Ethnicity seems to be a new term. In the sense in which we use it—the character or quality of an ethnic group—it does not appear in the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, and only makes its appearance in the 1972 Supplement, where the first usage recorded is that of David Riesman in 1953. It is included in Webster's Third New International, 1961, but did not find its way into the Random House Dictionary of the English Language of 1966, nor the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1969. It did, however, make the 1973 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary, where it is defined as: “1. The condition of belonging to a particular ethnic group; 2. Ethnic pride.” One senses a term still on the move. The first of these two definitions fits well with our own: an objective condition. The second, however, is decidedly subjective: “pride.” How very different from an old meaning, “obs. rare” as the OED has it, “heathendom: heathen superstition.” At the very least, a change of relative status is going on here, and a shift in the general understanding of ethnic groups. Where they were formerly seen as survivals from an earlier age, to be treated variously with toleration, annoyance, or mild celebration, there is now a growing sense that they may be forms of social life that are capable of renewing and transforming themselves.
Still, one may wonder how useful this new term really is. Does it describe a new reality, or is it simply a new way of describing something old? Is it not a matter of age-old human characteristics and sentiments, finding expression, perhaps, in new settings, but in themselves nothing new? We think not. In our judgment, something new has appeared. A reader of the early 19th century, encountering the assertion that industrialization was shaping distinctive social classes, could well have shrugged it off with the thought that there had always been social ranks, always different ways of earning a living. Yet to have done so would have been to miss a big event of that age. Similarly, we feel that to see only what is familiar in the ethnicity of our time is to miss the emergence of a new social category as significant for the understanding of the present-day world as that of social class itself.
Perhaps the best way of getting at what is new here is by reference to the prevailing ideas of most contemporary social scientists regarding the course of modern social development. One such idea has been called by Milton Gordon the “liberal expectancy”—the expectation that the kinds of features which distinguish one group from another would inevitably lose their weight and sharpness in modern and modernizing societies, that there would be increasing emphasis on achievement rather than ascription, that common systems of education and communication would wipe out group differences, that nationally uniform economic and political systems would have the same effect. Under these circumstances the “primordial” (or in any case antecedent) differences between groups would become less and less significant. This “liberal expectancy” flowed into the “radical expectancy”—that class would become the main line of division between people, erasing the earlier lines of tribe, language, religion, national origin, and that these class divisions would themselves, after the Revolution, disappear. Thus Karl Marx and his followers reacted with impatience to the heritage of the past, as they saw it, in the form of ethnic attachments. Interest should guide rational men in social action; and interest was determined by economic position.
Yet one of the striking characteristics of the present situation is the extent to which the ethnic group itself is now behaving as an interest group. Interest is pursued effectively by ethnic groups today as well as by interest-defined groups: indeed, perhaps it can be pursued even more effectively. As against class-based forms of social identification and conflict—which of course continue to exist—we have been surprised by the persistence and salience of ethnic-based forms of social identification and conflict.
Thus, whereas in the past religious conflicts were based on such issues as the free and public practice of a religion, today they are based—like the one which is tearing Northern Ireland apart—on the issue of which group shall gain benefits or hold power. Language conflicts—as in India—today have little to do with the right to the public use of the language, as they did in the 19th century when, for example, there were efforts to Russify the Russian Empire and Magyarize the Hungarian Kingdom. They have more to do with which linguistic group shall have the best opportunity to get which job. It would be wrong to insist on too sharp a distinction: certainly the prestige of one's religion and language is involved in both kinds of conflict. Nevertheless the weight has shifted from an emphasis on culture, language, religion, as such, to an emphasis on the economic and social interests of the members of the linguistic or religious group.
