Commentary Magazine


Topic: North Korea

Regime Change Works Better Than Trusting Dictators

For some reason naïve Westerners expect that every new dictator who takes over just about anywhere in the world will be a closest liberal and a reformer and an all around good guy. Remember in the early 1980s how Yuri Andropov, the KGB chief, was supposedly a jazz-loving Americanophile? Or more recently how Bashar Assad was going to be a breath of fresh air in Syria? Or how Hassan Rouhani would liberalize Iran?

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For some reason naïve Westerners expect that every new dictator who takes over just about anywhere in the world will be a closest liberal and a reformer and an all around good guy. Remember in the early 1980s how Yuri Andropov, the KGB chief, was supposedly a jazz-loving Americanophile? Or more recently how Bashar Assad was going to be a breath of fresh air in Syria? Or how Hassan Rouhani would liberalize Iran?

Such expectations have been brutally dashed time and again, and nowhere more so than in North Korea where the ascension of Kim Jong Un, following the death of his father Kim Il-Jong in 2011, was supposed to usher in Chinese-style reforms. For a refresher on such hopes, check out this Time article from 2012, headlined, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing to be North Korea’s Economic Reformer?”

Turns out that Kim Jong Un, far from being a closet liberal, is cast in precisely the same Stalinist mode as his father and grandfather—only perhaps more so. In 2013 Kim Jong Un had his uncle, Jang Sung-taek, who was one of the most powerful officials in the regime, arrested and executed. Now, South Korean intelligence is reporting that Gen. Hyong Yong-chol, minister of the People’s Armed Forces, was executed with an anti-aircraft gun (imagine the mechanics of that) for showing “disrespect” to the new Dear Leader. “Mr. Kim deemed General Hyon disloyal after he dozed off during military events and second-guessed Mr. Kim’s orders,” South Korean intelligence claims.

That’s a pretty severe response for getting a little shuteye. In reality, one assumes, Gen. Hyon was executed for the same reason as Jong Sung-taek—because they were viewed as being potential threats to Kim Jong Un’s absolute power. Young Kim is especially paranoid about the power of the army and determined to make it utterly subservient to his will. But that Kim Jong Un is dealing with potential challengers not by sacking them or even by arresting them but by executing them shows how ruthless and determined he is to consolidate power.

He apparently chooses particularly gruesome execution techniques to make a point—other senior officials have reportedly been killed not just by anti-aircraft guns but by mortars and flame throwers if media accounts are to be believed although it’s unlikely that Jang Song-thaek was torn apart by wild dogs. The good old firing squad has apparently lost its shock value.

Kim is also, predictably, going full speed ahead with North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In fact just recently Kim was pictured smiling broadly over the launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine — the kind of reaction normal people exhibit upon the birth of a baby.

Oh and of course there is no sign of any real economic reforms. Kim’s major economic initiatives are to build ski resorts and water parks where he and other regime insiders can cavort while the ordinary people of his country live in near-starvation conditions.

Bottom line: Don’t expect a princeling like Kim Jong Un or Bashar Assad to transform the system that brought him to absolute power. Occasionally real reformers do rise to the top of dictatorial systems—e.g. Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev. When that happens the West must be prepared to engage. But such instances are rare. The West should stop getting seduced by faux-reformers. Sadly the only way that regimes such as those in Syria or North Korea are likely to change is if they collapse. Our policy focus should be on hastening regime change rather than trying to extend a lifeline to such cruel and capricious rulers.

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Obama Gets Iran and North Korea Wrong

According to the Obama administration, they’ve learned their lessons from the disastrous American diplomatic effort that failed to stop North Korea from becoming a nuclear power. According to a feature in today’s New York Times, the administration rejects the notion that their diplomatic initiative with Iran is a repeat of the foolish disastrous efforts of the Clinton and Bush administrations that accomplished nothing but paving the way for the regime in Pyongyang to go nuclear. But the argument that their crafting of a far more specific agreement with much greater incentives built into it to persuade Iran to forebear from violating its restrictions will succeed where past efforts with North Korea failed doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. More to the point, and as the Times reports, officials in South Korea say President Obama has compounded the mistakes of his predecessors on North Korea with neglect. Rather than profit from past errors, it appears the administration has blundered on both nuclear fronts.

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According to the Obama administration, they’ve learned their lessons from the disastrous American diplomatic effort that failed to stop North Korea from becoming a nuclear power. According to a feature in today’s New York Times, the administration rejects the notion that their diplomatic initiative with Iran is a repeat of the foolish disastrous efforts of the Clinton and Bush administrations that accomplished nothing but paving the way for the regime in Pyongyang to go nuclear. But the argument that their crafting of a far more specific agreement with much greater incentives built into it to persuade Iran to forebear from violating its restrictions will succeed where past efforts with North Korea failed doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. More to the point, and as the Times reports, officials in South Korea say President Obama has compounded the mistakes of his predecessors on North Korea with neglect. Rather than profit from past errors, it appears the administration has blundered on both nuclear fronts.

As the Times reports, while President Obama’s foreign policy team concentrated all of their efforts in recent years on trying to appease Iran, the North Koreans took advantage of the distraction. South Koreans say Pyongyang’s mad rulers have gone “on an atomic spending spree” that Washington can no longer stop:

Satellite photographs of the North’s main nuclear facility at Yongbyon, released in 2013, have shown a doubling in size of the nuclear enrichment plant there, which the United States did not know about until 2010, and American officials strongly suspect there is a second one. A consensus is emerging that the North most likely possesses a dozen or so nuclear weapons and could be on the way to an arsenal of as many as 20 by the end of 2016.

The administration’s excuse on North Korea is that the cat was out of the bag long before Barack Obama arrived in the White House. That’s actually true as it was the Clinton administration and its chief negotiator Wendy Sherman who paved the way for North Korea to get a bomb with deals that Pyongyang quickly renounced after it received the Western bribes that were intended to entice them to renounce their nuclear ambitions. That doesn’t excuse the fact that the North Koreans have rightly come to the conclusion that Washington won’t do much no matter what they do. But since Obama rightly opposes negotiations that will recognize North Korea as a nuclear power and there is little short of war that the U.S. can do to force it to give up its weapons, some of the criticism of his conduct here is unfair.

But the problem is not so much that Obama hasn’t tried to learn from his predecessors’ folly but that he has asked the wrong questions about them and come to some terribly incorrect conclusions.

As Times Washington correspondent David Sanger notes, attempts to draw exact analogies between the North Korean and Iranian situations are not accurate. The agreements signed with North Korea were not as specific as the framework that has been drawn up with Iran. There have been some inspections of Iranian facilities though not as intrusive as would be necessary to ensure that they are not cheating and without being transparent about past nuclear military research. Moreover, the Iranian economy is sufficiently complex and dependent on foreign trade that the West had some real leverage over Tehran with the enforcement of tough sanctions.

Though the two rogue nuclear programs are different, what was the same was the fact that Sherman took on the same role with Iran that she had with North Korea. It’s true that she has not repeated the same exact mistakes she made before. But the problem is that instead of gaining from the experience, all it has done is to inspire her and her bosses to make different and perhaps even more tragic errors.

But what’s interesting about Obama’s policy toward the two countries is that while he thought getting tough was appropriate with North Korea, he rejected the same idea with Iran. This made no sense since not talking to Pyongyang did nothing to prevent them from rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenal on the president’s watch. Just as foolish was a decision to discard the considerable economic, political and military leverage the United States had over Iran. Instead of getting tough and isolating Iran as he unsuccessfully tried with North Korea, the president embraced favor a negotiating strategy that granted Tehran far reaching concessions that gives them two paths to a bomb: one by cheating easily evaded restrictions and the other by patiently waiting for it to expire.

Just as ridiculous is what Sanger reports about what the administration thinks the impact of the Iran deal will be on North Korea.

Some American officials say they have one last hope: If the deal with Iran works and sanctions are lifted, North Korean officials, who are following the negotiations closely, might conclude that their nuclear program could be traded for economic integration.

This is lunacy since, as even other members of the administration concede according to Sanger, the North Koreans want no part of economic integration with the West.

For all of the contrasts between these two problems, the common denominator is more than the presence of Sherman at the table. In the 1990s just as today, Western diplomats thought they could do business with a dangerous regime. With regard to North Korea, that was a colossal error and one that threatens the security of the Far East. But the implications of appeasing Iran are even more far reaching. In doing so, the administration has not only thrown away the good chance they had to bring Tehran to its knees via even tougher sanctions. It also has endangered the entire Middle East that now rightly fears that Iran’s dreams of regional hegemony have been made more likely by the United States decision to allow it to become a threshold nuclear power.

Just as South Koreans now shake their heads at Obama’s misguided policy, so, too, do America’s Middle East allies — the Arab states as well as Israel — have reason to regret the fact that the president got both North Korea and Iran wrong.

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The Ominous North Korea Precedent

At the Wall Street Journal, Aaron David Miller, who during the 1990s was one of Bill Clinton’s top negotiators for the “Middle East peace process,” offers an important warning about the tendency of negotiators to fall in love with their work. He warns that negotiators—whether himself back in the 1990s or the team currently dealing with the Iranians—are prone to be over-optimistic for three reasons.

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At the Wall Street Journal, Aaron David Miller, who during the 1990s was one of Bill Clinton’s top negotiators for the “Middle East peace process,” offers an important warning about the tendency of negotiators to fall in love with their work. He warns that negotiators—whether himself back in the 1990s or the team currently dealing with the Iranians—are prone to be over-optimistic for three reasons.

