A Poor Argument Against Syria Intervention
Max Boot 2013-06-20It tells you something about the composition of the Obama administration in its second term—without Bob Gates, Hillary Clinton, or David Petraeus—that the leading hawk is now Secretary of State John Kerry. But so it appears to be, at least if Jeff Goldberg is right in reporting that at a recent “principals meeting in the White House situation room, Secretary of State John Kerry began arguing, vociferously, for immediate U.S. airstrikes against airfields under the control of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime — specifically, those fields it has used to launch chemical weapons raids against rebel forces.”
The plan went nowhere because of the opposition of General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who reportedly argued “that the Air Force could not simply drop a few bombs, or fire a few missiles, at targets inside Syria: To be safe, the U.S. would have to neutralize Syria’s integrated air-defense system, an operation that would require 700 or more sorties. At a time when the U.S. military is exhausted, and when sequestration is ripping into the Pentagon budget, Dempsey is said to have argued that a demand by the State Department for precipitous military action in a murky civil war wasn’t welcome.”
As my Council on Foreign Relations colleague Elliott Abrams has astutely noted, this is a policy disagreement masquerading as a technical judgment. In point of fact, Israel has attacked Syrian installations at least three times, apparently using aircraft that never penetrated Syrian airspace. The U.S. could easily do the same—and more, if we were to employ cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons fired from warships in the Mediterranean or from heavy bombers such as the B-52 flying safely outside Syrian airspace. More to the point, whether it would take 700 sorties or not, taking down the Syrian air-defense network is well within American capabilities, especially if we were to act before the more advanced Russian S-300 system is online. The Pentagon claims this would be a formidable undertaking; the ease with which U.S. aircraft took down the similar air-defense systems of Iraq and Libya suggests otherwise. The Pentagon, recall, made similar arguments against intervention in the civil war of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, yet American intervention helped tip the balance and make a durable settlement possible. Dempsey is right to be worried about the cost of such an operation at a time of sequestration, but presumably Congress could pass a supplemental appropriation to pay for the added expense.
The real nub of the issue is a policy disagreement: Should we use our airpower to attack Syria? The case that Kerry makes, as outlined in a subsequent Jeff Goldberg column, is, to my mind, powerful and persuasive. Some of his key points: “The administration can’t sit idly by as the civil war claims hundreds of victims a day. … For negotiations to work, the regime of Bashar al-Assad must feel that its existence is threatened…Whether we like it or not, we are in a conflict with Iran, and our credibility is on the line….President Obama threatened unspecified, but dire-sounding, action against Assad if he deployed chemical weapons (or even if he shifted them around)…. The Israelis did it, and so can we. …The rebels aren’t the lunatics the Pentagon believes them to be. The State Department has been working for some time with the more moderate leaders among the fractured and disputatious rebel alliance. It believes not only that it can do business with many of these leaders, but also that by doing business with them it will strengthen them.”
To all this one should add the obvious: that providing small arms to the rebels will not stop the regime, which is reconquering territory in northern Syria. More dramatic action is needed to tilt the balance of power.
The argument against this is essentially Realpolitik on steroids: the notion that both Assad and the rebels are bad news and we should just let them fight it out indefinitely, providing only enough aid to fuel the conflict but not enough to allow the rebels to win. That is a deeply amoral argument—it suggests that we should allow thousands more Syrians to be slaughtered every month—and its strategic rationale is, at the very least, questionable. Given the progress Assad is making on the ground, absent more American aid the government could very well win this war—and that in turn would represent a big victory for Iran. Conversely, if Assad were to fall, that would be a big blow for Iran.
Do we have cause to be concerned about what kind of government will take over after Assad’s downfall? Of course. But, as suggested above, our best bet to shape the post-Assad Syria would be to help the moderate rebel factions now. Otherwise the Islamist extremists will be in control should Assad be toppled—and even if he stays in power the extremists might continue to exercise sway over a significant chunk of Syrian territory, as they do today.
We should never enter into any military intervention lightly, even if no one is proposing the dispatch of U.S. ground forces to Syria (beyond perhaps a few dozen Special Forces and CIA paramilitaries to work with the rebels). But the bulk of the evidence suggests we need to do more to end the civil war and prevent an Assad victory. Those who think otherwise, inside and outside the administration, need at the very least to make better policy arguments against further action instead of hiding behind a specious military analysis which claims that we have no military option. Even weakened as they have been by sequestration, the U.S. Air Force and Navy would have no trouble dispatching Syria’s air power and air defenses—and it is better to act sooner rather than latter because readiness will continue to fall as sequestration bites deeper.