There are two related explanations which may account for this development. The first is the evolution of the welfare state in the more advanced economies of the world and the advent of the socialist state in the underdeveloped economies. In either circumstance, the state becomes a crucial and direct influence on economic well-being, as well as on political status and everything flowing from that. In such a situation it is usually not enough, or not enough for long enough, to assert claims on behalf of large but loosely aggregated groups such as “workers,” “peasants,” “white-collar employees.” Claims of this order are too broad to elicit a very satisfactory response, and even when they do, the benefits are necessarily diffuse and often evanescent, having the quality of an across-the-board wage increase which produces an inflation that leaves everyone about as he was. As a matter of strategic efficacy, it becomes necessary to disaggregate, to assert claims for a group small enough to make significant concessions possible and, equally, small enough to produce some gain from the concessions made. A British Prime Minister who does “something for the workers” probably doesn't do much and almost certainly does even less for his party. Doing something for the Scots, however, becomes an increasingly attractive and real option for Westminster. That much in the way of resources can be found, and the Scots are likely both to know about it and to consider it a positive gain, at least past the point of the next general election.
The welfare state and the socialist state appear to be especially responsive to ethnic claims. This is everywhere to be encountered: an Indian minister assuring his parliament that “Muslims, Christians, and other minorities” will receive their “due and proper share” of railroad jobs; a Czech government choosing a Slovak leader; a Chinese prime minister in Singapore choosing an Indian foreign minister; and so on. Leaders of groups are aware that political skills in pressing such claims vary, and occasionally voice their concern, as reported in a recent Associated Press dispatch from Los Angeles:
The Asian-American community leaders have accused the U.S. Department of Labor of exploiting their inexperience in “the political game” to exclude them when allocating federal funds.
“We Asians have always been a quiet minority. We've always been taken for granted, and we always get the crumbs,” Miss —, a leader of the Chinese Community Council, told newsmen.
Miss — was referring to the distribution of $314,000 in federal funds for career counseling projects. The council leaders accused the U.S. manpower area planning council of doing “a tremendous wrong” in giving the funds away entirely to Black and Chicano groups, whose project proposals were more professionally drafted.
The strategic efficacy of ethnicity as a basis for asserting claims against government has its counterpart in the seeming ease whereby government employs ethnic categories as a basis for distributing its rewards. Nothing was more dramatic than the rise of this practice on the part of the American government in the 1960's, at the very moment it was being declared abhorrent and illegal. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the very embodiment of “the liberal expectancy.” “Race, color, religion, sex, national origin”: all such ascriptive categories were abolished. No one was to be classified by such primitive terms. In particular, government was to become color blind. Within hours of the enactment of the statute, in order to enforce it, the federal government, for the first time, began to require ever more detailed accountings of subgroups of every description, job trainees, kindergarten children, kindergarten teachers, university faculties, front-office secretaries in terms of—race, color, sex. (We have not yet proceeded to religion and national origin.) The expectancy that such characteristics would be ignored—in the immediate postwar years governments were busy eliminating all references to race and religion from official forms, even forbidding universities to request photographs of applicants for admission—was instantly replaced by the requirement that they not only be known but the facts as to distribution justified. Random distributions would not do: quotas appeared in American society, the instrument of national social policy designed ostensibly to prevent discrimination by going—inevitably, perhaps—beyond that to positive efforts on behalf of those presumptively discriminated against, a list which in short order commenced to lengthen.
Statutes began to reflect this new strategy. A small example: the Drug Abuse Education Act of 1970 provides “for the use of adequate personnel from similar social, cultural, age, ethnic, and racial backgrounds as those of the individuals served under any such program.” In other words, the federal government was not only to know the peculiar ethnic patterns of various kinds of drug-abuse, but was to match the therapists with the patients: Azerbaijani junkie, Azerbaijani counselor. In a variation of folk medicine, it was judged that wherever a malady was found, there too would a remedy reside. Which may or may not be nonsense: what is not to be denied is that the statute appropriated many millions of dollars for social services which were going to end up in the pockets of those who would dispense them, and these could be concentrated in specific ethnic groups. If government was doing a group a favor by providing special therapeutic services, it could compound the favor by concentrating the patronage involved within the very same group.