  1. “Negotiators are charged with getting stuff done, not telling their bosses why something won’t happen. Not surprisingly, negotiators are reluctant to admit when their single tool won’t work. They strive to preserve the process at all costs.”
  2. Being involved in the negotiations can breed “a feeling of superiority that can be intoxicating,” because by definition you know more than outsiders do.
  3. “The hundreds of hours that U.S. negotiators spend creating psychological and emotional connections [with the other side] can skew judgment and perspective.”

As if to illustrate the dangers that Miller warns about, two of the Clinton administration’s leading North Korea negotiators, Robert Gallucci and Joel Wit, have penned a piece in Foreign Affairs claiming that “The 1994 agreement was a success.” What agreement are they referring to? Why the Agreed Framework under which the U.S. pledged to provide North Korea with all sorts of aid, including building nuclear reactors for electric power, in return for an end to its nuclear program.

Earlier, former CIA expert Sue Mi Terry and I wrote a piece warning that the Agreed Framework was an ominous precedent for Iran negotiations today because there is every indication to believe that Iran, like North Korea, is intent on acquiring the benefits of having sanctions lifted without actually ending its nuclear work. In responding to our article, Galluci and Wit don’t deny that North Korea broke out of the Agreed Framework. They estimate that “ North Korea could have anywhere from 20–100 nuclear weapons by 2020, with a stockpile of 50 bombs the most likely outcome.”

So how can they possibly assert that the 1994 Agreed Framework was a success when it manifestly has not stopped North Korea from being a full-fledged nuclear weapons state? Their tortuous logic goes like this: “The consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community in the early 1990s was that Pyongyang’s nuclear program was so advanced that it could produce 30 Nagasaki-size nuclear weapons a year by the end of the decade. The 1994 U.S.-Agreed Framework stopped that drive and… more than 20 years later [the predicted expansion] still hasn’t happened. ”

That’s quite a leap of logic.

The most plausible explanation for why North Korea hasn’t built as many nuclear weapons as the US intelligence community predicted more than twenty years ago is that the US intelligence community doesn’t fully understand how the North Korean regime works. Intelligence analysts probably didn’t make sufficient allowance for the inherent inefficiencies of the world’s last remaining Stalinist regime. (In a similar vein, CIA analysts during the Cold War years routinely overestimated Soviet economic production.)

And even if the Agreed Framework did somewhat slow down the North Korean program—so what? The standard ought to be whether such negotiations stop a rogue state like North Korea or Iran from becoming nuclear at all. It’s scant comfort to know that North Korea will soon be in possession of dozens rather than hundreds of atomic bombs. Even one A-bomb in the hands of a regime like Kim Jong-un’s or Ayatollah Khamenei is one too many.

The larger problem that the Galluci-Wit article illustrates is, as Aaron Miller warns, the tendency of negotiators to make endless excuses for their handiwork. If Galluci and Wit are claiming that the 1994 Agreed Framework was a success even today, imagine how ardently the Obama administration will deny any evidence that the Iran nuclear accord isn’t a huge success too. Much of Obama’s argument today depends on the ability of “snap back” sanctions—but it’s a psychological impossibility for an administration that negotiated such an accord to admit that it made a mistake.

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The Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

With Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Washington and getting ready to address a joint meeting of Congress, the long-awaited “revised guidelines” for the U.S.-Japan Alliance were released yesterday. A copy of the document can be found here. It’s an impressive start, but a lot of the heavy lifting remains.

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With Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Washington and getting ready to address a joint meeting of Congress, the long-awaited “revised guidelines” for the U.S.-Japan Alliance were released yesterday. A copy of the document can be found here. It’s an impressive start, but a lot of the heavy lifting remains.

Both governments have been telegraphing for months what the revisions would likely include, so there were no real surprises for Asia watchers. Perhaps the most interesting revision, and one that may make a real difference, is the establishment of an “Alliance Coordination Mechanism, [to] enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning,” according to the document.

After 50-plus years of the alliance, it may be a bit surprising that no such mechanism hitherto existed, but rectifying that gap is a good idea. If it operates the way it should, Tokyo and Washington should be able to discuss on an early and continuous basis specific issues or threats that may fall under alliance auspices. That takes the pressure off of calling for formal alliance discussions when a threat arises, and also means that appropriate alliance managers are communicating regularly on issues that may eventually require a joint response.

The two sides will also upgrade the Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which may allow for a steady evolution of plans for coordinated operations, as well as requirements needed to undertake enhanced operations.

As expected, there is also an increased emphasis on planning with potential partners for situations where Japan is not under attack, but the security environment is deleterious to Japan, including “emerging threats.” This may open the door to far wider-ranging U.S.-Japan regional cooperation, not only on things like intelligence sharing, but also maritime security, refugee situations, and the like. Threats to cyber networks and space assets also have been a hot topic during the months of negotiations, and the revised guidelines have an entire section on notional cooperation on both those issues.

Overall, the document lives up to its billing, but implementation is now the order of the day. Prime Minister Abe will have to push through a raft of legislation in the Diet (parliament) in order to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to undertake the broadened array of operations envisioned in the guidelines. That will be no mean feat, given opposition from other political parties, including his own coalition partners, as well as public wariness of an expanded Japanese role abroad.

As for Washington, the sentiments and promises in the revised guidelines are only part of a broader strategy to deal with increased risk in Asia. In that sense, the document is too reactive. China’s creation of island territory in the South China Sea is giving it de facto sovereignty over those waters, according to worried Philippine officials, while North Korea continues to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities.

If Washington chooses simply to react to threats when they cross unknown redlines, then the U.S.-Japan alliance will forever be playing catch-up. Some bolder thinking on how to utilize Abe’s interest in playing a larger regional role may serve to blunt Chinese moves, and certainly aiming at weakening North Korea’s hermit regime is the best policy for trying to shape the region’s security environment. Even if not spelled out in the new alliance guidelines, those goals should be animating policymakers in Tokyo and Washington going forward.

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North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal Is Bigger Than We Thought

A few weeks ago, I wrote about North Korea’s nuclear breakout, and that the U.S. government was finally beginning to acknowledge the degree to which North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could no longer be ignored. Yet even as the Obama administration continues to talk about the North Korean nuclear “program,” along come the Chinese, of all people, to tell us that North Korea is in reality a nuclear power, with a growing arsenal beyond what American experts suspected.

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A few weeks ago, I wrote about North Korea’s nuclear breakout, and that the U.S. government was finally beginning to acknowledge the degree to which North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could no longer be ignored. Yet even as the Obama administration continues to talk about the North Korean nuclear “program,” along come the Chinese, of all people, to tell us that North Korea is in reality a nuclear power, with a growing arsenal beyond what American experts suspected.

Today, the Wall Street Journal reports on what many of us in Washington have been hearing for a while, namely that North Korea may possess as many as 20 nuclear weapons already, and that it could build 20 more by 2016, possibly having 75 nuclear bombs by 2020. The source of this latest intelligence (which, it must be acknowledged, is guesswork)? Chinese nuclear experts, who meet regularly with their American counterparts.

The American experts quoted in the piece take a lower-end estimate of Pyongyang’s nuclear inventory, but still believe that Kim Jong-un currently controls around a dozen bombs, with as many as 20 by next year. Combine either the Chinese or the American total with the North’s ability to launch a long-range ballistic missile that can travel up to 5,600 miles, covering most of America’s West coast, and the picture of strategic stability in Asia begins to look a little different.

By now, it must be clear to all but the most naive of observers that North Korea will never denuclearize. Any idea of returning to the moribund Six Party Talks to achieve that goal is a dangerous notion, as more negotiation over an unachievable outcome will only give Pyongyang more time to further build up its inventory and perfect its ICBM capability. Instead, it is time to put some intellectual firepower behind meaningful sanctions that harm the pocketbooks of North Korea’s leaders, and enhance anti-proliferation activities, to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration may be guilty of hiding information of precisely such proliferation activities, so as to keep nuclear negotiations with Iran alive. Given the failed Bush-Obama attempts to keep North Korea from developing nuclear weapons during years of intense negotiations, the folly of pursuing a similar script with Iran becomes ever clearer. Now, North Korea is stockpiling an arsenal of nuclear weapons controlled by a paranoid, erratic, aggressive regime. Counting on Kim Jong-un’s rationality is a risky bet, but America’s diplomatic failures up to now give few other options for dealing with his threat. Thinking about the unthinkable may become fashionable again.

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Is Iran the Next North Korea?

Yesterday Foreign Affairs posted an article I had written with Sue Mi Terry, once the CIA’s foremost North Korea analyst, arguing that the experience of the Agreed Framework was an inauspicious precedent for the proposed nuclear deal with Iran. We wrote: “The case of North Korea clearly exposes the dangers of the United States seeking a nuclear agreement with a state that has no intention of abiding by one. The 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, which called on North Korea to freeze the operation and construction of nuclear reactors, collapsed within a decade of its signing. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, and today it is a full-fledged nuclear power. The United States’ experience with North Korea should make it wary of similar nuclear negotiations, especially with Iran.”

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Yesterday Foreign Affairs posted an article I had written with Sue Mi Terry, once the CIA’s foremost North Korea analyst, arguing that the experience of the Agreed Framework was an inauspicious precedent for the proposed nuclear deal with Iran. We wrote: “The case of North Korea clearly exposes the dangers of the United States seeking a nuclear agreement with a state that has no intention of abiding by one. The 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, which called on North Korea to freeze the operation and construction of nuclear reactors, collapsed within a decade of its signing. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, and today it is a full-fledged nuclear power. The United States’ experience with North Korea should make it wary of similar nuclear negotiations, especially with Iran.”