A Poor Argument Against Syria Intervention
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The Flushing Remonstrance
Year zero.
JOHN STEELE GORDON 2017-08-25
The statue insanity goes on.
The latest is a call to scrub from New York City the name of one of the most famous people of early Colonial America, Peter Stuyvesant, governor of New Netherlands from 1647 till the British takeover in 1664.
Stuyvesant’s name is found all over the city, from Manhattan’s Stuyvesant Square, with its statue by Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney (founder of the Whitney Museum), to Bedford-Stuyvesant (usually elided to Bed-Stuy) neighborhood in Brooklyn, to Stuyvesant High School, one of the city’s (indeed the country’s) most elite public educational institutions, more difficult to get admitted to than Andover or Exeter.
(By the way, Stuyvesant had famously lost part of a leg to a cannon ball in his military days and stumped around on a wooden replacement. When Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney created her statue of him in the 1930’s it was not known which leg he had lost, so she had to guess. As luck would have it, she guessed right. Recent research has uncovered that it was his right leg that was lost.)
Stuyvesant’s thought crime was anti-Semitism. While the Dutch were notably more tolerant than most other Europeans at that time, Stuyvesant had in full measure the common 17th-century attitude about Jews. But he had little use for Catholics, Quakers, or Lutherans either or, indeed, for anyone not of the Dutch Reform Church. He tried to keep out of the colony anyone not of that faith, forbidding them to build houses of worship when he couldn’t prevent them from settling.
But Stuyvesant’s intolerance had a curious and wholly good result, the Flushing Remonstrance.
When Stuyvesant banned public meetings of non-Dutch Reform churches, a group of citizens in what is now Flushing, on Long Island, petitioned Stuyvesant to reverse the policy:
The law of love, peace and liberty in the states extending to Jews, Turks and Egyptians, as they are considered sonnes of Adam, which is the glory of the outward state of Holland, soe love, peace and liberty, extending to all in Christ Jesus, condemns hatred, war and bondage. . . .Therefore if any of these said persons come in love unto us, we cannot in conscience lay violent hands upon them, but give them free egresse and regresse unto our Town, and houses, as God shall persuade our consciences, for we are bounde by the law of God and man to doe good unto all men and evil to noe man. And this is according to the patent and charter of our Towne, given unto us in the name of the States General, which we are not willing to infringe, and violate, but shall houlde to our patent and shall remaine, your humble subjects, the inhabitants of Vlishing.
Stuyvesant ignored the petition, of course. Indeed, in 1658 he proclaimed a “Day of Prayer for the purpose of repenting from the sin of religious tolerance.” In 1662, he had John Bowne of Flushing arrested for allowing Quakers to meet in his house (which is still there, one of the oldest in North America and well worth a visit). He deported Bowne to Holland (although Bowne was English and spoke no Dutch) and Bowne asked the governors of the Dutch West India Company to intervene. They wrote Stuyvesant a letter ordering him, in no uncertain terms, to end all religious persecution in the colony.
Thanks to the Flushing Remonstrance (and thus at least indirectly to Peter Stuyvesant), New Amsterdam (New York after 1664) quickly became the most religiously tolerant city in the American colonies, welcoming all faiths, as it still does. The idea spread to the other colonies and is enshrined in the First Amendment of the Constitution. No wonder the Flushing Remonstrance is often called, “The birth certificate of American religious liberty.”
Obama’s Motives
Rehabilitation.
Noah Rothman 2017-08-25
When Caroline Randall Williams practically begs Barack Obama to speak out on the state of American politics, she speaks for millions of distraught Democrats. “We need your voice,” she writes in an op-ed for the New York Times. “There is not a saner, more trustworthy opinion that many of us would rather hear.”
Williams confesses to a sense of “panic,” and Donald Trump’s penchant for divisive racial agitation surely hasn’t helped ease her sense of dread. But by her own admission, her nervous condition is a result of less sober and rational voices on the left sucking up all the oxygen. Her anxiety peaked, she reveals, when people like Alan Dershowitz and Maxine Waters warned her that a constitutional crisis is just around the corner.