In addition to the strategic efficacy of ethnicity in making claims on the resources of the modern state, another reason for the shift to ethnicity as the organizing principle of interest conflicts concerns the issue of equality. Men are not equal; neither are ethnic groups. Whether they should be, or shouldn't be, is, of course, a wholly different question. If one is to describe the way the world is, one describes people everywhere ranked in systems of social stratification in which one person is better or worse off than another. This is the empirical fact. As with individuals, so with groups of individuals, with social groups defined by ethnic identity. We follow Ralf Dahrendorf in holding that inequalities among groups arise in the same way as he says they do among individuals: from differential success in achieving norms. Dahrendorf's thesis is that every society establishes norms selected from a universe of possible values. There seems no end to human ingenuity in thinking of characteristics that can be described as desirable or undesirable. It can be thought a good thing to be wealthy, or to be poor; to be dark or to be light; to be skinny or fat; generous or mean; religious or atheistic; fun-loving or dour; promiscuous or chaste. However, once a selection is made as to what is good and what is bad, individuals—and, we add, ethnic groups—have different levels of success in attaining the desired condition. Woe to blacks in Rhodesia; pity the white in Uganda. Pity the Nepalese in Bhutan who labors on construction gangs before the eyes of a landowning peasantry which despises such servility; woe to the Malay facing the onslaught of Chinese industriousness.
In Dahrendorf's account the individual encounters the norms of his society and the “sanctions designed to enforce these principles.” Some do better than others and reap the rewards; some suffer the punishments. But as between different ethnic groups, which have made quite different selections from the universe of possibilities, the norms of one are likely to be quite different from those of another, such that individuals who are successful by the standards of their own groups will be failures by those of the others. In a situation where one group is dominant—which is to say that its norms are seen as normal not just for them, but for everyone—there follows an almost automatic consignment of other groups to inferior status. This is not an entirely automatic consequence, since some groups will discover that they are good at achieving the norms of the dominant group, and may even be better than the group that laid down those “laws.” In Kenya the Indians were evidently better at trading than the Africans, and so the Indians are being expelled. Jews have known the experience, Japanese, Chinese: who has not? (There are, of course, situations in which no one group is dominant, and where differing norms compete with one another, but this makes if anything for less social peace, as no one is ever quite certain what constitutes success or failure.)
Herein lies the dynamic element in the system. Dahrendorf writes that “Inequality always implies the gain of one group at the expense of others; thus every system of social stratification generates protest against its principles and bears the seeds of its own suppression.” It is not perhaps necessary to assert that every system of social stratification generates protest against its principles. Some may not. But most that we run into in the 20th century seem to do so. This is to say that a different set of norms is set forth as desirable. Struggle ensues. Changes occur, not infrequently changes that favor those previously unsuccessful. Things they are good at come to be labeled good.
At this point we come back to the strategic efficacy of ethnicity as an organizing principle. In the most natural way the unsuccessful group has the best chance of changing the system if it behaves as a group. It is as a group that its struggle becomes not merely negative, but positive also, not merely against the norms of some other group, but in favor of the already existing norms of its own. One of the difficulties of social class as an organizing principle surely is that there just isn't that much conflict of norm between most social classes. In the West intellectuals and others at the top of the social stratification will fantasize about the differences between the values of those at the bottom and those in the middle—always to the advantage of the former—but it usually turns out that those at the bottom pretty much share notions of desirable and undesirable with those in the middle. Ethnic groups, however, often do differ as to what is desirable and what is undesirable.
Marxists thought ethnic groups would disappear. Why on earth would one wish to be a Pole when one could be a Worker? One reason, we are suggesting, is that being a Pole—or a Sikh, or a Mestizo—frequently involves a distinctive advantage or disadvantage, and that remaining a Pole, or a Sikh, or a Mestizo is just as frequently a highly effective way either to defend the advantage or to overcome the disadvantage.