Today the Wall Street Journal runs an article exposing just how grave the danger is. According to the Journal, Chinese experts have concluded that the North Korean nuclear program is even more advanced than the U.S. intelligence community has believed: “The latest Chinese estimates, relayed in a closed-door meeting with U.S. nuclear specialists, showed that North Korea may already have 20 warheads, as well as the capability of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to double its arsenal by next year.”

To add to the danger, the Journal notes, “Adm. William Gortney, head of U.S. Northern Command, said this month that defense officials believe North Korea can now mount a nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile called the KN-08. U.S. officials don’t believe the missile has been tested, but experts estimate it has a range of about 5,600 miles—within reach of the western edge of the continental U.S., including California.”

It’s not too hard to imagine, a decade from now, reading similar reports about how Iran has dozens of nuclear weapons and missiles capable of hitting the United States, to say nothing of nearby targets such as Israel, which Iran can already strike with an arsenal of 50,000 rockets positioned in Lebanon. And there is no reason to believe that Iran is any more sincere than North Korea about giving up its nuclear program. Those who advocate the agreement with Iran imagine that we will be able to somehow monitor Iranian nuclear developments, but the North Koreans caught us by surprise by developing a secret plutonium enrichment program—and if the Journal report is accurate, North Korea continues to surprise us still.

The rapid pace of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs is alarming in part because of its implications for regional stability–will South Korea and Japan feel compelled to go nuclear too in their own defense? If so that could set off a nuclear arms race. South Korea and Japan have so far refrained from such actions, even though both have extensive civilian nuclear programs that could be weaponized in a heartbeat, because both countries shelter under the American nuclear umbrella.

Some suggest that our nuclear umbrella could be extended to states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to prevent them from going nuclear to counter the Iranians, but the major reason our security guarantees to South Korea and Japan have credibility is because we have tens of thousands of troops stationed in those countries. We don’t have any troops in Saudi Arabia, nor are we likely to put any back in, because we would regard that as a provocation for more terrorism. Absent Americans in harms’ way, however, any American security guarantees would be about as credible as the “red line” that Obama drew in Syria. Thus the U.S. would have little influence to stop an incredibly dangerous nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Another reason why the advanced state of the North Korean program should be of such concern is because North Korea is a notorious nuclear and missile proliferator. As the Journal notes, North Korea “previously exported nuclear technology to Syria and missile components to Iran, Yemen and Egypt.” North Korea could easily offer Iran a shortcut toward putting nuclear weapons on missile warheads, bypassing entirely all of the procedures put in place to monitor Iranian compliance with a nuclear accord—procedures which appear to be if anything less rigorous than those under the Agreed Framework.

And if Iran breaks out as a nuclear power after a bogus agreement with the West, as North Korea did, the consequences will be much more severe for the world. North Korea, after all, is a declining, bankrupt state whose leadership is primarily intent on staying in power. Its juche philosophy appeals to no one outside its borders, and few within. Iran is an expansionist state, by contrast, with a jihadist ideology that appeals to many Shiites and ambitions of dominating the entire Middle East.  The nuclear accord with Iran is, therefore, potentially far more dangerous than the Agreed Framework with North Korea—and we know how that worked out.

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North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout: Canary in the Coalmine

Even a few months ago, nuclear war still seemed passé, an artifact of the Cold War, or derided as a fading dream for neoconservatives who want any excuse to increase defense budgets and meddle abroad. Sometimes, however, reality takes a bite out of comfortable establishment nostrums. Such was the case yesterday, when the commander of NORAD, Adm. William Gortney, admitted what many in D.C. have been whispering for months, that North Korea now has an “operational” road-mobile long-range ballistic missile, the KN-08, and that Pyongyang has “the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the [U.S.] homeland.”

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Even a few months ago, nuclear war still seemed passé, an artifact of the Cold War, or derided as a fading dream for neoconservatives who want any excuse to increase defense budgets and meddle abroad. Sometimes, however, reality takes a bite out of comfortable establishment nostrums. Such was the case yesterday, when the commander of NORAD, Adm. William Gortney, admitted what many in D.C. have been whispering for months, that North Korea now has an “operational” road-mobile long-range ballistic missile, the KN-08, and that Pyongyang has “the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the [U.S.] homeland.”

Thus, the fundamental goal of three U.S. administrations, to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power that can threaten the United States and its treaty allies, has utterly failed. Two decades of intensive, repeated negotiation have resulted in the polar opposite of what Washington wanted. The nuclear non-proliferation model has been cracked, if not broken, and America’s ultimate security guarantee, “extended deterrence,” will now be called into question even more by nervous allies in Asia, and elsewhere.

Adm. Gortney’s announcement, which senior officials have been inching toward over the past year, now raises two distinct problems for U.S. policymakers, completely separate from the question of whether or not Pyongyang would ever use one of its nuclear weapons.

First, it is time to accept that we are moving into a future of nuclear proliferation, and therefore the increased likelihood of a nuclear event, be it an accident or a conscious act of aggression. In short, America’s holiday from nukes since the end of the Cold War is now over. In addition to smaller nuclear states, great power nuclear competition may well heat up. With Russia and China, two adversarial regimes, modernizing and increasing their nuclear forces, Americans and their allies will have to become used to nuclear saber rattling once again, as shown by recent comments from Vladimir Putin.

Will nuclear blackmail become a standard tool of statecraft in the 21st century? If so, will we simply ignore it, or decide to be more cautious in pursuing our interests? How do we begin thinking again about the unthinkable, yet also learn new lessons that may well have little connection to those from the Cold War, when there were primarily two stable nuclear blocs? We face, instead, a far more fragmented and complex nuclear future, in which aggressive, destabilizing rogue regimes will have control over the world’s most powerful weapons. What strategy will ensure the safety of the American homeland, and does the administration’s plans to slightly modernize, yet draw down our nuclear capability still make sense in this new world?

The second problem is how to deter would-be nuclear regimes, most obviously Iran, when the playbook for gaining nuclear weapons has now been written and published by the North Koreans. Pyongyang is the canary in the coalmine for nuclear proliferators. The failure of negotiation, the unwillingness of the United States to take serious steps to prevent proliferation, the wishful thinking on the part of diplomats and leaders from both parties, has led us to the threshold of a world far more terrifying than anything we’ve faced in a long time. The repeated assurances of U.S. officials that we would never permit nor accept a nuclear North Korea now ring hollow around the world. It can only be a balm to Tehran to look at our record, and to judge that both time and more sophisticated negotiating strategies are on their side.

Pundits are fond of saying that “elections have consequences.” So do policy failures. The consequences of two lost decades that have allowed one of the world’s most evil regimes to gain the ultimate weapon could be unthinkable. It is a black mark against the comfortable belief that “a bad deal is better than no deal.” Such statements only reveal the poverty of thinking among those who do not show the imagination to see how quickly the world can change for the worse, and how the spillover effects of our misguided approaches can themselves cause far greater disruption than the particular policy failure itself.

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Repercussions from Bad Iran Deal Go Beyond Region

It’s become conventional wisdom—rightly—to assume that a bad Iran deal will unleash a cascade of proliferation across the region. Saudi Arabia has made no secret that it will purchase a nuclear weapon (or capability) should a deal confirm Iran’s nuclear-weapons capability. And if Saudi Arabia goes nuclear, then so too will Egypt and Turkey. But, as my American Enterprise Institute colleagues Dan Blumenthal and Ed Linczer have pointed out, the reverberations will go far beyond the region. Indeed, to look into the crystal ball on the Iran deal is simply to see North Korea today. North Korea often plays “Look at me” when it feels ignored or slighted. The Iran deal already appears far more generous than that offered to Pyongyang twenty years ago by the Clinton administration, and so it is natural that North Korea will now sabre-rattle in order to extract a far higher price than even that unwisely offered by Clinton two decades ago.

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It’s become conventional wisdom—rightly—to assume that a bad Iran deal will unleash a cascade of proliferation across the region. Saudi Arabia has made no secret that it will purchase a nuclear weapon (or capability) should a deal confirm Iran’s nuclear-weapons capability. And if Saudi Arabia goes nuclear, then so too will Egypt and Turkey. But, as my American Enterprise Institute colleagues Dan Blumenthal and Ed Linczer have pointed out, the reverberations will go far beyond the region. Indeed, to look into the crystal ball on the Iran deal is simply to see North Korea today. North Korea often plays “Look at me” when it feels ignored or slighted. The Iran deal already appears far more generous than that offered to Pyongyang twenty years ago by the Clinton administration, and so it is natural that North Korea will now sabre-rattle in order to extract a far higher price than even that unwisely offered by Clinton two decades ago.

The question is whether that will be a price the United States can afford. After all, Obama’s “pivot to Asia” has been rhetorical only; the U.S. Navy had more ships in the Pacific Ocean under President Jimmy Carter than it has in its entire arsenal today. And, while Iran’s ability to eradicate Israel is today merely theoretically, the South Korean capital Seoul is well within North Korean artillery range.

Secretary of State John Kerry may celebrate an agreement to reach an agreement. And, if that’s the only metric by which he judges international security, then he will have been successful. But if the goal was to prevent an Iranian nuclear breakout and to make the world safer, he has failed, and failed miserably.

