the first year of his first term. Reagan did it from his ranch in Santa Barbara, California. Maybe Trump would repeat the feat from his Trump Tower penthouse in Manhattan.
But that did not happen. Then again, very little of Trump’s ambitious domestic agenda has happened as planned. Repeal and replace was promised by Easter, leaving plenty of time to hash out the fine details of tax reform and move legislation through the House and Senate. But the GOP health reform was a long slog consuming valuable time, attention, and political capital. Also deserving blame was Trump’s inability to focus on pushing policy priorities rather than pounding political opponents on Twitter. As of now, it seems highly unlikely that significant tax reform will occur in 2017. And 2018 looks challenging as well.
Yes, Trump has provided more distraction than leadership on this issue. And trying to pass major legislation in a midterm year only adds to the political difficulties. But the biggest problem is that there is no tax-reform plan for Republicans to push.
What happened to the ready-to-serve House plan? It suffered from not being a fantasy. It acknowledged both political and policy constraints, something the populist president almost never does. For instance: the House plan tried to pay for the tax cuts—a political necessity to placate debt-hawk Republicans. That requires making somebody somewhere unhappy. Ryan knew that without such an effort, it would be extraordinarily difficult to reduce the corporate tax rate to anywhere close to 20 percent. But while exporters supported the border tax, importers hated it, complaining that it would raise costs. Nor was the Trump White House happy about axing business-interest deductibility.
Still, as problematic as those pay-fors were, the alternatives—limiting tax breaks for mortgages, 401(k)s, and state and local taxes—are equally if not more so. The state and local tax deduction is a case in point. Pushed hard by Republican leaders as the primary revenue generator to replace border adjustment, it seems unlikely to survive criticism from blue-state Republicans. Eventual legislation is likely to be a far smaller and less comprehensive bill than first envisioned—more cut than reform—with some temporary parts designed to satisfy congressional budget rules. Indeed, Senate budget writers cleared room for just a $1.5 trillion tax cut, and even that might be overly ambitious. Expect Trump and his people to call whatever passes a “down payment” on true tax reform. Pro-growth conservatives should call it a missed opportunity.
Click here to read what James Pethokoukis wrote about Candidate Trump and taxes last year.
James Pethokoukis is the DeWitt Wallace Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also an official CNBC contributor.
‘The Wall’ By Linda Chavez
“We’re going to build a wall. That wall will go up so fast, your head will spin.” Donald Trump made this promise on August 23, 2016, repeated it throughout his presidential campaign, and has reiterated it in tweets and at press conferences and rallies ever since. But the only spinning going on lately has been the president’s own efforts to assure his base that he will eventually build a wall, or a fence, or some barrier along the U.S. border with Mexico, except maybe for those areas that don’t need one or already have one. Oh, and someone will pay for it—preferably Mexico, as he promised—but if not, Congress, unless Democrats or even Republicans refuse to go along. A year after winning the presidency, Trump’s most ubiquitous pledge, The Great Wall separating the U.S. from Mexico, remains largely a figment of his imagination and evidence of his supporters’ gullibility.
No issue defined Trump’s campaign more viscerally than immigration, and on none was his position less ambiguous. Trump’s presidential record on immigration enforcement and policy, however, is decidedly more mixed. He continues to promise that construction of the wall is going to start soon: “Way ahead of schedule. Way ahead of schedule. Way, way, way ahead of schedule,” he said in February. But the cost, with estimates as high as $70 billion, and the sheer impracticality of erecting a solid barrier along 1,900 miles make little sense in light of recent trends in illegal immigration. Illegal immigration is at historically low levels today (roughly the same, in absolute numbers, as it was in the early 1970s) and has been falling more or less consistently since the peak in 2000, mostly because fewer people are crossing the border from Mexico. Apprehensions of Mexicans are at a 50-year low, as are all apprehensions along the southern border. Year-to-date in 2017, apprehensions at the Mexican border have dropped 24 percent compared with those in 2016, when a slight uptick occurred as more people tried to cross in advance of a feared Trump victory and border crackdown. The population of undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. is down as well and now stands at roughly 11 million, from a peak of 12.2 million in 2007; and two-thirds of these unauthorized immigrants have lived here a decade or longer. More Mexicans—whom Trump described as “bringing drugs. . . crime. They’re rapists”—are now leaving the U.S. than arriving. In 2013, for the first time since the 1960s, Mexico fell as the top source of immigrants to the U.S., behind both China and India.
Trump’s pledge to build a wall, of course, wasn’t his only promise on immigration, but he hasn’t lived up to his own hype in other areas either, which is a good thing. He said he’d end on day one the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program that provided temporary protection from removal for young people who arrived here illegally before age 16. Instead, Trump waited until September 5 to send his beleaguered Attorney General Jeff Sessions out to announce that DACA would end in six months unless Congress acted. Trump then almost immediately backtracked in a series of tweets and offhand statements. Polls show that large majorities of Americans, including some two-thirds of Trump voters, have no interest in deporting so-called Dreamers, half of whom came before they were seven years old and 90 percent of whom are employed and paying taxes. Trump’s own misgivings and the backlash over the policy’s announcement led him into a tentative deal with Democratic leaders Representative Nancy Pelosi and Senator Chuck Schumer in September to support legislation granting legal status for Dreamers who complete school, get jobs, or join the military. Trump’s most nativist supporters have already dubbed him “Amnesty Don” for even suggesting that Dreamers should be allowed to remain and gain temporary legal status, much less earn a path toward citizenship. But whether such legislation will make it through Congress is still uncertain. Similar bills have repeatedly passed one chamber and died in the other over the past 10 years, but the potential threat that the administration might begin deporting many of the 800,000 young adults who signed up for DACA should concentrate the minds of the Republican leadership to allow legislation to move forward. One of the complications in the House is the “Hastert Rule,” named after former Speaker Dennis Hastert, an informal agreement that binds the speaker from bringing a bill to the floor unless a majority of the majority party supports it.
To be sure, Trump’s rhetoric and his appointment of hard-line immigration restrictionists to posts in his administration have led to fear among immigrants, as have the administration’s erratic, irrational enforcement policies. Previous administrations, including Barack Obama’s, gave priority to detaining and deporting aliens convicted of serious crimes, but in one of his first executive orders and Department of Homeland Security memoranda, Trump broadened the priorities for detention and removal to include anyone even suspected of committing a crime, with or without charges or conviction. As a result, arrests for immigration offenses have increased under Trump and have swept up hundreds of individuals who pose no threat to safety or security, some picked up outside their children’s schools or when seeking court orders against domestic abuse. Actual deportations, on the other hand, are down slightly in Trump’s first eight months compared with the same period in Obama’s last year. This is largely because the overloaded system isn’t equipped for mass deportation. Trump promised to rid the country of a greatly exaggerated 2 million criminal aliens and “a vast number of additional criminal illegal immigrants who have fled or evaded justice.” But his boasting that “their days on the run will soon be over” has always been aimed less at promoting sensible immigration policy than at stoking nativist anger in pursuit of his own brand of identity politics. Trump’s America will be a less welcoming place for immigrants—legal as well as illegal—if Trump gets his way on proposed legislation to reduce legal immigration by half over the next decade. But labor shortages and an aging population make it unlikely that Trump’s efforts will succeed. The simple fact is that we need more, not fewer, immigrants if the economy is to grow. Building walls and deporting workers is exactly the wrong way to go about needed immigration reform, whether Trump and his hard-core base can admit it or not.
Click here to read what Linda Chavez wrote about Candidate Trump and ‘The Wall’ last year.
Linda Chavez is the president of the Becoming American Institute and a frequent contributor to Commentary.
On Infrastructure By Philip Klein
A massive infrastructure bill was supposed to be one of the early triumphs of President Trump’s administration. Instead, Trump’s inability to advance the ball on one of his signature issues has highlighted the lack of focus, inattention to detail, and difficulties working with Congress that are emblematic of his presidency to date.
The idea of rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure, though overshadowed by daily controversies during the wild 2016 campaign, wove together several elements of the Trump phenomenon.
His experience in building projects such as luxury hotels, resorts, skyscrapers, and golf courses became central to his argument that he had the skills required to get things done in Washington. By touting the economic benefits of infrastructure during his campaign, Trump also signaled that he was an unorthodox Republican, breaking with decades of conservative critiques of Keynesian stimulus projects. Trump also spoke of infrastructure in nationalist terms, integrating it into riffs about how the United States was constantly losing to China. “They have trains that go 300 miles per hour,” he said during the campaign. “We have trains that go: Chug. Chug. Chug.”
When Trump pulled off his election-victory upset, Washington insiders quickly focused on infrastructure as one issue on which he could get a legislative win and box Democrats into a corner. After all, could Democrats really resist passing a major policy priority that had eluded them when one of their own was in the White House?