Some individuals opt otherwise. They “pass” out of their own ethnic group into another, typically one that offers greater advantages. This process of absorption is extremely powerful: in the United States, at least, it is probably still quite the most important social process. Americans become more “American” and less ethnic all the time. But they may also—and simultaneously—become more ethnic. This was most dramatically the experience of Negro Americans during the 1960's—they even changed their name to “blacks” to establish that new assertion of distinctiveness—and other groups followed suit, or accompanied them on parallel tracks. As with student activism, this was a phenomenon whole parts of the world were experiencing, and any explanation that depends solely on local elements is not likely to remain satisfactory for long. Something larger was going on: something so large that Ralf Dahrendorf has recently referred to the “refeudalization” of society, the return of ascribed rather than achieved characteristics as determinants of social stratification. It may be that ethnicity is merely part of this larger development.
In a most tentative way one further suggestion may be advanced concerning the new saliency of ethnicity. Dahrendorf notes that for almost two centuries—“from Locke to Lenin”—“property dominated social and political thought: as a source of everything good or evil, as a principle to be retained or abolished.” Yet, he continues, in societies such as those of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Israel, where private property has been reduced to “virtual insignificance,” social stratification—class—persists, even flourishes. Further, we would add, the new stratification is to a considerable extent correlated with ethnicity. It probably always was, but the preoccupation with property relations obscured ethnic ones, which, typically, were seen either as derivative of the former, or survivals from a pre-contractual age. Now—as Yugoslav Communists struggle hopelessly (or so it would seem) to achieve some equity of development and living standard as between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia; as Israeli socialists look with alarm at the persisting differences in the “social class status” of “European” Jews as against “Oriental” Jews in their homeland; as Great Russians prattle on about the equality of ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, while Ukrainians in Washington rally in protest at the Russian Embassy, and Jews in Moscow demand to be allowed to emigrate to Israel—it is property that begins to seem derivative, and ethnicity a more fundamental source of stratification.
This phenomenon is likely to be as much in evidence in an advanced capitalistic society where property relations are attenuated, as in a Communist or socialist society where they are abolished. But it is the Communist nations which have shown the more pronounced concern with ethnic matters, possibly because ethnic reality is so at odds with Marxist-Leninist theory. (Otto Bauer, one of the few Communist theorists to attempt to incorporate “nationalities” into Communist theory was, perhaps significantly, a product of the Austro-Hungarian world at a time when Croatia was governed from Vienna.) There are scores of official nationalities in the Soviet Union, and every citizen, at age sixteen, must opt for one such identity, which he retains for life. Similarly, the Chinese, with their great, central Han culture, find themselves paying considerable heed to “minority nationalities.” According to a recent news dispatch from Peking:
More than 143,000 people of minority nationalities in the autonomous regions of Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Kwangsi and Ningsia, and the Province of Yunnan have been admitted into the Communist Party of China since the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. They include Tibetans, Mongolians, Uighurs, Chuangs, Huis, Koreans, Kazakhs, Yaos, and Miaos.
Most of the new party members are workers and former poor and lower-middle peasants or herdsmen. There is a certain number of revolutionary intellectuals. The new members are both men and women and range in age from young to old.
Many of the new party members from national minorities are emancipated slaves or serfs, or children of former slaves or serfs. They warmly love Chairman Mao, the Party, and the New Society, and hate the old society.1
In short, while religion, language, and concrete cultural differences did decline, at least in the West, as specific foci of attachment and concern (to the extent the “liberal expectancy” was fulfilled), the groups defined by these cultural characteristics were differentially distributed through the social structure. Hence, even as their cultural characteristics were modified by modern social trends and became increasingly “symbolic,” they were nevertheless able to serve as a basis for mobilization. Class was once expected to become the focus in the modern world for mobilizing group interests—it related directly to the rational character of society, and the way society generated different interests. Nation was the other great pole around which group interests could be mobilized. We do not in any way suggest that these are not the central categories for understanding modern societies; what we do propose is that ethnicity must now be added as a new major focus for the mobilization of interests, troublesome both to those who wish to emphasize the primacy of class, and those who wish to emphasize the primacy of nation.