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Iran Tests Obama’s Desperation Again

As the last weekend before the deadline for its nuclear talks with Iran wound down, administration sources were talking as if a deal was a foregone conclusion. But as they have throughout this process, Tehran’s agents decided to test President Obama’s desperation one more time. On Sunday, Iran’s deputy foreign minister Abbas Araqchi let slip that, contrary to the West’s expectations, the Islamist regime had no intention of agreeing to anything that would commit them to shipping their growing stockpile of enriched uranium out of the country. Reneging at the last minute on something they have previously committed to doing is a standard Iranian negotiating tactic. Though American officials are insisting that negotiations about this crucial point are continuing, the last-second switch was yet another telling moment in a dispiriting display of weak American diplomacy. Along with Iran’s ongoing refusal to reveal its military research program and reports about nuclear work in Syria and North Korea that may be conducted on behalf of the regime once sanctions are lifted, this news raises the question of just how much more will the U.S. have to concede to get Iran to sign on to anything?

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As the last weekend before the deadline for its nuclear talks with Iran wound down, administration sources were talking as if a deal was a foregone conclusion. But as they have throughout this process, Tehran’s agents decided to test President Obama’s desperation one more time. On Sunday, Iran’s deputy foreign minister Abbas Araqchi let slip that, contrary to the West’s expectations, the Islamist regime had no intention of agreeing to anything that would commit them to shipping their growing stockpile of enriched uranium out of the country. Reneging at the last minute on something they have previously committed to doing is a standard Iranian negotiating tactic. Though American officials are insisting that negotiations about this crucial point are continuing, the last-second switch was yet another telling moment in a dispiriting display of weak American diplomacy. Along with Iran’s ongoing refusal to reveal its military research program and reports about nuclear work in Syria and North Korea that may be conducted on behalf of the regime once sanctions are lifted, this news raises the question of just how much more will the U.S. have to concede to get Iran to sign on to anything?

The official U.S. response to the New York Times report about Iran reneging on exporting its nuclear fuel was hardly encouraging. Virtually all observers were under the impression that the West had secured Iran’s agreement on this point. Though there would still be plenty of room to cheat on a deal with such a provision in place, without it, the entire shaky edifice of the negotiations would collapse. Thus, when a “senior State Department official” said that, “Contrary to the report in The New York Times, the issue of how Iran’s stockpile would be disposed of had not yet been decided in the negotiating room, even tentatively,” that is hardly a sign that the situation is in hand. If Iran is still holding onto that crucial card with only hours before a deadline is supposed to expire, that’s a sign of enormous confidence on the part of Tehran’s negotiators that they have President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry just where they want them.

If Iran is planning on insisting on retaining their enriched uranium, all the confident talk coming out of the administration in recent months about a deal being the best way to ensure that the regime doesn’t get a bomb is exposed as patent falsehood. The Times hints, no doubt at the prompting of its helpful State Department sources, that a possible solution would be for the fuel remaining in Iran being kept in a diluted form. But we know that so long as it remains on Iranian soil and under its control, that stockpile could be easily converted back into material that can be used for a bomb.

As we noted last week, Iran’s refusal to fess up to its progress on possible military dimensions of its nuclear program is, in and of itself, a glaring weakness in any agreement since it means negotiators are operating in the blind about how close it may already be to a bomb. If that point is now apparently off the table as the West scrambles to try and persuade the Iranians not to gut what is left of an agreement that also doesn’t touch on their support for terror and missile program, there seems little hope that this agreement can be verified even in its weakened state. The West’s acquiescence to Iran continuing to operate centrifuges in its mountainside bunker at Fordow reduces even further the already slim chances that the deal can stand up to scrutiny.

It’s in that context that yesterday’s Washington Post article by Ali Alfoneh and Marc Ruel Gerecht about Iran hiding some of its nuclear work in North Korea and Syria must be viewed. Israel’s 2007 destruction of a Syrian nuclear reactor that was designed in North Korea and almost certainly an Iranian project eliminated one threat, but it did not foreclose the possibility that Tehran would continue to use this tripartite alliance of rogue regimes to further its nuclear ambitions. With the Assad regime now totally dependent on Iranian aid to survive in the current civil war, the prospect that Iran will use its Syrian ally to hide or store some of its nuclear work can’t be ignored. That’s especially true since U.S. intelligence—a vital aspect of compliance with any nuclear agreement—in both countries appears to be so poor.

But these obvious holes in the arguments buttressing support for the proposed deal are even more important when set beside Iran’s confidence that it can force Obama and Kerry to make even more concessions in the last hours of the talks rather than be forced to walk away with nothing. Indeed, the Islamist regime seems to be certain that there is almost nothing it could do or threaten that would be enough to scare off a U.S. negotiating team that cannot go home empty-handed.

If the Americans are not going to be tough about verification measures or the location of Iran’s nuclear stockpile now while the sanctions are still in place and there is yet a chance that the West might realize the current deal won’t actually stop Iran from getting a bomb, how much less likely will it be that the U.S. or its European allies will reimpose those economic restrictions once a nuclear pact is signed?

Iran knows this is the moment to pressure Obama to give up even more than the staggering concessions he has already made in the last two years. Having already failed to stand up to call Iran’s bluffs when all the leverage was on his side, what possible hope is there that he will do so when it is the ayatollahs that have him at a disadvantage?

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What South Africa Teaches Us About Suspect Nuclear Programs

Just as two decades ago in the run-up to the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, enthusiasm for a nuclear deal has trumped good sense and careful consideration about the implications of some of the concessions the White House was willing to make. Back in 1994, President Bill Clinton and his aides gave the South Korean president what might today be called “the Netanyahu treatment,” demonizing the leader of a democratic and pro-American country for having the temerity of raising concerns regarding how a rushed and ill-conceived diplomatic bargain cold undercut his own country’s security. At the same time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—which had just been burned when it emerged that Iraq had had a covert nuclear program despite 11 IAEA clean bills of health—began raising concerns that concessions which the Clinton administration negotiators had made with Pyongyang would make it impossible for the IAEA to do its job. Hindsight shows both the Seoul and the IAEA were right. The irony today is, of course, that Kerry has appointed to be his Iran negotiators some of the same individuals who brought us the Agreed Framework and, by extension, a North Korean nuclear arsenal.

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Just as two decades ago in the run-up to the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, enthusiasm for a nuclear deal has trumped good sense and careful consideration about the implications of some of the concessions the White House was willing to make. Back in 1994, President Bill Clinton and his aides gave the South Korean president what might today be called “the Netanyahu treatment,” demonizing the leader of a democratic and pro-American country for having the temerity of raising concerns regarding how a rushed and ill-conceived diplomatic bargain cold undercut his own country’s security. At the same time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—which had just been burned when it emerged that Iraq had had a covert nuclear program despite 11 IAEA clean bills of health—began raising concerns that concessions which the Clinton administration negotiators had made with Pyongyang would make it impossible for the IAEA to do its job. Hindsight shows both the Seoul and the IAEA were right. The irony today is, of course, that Kerry has appointed to be his Iran negotiators some of the same individuals who brought us the Agreed Framework and, by extension, a North Korean nuclear arsenal.

It is useful, however, to consider successful examples in which countries have abandoned their military nuclear programs. Libya is one example, of course. The late Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi agreed to abandon his nuclear program in 2003 against the backdrop first of the invasion of Iraq, and then Saddam’s capture. But, even then, American and international experts rushed around the clock to remove nuclear equipment and records in case the famously mercurial Qaddafi changed his mind. Obama has effectively voided six United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding a complete cessation of Iranian enrichment, and he has acceded to Iranian demands that enrichment occur inside Iran, rather than abroad, with a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for Iran’s plants.

South Africa is another example. After years of suspicion with regard to its nuclear intentions and, indeed, a weapons program, in 1991 South Africa agreed to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The IAEA moved in to assess South Africa’s compliance. In order to verify the completeness of South Africa’s declaration of inventory of nuclear material and facilities, the IAEA required more than two decades of past records into South Africa’s nuclear program. Ultimately, the organization was able to then trace and account for all nuclear material and verify that South Africa was in compliance.

Alas, Obama and Kerry have in effect acceded to Iran’s demand that transparency and accountability start only when a framework agreement is signed, and that there will be no requirement that Iran come clean about its past. In reality, however, the IAEA will need full and complete records going back to the mid-1980s when the Islamic Republic restarted its nuclear program. The IAEA is right to complain that it is being put in an impossible position because Kerry’s team is prioritizing imagery over substance. Rather than uphold South Africa’s nuclear negotiations as a model, Kerry is effectively allowing Iran to replicate the North Korea model, a model that Iranian nuclear negotiators have embraced. Alas, North Korea has already shown the world where that leads.

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Obama Must Explain Why the Iran Deal Isn’t North Korea Redux

As the Obama administration rushes into a nuclear deal with Iran, it pays to remember the last time the United States struck a deal with a rogue regime in order to constrain that state’s nuclear program and the aftermath of that supposed success.

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As the Obama administration rushes into a nuclear deal with Iran, it pays to remember the last time the United States struck a deal with a rogue regime in order to constrain that state’s nuclear program and the aftermath of that supposed success.

Bill Clinton had been president barely a month when North Korea announced that it would no longer allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, followed shortly thereafter by an announcement that it would withdraw from the NPT altogether within a matter of months. If Kim Il-sung expected Washington to flinch, he was right. The State Department aimed to keep North Korea within the NPT at almost any price. Chief U.S. negotiator Robert Gallucci and his aides explained in their book Going Critical, “If North Korea could walk away from the treaty’s obligations with impunity at the very moment its nuclear program appeared poised for weapons production, it would have dealt a devastating blow from which the treaty might never recover.” Unwilling to take any path that could lead to military action, Clinton’s team sought to talk Pyongyang away from nuclear defiance, no matter that talking and the inevitable concessions that followed legitimized Pyongyang’s brinkmanship.