The young author and columnist, whose moving appeal to the former president resonated with many apprehensive Democrats, will soon get her wish. Barack Obama will not languish in the shadows in his post presidency. Indeed, he cannot afford to, but not because of an acute civic crisis looming forever just over the horizon. He has an image to rehabilitate.
The 44th President left his party in tatters. Over 1,000 Democratic lawmakers lost their seats to Republicans between 2009 and 2017. We’re all familiar with the timeline of events. The House fell in 2010; the Senate in 2014. Democrats entered 2009 with 31 governorships. Today, they’re reduced to just 15. Half the Union is governed entirely by the Republican Party. But it’s at the legislative level where the damage to the Democratic brand becomes most obvious. In 2009, 62 of 99 legislative chambers were dominated by Democrats. Today, Democrats control just 31 state-level chambers.
This was Barack Obama’s chief regret, although he did not say so precisely. The decimation of the Democratic “farm team,” from which the youngest and hungriest candidates for federal office are drawn, has handicapped the party. In the autumn of 2016, Obama sought to address this dubious legacy by getting right down to the state level. He toured the country endorsing 150 legislative candidates and campaigning on their behalf. The result? The Democratic Party’s decline continued largely unabated. In the end, Obama’s near total repudiation is self-evident in the image of his successor.
Does Williams know that Barack Obama is as much to blame as Donald Trump for her trauma? She is beset by the voices of doom and panic, in part, because hundreds of center-left Democrats who are less prone to apocalyptic rhetoric find themselves in the private sector today. She hungers for a more reasonable set of Democrats who might reassure her that the system of checks and balances that prevent a demagogic figure from doing irreparable damage to the republic are working (which they are). Obama might be keen to play that role, but he would be doing his fellow Democrats yet another disservice.
All Donald Trump wants for Christmas is a foil onto whom he can project his frustrations that would also unite the GOP behind him. Congressional Democrats are weak and factious. Political media is disliked by Republicans, but they are an unsatisfying opponent (“media” won’t be on the ballot next November). Congressional Republicans maintain their individual constituencies, even if they are mistrusted by the Republican base in the aggregate. And Donald Trump seems disinclined to rally the country against a real foreign adversary.
Barack Obama plans to remerge into the national political scene along with Hillary Clinton, but both plan to do so with as much delicacy as possible, insofar as they can thread that needle, if only to avoid giving Trump what he wants. No matter how they make their move, Donald Trump will exploit their reappearance onto the political scene and reenergize the largely dispirited core GOP coalition.
Williams’s fear is honest, and her plea is heartfelt. That’s why she deserves to hear the unpleasant truth: Barack Obama is as accountable for her anxiety as anyone. The former president’s resurfacing this fall is as likely to exacerbate those symptoms as it is to alleviate them. Given that fact, it’s worth pondering whether Obama really is hitting the trail this fall entirely out of an abiding sense of moral and civic obligation. That’s surely part of what motivates the former president, but it’s not the only thing.
Who Knew Diversity Was So Complicated?
An inconvenient truth.
Jonathan Marks 2017-08-25
As students, faculty, and administrators return to campuses with Charlottesville on their minds, we can expect them to double down on “diversity” initiatives.
I put “diversity” in quotation marks because it means, here, increased representation of and protections for groups deemed marginalized. In this context, gains for Asian students and faculty barely, if at all, register as a gain for diversity.
There are reasons for wanting a diverse faculty even in this narrow sense. It is not hard to see how, in the absence of examples of women doing physics, undergraduate women who otherwise have the interest and capacity to excel in that field might get the impression that it is not for them.
However, the results of a recent study (I link to the working paper because the published version is gated) of professors in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and non-STEM (education, English, sociology, and the humanities) fields at forty selective public universities challenge those who expect that doubling down on diversity efforts will strike a blow against what they call white supremacy. First, efforts to increase faculty diversity have already made considerable headway. Second, areas in which we are not seeing gains may prove hard to crack. And third, we don’t understand well why we see striking differences across fields.
Diyi Li, a doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Missouri-Columbia, and Cory Koedel, an associate professor of economics and public policy there, conclude that “black, Hispanic, and female professors are underrepresented and white and Asian professors are overrepresented in [their] data,” even among assistant professors, who have been hired recently. However, “comparison of senior and junior faculty suggests a trend toward greater diversity in academia along racial/ethnic and gender lines, especially in STEM fields.”