In his Inaugural Address, Trump threw a jab at Bush-era Republicanism, declaring that the U.S. “spent trillions of dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.” Going forward, he said, “America will start winning again, winning like never before.” He promised: “We will build new roads, and highways, and bridges, and airports, and tunnels, and railways all across our wonderful nation.”
Now in the fall of the first year of his presidency, any effort to advance infrastructure legislation has been drowned out by daily controversies involving White House intrigue, the investigation into Russian influence in the 2016 election, and Trump’s raucous Twitter feed. Congress, meanwhile, spent much of the year focused on repealing and replacing Obamacare.
This isn’t to say that the Trump administration didn’t try, in fits and starts, to push infrastructure. In May, with the release of his first budget, Trump included $200 billion in funding for infrastructure as the first step in his $1 trillion infrastructure initiative. He also released a six-page fact sheet outlining his vision for infrastructure, which remains the most detailed resource on his infrastructure goals.
The document, broadly speaking, argues that current infrastructure money is spent inefficiently. It proposes greater selectivity in using federal dollars for infrastructure investments that are in the national interest and recommends giving state and local governments more leeway over their own projects. It also calls for more public-private partnerships.
Specifically, the proposal would create a nongovernment entity to manage the nation’s air-traffic-control system. It would also support private rest stops, give states the ability to work with private companies to manage their toll roads, and streamline the environmental-review process. The proposal received little attention, as it was rolled out during a week when Russia hearings took center stage in Congress and Trump was traveling in Europe and the Middle East.
Such inattention was supposed to end in early June, when White House officials announced “Infrastructure Week.” This was a carefully orchestrated campaign in which Trump was supposed to deliver speeches and lead staged events to highlight different aspects of his infrastructure initiative. But during this week, Washington was captivated by testimony of fired FBI Director James Comey, and Trump veered way off message in his speeches and on his favorite social-media platform.
He went on a Twitter tear. Trump attacked his own Justice Department for pursuing a “watered down” travel ban, took a shot at the mayor of London in the wake of a terrorist attack, unloaded on “fake news” outlets, and hit Comey as a liar. During a speech meant to make the case for both parties to get behind his infrastructure effort, Trump went off on a tangent, blasting Democrats as “obstructionists” on health care.
In truth, any hope of getting Democrats on board for the Trump infrastructure push had been fading even before this implosion. Liberals had already pressured lawmakers to pursue a policy of total resistance to Trump. But during Trump’s big policy push, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer declared overtly that Democrats had no appetite for his infrastructure initiative due to its reliance on privatization.
Before long, the phrase “Infrastructure Week” had become a punch line—an ironic metaphor for a presidency gone off the rails.
Trump has made little progress on infrastructure since then, beyond issuing an executive order in August aimed at making the permitting process for building roads, bridges, and pipelines more efficient. But again, this announcement was overshadowed, as it came during the same news conference in which he blamed “both sides” for the violence in Charlottesville and complained about the slippery slope of removing the Robert E. Lee statue.
On the other hand, by striking a deal with Democratic leaders on the debt ceiling and negotiating with them on immigration, Trump has revived talk about the possibility that he could be ready to compromise with them to get infrastructure legislation passed as well. It is important to note, however, that in both cases—DACA and the debt ceiling—there was a ticking-time-bomb element that forced action. No such urgency exists when it comes to infrastructure.
From the perspective of a limited-government conservative, Trump’s inability thus far to negotiate a trillion-dollar federal infrastructure package with Democrats is nothing to shed tears about. But if we’re looking at the issue through the broader lens of whether or not Trump has been able to deliver on his ambitious campaign promises and make the transition from being a bombastic reality-television star to governing, it’s a case study in failure.
Click here to read what Philip Klein wrote about Candidate Trump and infrastructure last year.
Philip Klein is managing editor of the Washington Examiner.
On NATO By Tod Lindberg
On the campaign trail, Donald Trump was unsparing in his disparagement of U.S. alliances. In a word, allies were freeloaders—complacent in their reliance on the United States to provide them security, contributing nothing like their “fair share” of the cost of their defense, and lavishing the dividend on their domestic needs. Maybe that was acceptable when they were flat on their backs after a war that left the United States on top, but now that they are prospering and the United States has pressing needs of its own, it’s time for the allies to pay up. He also mused about NATO being “obsolete.”
This was alarming (to put it mildly) to most American foreign-policy specialists—to say nothing of the reaction of U.S. allies. The postwar alliance structure in Europe has been the backbone of security on a continent where the United States fought two wars. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization underpinned the postwar revival of Western Europe and subsequently, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union, of Central and Eastern Europe. The relevance of the alliance has gained renewed salience with Russia’s aggression against its neighbors, first in Georgia in 2008, then in Ukraine in 2014.
At the heart of the alliance is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949—the commitment of each member to regard an armed attack on any as an attack on all. In practical terms, the meaning of Article 5 is that American power provides a security guarantee for Europe, a commitment upheld and explicitly reiterated by U.S. presidents since Harry S. Truman. The treaty is binding, yet equally in practical terms, it is the
American president whose commander-in-chief powers will dictate the response of the U.S. military to any attack—and by extension, the sincerity of his commitment determines the deterrent value of Article 5 against potential aggressors. Would a President Trump abrogate the U.S. commitment? Or hold it hostage to defense-spending increases by allies—perhaps even by demanding the payment of a much larger past-due bill, as the candidate suggested on at least one occasion?
In Asia, the biggest long-term challenge is the rise of China; the U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines (as well as the more complicated commitment enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act) represent the underpinning of Pacific security. Would this, too, be up for grabs under Trump? Was “America First” shorthand for an isolationist retooling of U.S. relations with the rest of the world? The short answer to these questions turns out to be no. Trump has no apparent intention to do away with U.S. alliance relationships, however cumbersome and expensive he perceives them to be, and he evinces no intention to try to replace the postwar security architecture with something new and different, whatever that might be. So what happened? Were his many critics sounding the alarm therefore wrong about his intentions? Did he change his mind? Is the question of alliances now settled? Since Trump has taken office, alliance policy seems to have operated on two tracks within the U.S. government. The first track is the president’s own. He has continued to warn allies that they need to pay up—though his demands have moderated considerably, coalescing around the 2 percent of GDP that allies have pledged to spend on defense (though very few do). And although he has reaffirmed the U.S. Article 5 commitment on some occasions, on others when it would have been appropriate for him to do so, he has declined, apparently intentionally. Still, he has never repudiated the commitment. There seem to be two possibilities here: either a deliberate exercise in ambiguity, or incompetence and confusion of the kind his critics have long diagnosed.
I think the evidence points distinctly toward the former. That evidence is the second track of policy within the government. Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Secretary of Defense James Mattis—as well as officials junior to them—have been on something close to a nonstop reassurance tour of U.S. allies and partners since the beginning of the administration. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster has joined the chorus since he stepped in to replace the ousted Michael Flynn. Their message has been unambiguous: The United States stands by its security and alliance commitments, and allies must contribute more to collective defense. True, some allies continue to harbor doubts centered on the persona of Trump. Yet—therefore?—many are moving to spend more on defense.
Now, the simple fact is that Trump could order his Cabinet members and senior staff to desist from repeating the first half of their message—the reassurance. Trump might have had some resignations to cope with, but it is well within his power to issue such an edict, and he hasn’t done so. The most likely reason he hasn’t is that he has concluded that too much is riding on these alliances. To continue in this speculative vein, what Trump knew to be true about U.S. allies during the campaign season was that they weren’t contributing enough; that’s a message that Washington has been sending with little effect for decades. What he didn’t know on the campaign trail and has since determined is how central these alliances are to U.S. national security. U.S. alliances aren’t quite so fragile as some feared. The case for them, competently made by the likes of Mattis, must be compelling, including to the skeptic in chief.
It’s here that we may be getting a little lesson in the cunning of history. From his skeptical premise, Trump sparked a very broad debate over alliances. Senior officials of his administration have probably devoted more time and energy to making the public case for NATO and our Pacific alliances during his first 10 months in office than their predecessors did in the previous 10 years. The latter had taken the utility of alliances to U.S. national security as a given.
All this attention has had an effect on public opinion. But the effect has not been, as many feared, a groundswell of support for isolationist or anti-alliance sentiment. Just the opposite. For the past three years, the Chicago Council Survey has asked, “How effective do you think [maintaining effective alliances is] to achieving the foreign-policy goals of the United States?” In 2015, 32 percent of all respondents responded “very effective.” In 2016, the figure was 40 percent. In 2017? Forty-nine percent. Specifically on NATO, 69 percent say the alliance is “essential” to U.S. security, a slight increase from 65 percent in 2016 and well above the 57 percent who said the same when the Chicago Council first asked the question in 2002.