As with President Obama relieving Iran of the burden of six United Nations Security Council resolutions which demanded a complete cessation of enrichment, Clinton’s willingness to negotiate North Korea’s nuclear compliance was itself a concession. After all, the 1953 Armistice required Pyongyang to reveal all military facilities and, in case of dispute, enable the Military Armistice Commission to determine the purpose of suspect facilities. By making weaker frameworks the new baseline, Clinton let North Korea off the hook before talks even began.

Just as Israeli (and Saudi and Emirati and Egyptian and Kuwaiti and Bahraini) leaders express frustration with the Obama administration regarding its naiveté and unwillingness to consult, so too did South Korea at the time chafe at Clinton’s arrogance. South Korean President Kim Young Sam complained to journalists that North Korea was leading America on and manipulating negotiators “to buy time.” And in a pattern that repeats today with regard to Iran, the IAEA held firmer to the demand that North Korea submit to real inspections than did Washington. The issue came to a head in September 1993 after the State Department pressured the IAEA to compromise on limited inspections.

In the face of Pyongyang’s defiance, Clinton was also wary that coercion could be a slippery slope to war. Just as President Obama and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel instructed U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf not to stand firm but rather to retreat if probed or pushed by Iran, Clinton sought to mollify Pyongyang, for example cancelling the joint U.S.–South Korea military exercise in 1994. Adding insult to injury, the Clinton administration criticized the South Korean government for being unwilling to compromise. Indeed, everything the Obama administration has done with regard to Israel over the past year—with the exception, perhaps, of the classless chickensh-t comment—was ripped right from the Clinton playbook two decades before when the White House sought to silence Seoul.

There followed months of baseless optimism in Washington, followed by disappointment quickly supplanted by denial. At one point, when it looked like Kim Il-sung’s intransigence might actually lead to war, former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang and, whether cleared to or not, made concessions which diffused the situation. It was the diplomatic equivalent of Obama’s voided redlines. Nightline host Ted Koppel observed on May 18, 1994, “this administration is becoming notorious … for making threats and then backing down.”

On July 8, 1994, a heart attack felled Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-il, his eldest son, took over. Negotiations progressed quickly. Gallucci and his team promised an escalating series of incentives—reactors, fuel oil, and other economic assistance. They kicked inspections of North Korea’s suspect plutonium sites years down the line.

What had begun as North Korean intransigence had netted Pyongyang billions of dollars in aid; it would go down in history as the largest reward for cheating and reneging on agreements until Obama granted Iran $11 billion in sanctions relief just for coming to the table. Columnist William Safire traced the steps of concessions on North Korea. “Mr. Clinton’s opening position was that untrustworthy North Korea must not be allowed to become a nuclear power,” he observed, but Clinton “soon trimmed that to say it must not possess nuclear bombs, and stoutly threatened sanctions if North Korea did not permit inspections of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, where the CIA and KGB agree nuclear devices have been developed. But as a result of Clinton’s Very Good Deal Indeed, IAEA inspectors are denied entry to those plants for five years.” And Sen. John McCain, for his part, lamented that Clinton “has extended carrot after carrot, concession after concession, and pursued a policy of appeasement based … on the ill-founded belief that North Koreans really just wanted to be part of the community of nations.” Again, the parallels between Clinton’s and Obama’s assumptions about the desire of enemies to reform were consistent.

Clinton wasn’t going to broker any criticism of what he believed was a legacy-defining diplomatic triumph, all the more so when the criticism came from abroad. On October 7, 1994, South Korean President Kim Young Sam blasted Clinton’s deal with the North, saying, “If the United States wants to settle with a half-baked compromise and the media wants to describe it as a good agreement, they can. But I think it would bring more danger and peril.” There was nothing wrong with trying to resolve the problem through dialogue, he acknowledged, but the South Koreans knew very well how the North operated. “We have spoken with North Korea more than 400 times. It didn’t get us anywhere. They are not sincere,” Kim said. His outburst drew Clinton’s ire. He became the Netanyahu of his day. Meanwhile, the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. Gallucci and his team were “exhilarated.” They later bragged they “had overcome numerous obstacles in the negotiations with the North; survived the intense, sometimes strained collaboration with Seoul and the International Atomic Energy Agency; and marshaled and sustained an often unwieldy international coalition in opposition to the nuclear challenge, all under close and often critical scrutiny at home.”

Today, by some estimates, North Korea is well on its way to having 100 nuclear weapons and is steadily developing the ballistic capability to deliver them. Iran’s nuclear negotiators have cited North Korea’s negotiating strategy as a model to emulate rather than an example to condemn. Meanwhile, Obama has relied on many of the same negotiators to advance his deal with Iran.

The State Department has never conducted a lessons learned exercise about what went wrong with the North Korea deal. Perhaps it’s time. Diplomatic responsibility and national security demand it.

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North Korea Evades More Sanctions While U.S. Pursues Yet More Talks

As the endgame for America’s nuclear negotiations with Iran looms, I hope that Washington is paying attention to the critical flaws in both its failed agreements with North Korea and the ineffective sanctions imposed on the country in response. I wrote in last month’s issue how Pyongyang has constantly outwitted the United States over the past two decades because the sole goal of the regime is to stay in power, and it therefore will do everything possible to buy time, hug the Americans close, undercut its commitments, and the like.

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As the endgame for America’s nuclear negotiations with Iran looms, I hope that Washington is paying attention to the critical flaws in both its failed agreements with North Korea and the ineffective sanctions imposed on the country in response. I wrote in last month’s issue how Pyongyang has constantly outwitted the United States over the past two decades because the sole goal of the regime is to stay in power, and it therefore will do everything possible to buy time, hug the Americans close, undercut its commitments, and the like.

Now comes news of yet another way that North Korea has evaded U.N.-imposed sanctions, by renaming and transferring the ownership of vessels of a shipping company targeted for illicit arms shipments. None of this should be a surprise, but it is further proof that sanctions are an imperfect tool, at best. Washington has repeatedly turned to sanctions as a way to express its displeasure with Pyongyang and in the hopes of putting enough pressure on the regime that it will eventually return to the negotiating table. With clear acquiescence, if not actual help, from China and Russia, among others, North Korea has been able to avoid serious repercussions for its actions and flout the international community.

The ingenuity of the Kim regime in finding ways around sanctions should be the primary case study for any future sanctions policy. Yet even as more information is made public about its continuing illicit activities, the Obama administration appears to be flirting with going down the primrose path of considering yet more negotiations. In this case, envoys of the White House have been holding talks with representatives from the North about having “talks about talks,” according to the Washington Post. “We want to test if they have an interest in resuming negotiations,” the Post reported an American official saying just this month. The North Koreans undoubtedly would welcome more talks, as that simply gives them more time to perfect their nuclear and ballistic-missile technology. With Washington caught in a dialogue dependency trap, unable to think outside the box and hoping against all experience for an outcome different from last time, expect more evasion and bad faith agreements in the future.

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Update the State Sponsor of Terrorism List

At the rate President Barack Obama is going, the State Sponsor of Terrorism list will be empty by the time he leaves office. Today, only Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria remain on the list, and Obama seems intent on having Secretary of State John Kerry remove Cuba within months. Nor is Cuba the only country which Obama seeks to remove. As Team Obama scrambles to find new incentives to keep Iran at the nuclear negotiating table, it’s likely that Obama will also seek Iran’s removal as part of any deal. Iranian officials have made clear they expect all sanctions to be lifted, and that includes those which kick in for being a designated state sponsor of terrorism. Does Iran support Hezbollah? Certainly. But all the discussion about Hezbollah being a Lebanese nationalist group which has weaned itself from its Iranian founders (never mind its involvement in Syria or its putsch in Beirut in 2008) set the stage for a sleight of hand.

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At the rate President Barack Obama is going, the State Sponsor of Terrorism list will be empty by the time he leaves office. Today, only Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria remain on the list, and Obama seems intent on having Secretary of State John Kerry remove Cuba within months. Nor is Cuba the only country which Obama seeks to remove. As Team Obama scrambles to find new incentives to keep Iran at the nuclear negotiating table, it’s likely that Obama will also seek Iran’s removal as part of any deal. Iranian officials have made clear they expect all sanctions to be lifted, and that includes those which kick in for being a designated state sponsor of terrorism. Does Iran support Hezbollah? Certainly. But all the discussion about Hezbollah being a Lebanese nationalist group which has weaned itself from its Iranian founders (never mind its involvement in Syria or its putsch in Beirut in 2008) set the stage for a sleight of hand.

And it is doubtful that Obama will seek to stigmatize Sudan, Darfur and Sudan’s increasing support for the Lord’s Resistance Army notwithstanding. Syria’s another call—but Obama seems to be pivoting to reconciling with Bashar al-Assad despite the brutality of the last four years. With both Khartoum and Damascus, Obama might also argue that whatever the brutality of the regimes, they have focused their repression inward and have not engaged in international terrorism. To reach such a conclusion would, of course, require cherry-picking Sudanese assistance with weapons transfers to Palestinian terrorists and Syrian-sponsored violence inside Lebanon.

Clearly, Obama is treating the State Sponsor of Terrorism list subjectively rather than objectively. To be fair, George W. Bush did likewise: The only reason why Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice removed North Korea from the list in 2008 was to try to jumpstart diplomacy in the hope that she could provide Bush with a foreign-policy success. North Korea was no more deserving of removal than Iran would be: While Bush administration officials insisted that Pyongyang had ceased its support for terror in the 1980s, the Congressional Research Service was reporting continued ties between North Korea on one hand, and both the Tamil Tigers and Hezbollah on the other.

