The Arms Control Association (ACA) bills itself as “a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.” It is a serious organization and does serious work, even if its bipartisanship seems in recent years a bit more theoretical than real, perhaps not a surprise given support for the likes of the Ford Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and MacArthur Foundation.
Most recently, in a series of media appearances and radio hits by staff, it has lent its organizational reputation to the promotion of President Barack Obama’s Iran diplomacy and has embraced partisan Bush-bashing nonsense like the discredited notion of a 2003 Iranian peace proposal. It has also been surprising to travel to the Persian Gulf and hear Iran watchers there list a litany of loopholes in the proposed agreement, all of which the ACA seems to dismiss or disregard. When ACA staff lends their imprimatur to the rigorous verifications and downplay concerns inherent in the Iran nuclear deal, a relevant question is the degree to which their track record inspires confidence in their willingness to put objectivity above politics.
In 1983, for example, in an episode I cover in my recent book, an American spy satellite detected a Soviet radar complex near Krasnoyarsk, in the middle of Siberia. Its configuration suggested a military purpose. The sheer size of the complex underlined the scale of Soviet subterfuge of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To lend credence to Soviet cheating, however, would undercut hopes for new arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union. The Arms Control Association duly chimed in and dismissed Krasnoyarsk as insignificant. Reagan thought otherwise. “No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with,” he explained. And, indeed, subsequent revelations hastened by the collapse of the Soviet Union showed that it had been cheating.
It is quite possible that the Obama administration will strike a nuclear deal with Iran, not by resolving the obstacles or removing the reasons for such long-term distrust, but rather by ignoring or downplaying them. If the historical pattern holds true, the ACA will affirm that strategy by lending its organization’s reputation to efforts to downplay the concerns of critics. This would less attest to the strength of the Iran deal, however, then to the joint tendency to promote a political agenda and prioritize the act of reaching an agreement over the substance of that agreement.