For the first time in the history of the survey, a majority of Americans, 52 percent, say they would support “the use of U.S. troops…if Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia.” The Trump administration has had little to say about the Russian threat to the Baltics but a great deal to say about the danger of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program. A year ago, 47 percent said they would favor “the use of U.S. troops…if North Korea invaded South Korea.” That was the view of 26 percent of Americans in 1990. Today, it’s what 62 percent think.
Finally, on the question of allies paying up, the survey asked which comes closer to the respondent’s views: “The United States should encourage greater allied defense spending through persuasion and diplomatic means” or “The United States should withhold its commitment to defend NATO members” until they actually spend more. Overall, 59 percent said persuasion and diplomacy; 38 percent (including 51 percent of Republicans) would put Article 5 at risk. Maybe I’m hearing things, but that sounds to me more like a warning to our allies to take seriously American insistence that they spend more on defense starting now than it does an abrogation of the commitments at the center of U.S. national-security strategy for 70 years.
Click here to read what Tod Lindberg wrote about Candidate Trump and NATO last year.
Tod Lindberg is a member of the Chicago Council Survey’s foreign policy advisory board.
On Asia By Michael Auslin
Despite continued Russian threats in Eastern Europe and the lurking danger of an Iranian race to a nuclear bomb, it is Asia that has vaulted to the top of the national-security agenda. Barack Obama had warned Donald Trump that North Korea would be the major national-security threat he would face, and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has proved him right. Kim is on the threshold of fielding a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that can reach U.S. territory in the Pacific and even the American homeland. He is within striking distance of achieving his family’s long-held dream of possessing the ultimate weapon. Not since 1994, when Bill Clinton initially ordered and then called back an air strike on Pyongyang’s nascent nuclear facilities, has the region seemed so close to war.
Beyond the Korean peninsula, Asia has arguably been Trump’s central foreign preoccupation since his entry into politics. He talked during his campaign about a 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods. And despite his noninterventionist affect, he began his transition phase by getting tough on China for its increasingly assertive actions during the Obama years, including the successful building and militarization of islands in contested waters in the South China Sea.
Then Trump retreated from his tough stance toward Beijing, initiating a period of seesawing between cooperation and confrontation and mixing together trade and economic concerns with security and diplomatic issues. His explicit linkage of the two, carefully separated by previous presidents, has been particularly unnerving to Beijing. China’s regime has warned of the risks of a larger trade war if Trump continues to threaten economic retaliation for disagreement on security issues. Of equal concern to Beijing has been his recent willingness to permit more frequent freedom-of-navigation operations by the U.S. Navy in the disputed South China Sea waters off the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
Trump’s initial hard line, including an unprecedented transition-period phone call to Taiwan’s president, put Beijing on its back foot. But his subsequent inconstancy has led to a reassertion of Chinese activism on economic and diplomatic issues. His withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and general anti-free-trade stance have allowed Chinese President Xi Jinping to claim the mantle of global economic leadership—promoting free-trade alternatives and grandiose policies such as the “Belt and Road Initiative,” in which Xi has promised more than $1 trillion of infrastructure investment to link the world in a trading network centered in China.
In contrast, Trump’s relations with America’s Asian allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, have been surprisingly smooth. Again backing down from campaign rhetoric, Trump early on reaffirmed the importance of both alliances, and buried talk of making the two pay more for hosting U.S. forces on their territory. His bond with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been particularly close, and his conversations with South Korea’s new left-leaning president, Moon Jae In, have gone better than some expected. Far from scaling back the alliances, Trump and his top officials, including Secretary of Defense James Mattis, have put them at the center of American strategy in the Pacific, especially with respect to North Korea.
It is North Korea, however, that remains the first great test of the Trump administration. Trump clearly inherited a failed policy, stretching over past Democratic and Republican administrations alike, and was doubly cursed in coming to office on the eve of Kim Jong Un’s nuclear and ICBM breakout.
Yet despite Trump’s heated rhetoric, he and his team have actually moved cautiously on North Korea. Like its predecessors, the administration has combined shows of force, such as flying B-1 bombers over the peninsula, with appeals to the United Nations for further sanctions on Pyongyang. Two new rounds of sanctions, in July and September, may indeed have been harder than those previously levied, but, just as in the past, the administration had to settle for less than it wanted. More worrying, Trump appears to be adopting the long-held goal of presidents past: North Korean denuclearization. This is a strategic mistake that threatens to lock him into an unending series of negotiations that have served over the past quarter-century to buy time for Pyongyang to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. I believe it would be a far more realistic move for Trump to drop the chimera of denuclearization and instead tacitly acknowledge that North Korea is a nuclear-weapons-capable state. This would free up the administration to focus on the far more important job of deterring and containing a nuclear North Korea. Since Trump is almost certainly sure to avoid a preventive war to remove Kim’s nuclear weapons, given the associated military and political risks, he will be forced in the end to accept them. That then mandates a credible and comprehensive policy to restrict North Korea’s actions abroad while making clear that any nuclear use will result in a devastating counterstrike. Washington has been deterring North Korea ever since the end of the Korean War. This new approach explicitly makes deterrence the center of U.S. policy, dropping the unobtainable goal of denuclearization or the imprudent goal of normalizing relations with North Korea. To be successful, Trump will need to get the support of both Seoul and Tokyo, which is a tall order. The alternative, however, is another round of Kabuki negotiations and the diversion of U.S. attention from the far more necessary task of ensuring that Kim Jong Un is kept in his nuclear box.
Click here to read what Michael Auslin wrote about Candidate Trump and Asia last year.
Michael Auslin is the Williams-Griffis Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the author of The End of the Asian Century (Yale).
On Israel By Daniella J. Greenbaum
As a candidate, Donald Trump’s positions on Israel were a blend of incoherence and inconsistency. He was an isolationist, except he was also Israel’s biggest supporter; he would enforce the Iran deal, except he wanted to rip it up on day one; he was the most pro- Israel candidate on the stage, except that he wanted to be “the neutral guy”; he wouldn’t commit to a policy on Jerusalem, except he declared his plan to immediately move the American Embassy to Israel’s eternal and undivided capital.
Words—especially a president’s—matter, but until Trump took office, it was impossible to predict how his administration would treat the Jewish state. Some Israel advocates became convinced that Trump’s victory would lead to the fulfillment of their bucket list of Middle East dreams—in particular, resolution of the long-simmering issue involving the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel. The Jerusalem Embassy Act, which became law in 1995, recognized that “each sovereign nation, under international law and custom, may designate its own capital” and that “since 1950, the city of Jerusalem has been the capital of the State of Israel.” It ordered that “the United States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999.”
And yet, despite all that, the American Embassy has remained in Tel Aviv. (Presidents were given the power to push the date back on national-security grounds.) Much like then-candidates Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Trump pledged to move the embassy if elected president. In a March 2016 speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s Policy Conference, Trump said unequivocally: “We will move the American Embassy to the eternal capital of the Jewish people, Jerusalem.”
The American Embassy belongs in Jerusalem, and Trump’s evolution on the issue was, for the most part, encouraging. (Early on in his candidacy, he was booed at the Republican Jewish Coalition’s annual meeting after refusing to take a position on Jerusalem’s status.) But for Israelis, who face myriad threats on a daily basis—both physically, from their many hostile neighbors, and economically, through an international boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign—the location of the embassy ranks low on the list of urgent political matters. Even the most ardent proponents of this policy shift acknowledge it has the potential to inflame tensions in the region. Like his predecessors, Trump signed the waiver and suspended the move.
Next on the bucket list: discarding Barack Obama’s cataclysmic Iran deal. When Trump was a candidate, his intentions for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were anything but clear. He told AIPAC, “My number-one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” But he also said, “We will enforce it like you’ve never seen a contract enforced before folks, believe me.” It’s hard to know which part of his schizophrenic speech the audience—and the country—was supposed to believe. The schizophrenia has continued during his tenure, with Trump certifying the Iran deal twice before announcing in October his decision not to recertify a third time. Despite signaling his extreme displeasure with the deal, Trump has so far opted not to terminate it. But, by refusing to recertify, he has instead left to Congress the decision whether or not to reimpose sanctions.
Most important, perhaps, to pro-Israel forces was Trump’s choice of foreign-policy team. While Jared Kushner’s lack of political experience made him an odd choice for Middle East maven—Trump exclaimed at an inauguration event: “if [he] can’t produce peace in the Middle East, nobody can”—there is no denying that Kushner is a Zionist. Along with Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s envoy to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, Kushner visited Israel this summer to determine whether restarting peace talks was a viable course of action. The duo have articulated their desire to refrain from repeating the mistakes of previous administrations: “It is no secret that our approach to these discussions departs from some of the usual orthodoxy. … Instead of working to impose a solution from the outside, we are giving the parties space to make their own decisions about the future,” Greenblatt explained. Maybe that’s why Benjamin Netanyahu seems so elated. Bibi’s friction with Obama was well documented, and the prime minister has expressed his jubilation at the changed nature of his relationship to Washington. During the United Nations General Assembly, he tweeted: “Under your leadership, @realDonaldTrump, the alliance between the United States and Israel has never been stronger.”