In an ideal world, there would be no state sponsors of terror, but simply waving the diplomatic wand to remove states from the list does not end terror. Indeed, the whole purpose of designation is not to hamper diplomacy but to aid it: When states are listed on objective grounds, it provides diplomatic leverage to get them to reform.

Perhaps, then, it would be useful for the State Department not only to review those states on the list like Cuba and Iran which Obama wants removed, but also other states or entities whose recent behavior suggests they deserve inclusion.

Turkey is a clear example. There is ample evidence that Turkey has smuggled arms to Boko Haram, and there is also conclusive evidence that Turkey has also armed radical groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates and perhaps even ISIS in Syria.

Both Turkey and Qatar also overtly support Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. It may be diplomatically inconvenient to designate two U.S. allies but, then again, it should be even more inconvenient to have allies who are unrepentant sponsors of terrorist groups.

By any objective measure, Russia should also be considered a state sponsor of terrorism: Whether it is providing arms used to shoot down civilian jets, or simply providing arms to militias which indiscriminately shell civilian targets, it is clear that Russia does not abide by the rule of law.

And, of course, if the Palestinian Authority wishes to be treated as a state, one membership they deserve is designation as a terror sponsor. Despite the Oslo Accords and subsequent interim agreements, the Palestinian Authority simply has not kept its hand clean: offering salaries to convicted terrorists—men and women who fully acknowledge their role in attacks targeting civilians—is evidence enough.

While Cuba remains an autocratic, corrupt regime, it is debatable whether they still are an international terror sponsor. What is not debatable, however, is that Venezuela is. And, so long as Algeria continues to aid and support the Polisario Front almost 25 years after that Cold War relic agreed to a ceasefire with Morocco, then Algeria too deserves to be listed as a terror sponsor. Pakistan, too, for all its assistance to the Taliban and other radical Islamist groups. And North Korea’s brief interlude off the list should end so long as it continues its relationship with Hezbollah and Syria, for whom it apparently still digs tunnels and builds other underground facilities.

Let’s hope that one day there will be no need for a State Sponsor of Terrorism list. But let’s also acknowledge that that day has yet to come. Alas, a true State Sponsor of Terrorism list would not include just two or three countries, but perhaps a dozen. Diplomatic sleights-of-hand might be the bread and butter of the Obama administration and State Department more broadly, but pretending terrorism has no sponsors does not actually do anything to stop terrorism. Quite the contrary, it just convinces terror sponsors in Algiers, Ankara, Caracas, Doha, Islamabad, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Ramallah that they face no accountability for their actions.

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How to React to Algeria’s Diversion of Humanitarian Aid?

Within both the United States and Europe, foreign aid has become a feel-good operation more successful at creating jobs for bureaucrats and consultants in Washington and Brussels than in achieving real success among its targets. This shouldn’t surprise since so often the metric of success used by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is money spent rather than results achieved. A decade ago, for example, it emerged that 95 percent of the money which the United States spent to “fight” malaria in Africa was actually being spent on consultants, and only five percent was making it to Africa itself to counter Africa’s most deadly disease. Lots of malaria experts bought new cars, but it didn’t do the public health in Africa much good.

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Within both the United States and Europe, foreign aid has become a feel-good operation more successful at creating jobs for bureaucrats and consultants in Washington and Brussels than in achieving real success among its targets. This shouldn’t surprise since so often the metric of success used by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is money spent rather than results achieved. A decade ago, for example, it emerged that 95 percent of the money which the United States spent to “fight” malaria in Africa was actually being spent on consultants, and only five percent was making it to Africa itself to counter Africa’s most deadly disease. Lots of malaria experts bought new cars, but it didn’t do the public health in Africa much good.

For both the foreign or humanitarian aid industries, refugees have become a particular cash cow. The Palestinians have received more per capita in aid than any other people, but have little to show for it, except perhaps the inflated bank accounts of UNRWA officials and the tremendous mansions built by Palestinian politicians, from both Fatah and Hamas. And as for those with their hands out on behalf of their people? Let’s just say that Palestinian spokesmen like Hanan Ashrawi (a speech for whom I once handled while working at Yale University) don’t often fly economy class or stay at the Hampton Inn. The main victims of the refugee industry become the Palestinians themselves, who are used as diplomatic distractions and pawns for others’ enrichment.

Alas, the Palestinians are not alone. I have written before about the Tindouf refugees camps over which the Polisario Front and its self-styled “Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic” rules with an iron fist. Tens of thousands of Sahrawi refugees remain stranded in the desert with their voluntary return to Morocco prevented so that Algeria and the Polisario can profit off them. And almost a year ago, I wrote here how the Polisario Front and its Algerian backers were diverting and smuggling humanitarian aid.

Now it seems the European Union is catching on. Last month, Le Monde reported on a new report out of Brussels which confirms what has become obvious: Algeria has been actively colluding with the Polisario Front to divert international aid, using the remaining refugees as humanitarian pawns while enriching themselves. According to Le Monde, the diversion of humanitarian aid begins in the Algerian port of Oran, but assistance gets diverted along the almost 1,000-mile route into Tindouf. It’s really no different from how the North Koreans diverted food and fuel aid in the 1990s.

Alas, just as the State Department sought to bury talk of North Korean cheating, the Pentagon actually for a time thought it wiser to classify corruption rather than eliminate it, and the United Nations sought to bury investigation into its multi-billion-dollar oil-for-food corruption scheme, the European Commission is so far keeping its full report under wraps. In every case, the bureaucratic response is without fail to excuse corruption and protect the reputations of incompetent administrators even at the expense of helping those in need.

So what to do? The European Commission should release its full report. And, with proof of Algerian and Polisario embezzlement, it should also first demand restitution and reimbursement of the diverted funds—perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars over the years—from Algeria and, second, investigate and explain the failure of checks and balances that led the criminal scheme to continue for so long. Accountability should never be a dirty word. Foreign assistance should never be an entitlement, and it should never occur into perpetuity lest as with the cases of Tindouf, North Korea, and Gaza, it becomes an obstacle to conflict resolution rather than a solution to humanitarian crises.

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The U-2 Flies Again: The Pentagon Keeps the Dragon Lady

The Pentagon has released its budget request for 2016, and among the items being digested by the D.C.-based defense community is the reprieve of the storied U-2 spy plane. First built in 1955, the U-2 is, next to the B-52 bomber, the longest-lived airplane in the U.S. Air Force’s inventory. Today’s U-2s are dramatically modified from their original version, being larger and with far more sophisticated reconnaissance capabilities. Crucially, they offer greater flexibility than satellites. Plus, on balance, they still remain cheaper to operate than drones.

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The Pentagon has released its budget request for 2016, and among the items being digested by the D.C.-based defense community is the reprieve of the storied U-2 spy plane. First built in 1955, the U-2 is, next to the B-52 bomber, the longest-lived airplane in the U.S. Air Force’s inventory. Today’s U-2s are dramatically modified from their original version, being larger and with far more sophisticated reconnaissance capabilities. Crucially, they offer greater flexibility than satellites. Plus, on balance, they still remain cheaper to operate than drones.

These capabilities are what keep the Dragon Lady in the air. As I wrote in the Wall Street Journal last year, the military is actually relying more on the U-2 today than in the past. While the Air Force flip-flopped on keeping or retiring the U-2 fleet, top commanders have testified to its usefulness in an increasingly unstable world. The head of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula asserted that the U-2 right now is the best reconnaissance platform for use along the Demilitarized Zone, something even more important given the unpredictability of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un. Similarly, with NATO military commander Gen. Philip Breedlove now calling for supplying Ukrainian forces with defensive weapons in light of new Russian attacks in the east of that country, the U-2 can provide needed, real-time intelligence of Russian troop movements. The same could be said for keeping an eye on sudden developments in Libya or tracking conflict associated with groups like Boko Haram.

So, a bit of good news. Parts of the world continue to become more unstable, but for now, Washington will maintain one unique capability of keeping an eye on trouble spots. Whether that prevents more strategic surprise, let alone leads to better defense policy, is another matter, but stripping away part of our ability to know what’s going on in the world would have been a cause for alarm.

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Anti-Israel Feeling in Britain Reaching Dangerous Levels

Beyond Europe, the only country the British now dislike more than Israel is North Korea. That is the finding of a new survey by the foreign policy institute Chatham House. Even Iran is viewed more favorably than Israel. These findings come amidst a fraught debate over whether or not Britain is becoming more anti-Semitic. But because much of the British establishment and even significant sections of Britain’s Jewish community refuse to view anti-Israel feeling as synonymous with anti-Semitism, people are not taking this phenomenon nearly as seriously as they might one day wish they had.

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Beyond Europe, the only country the British now dislike more than Israel is North Korea. That is the finding of a new survey by the foreign policy institute Chatham House. Even Iran is viewed more favorably than Israel. These findings come amidst a fraught debate over whether or not Britain is becoming more anti-Semitic. But because much of the British establishment and even significant sections of Britain’s Jewish community refuse to view anti-Israel feeling as synonymous with anti-Semitism, people are not taking this phenomenon nearly as seriously as they might one day wish they had.

In all, 35 percent said they viewed Israel unfavorably, as opposed to 33 percent who felt negatively toward Iran (down from 45 percent in the previous survey), 21 percent for Saudi Arabia, 9 percent for Egypt, and 2 percent for Indonesia. These other figures are an indication of just how warped attitudes toward the Jewish state have become.

