With 51 days left in the period for Congressional consideration of the Iran deal, the respected Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has released a report on “Verification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” which concludes there are weaknesses that “must be remediated or compensated for if the agreement is to be verifiable,” and that “without stringent long-term limits on Iran’s sensitive nuclear programs … these verification conditions … are unlikely to be sufficient.” ISIS concludes that – if the remediation or compensation occurs – the verification provisions will likely be adequate during the first 10-15 years of the agreement, “but will be inadequate afterwards if Iran implements its plan to expand its centrifuge program and possibly start a reprocessing program.” In other words, the agreement as it stands is unverifiable without additional steps; and after it sunsets, the verification provisions will be inadequate.
Here is what the ISIS reports concludes regarding the 24-day period for inspection of suspicious Iranian sites:
What could Iran potentially hide or disguise in a 24-day time period? At ISIS, over the years, we have conducted several assessments on countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq which have all cheated on their safeguards obligations. We have assessed the types and quantities of uranium releases from gas centrifuge plants as part of official safeguards studies and evaluated many cases where environmental sampling was used to uncover undeclared activities or failed to do so. Based on this work, we assess that Iran could likely move and disguise many small scale nuclear and nuclear-weapon-related activities. [Emphasis added].
Secretary of State Kerry said recently that “anytime, anywhere” inspections were “not on the table” in the negotiations with Iran, and that he had “never heard the term in the four years that we were negotiating.” According to Kerry, “There’s no such thing in arms control as anytime, anywhere. There isn’t any nation in the world, none that has an anytime, anywhere.” But that position is flatly contradicted by the ISIS report:
[S]mall-scale activities matter and this is one of the key reasons why inspectors want prompt, or anytime, anywhere access. Inspectors had this type of access in Iraq in the 1990s and early 2000s. South Africa provided the IAEA anywhere, anytime access “within reason,” which was explained to one of the authors of this report as a request only to not ask to go to a site in the middle of the night. In practice, the IAEA could get access to any South African facility soon after the request. [Emphasis added].
Back in April, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said the international community would have “anywhere, anytime, 24/7 access.” Now, it turns out the secretary of state never heard of it, never raised it, doesn’t even know it exists.