During the campaign, it was hard to imagine that might be the case. Trump’s repeated use of the phrase “America First,” a classic isolationist trope with anti-Semitic overtones, was deeply concerning to pro- Israel voters. He continually insisted that foreign governments were a drain on the American economy: “I want to help all of our allies, but we are losing billions and billions of dollars. We cannot be the policemen of the world. We cannot protect countries all over the world…where they’re not paying us what we need.” According to a 2016 report from the Congressional Research Service, “Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II.” The report calculates that the United States has, over the years, provided Israel with more than $127 billion in bilateral assistance. If words and campaign promises meant anything to Trump, the candidate who insisted that Israel could pay “big league” would have metamorphosed into the president who ensured that it did.
But Trump’s campaign promises seem to have had no bearing on his actions. In an appropriations bill, Congress pledged an extra $75 million in aid to Israel, on top of the annual $3.1 billion already promised for this year. As part of negotiations for the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding, the Israeli government promised to return any funds that surpassed the pre-negotiated aid package. In what was doubtlessly a major disappointment to Trump’s America-first base, the State Department confirmed it will not be asking the Israelis to return the additional funds.
His behavior toward Israel during his eight months in office has confirmed what was evident throughout the campaign: Donald Trump’s words and actions have, at best, a haphazard relationship to each other. So far Israel has benefited. That may not always be the case.
Click here to read what Jordan Chandler Hirsch wrote about Candidate Trump and Israel last year.
Daniella J. Greenbaum is assistant editor of Commentary.
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Of Hobbes and Harvey Weinstein
In man’s natural state, with no social or religious order to impose limits upon his hungers and passions, “notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, force and fraud are…the cardinal virtues.” Thus did Thomas Hobbes, in 1651, anticipate and describe the sordid story of the film producer Harvey Weinstein.
The reason Weinstein’s three decades of monstrous personal and professional conduct are so appalling and fascinating in equal measure is that he was clearly functioning outside the “social compact” Hobbes said was necessary to save men from a perpetual state of war they would wage against one another in the state of nature. For that is what Weinstein was doing, in his own way: waging Hobbesian war against the women he abused and finding orgasmic pleasure in his victories.
And Weinstein did so while cleverly pretending to leadership within the social compact and disingenuously advocating for its improvement both through political change and artistic accomplishment. Hobbes said the life of man in the state of nature was nasty, brutish, and short, but he did not say the warrior could not be strategic. Rochefoucauld’s immortal declaration that hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue is entirely wrong in this case. Weinstein paid off feminists and liberals to extend his zone of protection and seduction, not to help support the virtues he was subverting with his own vices.
Hobbes said that in the state of nature there was “no arts; no letters; no society.” But if the man in the state of nature, the nihilistic warrior, coexists with people who live within the social compact, would it not be a brilliant strategy to use the arts, letters, and society as cover, and a means of infiltrating and suborning the social compact? Harvey Weinstein is a brutal thug, a man of no grace, more akin to a mafioso than a maker of culture. And yet as a movie producer he gravitated toward respectable, quality, middlebrow, elevated and elevating fare. People wanted to work with him because of the kinds of movies he made. I think we can see that was the whole point of the exercise: It was exciting to be called into his presence because you knew you would do better, more socially responsible, more praiseworthy work under his aegis than you would with another producer.
And then, garbed only in a bathrobe, Weinstein would strike.
Weinstein was universally known to be a terrible person long before the horrifying tales of his sexual predation, depredation, and assault were finally revealed. And—this is important—known to be a uniquely terrible person. His specific acts of repugnant public thuggishness were detailed in dozens of articles and blog items over the decades, and were notable precisely because they were and are not common currency in business or anywhere else. It was said of him after the latest revelations that he had mysterious abilities to suppress negative stories about himself, and perhaps he did; even so, it was a matter of common knowledge that he was the most disgusting person in the movie business, and that’s saying a lot. And that’s before we get to sex.
To take one example, Ken Auletta related a story in the New Yorker in 2001 about the director Julie Taymor and her husband, the composer Eliot Goldenthal. She had helmed a movie about Frida Kahlo produced by Weinstein. There was a preview screening at the Lincoln Square theater in Manhattan. The audience liked it, but some of its responses indicated that the plotline was confusing. Weinstein, whose hunger to edit the work of others had long since earned him the name “Harvey Scissorhands,” wanted to recut it to clarify the picture. Taymor didn’t, citing the audience’s favorable reaction. Then this happened:
He saw Taymor’s agent…and yelled at him, “Get the fuck out of here!” To Goldenthal, who wrote the score for Frida, Weinstein said, “I don’t like the look on your face.” Then, according to several witnesses, he moved very close to Goldenthal and said, “Why don’t you defend her so I can beat the shit out of you?” Goldenthal quickly escorted Taymor away. When asked about this incident, Weinstein insisted that he did not threaten Goldenthal, yet he concedes, “I am not saying I was remotely hospitable. I did not behave well. I was not physically menacing to anybody. But I was rude and impolite.” One member of Taymor’s team described Weinstein’s conduct as actually bordering on “criminal assault.”
Weinstein told the late David Carr in 2002 that his conduct in such cases had merely been the result of excess glucose in his system, that he was changing his diet, and he was getting better. That glucose problem was his blanket explanation for all the bad stories about him, like this one:
“You know what? It’s good that I’m the fucking sheriff of this fucking lawless piece-of-shit town.” Weinstein said that to Andrew Goldman, then a reporter for the New York Observer, when he took him out of a party in a headlock last November after there was a tussle for Goldman’s tape recorder and someone got knocked in the head.
Goldman’s then-girlfriend, Rebecca Traister, asked Weinstein about a controversial movie he had produced. Traister provided the predicate for this anecdote in a recent piece: “Weinstein didn’t like my question about O, there was an altercation…[and] he called me a c—.”
Auletta also related how Weinstein physically threatened the studio executive Stacey Snider. She went to Disney executive Jeffrey Katzenberg and told him the story. Katzenberg, “one of his closest friends in the business,” told Weinstein he had to apologize. He did, kind of. Afterward, Katzenberg told Auletta, “I love Harvey.”
These anecdotes are 15 years old. And there were anecdotes published about Weinstein’s behavior dating back another 15 years. What they revealed then is no different from what they reveal now: Weinstein is an out-and-out psychopath. And apparently this was fine in his profession…as long as he was successful and important, and the stories involved only violence and intimidation.
Flash-forward to October 2017. Katzenberg—the man who loved Harvey—publicly released an email he had sent to Weinstein after he was done for: “You have done terrible things to a number of women over a period of years. I cannot in any way say this is OK with me…There appear to be two Harvey Weinsteins…one that I have known well, appreciated, and admired and another that I have not known at all.”
So which Weinstein, pray tell, was the one from whom Katzenberg had had to protect Stacey Snider? The one he knew or the one he didn’t know? Because they are, of course, the same person. We know that sexual violence is more about power than sex—about the ultimate domination and humiliation. In these anecdotes and others about Weinstein, we see that his great passions in life were dominating and humiliating. Even if the rumors hadn’t been swirling around his sexual misconduct for decades, could anyone actually have been surprised he sought to secure his victory over the social compact in the most visceral way possible outside of murder?
The commentariat’s reaction to the Weinstein revelations has been desperately confused, and for once, the confusion is constructive, because there are strange ideological and moral convergences.
The most extreme argument has it that he’s really not a unique monster, that every working woman in America has encountered a Weinstein, and that the problem derives from a culture of “toxic masculinity.” This attitude is an outgrowth of the now-fashionable view that there have been no real gains for women and minorities over the past half-century, that the gains are illusory or tokenish, and that something more revolutionary is required to level the playing field.
As a matter of fact in the Weinstein case, this view is false. Women have indeed encountered boors and creeps in their workplaces. But a wolf-whistler is not a rapist. Someone who leers at a woman isn’t the same as someone who masturbates in front of her. Coping with grotesque and inappropriate co-workers and bosses is something every human being, regardless of gender, has had to deal with, and will have to deal with until we are all replaced by robots. It’s worse for women, to be sure. Still, no one should have to go through such experiences. But we all have and we all do. It’s one of the many unpleasant aspects of being human.
Still, the extreme view of “toxic masculinity” contains a deeper truth that is anything but revolutionary. It takes us right back to Hobbes. His central insight—indeed, the insight of civilization itself—is that every man is a potential Weinstein. This clear-eyed, even cold-eyed view of man’s nature is the central conviction of philosophical conservatism. Without limits, without having impressed upon us a fear of the legal sanction of punishment or the social sanction of shame and ostracism, we are in danger of seeking our earthly rewards in the state of nature.