Moreover, when we consider representation relative to Ph.D. production, rather than to the overall population, we find mixed results. Among Hispanics, there is “no indication of systematic over- or under-representation among assistant professors.” Asian faculty members are “significantly overrepresented as assistant professors relative to domestic degree-production rates in all fields except in sociology.” White assistant professors “are overrepresented relative to Ph.D. production in biology, and to a lesser extent educational leadership and policy; but underrepresented in all other fields, most notably in economics.” As for gender, “representation among assistant professors . . . is generally fairly even.” Finally, “black faculty are consistently underrepresented as assistant professors in STEM fields” and “overrepresented . . . in . . . non-STEM fields.”
The fact that the picture changes dramatically when we look at representation relative to Ph.D. production rather than to the general population reinforces a familiar finding: those who want to increase faculty diversity have a “pipeline problem,” at least in some fields.
In 2015, according to the Survey of Earned Doctorates, 73 doctorates were awarded in chemistry to black candidates, 2.9 percent of the total. Not all of those Ph.D.’s plan a career in academia. In many of the nation’s vast number of colleges and universities seeking to diversify their ranks, quite a few searches will come up empty. Institutions like the University of Pennsylvania, which is pouring $100 million into efforts to attract candidates from under-represented groups, will probably get somewhere. But poorer institutions are likely to be disappointed. Even when it comes to championing social justice, it is good to be rich.
But, Li and Koedel observe, even when the pipeline problem is accounted for, black faculty are surprisingly scarce in the fields of biology and chemistry at the selective public universities they studied. In 2014-15, black candidates earned 2.5 percent of the Ph.D.’s awarded in chemistry by the top fifty colleges and universities, as rated by U.S. News. But they constituted less than 1 percent of the assistant professors in Li and Koedel’s data set. They earned 3.6 percent of the Ph.D.’s awarded in biology but constituted less than one-half of 1 percent of the assistant professors.
This scarcity does not carry over into economics, the other STEM field considered, in which black candidates earned 2.7 percent of the Ph.D.’s and constituted 2.4 percent of the assistant professors. As already noted, we find over-representation in other fields. For example, black candidates earned 1.8 percent of the Ph.D.’s awarded in English but were 8.6 percent of the assistant professors in Li and Koedel’s sample.
Whatever these complex and in some ways puzzling results indicate, they do not suggest that a new push is needed to drag reluctant colleges and universities, complicit in white supremacy, into a diversity fight they have plainly been waging with some vigor. Rather, assuming Li and Koedel’s results survive scrutiny, close attention should be paid to the disparate outcomes they find across groups and across fields.
But at a time in which the urge to do something is strong, their results will probably be ignored.
Notes on Trump’s Usurper
The 2020 race has begun.
Noah Rothman 2017-08-24
It’s no secret that President Donald Trump is no fan of Arizona Senator Jeff Flake. He’s gone so far as to encourage Flake’s prospective primary challengers and to attack Flake at a rally in the senator’s home state. Turnabout is fair play. Asked whether the president’s habit of engaging in internecine feuds with his fellow Republicans made a primary challenge to Trump more likely, Flake did not give a political answer. “I think he’s inviting one,” he said. Flake is right, but don’t take his word for it. Donald Trump’s own pollster confirms it.
On Tuesday, the Republican consultant and Trump campaign pollster Tony Fabrizio revealed the results of a survey was ostensibly designed to dispel the notion that the president’s base was beginning to lose heart. It achieved the precise opposite effect.
According to Fabrizio, the number of Republican voters who approve of the job Trump is doing in office declined from 81 percent in June to 75 percent in August. Total disapproval increased from 19 to 25 percent. That kind of attrition is remarkable and outpaces even the rate at which public pollsters have shown Republican voters abandoning Trump.
But Fabrizio wasn’t done face-planting. To prove that Trump still commands the enduring affections of his voters, the pollster tested a handful of prominent Republicans who are or were critical of the president against him in a theoretical primary battle.
“[Trump is] crushing a hypothetical GOP primary field,” Fabrizio boomed triumphantly. “So much for the ‘buyer’s remorse’ the DC insiders are convinced the GOP has.” In fact, by even testing this proposition just seven months into a presidency, Fabrizio demonstrated that the president’s people think the ground is softening beneath Trump’s feet. The results of this survey proved conclusively that it is.