What relation, if any, this has with rising anti-Semitism is now a fiercely debated subject. Indeed, there are plenty who dispute the premise that anti-Semitism even is rising in Britain. Something of the confusion was recently expressed by Michael Portillo—formerly a senior Conservative party figure—who told the BBC that while he thought anti-Semitism had diminished in Britain, Jews were still being identified with the policies of Israel. And Israel, Portillo noted, is becoming increasingly unpopular, something which he also stressed he didn’t believe to be justified. But there we have the contradiction. People hating Jews because of an unjustified loathing of Israel is the new anti-Semitism.

Besides, mounting evidence shows direct anti-Semitism is indeed on the rise. By the middle of 2014, British Jews had witnessed a 400 percent increase in the number of anti-Semitic incidents compared to the previous year. And then there are the opinion surveys. One carried out at the beginning of this year by the European Jewish Congress found that 15 percent of young Brits approved of the idea that Jews should be forced to carry special identification and that Jewish businesses should be marked. A similar number said they needed more evidence to be convinced the Holocaust had happened. Another survey, this one commissioned by the Campaign Against Anti-Semitism, found that half of British people agreed with at least one of several anti-Semitic statements put before them.

There has been some recognition of this problem by the government—which has stepped up policing in Jewish areas—as well as by the media, even while no shortage of Jewish voices loudly insist that what is plainly happening in fact isn’t. But there are also other voices who would blame the Jewish state for causing this growing hostility toward British Jews. On Holocaust Memorial Day (no less) Britain’s chief rabbi was asked three times by Sky News reporter Adam Boulton whether Israeli policy was contributing to anti-Semitism in the UK. It is lost on people like Boulton that in a previous era they would have been asking the rabbi if it was not Jewish dishonesty in business, or their disloyalty to the host nation, that was in fact contributing to anti-Semitism.

Today Britain seems to be full of people who in one breath insist they oppose anti-Semitism wholeheartedly, only to then demonize Israel mercilessly in the next. One wonders if in 1930s Germany it was possible to find people who maintained they didn’t wish to see Jews mistreated, but endorsed the Nuremburg Race Laws nonetheless. During this week’s House of Lords debate on Palestinian statehood the now infamous Baroness Jenny Tonge complained that “critics” of Israel such as herself are often labelled anti-Semitic. However, the baroness swiftly proceeded to make a number of anti-Semitic assertions in the very same speech. Not only did she claim that injustices against Palestinians “sowed the seeds of Islamic fundamentalism” so putting all of us at risk, but she also urged Jewish leaders to condemn Israel so as to spare their community from suffering the same hatred Israel now receives. And what if they don’t? What if they continue to support Israel? Is the implication then that they deserve everything they get?

The more of this discourse one listens to the more apparent it becomes that anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism have not only become inseparably tangled, but worse still the two are perpetuating one another. As a result, 45 percent of British Jews say they fear Jews don’t have a future in Britain. Among those who say they are considering leaving is the actress Maureen Lipmann, yet some in her own community have labelled her an alarmist. Indeed, Jewish talk show host Esther Rantzen and the Guardian writer David Conn have even suggested that British Jews are being ungrateful with all their talk of anti-Semitism and thoughts of leaving.

To be sure, Britain is not France. Not yet, at least. But to avoid that, those who care must start saying unequivocally that demonization of Israel is the most dangerous form of anti-Semitism in the world today. Furthermore, it is time to recognize that Israel advocacy in Britain and Europe has failed. The only thing left to be done is to stop apologizing for Israel defending herself and to instead put those doing the attacking under the spotlight. If exposed to the full horror of Israel’s Islamist enemies, there are still many fair-minded people in Britain who could be persuaded to see things differently.

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Thinking Long Term on North Korea

Pyongyang is spluttering with predictable outrage over the sanctions announced last week by President Obama in retaliation for the hack attack on Sony, claiming it had nothing to do with the huge data breach.

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Pyongyang is spluttering with predictable outrage over the sanctions announced last week by President Obama in retaliation for the hack attack on Sony, claiming it had nothing to do with the huge data breach.

Obama is to be commended for sticking to his guns in the face of considerable skepticism that North Korea really was responsible. Suffice to say this is one of those issues where anyone who does not have access to the U.S. government’s most secret intelligence cannot opine with any degree of certainty. But I am struck by the unanimity and certainty expressed by the U.S. intelligence community in attributing the attack to North Korea, which suggests that the spooks have some highly classified clue pointing the finger of blame at Pyongyang.

In terms of how to respond, the sanctions announced last week are a good start, but only a start.

The sanctions target 10 North Korean government officials and three organizations involved in arms sales abroad. The administration should also move to put North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, from which it was prematurely removed by President Bush during his futile attempts to strike a nuclear deal with the North.

The Senate should also get into the act by passing legislation sponsored by Rep. Ed Royce, which has already passed the House, to tighten financial sanctions on the North. We constantly hear that there is little that can be done to ratchet up sanctions on North Korea any more, but that’s not true: Sanctions are much tighter on Iran than on North Korea. The Royce bill will go a considerable way toward rectifying this puzzling disparity.

In the final analysis, beyond sanctions, the real solution to the North Korean threat lies in peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. That won’t happen overnight but it is a goal that the U.S. should dedicate itself to–as urged by the noted North Korea watcher, my friend Sue Mi Terry, and more recently by my boss, Richard Haass. If President Obama truly wants the right answer not just to the cyber-attack but to other North Korean outrages, this is it: Come up with a strategy to hasten the eventual implosion of Communist North Korea, the worst human-rights violator on the planet, and the creation of a single, democratic, unified Korean state.

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Why Was North Korea Removed from the Terrorism List?

I’ve been offline for about two weeks because of work-related travel, and so I wasn’t able to chime in on the debate with regard to North Korea and its alleged hacking of Sony. But, while according to news reports, there are still questions about the degree of Pyongyang’s culpability, the incident—and revelations about the extent to which North Korea has developed it cyber-terrorism capabilities—should be cause for reflection about just why North Korea was removed from the state sponsor of terrorism list in the first place. It’s an episode I cover in my book about the history of American diplomacy with rogue regimes, and it doesn’t reflect well on the George W. Bush administration in general, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in particular. But, against the backdrop of the rush to normalize relations with Cuba, lift sanctions, and remove that communist dictatorship from the state sponsor of terrorism list, it’s useful to reflect on how putting diplomatic ambition and legacy above reality really can hurt American national security.

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I’ve been offline for about two weeks because of work-related travel, and so I wasn’t able to chime in on the debate with regard to North Korea and its alleged hacking of Sony. But, while according to news reports, there are still questions about the degree of Pyongyang’s culpability, the incident—and revelations about the extent to which North Korea has developed it cyber-terrorism capabilities—should be cause for reflection about just why North Korea was removed from the state sponsor of terrorism list in the first place. It’s an episode I cover in my book about the history of American diplomacy with rogue regimes, and it doesn’t reflect well on the George W. Bush administration in general, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in particular. But, against the backdrop of the rush to normalize relations with Cuba, lift sanctions, and remove that communist dictatorship from the state sponsor of terrorism list, it’s useful to reflect on how putting diplomatic ambition and legacy above reality really can hurt American national security.

At any rate, the story of North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list dates back to 2006. American forces were mired in Iraq, Bush’s popularity was plummeting, and so Rice decided to seize upon North Korea to try to secure a positive legacy for Bush. In November 2006, Rice and Christopher Hill, her point man for the Korean peninsula, offered to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the Trading with the Enemy Act, scrapping the Clinton team’s demand that North Korea provide a written guarantee that it had ceased terrorism, would acquiesce to international agreements for combating terrorism, and would address its past terrorism.

It’s useful to remember just why North Korea was on the list in the first place. First of all, there were multiple bombings in the 1980s—of a South Korean passenger plane and of a mausoleum in Burma in which multiple South Korean officials were holding a ceremony. But shouldn’t there be an expiration date on past terrorism? For the sake of argument, let’s say Rice should let bygones be bygones, and that states should fall off the terror sponsorship list after remaining clean for a period of time. Alas, North Korea never passed this test either. For purely political reasons, Rice’s State Department attested that Pyongyang had not sponsored terrorism since 1987. Information available to the U.S. government and chronicled by the Congressional Research Service, however, suggested the opposite. Sources in France, Japan, South Korea, and Israel alleged robust North Korean involvement with both Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Ali Reza Nourizadeh, a London-based Iranian reporter close to Iran’s reformist camp, described North Korean assistance in the design of underground Hezbollah facilities, assertions backed by a diverse array of reporting. These tunnels allowed Hezbollah to shield rockets from Israeli surveillance prior to the 2006 war and to evade Israeli strikes during it. Chung-in Moon, a professor at South Korea’s Yonsei University, has reported allegations that Hezbollah missiles included North Korean components.

North Korean efforts to aid the Tamil Tigers were more blatant. While that group was subsequently eliminated from the face of the earth by the Sri Lankan military, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported in 2000 that North Korea had supplied the Tamil Tigers with weaponry, and the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism made similar claims over the next three years. How sad it was that the State Department’s clean bill of health for North Korea was so readily contradicted by information the State Department had gathered, vetted, and compiled. Meanwhile, three times between October 2006 and March 2007, the Sri Lankan navy intercepted cargo ships flying no flag or identifying marker and found them to be carrying North Korean arms. For Rice and, by extension George W. Bush, however, diplomacy outweighed intelligence reality.