The revolutionary and the conservative also seem to agree there’s something viscerally disturbing about sex crimes that sets them apart. But here is where the consensus between us breaks down. Logically, if the problem is that we live in a toxic culture that facilitates these crimes, then the men who commit them are, at root, cogs in an inherently unjust system. The fault ultimately is the system’s, not theirs.
Harvey Weinstein is an exceptionally clever man who spent decades standing above and outside the system, manipulating it and gaming it for his own ends. He’s no cog. Tina Brown once ran Weinstein’s magazine and book-publishing line. She wrote that “strange contracts pre-dating us would suddenly surface, book deals with no deadline attached authored by attractive or nearly famous women, one I recall was by the stewardess on a private plane.” Which means he didn’t get into book publishing, or magazine publishing, to oversee the production of books and articles. He did it because he needed entities through which he would pass through payoffs both to women he had harassed and molested and to journalists whose silence he bought through options and advances. His primary interest wasn’t in the creation of culture. It was the creation of conditions under which he could hunt.
Which may explain his choice of the entertainment industry in the first place. In how many industries is there a specific term for demanding sexual favors in exchange for employment? There’s a “casting couch”; there’s no “insurance-adjustor couch.” In how many industries do people conduct meetings in hotel rooms at off hours anyway? And in how many industries could that meeting in a hotel room end up with the dominant player telling a young woman she should feel comfortable getting naked in front of him because the job for which she is applying will require her to get naked in front of millions?
Weinstein is entirely responsible for his own actions, but his predatory existence was certainly made easier by the general collapse of most formal boundaries between the genders. Young women were told to meet him in private at night in fancy suites. Half a century earlier, no young woman would have been permitted to travel alone in a hotel elevator to a man’s room. The world in which that was the norm imposed unacceptable limitations on the freedoms of women. But it did place serious impediments in the paths of predators whose despicable joy in life is living entirely without religious, spiritual, cultural, or moral impediment.
Hobbes was the great philosopher of limits. We Americans don’t accept his view of things; we tend to think better of people than he did. We tend to believe in the greater good, which he resolutely did not. We believe in self-government, which he certainly did not. But what our more optimistic outlook finds extraordinarily difficult to reckon with is behavior that challenges this complacency about human nature. We try to find larger explanations for it that place it in a more comprehensible context: It’s toxic masculinity! It’s the residue of the 1960s! It’s the people who enabled it! The truth is that, on occasion—and this is one such occasion—we are forced to come face to face with the worst of what any of us could be. And no one explanation suffices save Hamlet’s: “Use every man after his desert, and who should ’scape whipping?”
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The education-reform outfit’s hard-left shift
In remaking itself, TFA has subtly downgraded the principles that had won it allies across the spectrum. George W. Bush, Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, Chris Christie, and Meg Whitman are a few of the Republicans who championed TFA. The group attracted such boldface names, and hundreds of millions of dollars from some of the largest American firms and philanthropies, because it stood for a simple but powerful idea: that teacher quality is the decisive factor in the educational outcomes produced by schools.
Judging by its interventions in recent debates, it isn’t all that clear that senior TFA executives still believe this. These days, TFA’s voice on charters, accountability, and curricular rigor is decidedly muffled. Such education-reform essentials have been eclipsed in TFA’s discourse by immigration, policing, “queer” and transgender-identity issues, and other left-wing causes. TFA’s message seems to be that until numerous other social ills are cured—until immigration is less restricted, policing becomes more gentle, and poverty is eliminated—an excellent education will elude the poor. That was the status-quo defeatism TFA originally set out to challenge.
Wendy Kopp conceived TFA when she was a senior at Princeton in 1989. Unable to get a New York City teaching job without a graduate degree and state certification, Kopp wrote a thesis calling for the creation of a nontraditional recruitment pipeline that would bring America’s most promising young people to its neediest classrooms. TFA members would teach for two years, applying their energy and ambition to drive achievement at the classroom level. She speculated that some would stay in education, while others would go on to careers in law, medicine, business, journalism, etc. But all would remain “lifelong leaders in the effort to end educational inequity.”
The following year, Kopp launched TFA with a corps of 489 new teachers who were dispatched to schools in six regions—a virtuoso feat of social entrepreneurship. Since then some 50,000 teachers have completed the program. This year’s corps counts around 6,400 members, serving 53 regions from coast to coast.
By the time I joined, in 2005, TFA had distilled the experience of its best corps members into a theory of educational transformation called “Teaching as Leadership.” Most people, it said, aren’t natural-born educators. But they could rise to classroom greatness by setting “big goals” for all students, planning engaging lessons, continually assessing their students, maintaining tough discipline, and investing parents and the wider community in their goals.
Mostly, great teachers work hard—really hard. TFA brought the work habits usually associated with large law firms and high-end management consultancies to America’s K–12 failure factories. Its “summer institute” for new recruits was a grueling ordeal of tears, sweat, and 16-hour days. When I was a corps member, we were told that this is what it would take to overcome the forces of the status quo, which were chronically low expectations; broken homes and criminality in the streets; messy, undisciplined classrooms; and bloated bureaucracies that put the needs of adults above those of children.
The TFA worldview diverged sharply from the one that predominated in the education industry. The leading lights of the profession held that the achievement gap was a product of inadequate funding and larger social inequalities. Thus they transferred blame for classroom outcomes from teachers to policymakers and society at large. Teachers’ unions were particularly fond of this theory, since it provided cover for resisting accountability and high expectations.
TFA raged against all this. The assumption that some kids were doomed to underachievement was wrong and, indeed, bigoted. Ditto for the notion that inner-city children couldn’t be expected to behave like young scholars. These children could pull themselves up, provided they had dedicated educators who believed in them. This wasn’t to say that external factors were discounted altogether. But TFA concentrated on the things that educators and school leaders could control. It would emphasize self-help and uplift. And it would accept friends and allies across political divides to fulfill the promise of educational equality.T oday’s Teach for America is a different story. TFA’s leaders have now fully enlisted the organization in the culture war—to the detriment of its mission and the high-minded civic sensibility that used to animate its work.
This has been most visible in TFA’s response to the 2016 election. TFA chief executive Elisa Villanueva Beard, who took over from Kopp four years ago, doesn’t bother to mask either her progressivism or her revulsion at the new administration. When, a couple of weeks after the election, the president-elect announced his choice of Betsy DeVos to lead the Department of Education, Beard’s response was swift and cold.
A November 23 TFA news release began by decrying Trump’s “indisputably hostile and racially charged campaign” and called on DeVos to uphold “diversity, equity, and inclusiveness.” The statement went on to outline 11 TFA demands. Topping the litany was protection of the previous administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, program, which granted legal status to certain illegal immigrants brought into the country as children. Then came the identity-politics checklist: “SAFE classrooms for LGBTQ youth and teachers,” “safe classrooms for students and teachers with disabilities,” “safe classrooms for Muslim students and teachers,” “culturally responsive teaching,” and so on.
Of the 11 demands, only three directly touched core education-reform areas—high expectations, accountability, and data-driven instruction—and these were couched in the broadest terms possible. Most notably, there wasn’t a single kind word for DeVos: no well wishes, no hope of “working together to achieve common goals,” no call for dialogue, nothing but angry demands. This, even though the secretary-designee was a passionate charter advocate and came from the same corporate philanthropy and activism ecosystem that TFA had long inhabited.
It is true that inner-city educators were horrified at the election of a candidate who winked at David Duke and suggested that a federal judge’s Mexican heritage was disqualifying. TFA’s particular concern about DACA makes sense, since many corps members work with illegal-immigrant children in border states. (My own stint took me to the Rio Grande Valley region of South Texas.)
Even so, TFA’s allergic reaction to the Trump phenomenon reflects faulty strategic thinking. Beard isn’t Rachel Maddow, and TFA isn’t supposed to be an immigration-reform outfit, still less a progressive think tank. With Republicans having swept all three branches of the federal government, as well as a majority of statehouses and governors’ mansions, TFA must come to terms with the GOP. Condemning the new education secretary as barely legitimate wasn’t wise.
Beard is also making a grave mistake by attempting to banish legitimate conservative positions from the reform movement. In the wake of the bloody white-nationalist protests in Charlottesville, Virginia, she blasted an email to the organization that denounced in one breath opposition to affirmative action and “racist and xenophobic violence.” Some two-thirds of Americans oppose race-based affirmative action. Will these Americans give TFA a fair hearing on educational reform when the organization equates them with alt-right thugs? In a phone interview, Beard said she didn’t intend to link white nationalism with opposition to affirmative action.
As for DACA, the amount of attention TFA devotes to the fate of those affected is out of all proportion. TFA has a full-time director for DACA issues. A search of its website reveals at least 31 news releases, statements, and personal blogs on DACA—including a 2013 call for solidarity with “UndocuQueer students” that delved into the more exotic dimensions of intersectionality. As one education reformer told me in an interview, “They are super-concerned with ‘can’t wait’ issues—DACA and so on—and so much of their mental space [is filled up] by that kind of thing that less of their attention and time is being spent” on central priorities. “Personally, I think that’s such a shame.” (This reformer, and others I interviewed for this article, declined to speak on the record.)