In a five-way primary race between Trump, Ohio Governor John Kasich, and Senators Ted Cruz, Ben Sasse, and Tom Cotton, Trump wins the contest handily. But he only pulls the support of 50 percent of the potential GOP electorate and 54 percent of the likely Republican vote. Among all Republicans, only 42 percent would “definitely” vote for Trump, rising to just 49 percent among likely GOP voters.
These are atrocious numbers for an incumbent. By way of comparison, in the immediate wake of the 2010 midterm elections and at the nadir of Barack Obama’s political potency to that point, he was still drawing 65 percent among Democrats in a hypothetical primary contest between him and Hillary Clinton. Fabrizio’s numbers prove without a doubt that Trump’s base is crumbling, and Republicans who are contemplating a primary challenge are justified in doing so.
Trump’s Praetorian Guard may pretend as though the president is unconcerned about a primary challenge, but his behavior suggests otherwise. His 2020 campaign machine is staffing up, raising funds, and tracking potential Democratic challengers. The president is touring swing states holding campaign-style rallies among devoted fans. Donald Trump is not exactly a wounded animal, but he clearly senses that predators are starting to gather, eying him hungrily.
It’s worth considering that this kind of thinking is precisely what Team Trump wants to incept in prospective challengers. Maybe Fabrizio’s inexplicable victory lap is explained by the White House’s desire to bait prospective GOP challengers into probing donors, gauging receptivity on the Hill, or otherwise outing themselves early enough to nail them before they become threats. If that’s the strategy, it’s so obvious and ham-fisted it may only embolden potential candidates.
Inevitably, when political observers think about the prospect of a primary challenge against a sitting president, they think about personalities. Who will the candidates be? This is the wrong way to think about it at this early stage. Few anticipated Eugene McCarthy would emerge a credible candidate in 1965, or that the Vietnam War would be such a rallying cry. In 1977, who expected Ted Kennedy to test his popularity among Democrats at the polls? The issue set that Pat Buchanan used to mobilize a GOP coalition to challenge George H. W. Bush barely existed in 1989. The figures that emerge to challenge Trump could take us entirely by surprise. That’s why it may be more predictive to examine the ideological camps from which primary challengers might emerge.
We can consolidate those camps into three factions. The first we’ll call the Kasich Camp. Ohio’s governor has been unguardedly positioning himself as a challenger to Trump in 2020, but from the president’s left. He does not support Obamacare’s repeal or the prolonging of America’s mission in Afghanistan, and he’s been reliably critical of Trump’s rhetorical excesses.
The second camp is the camp into which Flake and Sasse fall: these Republicans are happy Trump has been convinced to abandon much of his isolationist and protectionist policy preferences, but are convinced his uncivil rhetoric is dividing the nation against itself.
The third camp is the Bannon camp: the wing of the GOP that believes in Trumpism even more than Trump.
Let’s dismiss the last group offhand. The Bannon camp may be the most disappointed with the reality of Trump, but he’s the only game in town. There just isn’t much room to Trump’s right on issues close the hearts of populist nationalists. As for the Kasich Camp, John Kasich pretty has that one locked. This leaves us to speculate on the Flake/Sasse wing. This group has the broadest Republican constituency from which to draw support. It is very likely to produce a real contender.
That contender should, however, realize what he or she might be getting into. There is no triumph on this path; at least, not in the near-term. Trump’s challenger or challengers should know that they are most likely martyring themselves. No one has ever defeated a sitting president in a primary. They will be blamed for rending the party asunder and undermining Trump’s chances for victory in November. If Trump loses, his supporters will be able to dismiss that loss as reflective not of Trump’s record in office but the conceit of the spoiler.
All of these burdens may be worth bearing if prospective candidates truly believe the GOP is being transformed permanently into an irascible, bitter, racially anxious party that is hostile toward conservatism. Trump’s challengers may arrest that transformative process, but they won’t get credit for it initially. Vindication would come later.
Not What You Expect In a President
Podcast: Does Trump have to start worrying about the primary?
John Podhoretz 2017-08-24The second COMMENTARY podcast of the week features me, Noah Rothman, and Abe Greenwald digging deep into new polls—including one issued by President Trump’s own pollster showing Trump with shockingly low support among Republicans as they look ahead to the 2020 primaries—and exploring the question of whether the president actually wants a border wall or just wants to keep talking about one to keep his base riled up. Give a listen.
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