But in order to understand why ethnicity has become stronger as a basis of group mobilization, it is necessary to modify the bald assertion that ethnicity serves as a means of advancing group interests—which it does—by insisting that it is not only a means of advancing interests. Indeed, one reason that ethnicity has become so effective a means of advancing interests is that it involves more than interests. As Daniel Bell puts it: “Ethnicity has become more salient [than class] because it can combine an interest with an affective tie,” while, on the other hand, in the case of class, “what had once been an ideology has now become almost exclusively an interest.”
Illuminating as they are, however, such observations do not answer the questions: Why ethnicity? and Why now? Harold Isaacs, describing the making of a basic group identity, begins his analysis with something so immediate as body image. Clearly that, as well as language and intimately transmitted culture, all play a role in the affective component of ethnicity. But in a world of rapid change and shifting identity, any fixed notion of the “primordial” as the basis of group formation is bound to run into trouble. One problem with the primordial is that nowadays we know how recently many “primordial” groups were created. It is also clear that circumstances have much to do with degrees of ethnic attachment, mobilization, and conflict. In some circumstances, there is much; in others, very little.
These are two poles of analysis—the “primordialist” and the “circumstantialist”—between which explanations for the persistence or revival or creation of ethnic identities tend to waver—ours included. We do not celebrate ethnicity as a basic attribute of men which, when suppressed, will always rise again; nor do we dismiss it as an aberration on the road to a rational society in which all such heritages of the past will become irrelevant to social and political action. For as a political idea, as a mobilizing principle, ethnicity in our time has manifested itself under widely disparate conditions with luxuriantly varied results.
Thus, in the United States the rising demands among blacks first for civil rights, then for equality of opportunity, finally for some equality of participation in the social, economic, and political institutions of the country, can be understood in terms of the distinctive history of blacks in the United States. But it is striking that the black movement found an echo among other ethnic groups in the United States—Latin American, American Indian, Oriental, and eventually whites of various kinds. The circumstances of each of these groups were different. Some had been conquered, some had emigrated from colonies, some from free countries, some had met substantial prejudice and discrimination, others nothing much more than the inconvenience of a new country. Yet the form of the mobilized ethnic group seemed, in some degree, to satisfy individuals in each. (Indeed, many had been involved in vigorous ethnic politics for half a century or more. What changed was that such activity was legitimated: previously it had been disapproved and to some degree disavowed.) We do not assert that some common need, some common distress, existed in everybody ready to be evoked. We do not say that ethnicity is something like the identity of parents in Victorian novels which must be discovered lest some nameless distress follow. But on the other hand we do not believe that the new intensity of ethnic identification among a number of groups was merely a matter of imitation, or even of protective mimicry. Some combination of need and imitation seems to have been at work.
The black revolution had as surprising a resonance abroad as at home. A “black power” movement developed in the West Indies, a “civil rights” movement in Northern Ireland, and “Black Panthers” formed in Israel. Once again, as we consider the relative weight of primordial and circumstantial factors, we find a complex interplay. The Catholics of Northern Ireland did not need the black example to teach them that they were aggrieved—their miseries go back farther in history than those of American blacks—nor did the Oriental Jews of Israel need the American blacks to remind them that something was amiss with their position. Nevertheless through the ever more universally pervasive mass media, the black example exerted its influence to some indeterminate extent, just as on, their side American blacks were influenced by certain developments abroad.
The American civil-rights movement, for example, avowedly and explicitly adopted techniques developed in 20th-century India during the struggle against British rule. The more recent (and, it is hoped, marginal) incidents of urban terrorism followed, albeit without any evident awareness of the fact, a model of resistance developed by the Irish in the 19th century, and still dominant there. Underground “commandants” in San Francisco issuing “execution” orders against deviant revolutionaries were acting out the drama of Dublin in 1920. North Africans picked up the technique, or else invented it on their own; and an Italian made a movie, The Battle of Algiers, which American revolutionaries were soon trying to imitate. And so exchanges proceeded, with, in our time, ever mounting violence. Hijacking was invented, we believe, by the Palestinians—but Croatian workers resident in Sweden and Moslem dissidents in Ethiopia (to refer only to some of those who have acted out of some ethnic interest) have both made use of it.