By contrast, TFA didn’t call out Mayor Bill de Blasio on his attempts to roll back charter schools in New York. The organization has rarely targeted teachers’ unions the way it has ripped into Trump. But it is the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers that pose the main obstacle to expanding school choice and dismissing ineffective teachers. It is the unions that are bent on snuffing out data-driven instruction. It was a teachers’ union boss (Karen Lewis of Chicago), not the 45th president, who in 2012 accused TFA of supporting policies that “kill and disenfranchise children.”T
each for America’s turn to the harder left predated Trump’s ascent, and it isn’t mainly about him. Rather, it tracks deeper shifts within American liberalism, from the meritocratic Clintonian ideas of the 1990s and early aughts to today’s socialist revival and the fervid politics of race, gender, and sexuality.
Culturally, TFA was always more liberal than conservative. Educators tend to be liberal Democrats, regardless of the path that brings them to the classroom. But education reformers are unwanted children of American liberalism. They are signed up for the Democratic program, but they clash with public-sector labor unions, the most powerful component of the party base.
As TFA went from startup to corporate-backed giant, it sustained withering attacks from leftist quarters. On her influential education blog, New York University’s Diane Ravitch (a one-time education reformer who changed sides) relentlessly hammered corps members as “woefully unprepared,” as scabs “used to take jobs away from experienced teachers,” as agents of “privatization” and the “neoliberal attack on the public sector.” It was Ravitch who publicized Lewis’s claim that TFAers “kill” kids.
Michelle Rhee, the Korean-American alumna who in 2007 was tapped as chancellor of the District of Columbia system, became a lightning rod for anti-TFA sentiment on the left. Rhee’s no-nonsense approach to failing schools was summed up in a Time magazine cover that showed her holding a broom in the middle of a classroom. When D.C. Mayor Adrian Fenty didn’t win reelection in 2010, it was seen as a popular verdict against this image of TFA-style reform.
In 2013, one university instructor, herself a TFA alumna, urged college professors not to write letters of recommendation for students seeking admission to the organization. Liberal pundits took issue with TFA’s alleged elitism and lack of diversity, portraying it as the latest in a long line of “effete” white reformist institutions that invariably let down the minorities they try to help. TFA, argued a writer in the insurgent leftist magazine Jacobin, is “another chimerical attempt in a long history of chimerical attempts to sell educational reform as a solution to class inequality. At worst, it’s a Trojan horse for all that is unseemly about the contemporary education-reform movement.” By “unseemly,” the writer meant conservative and corporate.
The assaults have had an effect. Applications to TFA dropped to 37,000 last year, down from 57,000 in 2013. Thus ended a growth spurt that had seen the organization increase the size of its corps by about a fifth each year since 2000. Partly this was due to more jobs and better salaries on offer to elite graduates in a rebounding private sector. But as Beard conceded in a statement in April 2016, partly it was the “toxic debate surrounding education” that was “pushing future leaders away from considering education as a space where they can have real impact.”
The temptation for any successful nonprofit crusade is to care more about viability and growth than the original cause. Wounded by the union-led attacks, TFA leaders have apparently concluded that identity politics and a progressive public presence can revive recruitment. With its raft of corporate donors and the massive Walton-family endowment, TFA would never fit in comfortably with an American liberalism moving in the direction of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. But talk of Black Lives and “UndocuQueers” might help it reconnect with younger millennials nursed on race-and-gender theory.
Thus, TFA leads its current pitch by touting its diversity. Beard opened her keynote at last year’s 25th-anniversary summit in Washington by noting: “We are more diverse than we have ever been. . . . We are a community that is black, that is Latino, that is white, that is American Indian, that is Asian and Pacific Islander, that is multiracial. We are a community that is lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer and trans.” The organization’s first priority, Beard went on, will always be “to build an inclusive community.”
It makes sense to recruit diverse teachers to lead classrooms in minority-majority regions, to be sure. But one can’t help detecting a certain liberal guilt behind this rhetoric, as if TFA had taken all the attacks against it to heart: We aren’t elite, we swear! Yet the 90 percent of black children who don’t reach math proficiency by eighth grade need good math teachers, period. Their parents don’t care how teachers worship (if at all), what they look like, or what they get up to in the bedroom. They want teachers who will put their children on a trajectory out of poverty.
Minority parents, moreover, fear for their kids’ well-being in chaotic schools and gang-infested streets. Yet to hear many of the speakers at TFA’s summit, you would have thought that police and other authority figures represent the main threat to black and Hispanic children. At a session titled “#StayWoke,” a TFA teacher railed against the police:
I teach 22 second-graders in Southeast D.C., all of them students of color. Sixteen of them are beautiful, carefree black and brown boys, who, despite their charm and playfulness, could be slain in the streets by the power that be [sic], simply because of the color of their skin, what clothes they wear, or the music they choose to listen to.
Educators must therefore impart “a racial literacy, a literacy of resistance.” Their students “must grow up woke.” Another teacher-panelist condemned anti-gang violence initiatives that
come from the same place as the appetite to charge black and brown people with charges of self-destruction. The tradition of blaming black folk keeps us from aiming at real sources of violence. If we were really interested in ending violence, we would be asking who pulled the trigger to underfund schools in Philadelphia? Who poisoned our brothers and sisters in Flint, Michigan? Who and what made New Orleans the incarceration capital of the world? We would teach our students to raise these questions.
Throughout, he led the assembly in chants of “Stay Woke!”
Talk of teaching “resistance” represented a reversion to the radical pedagogy and racial separatism that left a legacy of broken inner-city schools in the previous century. TFA’s own experience, and that of TFA-linked charter networks such as the Knowledge Is Power Program, had taught reformers that, to thrive academically, low-income students need rigid structure and order. Racial resentment won’t set these kids up for success but for alienation and failure—and prison.
Another session, on “Academic Rigor, Social and Political Consciousness, and Culturally Relevant Pedagogy,” pushed similar ideas. Jeff Duncan-Andrade, an associate professor of “Raza studies” at San Francisco State University, urged teachers to develop an ultra-localized race-conscious curriculum:
Don’t even essentialize Oakland’s culture! If you’re from the town, you know it’s a big-ass difference between the west and the east [sic]. We talk differently, we walk differently, we dress differently, we speak differently. The historical elements are different. So if you use stuff from the west [of Oakland] you have to really figure out, ‘How do I modify this to be relevant to the communities I’m serving in East Oakland?’ Develop curriculum, pedagogy, assessment that is responsive to the community you serve. You gotta become an ethnographer. You gotta get on the streets, get into the neighborhoods and barrios…talk to the ancestors…
If your curriculum is not building pathways to self-love for kids who at every turn of their day are taught to hate themselves, hate the color of their skin, hate the texture of their hair, hate the color of their eyes, hate the language they speak, hate the culture they come from, hate the ‘hood that they come from, hate the countries that their people come from, then what’s the purpose of your schooling?
Other sessions included “Native American Community Academy: A Case Study in Culturally Responsive Pedagogy”; “What Is the Role of White Leaders?”; “Navigating Gender Dynamics”; “Beyond Marriage Equality: Safety and Empowerment in the Education of LGBTQ Youth”; “A Chorus of Voices: Building Power Together,” featuring the incendiary Black Lives Matter activist and TFA alumnus DeRay McKesson; “Every Student Counts: Moving the Equity Agenda Forward for Asian American and Pacific Islander Students”; “Intentionally Diverse Learning Communities”; and much more of the kind.
Lost amid all this talk of identitarian self-love was the educator’s role in leading poor children toward things bigger and higher than Oakland, with its no doubt edifying east–west street rivalries—toward the glories of the West and the civic and constitutional bonds that link Americans of all backgrounds. You can be sure that the people who participate in TFA see to it that their own children learn to appreciate Caravaggio and Shakespeare and The Federalist. The whole point of the organization was to ensure that kids from Oakland could do the same.
Twenty-seven years since Teach for America was founded, the group’s mission remains vital. Today fewer than 1 in 10 children growing up in low-income communities graduate college. The basic political dynamics of education reform haven’t changed: Teach for America, and the other reform efforts it has inspired, have shown what works. The question is whether Teach for America is still determined to reform schools and fight for educational excellence for all—or whether it wants to become a cash-flush and slick vehicle for the new politics of identity.