Rice’s drive to remove North Korea from the terrorism list for purely diplomatic reasons also had repercussions on allies. North Korea’s refusal to come clean about its kidnappings of Japanese citizens had long been an irritant and was also a major factor in its initial listing. It is certainly true that Pyongyang had started to come around: In 2004, the regime returned five surviving abductees of the ten it eventually admitted seizing, but the Japanese government believes that Pyongyang’s agents had actually kidnapped eighty Japanese citizens. For North Korea, why take a full step, when a half step—or even an eighth of a step—would suffice? And Pyongyang guessed right. Rice pressured Tokyo to tone down its objections and told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that the White House was under no obligation to classify the kidnappings as terrorism. As so often happens in the State Department, appeasing an enemy had trumped honoring allies.

Well, with sleight of hand, Rice had removed obstacles to further normalization with North Korea. It was full speed ahead on efforts to bring a comprehensive settlement to the North Korea problem. In January 2007, Hill met with top North Korean diplomat Kim Kye Gwan. Their discussions and agreements culminated the next month in a two-phase six-party agreement, which the White House celebrated as a “very important first step.” In the first sixty-day phase, North Korea would freeze its nuclear program. A second phase—for which no time frame was set—would have North Korea disable its nuclear facilities and disclose all nuclear activities.

Hill’s triumph was, in reality, a major step down: the agreement allowed North Korea to keep its nuclear weapons. For Kim Jong-il, it was a complete victory, capped off by the repatriation of laundered money frozen in a Macau bank. John Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, was blunt in his condemnation of the deal, saying, “It sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world: ‘If we hold out long enough, wear down the State Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded.’” True to form, however, the New York Times, praised the agreement without equivocation, famously suggesting that the State Department’s rule of thumb on any initiative should be to ask, “What would Chris Hill do?” If American policymakers took their cues from the New York Times editorial page, however, Ronald Reagan never would have pushed the Soviet Union over the precipice to economic collapse, hundreds of million more people would be living under dictatorships, and Cuba would be more the norm than the exception in the hemisphere.

Rice may have wanted a ‘Hail Mary pass’ to change Bush’s legacy, but the only thing she achieved was to soil it. As recent actions and revelations suggest, North Korea never reformed. It pocketed its concessions, and doubled down on both its terror capabilities and nuclear program. Back to Cuba: Simply pumping money into the Cuban economy and encouraging tourism does not bring change: after all, Raul Castro and the Cuban military largely control the hotels and other tourist infrastructure: the hard currency gained disproportionately will benefit Cuba’s infrastructure of terror and repression.

The lesson to be learned as Obama tried to repeat history with regard to Cuba? White-washing rogue regimes is never an American interest, and magic wands do not change the nature of rogue regimes: only regime change does. Europeans might always subordinate principle and freedom to a quick buck, but America should mean more. The United States should have the wherewithal to outlast a country like Cuba. Cuba needs America far more than America needs Cuba, and politicians in both Washington and Havana should never forget that.

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Vandalism or Terror, North Korea is Obama’s Responsibility

In an interview on CNN’s “State of the Nation,” President Obama set off a minor controversy by referring to the North Korean cyber attack on Sony Pictures as an act of “cyber vandalism” rather than one of “cyber terrorism.” That argument as well as the one about whether the president was right to criticize Sony for backing down in the face of threats of violence and further hacking are not as important as to what counter-measures the U.S. is taking today to ensure that this crime doesn’t happen again. With reports that the North Korean Internet is currently out of service, it’s not clear whether this is due to a U.S. response or the Communist regime’s own defensive actions. But no matter what we’re calling what happened to Sony, the main point to be gleaned from these events is that this is no longer a matter of a private business deciding how to deal with a crime. From the moment that the U.S. government named North Korea as the perpetrator, this issue is President Obama’s responsibility to address and decisively fix.

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In an interview on CNN’s “State of the Nation,” President Obama set off a minor controversy by referring to the North Korean cyber attack on Sony Pictures as an act of “cyber vandalism” rather than one of “cyber terrorism.” That argument as well as the one about whether the president was right to criticize Sony for backing down in the face of threats of violence and further hacking are not as important as to what counter-measures the U.S. is taking today to ensure that this crime doesn’t happen again. With reports that the North Korean Internet is currently out of service, it’s not clear whether this is due to a U.S. response or the Communist regime’s own defensive actions. But no matter what we’re calling what happened to Sony, the main point to be gleaned from these events is that this is no longer a matter of a private business deciding how to deal with a crime. From the moment that the U.S. government named North Korea as the perpetrator, this issue is President Obama’s responsibility to address and decisively fix.

Whatever one might think of what seemed, at least at first, as an act of cowardice on the part of the film company, to withdraw the movie at the heart of this story, one primary fact should be acknowledged. It is not President Obama’s job to decide what films get produced in this country or whether they will be shown in theaters, on DVD or the Internet. But it is the government’s job to protect American citizens and businesses from criminal attacks by foreign governments.

We don’t know exactly what the United States is doing to retaliate against North Korea or to forestall future attacks. Nor should we. Let us hope that whatever is going on today, President Obama should be taken at his word when he says that the U.S. will respond at a time and in a manner of its own choosing. But whatever orders have been given, the dustup over the difference “vandalism” and “terror” is one that deserves a little more attention.

Some liberals are pushing back hard against figures like Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham for calling for stern measures against North Korea. This has given rise to a meme in which the left has abandoned its erstwhile Hollywood allies and urged caution in any response to North Korea and heaped scorn on conservatives they say never pass up an opportunity to call for “war.”

But as some in the entertainment industry now realize, even if you didn’t like George W. Bush or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the words “national security” can take on a whole new and very important meaning if you perceive that your government isn’t defending you against a hostile foreign power.

Make no mistake about it. Though the argument over Obama’s comments can be perceived as one of semantics rather than substance, if the U.S. government treats what happened to Sony as the moral equivalent of someone drawing graffiti on their walls of their corporate headquarters rather than act of terror against a U.S. target, it is making a critical mistake.

Prior to the Internet age, acts of war or terror by foreign powers and other international actors were easily understood as consisting of physical attacks on persons and property or invasions of territory. But in our day, attacks on the United States don’t only consist of events such as the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the 9/11 atrocities. While the hacking of a corporations online presence and emails is not to be compared to those horrific events, it must also be understood that when a sovereign nation is using the tools of the Internet to interfere with an American company on American soil, then it has crossed a clear line and taken an action that truly provides a casus belli for actions by the U.S. government. In other words, no matter what you call it, it is time for the U.S. to behave in such a manner as to make North Korea fear to ever trespass again on American freedoms.

Stopping or punishing North Korea from carrying out acts of terror won’t be easy. Thanks to the diplomatic failures of the Clinton and Bush administrations, North Korea is, at the very least, a threshold nuclear power. It is also already so isolated and its economy so backward that sanctions will have even less impact on its despotic and brutal government than those on its rogue partners like Iran. But it is nevertheless the responsibility of the president and his national security team to find a way to make Pyongyang pay dearly for its chutzpah. We shouldn’t prejudge those efforts before we know what is planned or actually happening. But this isn’t Sony’s fight or event that of Hollywood. Unless the U.S. is able to hit North Korea or at least scare it enough to ensure that this never happens again, no American should feel safe.

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Can Obama Learn to Punish Tyrants Instead of Rewarding Them?

By publicly fingering North Korea as the culprit behind the Sony hack attack, the FBI has put President Obama in a quandary: What to do about this cyber-attack which has caused grave damage to the American subsidiary of a prominent Japanese company?

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By publicly fingering North Korea as the culprit behind the Sony hack attack, the FBI has put President Obama in a quandary: What to do about this cyber-attack which has caused grave damage to the American subsidiary of a prominent Japanese company?

Leaks out of the White House are that the “principals committee” composed of senior Cabinet-level officials has been meeting to formulate a response. Given the track record of this administration, that means a decision could be forthcoming in a few months, or maybe not at all. All that we’ve seen so far is President Obama’s bland statement today that Sony made a “mistake” in pulling “The Interview” from theaters, which is hardly a suitable response to a humiliating retreat in the face of North Korean aggression.

I know it’s probably expecting too much from this president, but it would be nice if just once he would act decisively instead of talking a good game and setting red lines that can be crossed with impunity. What would constitute decisive action in this case? The obvious proportional response–attack North Korea’s computer networks–isn’t very satisfying for a couple of reasons. First North Korea simply doesn’t have a lot of computer networks; it is one of the most disconnected countries on earth. Second, as someone in the government has (unwisely) leaked to the Wall Street Journal, what few networks it has are monitored for intelligence by the US.

So what does that leave? More sanctions. In 2007, recall, the North Korean regime went bonkers when the Treasury Department issued sanctions against the Banco Delta Asia, a small bank in Macao where some $25 million in North Korean assets was held. Pyongyang demanded that those sanctions be lifted and that North Korea be taken off the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism before it would continue talks over its nuclear program. Under the unwise guidance of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her chief North Korean negotiator, Chris Hill, President George W. Bush lifted the sanctions on Bando Delta Asia and took North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

With its attack on Sony, North Korea has shown for the umpteenth time why it deserves to be placed on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, a unilateral move that President Obama could take right now. Congress should also pass and Obama vow to sign legislation introduced by Rep. Ed Royce that would tighten general financial sanctions on the North Korean regime. There is a general perception that there isn’t much more to be done on the sanctions front, but that’s not true–North Korea still has money in foreign banks and it still relies on some dealings with the international financial system to stay afloat. Those lifelines need to be snipped pronto.

North Korea needs to understand there will be a cost for its cyber-aggression, just as Russia needs to understand there will be a cost for its physical aggression in Ukraine. That is not something this administration has been very good at–it is better at outreach to despotic regimes such as Iran and Cuba than it is to punishing them for misbehavior–but that’s a failing that Obama still has time to change if he wants to correct the general perception of foreign policy weakness that dogs his administration.

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