What of the future? In the 18th and 19th centuries, international economic developments led to great migrations of labor, which in turn led to the creation of a good number of multi-ethnic states. This process is still going on. Never in history did Western Europe import as much labor as in the years after the Second World War. A new colored population of West Indians, Indians, and Pakistanis was added to England. One-third of the labor force of Switzerland, one-eighth of the labor force of Germany, and substantial parts of the labor forces of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden came to be made up of foreign workers. The legal circumstances of each of these waves of new immigrants varied. Some, like the new colored groups of England, were permanent, and had all the rights of citizenship. Some were from neighboring members of the European Commonwealth, and had claims to full social benefits in any other state of the Commonwealth. Some—like the Algerians in France—came from former colonies and had special rights. Others—Turks and Yugoslavs in Germany—came under permits and, theoretically at least, had no right to any permanent settlement. In other cases, such as Sweden, an egalitarian philosophy of government treated all newcomers, whether Italian or Finnish, generously, both as to social benefits and political rights.
Varied though the patterns are, however, we see everywhere two different approaches in conflict. On the one hand, the common philosophy of egalitarianism asserts that all should be treated alike: not only natives and older citizens of a nation, but those who come to work and settle there. On the other hand, Western Europeans have learned that new and permanent settlements of other ethnic groups mean ethnic conflict, and they intend to avoid it if they can. For Great Britain it is too late: although only 2 per cent of the population, the new colored groups already form an issue in British politics that far outweighs their minuscule numbers, and further immigration has virtually been halted. The North Africans, Spanish, and Portuguese in France, and the Italians, Yugoslavs, and Turks in Germany have lesser rights than the West Indians, Pakistanis, and Indians in England, but one wonders whether they will actually be any less permanent a part of those countries. Will the problems arising from the new heterogeneity of France and Germany—the familiar conflicts over housing, schooling, jobs—really be settled by simple mass expulsions, legal as that may be?
Alone of the major nations in the world, the United States continues to accept large numbers of permanent immigrants. Moreover, these immigrants are of quite different “stock” from those of the past. Most notably, they are Asian, and most notable of all, they are to an unprecedented degree professional, upper-middle-class persons. What this means is that the process of gaining political influence—a process which took even the most successful of earlier groups two generations at least—is likely to be rapid for these most recent newcomers. Thus, however much Western Europeans and others may succeed in protecting themselves from the ethnic storms of the 20th century, we may be sure they will continue to buffet the Great Republic.
Nor, of course, can the remaining nation-states easily succeed in avoiding their share of such difficulties. Since the Second World War almost every new nation—and they far outnumber the older nations—has come into existence with a number of serious ethnic conflicts waiting, as it were, their turn to be the focus of post-independence political life. The old European states, while becoming somewhat more diverse with the addition of new groups, are still in the process of finding out just how diverse they had already become. Add to this the fact—still given surprisingly little attention—that in a world in which each society becomes ethnically more diverse, we have had, since the Second World War, a strong prejudice against the formation of new states organized along ethnic lines. As Samuel Huntington has written, “The 20th-century bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is just about as strong as the 19th-century bias against marital divorce.” Bangladesh is an exception, but the general rule remains in force. Certainly these political realities alone seem to provide a good number of the ingredients for a greater degree of ethnic conflict than was experienced, for example, in the world of the Great Depression.