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Review of 'iGen' By Jean Twenge
n 1954, scientists James Olds and Peter Milner ran some experiments on rats in a laboratory at McGill University. What they found was remarkable and disturbing. They discovered that if electrodes were implanted into a particular part of the rat brain—the lateral hypothalamus—rats would voluntarily give themselves electric shocks. They would press a lever several thousand times per hour, for days on end, and even forgo food so that they could keep pressing. The scientists discovered that the rats were even prepared to endure torture in order to receive these shocks: The animals would run back and forth over an electrified grid if that’s what it took to get their fix. They enjoyed the shocks so much that they endured charring on the bottoms of their feet to receive them. For a long time afterward, Olds and Milner thought that they had discovered the “bliss center” of the brain—but this was wrong. They had discovered the reward center. They had found the part of the brain that gives us our drives and our desires. These scientists assumed that the rats must have been in a deep state of pleasure while receiving these electric shocks, but in reality they were in a prolonged state of acute craving.
Jean Twenge’s important new book, iGen: Why Today’s Super-Connected Kids Are Growing Up Less Rebellious, More Tolerant, Less Happy—and Completely Unprepared for Adulthood, talks about a new form of electronic stimulation that appears to be driving young people to extreme distraction. A professor of psychology at San Diego State University, Twenge has built her career on looking at patterns in very large samples of people across long periods of time. She takes data from the General Social Survey, which has examined adults 18 years and older since 1966; the American Freshman Survey, which has questioned college students since 1991; the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System; and the Monitoring the Future databases. She looks to see whether there have been any changes in behavior and personality across time for people the same age but from different generations. Prior to iGen, she was the author of The Narcissism Epidemic (2009), co-written with psychologist W. Keith Campbell, and Generation Me (2013), a book about self-entitled Millennials. Twenge knows whereof she speaks.
Unlike previous patterns of rising narcissism, the trends of self-regard and self-entitlement associated with those born after 1995 appear to have petered out. What Twenge does find, however, is that reversals in trends of narcissism have been replaced by sharp increases in anxiety. Rates of anxiety and depression are spiking rapidly in young people, while at the same time their engagement with adult behaviors is declining. Using dozens of graphs, Twenge shows the reader how teenagers today drink less, go out less, socialize less, are less motivated to get their driver’s license, work less, date less, and even have sex less.
At first glance, the data seem counterintuitive, because the social pressures to abstain from alcohol and casual sex have never been more relaxed. But, on further reading, it appears that young people’s avoidance of adult behaviors has at least something to do with the addictive and distracting nature of smartphones and social media. Of course, Twenge is careful to point out that this is all “correlational.” She does not have a smoking gun and cannot prove causality. But the speculation seems plausible. All of the changes she observes started accelerating after 2007, when smartphones became ubiquitous. She writes:
I asked my undergraduate students what I thought was a very simple question: “What do you do with your phone while you sleep? Why?” Their answers were a profile in obsession. Nearly all slept with their phones, putting them under their pillows, on the mattress, or at the very least within arm’s reach of the bed. They checked social media websites and watched videos right before they went to bed and reached for their phones again as soon as they woke up in the morning (they had to—all of them used it as their alarm). Their phone was the last thing they saw before they went to bed and the first thing they saw when they woke up. If they woke up in the middle of the night they often ended up looking at their phones. They talked about their phones the way an addict would talk about crack: “I know I shouldn’t, but I just can’t help it.”
Recent experiments also lend support to the hypothesis. In an experiment carried out in 2013, psychologists Larry Rosen and Nancy Cheever brought 163 university students into a room. Some students had their phones unexpectedly taken away and others were told to put their phones on silent and out of sight. All students were then asked to fill out a brief anxiety questionnaire in 20-minute intervals. Those who were the heaviest smartphone users and heaviest social-media users recorded anxiety levels that kept climbing over the 90-minute period. The kids who used their smartphones the least did not have any increase in anxiety. This experiment lends strong support to the hypothesis that smartphones, by their propensity to promote constant use, do in fact cause agitation.
Twenge’s chapter on mental health in the generation born after 1995 makes for the book’s most disturbing reading. Heavy smartphone and social-media use correlates with higher anxiety and increased feelings of loneliness, particularly in girls. Social media seems to allow girls to bully one another in much more subtle and effective ways than were previously available. They constantly include or exclude one another from online activities such as group “chats,” and they are forever surveilling their peers’ presentation and appearance. This means that if girls aren’t vigilantly checking their social-media accounts, they won’t know if they’re being gossiped about or excluded from some fun activity. Like the electrodes placed on Olds and Milner’s rats, this new technology seems to activate the reward center—but it does not induce states of contentment, satisfaction, or meaning. It also takes time away from other activities such as sports and in-person socializing that would induce feelings of contentment and satisfaction. For a young person who is developing his personality and his competencies in the real world, this could have a profound and long-lasting effect.
Twenge tries not to be alarmist, and she presents her findings in a cautious, conscientious manner. She takes care to make caveats and eschew emotionally laden language. But it’s hard not to be alarmed by what she has found. In the six years between 2009 and 2015, the number of high-school girls who attempted suicide increased by 43 percent and the number of college students who “seriously considered” ending their lives rose by 51 percent. Suicides in young people are carefully tracked—there can be no ambiguity in this data—and increasing rates of children killing themselves are strong evidence that something is seriously amiss. From 2007 (the year smartphones became omnipresent) to 2015, suicide among 15- to 19-year-olds rose by 46 percent, and among those aged 12 to 14, it rose by half. And this rise is particularly pronounced for young girls. Three times as many 12- to 14-year-old girls killed themselves in 2015 as in 2007; among boys that age, suicide doubled in the same period. The suicide rate is always higher for boys (partly because they use more violent methods), but girls are now beginning to close this gender gap.
Another startling chapter in Twenge’s book focuses on sex, relationships, and family formation. We all know that young people are putting off marriage and child-rearing until later years, often for sensible reasons. But what is less well known is that young people are dating a lot less and spending a lot more time alone. It appears that old-fashioned romance and courtship norms are out the window, and so too is sex among young people. Twenge writes:
[M]ore young adults are not having sex at all. More than twice as many iGen’ers and late Millennials (those born in the 1990s) in their early twenties (16 percent) had not had sex at all since age 18 compared to GenX’ers at the same age (6 percent). A more sophisticated statistical analysis that included all adults and controlled for age and time period confirmed twice as many “adult virgins” among those born in the 1990s than among those born in the 1960s.
But if 16 percent are virgins, that means 84 percent of young people are having sex. Perhaps, then, there’s only a small segment bucking the trend toward more libertine lifestyles? Not so. Twenge writes:
Even with age controlled [in samples], Gen X’ers born in the 1970s report having an average of 10.05 sexual partners in their lifetimes, whereas Millennials and iGen’ers born in the 1990s report having sex with 5.29 partners. So Millennials and iGen’ers, the generations known for quick, casual sex, are actually having sex with fewer people.
For decades, conservatives have worried about loosened social and sexual mores among young people. It’s true that sexual promiscuity poses meaningful risks to youths’ well-being, especially among women. But there are also risks that manifest at a broader level when there is a lack of sexual activity in young people. And this risk can be summed up in three words—angry young men. Anthropologists are well aware that societies without strong norms of monogamous pairing produce a host of negative outcomes. In such populations, crime and child abuse increase while savings and GDP decline. Those are just some of the problems that come from men’s directing their energies toward competing with one another for mates instead of providing for families. In monogamous societies, male-to-male competition is tempered by the demands of family life and planning for children’s futures.
These trends identified by Twenge—increased anxiety and depression, huge amounts of time spent on the Internet, and less time spent dating and socializing—do not bode well for the future of Western societies. It should come as no surprise that young people who struggle to connect with one another and young men who can’t find girlfriends will express their anxieties as political resentments. Twenge’s book reveals just how extensive those anxieties are.
Like the rats that forgo food to binge on electric shocks, teenagers are forgoing formative life experiences and human connection in order to satiate their desire for electronic rewards. But the problem is not necessarily insurmountable. Twenge identifies possible protective factors such as playing sports, real-life socializing, adequate sleep, sunlight, and good food. Indeed, phone apps designed to encourage good habits are becoming popular, as are those that lock people out of their social-media accounts for predetermined periods of time. Twenge also argues that iGen has several positive indicators. They are less narcissistic and are more industrious than the generation before them, and they are also more realistic about the demands of work and careers. But harnessing those qualities will require an effort that seems at once piddling and gargantuan. IGen’s future well-being, and ours, depends on whether or not they can just put down their phones.
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Playwrights and politics
No similar incidents have been reported, but not for lack of opportunity. In the past year, references to Trump have been shoehorned into any number of theatrical productions in New York and elsewhere. One Trump-related play by a noted author, Robert Schenkkan’s Building the Wall, has already been produced off Broadway and across America, and various other Trump-themed plays are in the pipeline, including Tracy Letts’s The Minutes and Beau Willimon’s The Parisian Woman, both of which will open on Broadway later this season.