Indeed, there is already evident an increase both in the number and intensity of ethnic conflicts. Walker Conner has undertaken the invaluable task of recording the rise and extent since the French Revolution of what he calls “ethnonationalism.” He reports that nearly half of the independent countries of the world have been troubled in recent years by some degree of “ethnically inspired dissonance.” We do not have benchmarks for earlier periods, but it seems clear that ethnic conflicts have shown a rise, too, in intensity in the last decade or so. As some examples, consider the Anglophone-Francophone conflict in Canada, Catholic and Protestant in Northern Ireland, Walloon and Fleming in Belgium, Jews and other minority groups versus great Russians in the Soviet Union, Ibo versus Hausa and Yoruba in Nigeria, Bengali versus non-Bengali in Pakistan, Chinese versus Malay in Malaysia, Greek versus Turk in Cyprus. If we had measurements of intensity we would not necessarily find that every one of these conflicts has become uniformly more intense. Some of them seem happily to have peaked (sometimes in war and violent conflict), and measures of harmonization and accommodation seem to have had some effect since these peaks were reached (Nigeria, the United States). In at least one other case—Pakistan—conflict has reached the point of separation, and has subsequently declined in intensity, to be succeeded perhaps by a rise in ethnic discord within each one of the two successor states.
There are those who say that ethnic conflict is simply the form that class conflict has been taking on certain occasions in recent decades, and that without the motor of class exploitation nothing-else would follow. Others say that ethnic conflicts must be decomposed into a variety of elements: colonial conflicts; the uprising of the “internally” colonized; the ambition of self-appointed leaders; fashions and fads. To us, however, it seems clear that ethnic identity has become more salient, ethnic self-assertion stronger, ethnic conflict more marked everywhere in the last twenty years, and that the reasons include the rise of the welfare state, the clash between egalitarianism and the differential achievement of norms, the growing heterogeneity of states, and the international system of communication. This set of reasons scarcely amounts to a theory, but it does, we believe, suggest that there is a phenomenon here that is, in ways not yet explicated, no mere survival but intimately and organically bound up with major trends of modern societies.
Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan collaborated on the pioneering study of ethnicity, Beyond the Melting Pot (1963), several parts of which originally appeared in COMMENTARY. Mr. Glazer is professor of education and social structure at Harvard; his most recent book is Remembering the Answers. Daniel P. Moynihan, on leave from the government department at Harvard, is currently serving as Ambassador of the United States to India; his most recent book is Coping. A somewhat different version of the present article will form the introduction to a volume on ethnicity that they have edited for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences which will be published next spring by Harvard University Press.
1 Compare the following item taken from a recent issue of GOP Nationalities News, a publication of the Republican National Committee:
Martin E. Seneca, Jr., a Seneca Indian, has been appointed to the important position of Director of Trust Responsibilities, Bureau of Indian Affairs, by BIA Commissioner Morris Thompson. Seneca, with a doctorate of law degree from Harvard, is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Utah. . . .
At the April 21 meeting in New York of the newly-formed Albanian-American Republican Club, the following slate of officers was elected: Hamdi H. Oruci, Chairman; Mrs. Nejmie Zaimi and Dr. Ligoz Buzi, Vice Chairmen; Lumo M. Tsungu, Secretary; and Mick Kajtazi, Treasurer.
Present at the 11th Annual Hungarian Ball of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation of the U.S. held in Washington, D.C., on April 20, were Republican Congressman Larry Hogan of Maryland; the Director of the RNC Heritage Division and Mrs. Julian Niemczyk; and Mr. and Mrs. Laszlo Pasztor and Dr. and Mrs. John B. Genys, Chairman and Treasurer respectively of the NRHG(N) Council.
Mrs. Angela Miller, of Colombian origin, who is vice president of the Latin American Nationalities Council, 3rd vice chairman of the Republican Business Women of New York, and president of All Nations Women's Club, Inc., was elected co-chairman of Activities and Planning Committee of the NRHG(N) Council.
Mrs. Inese Stokes, of Latvian heritage, recording secretary of the Illinois Republican State Nationalities Council, was elected co-chairman of the NRHG(N) Awards Committee.