The first thing to be said about this avalanche of theatrical activity is that these plays and productions, so far as is known, all show Trump in a negative light. That was to be expected. Save for David Mamet, I am not aware of any prominent present-day American playwright, stage actor, director, or technician who has ever publicly expressed anything other than liberal or progressive views on any political subject whatsoever. However, it appears one can simultaneously oppose Trump and still be skeptical about the artistic effects of such lockstep unanimity, for many left-of-center drama critics have had unfavorable things to say about the works of art inspired to date by the Trump presidency.
So even a political monoculture like that of the American theater can criticize the fruits of its own one-sidedness. But can such a culture produce any other kind of art? Or might the Theater of Trump be inherently flawed in a way that prevents it from transcending its limitations?F rom Aristophanes to Angels in America, politics has always been a normal part of the subject matter of theater. Not until the end of the 19th century, though, did a major playwright emerge whose primary interest in writing plays was political rather than aesthetic. George Bernard Shaw saw himself less as an artist than as a propagandist for the causes to which he subscribed, which included socialism, vegetarianism, pacifism, and (late in his life) Stalinism. But Shaw took care to sugar the political pill by embedding his preoccupations in entertaining comedies of ideas, and he was just as careful to make his villains as attractive—and persuasive-sounding—as his heroes.
In those far-off days, the English-speaking theater world was more politically diverse than it is today both on and off stage. It was only in the late ’40s that the balance started to shift, at first slowly, then with steadily increasing speed. In England, this ultimately led to a theater in which it is now common to find explicit political statements embedded not merely in plays but also in such commercial musicals as Billy Elliot, a show about the British miners’ strike of 1984 in which a chorus of children sings a holiday carol whose refrain runs as follows: “Merry Christmas, Maggie Thatcher / We all celebrate today / Cause it’s one day closer to your death.”
As this example suggests, postwar English political theater is consumed with indictments of the evils arising from the existence of a rigid class system. American playwrights, by contrast, are typically more inclined to follow in the footsteps of Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams, both of whose plays portray (albeit for different reasons) the spiritual and emotional poverty of middle-class life. In both countries, most theater is neither explicitly nor implicitly political. Nevertheless, the theater communities of England and America have for the last half-century or so been all but unanimous in their offstage political convictions. This means that when an English-language play is political, the views that it embodies will almost certainly be left-liberal.
This unanimity of opinion is responsible for what I called, in a 2009 Commentary essay about Miller, the “theater of concurrence.”1 Its practitioners, presumably because all of their colleagues share their political views, take for granted that their audiences will also share them. Hence they write political plays in which no attempt is made to persuade dissenters to change their minds, it being assumed that no dissenters are present in the theater. In the theater of concurrence, disagreement with left-liberal orthodoxy is normally taken to be the result either of invincible ignorance or a deliberate embrace of evil. In the U.S. and England alike, it has become rare to see old-fashioned Shavian political plays like David Hare’s Skylight (1995) in which the devil (in this case, a Thatcherite businessman in love with an upper-middle-class do-gooder) is given his due. Instead, we get plays whose villains are demoniacal monsters (Tony Kushner’s fictionalized portrayal of Roy Cohn in Angels in America is an example) rather than flawed humans who, like Tom in Skylight, have reached the point of no moral return.
All this being the case, it makes perfect sense that Donald Trump’s election should have come as so disorienting a shock to the American theater community, which took for granted that he was unelectable. No sooner were the votes tallied than theater people took to social media to angrily declare their unalterable resistance to the Trump presidency. Many of them believe both Trump and his supporters to be, in Hillary Clinton’s oft-quoted phrase, members of “the basket of deplorables . . . racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, you name it.”
What kind of theater is emerging from this shared belief? Building the Wall, the first dramatic fruit of the Trump era, is a two-character play set in the visiting room of a Texas prison. It takes place in 2019, by which time President Trump has been impeached after having responded to the detonation of a nuclear weapon in Times Square by declaring nationwide martial law and locking up every foreigner in sight. The bomb, it turns out, was a “false flag” operation planted not by terrorists but by the president’s men. Rick, the play’s principal character, has been imprisoned for doing something so unspeakably awful that he and his interlocutor, a sanctimonious black journalist who is interviewing him for a book, are initially reluctant to talk about it. At the end of an hour or so of increasingly broad hints, we learn that Rick helped the White House set up a Nazi-style death camp for illegal immigrants.
Schenkkan has described Building the Wall as “not a crazy or extreme fantasy,” an inadvertently revealing remark. It is possible to spin involving drama out of raging paranoia, but that requires a certain amount of subtlety, not to mention intelligence—and there is nothing remotely subtle or intelligent about Building the Wall. Rick is a blue-collar cartoon, a regular-guy Texan who claims not to be a racist but voted for Trump because “all our jobs were going to Mexico and China and places like that and then the illegals here taking what jobs are left and nobody gave a damn.” Gloria, his interviewer, is a cartoon of a different kind, a leftsplaining virtue signal in human form who does nothing but emit smug speeches illustrating her own enlightened state: “I mean, at some point in the past we were all immigrants, right, except for Native Americans. And those of us who didn’t have a choice in the matter.” The New York production of Building the Wall closed a month ahead of schedule, having received universally bad reviews (the New York Times described it as “slick and dispiriting”).
The Public Theater’s Julius Caesar, by contrast, received mixed but broadly positive reviews. But it, too, was problematic, albeit on an infinitely higher level of dramatic accomplishment. Here, the fundamental problem was that Eustis had superimposed a gratuitous directorial gloss on Shakespeare’s play. There have been many other high-concept productions of Julius Caesar, starting with Orson Welles’s 1937 modern-dress Broadway staging, which similarly transformed Shakespeare’s play into an it-can-happen-here parable of modern-day fascism. But Eustis’s over-specific decision to turn Caesar into a broad-brush caricature of Trump hijacked the text instead of illuminating it. Rather than allowing the audience to draw its own parallels to the present situation, he pandered to its prejudices. The result was a quintessential example of the theater of concurrence, a staging that undercut its not-inconsiderable virtues by reducing the complexities of the Trump phenomenon to little more than boob-baiting by a populist vulgarian.
Darko Tresjnak committed a venial version of the same sin in his Hartford Stage revival of Shaw’s Heartbreak House (1919), which opened around the same time as Building the Wall and Julius Caesar. Written in the wake of World War I, Heartbreak House is a tragicomedy about a group of liberal bohemians who lack the willpower to reconstruct their doomed society along Shaw’s preferred socialist lines. Tresjnak’s lively but essentially traditional staging hewed to Shaw’s text in every way but one: He put a yellow Trump-style wig on Boss Mangan, the bloated, parasitical businessman who is the play’s villain. The effect was not unlike dressing a character in a play in a T-shirt with a four-letter word printed across the chest. The wig triggered a loud laugh on Mangan’s first entrance, but you were forced to keep on looking at it for the next two hours, by which time the joke had long since grown numbingly stale. It was a piece of cheap point-making unworthy of a production that was otherwise distinguished.How might contemporary theater artists engage with the Trump phenomenon in a way that is both politically and artistically serious?
For playwrights, the obvious answer is to follow Shaw’s own example by allowing Trump (or a Trump-like character) to speak for himself in a way that is persuasive, even seductive. Shaw himself did so in Major Barbara (1905), whose central character is an arms manufacturer so engagingly urbane that he persuades his pacifist daughter to give up her position with the Salvation Army and embrace the gospel of high explosives. But the trouble with this approach is that it is hard to imagine a playwright willing to admit that Trump could be persuasive to anyone but the hated booboisie.
Then there is Lynn Nottage’s Sweat, which transferred to Broadway last March after successful runs at the Oregon Shakespeare Festival and the Public Theater. First performed in the summer of 2015, around the time that Trump announced his presidential candidacy, Sweat is an ensemble drama about a racially diverse group of unemployed steel workers in Reading, the Pennsylvania city that has become synonymous with deindustrialization. Trump is never mentioned in the play, which takes place between 2000 and 2008 and is not “political” in the ordinary sense of the word, since Nottage did not write it to persuade anyone to do anything in particular. Her purpose was simply to show how the people of Reading feel, and try to explain why they feel that way. Tightly structured and free of sermonizing, Sweat is a wholly personal drama whose broader political implications are left unsaid. Instead of putting Trump in the pillory, it takes a searching look at the lives of the people who voted for him, and it portrays them sympathetically, making a genuine good-faith attempt to understand why they chose to embrace Trumpian populism.
Sweat is a model for serious political art—artful political art, if you will. Are more such plays destined to be written about Donald Trump and his angry supporters? Perhaps, if their authors heed the wise words of Joseph Conrad: “My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make you feel—it is, before all, to make you see.” Only the very best artists can make political art with that kind of revelatory power. Shaw and Bertolt Brecht did it, and so has Lynn Nottage. Will Tracy Letts and Beau Willimon follow suit, or will they settle for the pandering crudities of Building the Wall? The answer to that question will tell us much about the future of political theater in the Age of Trump.
1 “Concurring with Arthur Miller” (Commentary, June 2009)